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TOLKIEN AND THE FELLOWSHIP OF ALL LIVING THINGS
THE POLITICS OF PROXIMITY, PERSON AND PLACE

1 Introduction
Tolkien seems to strike a chord with people. A few of my school friends were Tolkien fanatics and would talk endlessly on the way home about scenes, characters and events in The Lord of the Rings. I had never read the book, so had no idea who this strangely named character Bilbo Baggins was. And was so bored with what seemed a Tolkien cult I was never concerned to find out. Recent times have seen the hugely popular Peter Jackson Lord of the Rings films, subtitled The Fellowship of the Ring (2001), The Two Towers (2002) and The Return of the King (2003). Then there is the prequel The Hobbit, is a three-part cinematic adaptation by Jackson of Tolkien's classic fantasy novel of the same name. I have to admit, I’m not much of a film or TV buff. I’ve not seen any of these. Let’s just say that Tolkien is popular and that his stories and characters are familiar to many.

My world is the world of words. I would hope that Tolkien’s popularity on screen could extend to an active exploration of his ideas and values so as to feed the imagination and strengthen the resolve of the ‘little folk’ as they confront the big powers that govern the world. In these trying times, Tolkien’s words on ‘fighting the long defeat’ are pertinent and endlessly inspiring. Tolkien gives us no false promises of success or progress, but a ‘hope without guarantees.’ And he inspires us to face up to the challenge of fighting the long defeat, for no other reason than that is the right thing to do if we are to live authentically in being what we are. He also holds out the hope that, in coming together, in the little acts of love and kindness and solidarity, we gain ‘glimpses of final victory.’ Tolkien is good at giving these little glimpses. 
I share Tolkien’s ‘hope without guarantees.’ There is currently a lot of discussion taking place with respect to what it takes to motivate people to act at the moment. The best book I have read here is by Per Espen Stoknes, What We Think About When We Try Not To Think About Global Warming: Toward a New Psychology of Climate Action (2015). How can we link our knowledge of facts and events with our behaviour and actions? What is the moral or psychological spring of action that connects knowing about things to acting upon that knowledge via values, motivations etc? Why has the campaign to get the public on board with regard to climate change failed? (http://pcritchley2.wixsite.com/beingandplace/single-post/2016/08/10/Why-has-the-campaign-to-get-the-public-on-board-with-regard-to-climate-change-failed (​http:​/​​/​pcritchley2.wixsite.com​/​beingandplace​/​single-post​/​2016​/​08​/​10​/​Why-has-the-campaign-to-get-the-public-on-board-with-regard-to-climate-change-failed​))

Tolkien makes for interesting reading with respect to addressing the question of the motivational economy in light of the environmental crisis. Tolkien expresses environmental concern as a moral concern. His ‘environmentalism’ was developed many years before environmentalism emerged as a social and political movement, and it would be hard to know how precisely the two could be run together. Tolkien’s environmentalism is really a Christian stewardship. That’s not incompatible with environmentalism as a political and social movement – it’s just that it would be wrong to read Tolkien in these terms. Indeed, many would consider the man and his ideas to be nostalgic, reactionary even, not merely anti-technological but anti-modern. There would seem to be little here for left-liberal Greens to enthuse over, and plenty to be concerned about. But broad brush generalisations serve to obscure and divert. 

Tolkien saw the impacts of industrialisation and urbanisation upon the world he loved, and he didn’t like them, criticising them as forces that drew us increasingly away from the right way of relating to each other and to the world. I think his emphasis on face-to-face interaction, social connection and the proximate awareness of people and place is one that people will warm to in an age of electronic distraction, hyper-reality and mobility. The tyranny of abstraction that Tolkien feared so much has come about and has brought us to a situation in which global problems require global solutions beyond local organisation and action. To overcome the impersonal violence of abstract systems, we the little people of the world have no option but to think big and act big. I argue strongly for concerted and effective action in that respect. And that risks the accusation of being a ‘globalist’ complicit in the very abstraction that is emptying the world of meaning and substance. Having unleashed collective forces of substantial environmental impact upon the world, we have no option but to take action at an appropriate level. Withdrawing to local modes of thought, action and organisation would merely amount to a collective impotence in face of destructive external forces. But I’ll keep on arguing that, to succeed, large scale ambitious projects of environmental action need to be grounded in small-scale reasoning, communities of practice and love of place – oikophilia, a Hobbit like existence in which the ordinary actions of the ‘little people’ knit communities together and create the warm and affective bonds between us, moving people from within. Through forms of the common life, individuals come to join together as a “we,” forming a collective identity so that all the discrete, separated “I’s” of an atomised market society take active shape as an “us.” Through social proximity and warm, affective bonds and ties, the character and identity is formed that makes people prepared to act to defend the places and persons they love and value. It’s from that social and moral-psychological infrastructure that the motivation to act comes from. And that’s the source of an active hope. 

I develop these themes throughout this piece on Tolkien. It’s a personal statement on my part, in the sense that, above and beyond the reporting, communication and education on climate change, science, politics, policy and solutions, I argue for the life that is simple in means but rich in ends - material sufficiency and virtuous action within right relationships. That’s a vision of living sufficiently, and amply. And that is well within the reach of all of us. I just potter away in my little community, engaging in solidary exchange, creating bonds and links. We need the facts and figures and the right policies and policy framework. And we need large-scale thought and action to address what is a ‘global’ problem. My deep concern, though, is that the ‘big’ and the ‘small’ be held together so as to avoid opening up a democratic deficit when it comes to climate action. To be more than an international rescue squad – and I recognise that the crisis may well be so great as to require precisely this kind of large-scale rescue - we do not need a top-down eco-authoritarianism of philosopher-kings. We need an environmentalism that gives the ‘little folk’ a material and moral stake in the ecological society to come. If we are Hobbits at heart, in our authentic being, then cultivating the moral and social infrastructures of that being will suffice; in acquiring the appropriate habits, we will develop the motivation to act and won’t stand in need of persuasion by way of clever psychological stratagems; nor will we need to be organised and directed by smartly designed and executed strategies and projects.

And here, within this habitus, we see how that the protagonists in the Lord of the Rings come to put everything on the line, their lives and futures, throwing themselves, whole heart and soul, into the struggle. And they do this because everything they hold dear is at stake, the people and places they love, everything they hold true and know to be right. They long to preserve these things and are prepared to sacrifice themselves for their protection. That’s some love. That’s a love with roots that have struck deep in soil and soul. (To take the title of a fine book by Alastair McIntosh, Soil and Soul: People Versus Corporate Power, 2001). That’s the love that impels Boromir to courageously fight off hordes of orcs in an attempt to protect two young hobbits captured and carried off by orcs. We see it again in King Theoden’s seemingly hopeless charge at the Battle of the Pelennor Fields. 

“Little hope there is of  living out this night.” “Perhaps,” said a new, rather gruff voice. “But we shall fight and die as men of Rohan.” 
“They say that it is hopeless.” “There is always hope.”
“There is always hope. The words rang in my head and seemed to give me a vital strength…”
“There is always hope, I told myself silently. Hope for Rohan; even if we die, even if the fortress is taken. Somehow, there is hope.”

That’s the hope I was referring to earlier, the ‘hope without guarantees.’ It is the hope we need in order to address the crisis in the climate system and the way in which it will impact upon the environment. “Rarely have we discussed the worst case,” says Penn State professor and glaciologist Richard Alley with respect to climate change. But the worst case may not happen. “Don’t give up hope,” Alley says, pointing to possibilities of political as well as behavioural changes keeping up with what the science is telling us. “I really believe that.” Expect the worst, hope for the best, do what you can, do what is right, and the future will be here soon enough.

Glaciologist warns that rapidly melting ice sheets could submerge Cape
http://www.capecodtimes.com/news/20170727/glaciologist-warns-that-rapidly-melting-ice-sheets-could-submerge-cape (​http:​/​​/​www.capecodtimes.com​/​news​/​20170727​/​glaciologist-warns-that-rapidly-melting-ice-sheets-could-submerge-cape​)

These comments beg the question as to the source of Tolkien’s hope, his faith in the little folk, his belief that the small deeds of small hands would be repaid and could even succeed in turning the machine world around. What is the source of these ordinary acts of kindness and love in fighting the long defeat, but which nevertheless yield glimpses of final victory?

Tolkien, as I shall show, offers us a profoundly religious truth grounded in the hope and promise of transcendent justice. As he wrote: ‘The birth, death and resurrection of Jesus means that one day, everything sad will come untrue.’

In our common experiences and struggles, in the events we share together as we fight to defend the places and people we love and value, we get those ‘glimpses of final victory.’ And those glimpses inspire us to fight on, regardless of the odds against us. And this fight is one that is undertaken by the weak, the humble and the small, not great heroes armed with vast resources, tools, high intelligence, plans, and strategies… That’s a power game played by those already possessing central power, or those aiming to win and monopolise such power for themselves. In countering this ‘realist’ – and divisive – conception of politics, Gandalf speaks for all the little folk out there, which is all of us at work as citizens in the everyday public life of the community:





Tolkien writes disparagingly of ‘the inevitable fate that awaits all attempts to defeat evil power by power.’ (31 July 1947, letter 109). 

Tolkien plainly has no time for the ‘men as gods’ thesis, the thesis which holds that through scientific advance, technological innovation, industrial expansion and self-legislating reason, human beings could come to be masters of the world. Gandalf again, giving voice to words which point to the kind of eco-citizenship the world today is crying out for:

‘Yet it is not our part to master all the tides of the world, but to do what is in us for the succour of those years wherein we are set, uprooting the evil in the fields that we know, so that those who live after may have clean earth to till. What weather they shall have is not ours to rule.’

Gandalf in The Return of the King, The Last Debate

That’s the environmentalism of Tolkien that I shall set out in the pages that follow. It is firmly grounded in a moral ecology of the good.

This appreciation of Tolkien is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive, more a series of essays around the central theme of the problems and paradoxes of Modernity, particularly with respect to threats of a moral and ecological unravelling. That is the explicit purpose of the book, not an extensive treatment of Tolkien’s work. This is not a book for those who are not interested in that theme, and who just want to read about Tolkien. I am concerned with the ills of the contemporary age, and seek to foster an environmental vision and sensibility for the times to come. And I am concerned to demonstrate what Tolkien offers us in this regard – which is plenty. In that sense, the book has commonalities with Defending Middle Earth: Tolkien: Myth and Modernity by Patrick Curry (2004). Curry highlights the ecological aspects of Tolkien’s vision, emphasising three aspects of his work: ‘The Shire: Culture, Society and Politics’, ‘Middle-Earth: Nature and Ecology’, and ‘The Sea: Spirituality and Ethics.’ Where Curry is deficient is in his downplaying of the Christian underpinnings of Tolkien’s work. I don’t want to make the opposite error of overplaying the religious character of Tolkien’s writing, but I do give it the prominence it deserves. It is not a secondary or coincidental aspect of his vision, but central. But, as I shall show, its power lies in being so understated, working through the fabric of the work, rather than being imposed by some towering philosophical edifice of intellectual propositions and moral imperatives. OK, Tolkien declared The Lord of the Rings to be a pre-eminently Catholic work. But what changes if one and all are made to accept the truth of that statement? I see no gain. I can only see a heavy-handed religiosity coming to do damage by getting in the way of the message, and forcing people to debate the rights and wrongs of the moral underpinning. The same with attempts to translate Tolkien’s themes back into religious sources – in the end, we will find that the literary ecology has disappeared and given way to … theology. That’s fine for theologians, and those interested in such things. And it has an important role to play. But purpose of this work is different.

Another thing to be cautious of is the politics. This is treacherous ground indeed. Tolkien disliked allegory and warned against allegorical readings of his work. I’m not sure how we can avoid such interpretations – other than by ignoring Tolkien altogether and leaving his books alone, without spelling out the meaning by way of referring to anything going on in the world. Or just read Tolkien for his fine story-telling, which is fair enough. For good or ill, laying myself open to charges of pressing Tolkien into doing service on in furtherance of my own pet interests, I’ve indicated the pertinence of key themes in Tolkien to the various problems that afflict the contemporary age. I don’t think I’ve been too outrageous in taking liberties in this respect. I take Tolkien not just to be spinning stories for their own sake, but to be telling stories about something and for some purpose. There is a philosophy underpinning his story, and I think we are entitled to draw upon it in making sense of our world. I think what Tolkien says offers us plenty in these troubled times.

Allegorical readings, certainly those made through political filters, have generated a whole heap of trouble. Tolkien has been accused of being an imperialist, a nationalist, a racist, and a fascist. Misreadings and misinterpretation of myth and fantasy can keep the accusations going for as long as there are political axes to grind in the world, which will be forever. The charges are nonsense. But the danger works both ways. An allegorical reading can enlist Tolkien into favourable political causes too – favourable depending on your political perspective, of course. I have my own political interests, and they will be made clear throughout. I don’t claim that Tolkien is on my side of the political divide, he isn’t. But I share his vision beyond the political divide. Politics is a curious world, an ideological world at a certain angle to the logical world that is supposed to underpin reality. I’ve read of a Marxist interpretation of the dragon as symbolising monopoly capital and the iniquitous accumulation and division of wealth. I’d say that there’s more to be said for this view than the reading of Tolkien as a fascist! Before long, we have class struggle breaking out in Middle-earth, with victory over the capitalist rulers being won by an alliance of the lower middle class (the Hobbits) with the working class miners (the dwarves). Don’t knock it! I always had a soft spot for those dwarves. And, I kid you not, Marx himself praised the little fellows working underground for the revolution. Evidence in the text below.

Tolkien the revolutionary! Tolkien the elitist. Tolkien the nationalist. Tolkien the anarchist. Whatever you want to read him as. There is, in truth, no mystery at all as to what Tolkien was. He was a devout Roman Catholic, committed Christian and a lifelong Tory. I’d caution against allegorical and political readings, and place the emphasis first and foremost on the love of God, nature, place, friends and proximity. Go to that love first, and you won’t go far wrong. And you won’t get too heated up over the political debates and conflicts. It is this greater love that led Tolkien to castigate war, technology, industrialization and urbanisation. 

I go further, though, and connect the global environmental crisis we are facing with the disenchantment of the world and the loss of transcendence as a result of modernism, scientific reductionism, and mechanistic materialism. 

Rebecca Goldstein writes of ‘the sad sight of human life untouched by transcendence.’ (Rebecca Goldstein, 36 Arguments for the Existence of God: A Work of Fiction, New York, Pantheon, 2010).

The poet Wallace Stevens writes of the 'The Plain Sense of Things'

It is as if
We had come to an end of the imagination,




As this crisis deepens and intensifies, threatening full-scale ecological and civilizational collapse, Tolkien's distinct anti-modernism may cease to look reactionary and, as revolutionaries come to abandon the false prospectus of progress, and rethink the relation of human creations to the natural world, may even come to seem the height of wisdom. 





2 Literary Ecology: The Power of Story

Human beings as story-telling beings engaged in life’s journey as a quest … The word ‘quest’ is appropriate here, with its connotations of myths and legends, the stories which human beings in their various groups and communities tell themselves, making sense of their lives and thereby developing a symbolic consciousness in their search for truth, meaning and justice. The object of the search in such quests is typically elusive, and ultimately its supreme importance comes to be apprehended and even transcended by the lessons that are learned in overcoming the challenges on the way. The journey is at least as important as journey’s end, in that it is in finding the object ‘out there’ that we come to find ourselves. 

Alasdair MacIntyre is an important figure in the recovery of narrative in the modern world, along with Charles Taylor. ‘The unity of an individual life’, he writes, ‘is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. To ask “What is the good for me?” is to ask how best I might live out that unity and bring it to completion. . . .’ MacIntyre continues:

‘The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest. Quests sometimes fail, are frustrated, abandoned or dissipated into distractions; and human lives may in all these ways also fail. But the only criteria for success or failure in a human life as a whole are the criteria of success or failure in a narrated or to-be-narrated quest. A quest for what? Two key features of the medieval conception of a quest need to be recalled. The first is that without some at least partly determinate conception of the final telos there could not be any beginning to a quest. Some conception of the good for man is required. Whence is such a conception to be drawn? Precisely from those questions which led us to attempt to transcend that limited conception of the virtues which is available in and through practices. It is in looking for a conception of the good which will enable us to order other goods, for a conception of the good which will enable us to extend our understanding of the purpose and content of the virtues, for a conception of the good which will enable us to understand the place of integrity and constancy in life, that we initially define the kind of life which is a quest for the good. But secondly it is clear the medieval conception of a quest is not at all that of a search for something already adequately characterized, as miners search for gold or geologists for oil. It is in the course of the quest and only through encountering and coping with the various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide any quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be understood. A quest is always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge. The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good. The catalogue of the virtues will therefore include the virtues required to sustain the kind of households and the kind of political communities in which men and women can seek for the good together and the virtues necessary for philosophical enquiry about the character of the good, We have then arrived at a provisional conclusion about the good life for man: the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is.’

Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 219

This completes the first and second stage in MacIntyre’s account of the virtues, situating them not only in relation to practices but in relation to the good life for human beings. He now goes on to the third stage. ‘For I am never able to seek the good or exercise the virtues qua individual.’ What it is to live the good life concretely varies according to different circumstances, even when we are dealing with the one and the same conception of the good life and one and the same set of virtues embodied in a human life. Further, we all approach our particular circumstances as bearers of particular social identities. ‘What is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity. This thought is likely to appear alien and even surprising from the standpoint of modern individualism. From the standpoint of individualism, I am what I choose to be … ‘

Such individualism is a contradiction of the social nature of human beings – individuality and sociability are two aspects of the same human nature. The loss or distortion of the one is the loss or distortion of the other, through skewing the integral relationship that exists between both in a truly human life. The quest for the good life thus return us to nature and human nature, to universal standards which transcend their particular incarnation in time and place. The truth of story-telling is rooted in something outside of the social group, identity and community, however those things come to be defined in history. 

‘While it is true that man can adapt himself to almost any conditions, he js not a blank sheet of paper on which culture writes its text. Needs like the striving for happiness, harmony, love and freedom are inherent in his nature. They are also dynamic factors in the historical process which, if frustrated, tend to arouse psychic reactions, ultimately creating the very conditions suited to the original strivings. As long as the objective conditions of the society and the culture remain stable, the social character has a predominantly stabilizing function. If the external conditions change in such a way that they do not fit any more with the traditional social character, a lag arises which often changes the function of character into an element of disintegration instead of stabilization, into dynamite instead of a social mortar, as it were.’

Fromm 1990 ch 5 

The quest, ultimately, is the truly human society of truly human beings – a work of self-knowledge. 

‘Undoubtedly, lack of concern for one's own country is an expression of a lack of social responsibility and of human solidarity, as are the other acts mentioned here, but the reaction to the violation of the flag is fundamentally different from the reaction to the denial of social responsibility in all other aspects. The one object is "sacred," a symbol of clan worship; the others are not. After the great European Revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries failed to transform "freedom from" into "freedom to," nationalism and state worship became the symptoms of a regression to incestuous fixation. Only when man succeeds in developing his reason and love further than he has done so far, only when he can build a world based on human solidarity and justice, only when he can feel rooted in the experience of universal brotherliness, will he have found a new, human form of rootedness, will he have transformed his world into a truly human home.’

Erich Fromm, The Sane Society 1990: 60

Reason and love working together in harmony, solidarity and justice in a fellowship grounded in place and relations to others, a rootedness against abstraction, a genuine community as against ersatz, surrogate collectivities, a love of the particularities of place and warm, affective ties, bonds and loyalties as against empty universals … Tolkien gives us all of these things. He sees human life as a quest for meaning, and a search for love, truth and belonging. And he roots this quest in the realities of nature and goodness and experience. These are the themes I shall develop at length. 

J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings is not merely a popular book but a beloved work of literature. The characters and stories contained in the book invite an emotional engagement that expresses a real psychological and moral depth. This points to the existence of qualities in the text that have a real affective power. Charged with the responsibility of resolving the environmental crisis we face, many people are asking what it takes to motivate, persuade and mobilise large numbers of people. Tolkien’s words – the message they convey and the way it is conveyed – has the power to persuade and move. Tolkien knew what he was doing with respect to storytelling. He knew of the power of stories. He wanted to tell stories that would bring about ‘the satisfaction of certain primordial human desires’, that embodied a certain ‘quality of strangeness and wonder,’ that would ‘survey the depths of space and time’ and that would ‘hold communion with other living things.’ (J.R.R. Tolkien, On Fairy-Stories, ed. Verlyn Flieger and Douglas A. Anderson (London, England: Harper Collins Publishers, 2014), 4.) The result was a mythology of Middle-Earth that embodies and articulates the moral and psychic truth of our world. The work strikes a chord and moves at the deepest level of the human psyche.

Tolkien’s environmentalism
Tolkien is difficult to pigeonhole. To test what people thought of him, I approached a friend and explained some of Tolkien’s thoughts on war, industry, government and technology, his objections to the way that the machine world has come to ride roughshod over the primary reality that constitutes the true ground of our being. My friend promptly described him as an eco-communalist anarchist. I told him that Tolkien was a devout Catholic and a lifelong Tory. He was a conservative. His ‘anarchism’ was really an ordered and placid conservatism born of a love of God, a love of place and a love of family and friendship. That’s a conservatism that is at odds with the tyranny and violence of institutional and systemic violence that characterises the modern Megamachine, and which refuses complicity with the Machine, with all its bribing and bullying. The hostility to the Machine is implacable and uncompromising.
On reflection, my friend’s description of eco-communalism wasn’t far wrong. That strand is in Tolkien. But there is more to Tolkien than this. Simone D’Ardenne says that we can encounter Tolkien as ‘the Christian, or the friend, the artist or the humanist, the father or the teacher.’ (Simone D’Ardenne, “The Man and Scholar,” in J.R.R. Tolkien, Scholar and Storyteller: Essays in Memoriam, ed. Mary Salu and Robert T. Farrell (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1979), 33.) My own view is that you can indeed encounter Tolkien as a humanist, a pagan even, without the overtly religious scaffolding, but that it is impossible to truly grasp Tolkien’s message without understanding that the moral, intellectual and psychic infrastructure in his work is Christian. God is present throughout, an invisible force pervading the whole. There have been many attempts to render this Christian character overt and explicit, in the work of Peter Kreeft, for instance. Kreeft is right, and this piece shows the influence of his work. However, I do wonder whether Tolkien’s approach to religion is much the more effective by being covert and implicit. In other words, the point is not to prove a point with respect to the truth or otherwise of the Christian edifice, but to do good and live well by working with the invisible magic at work in the world. 

Tolkien’s underlying philosophy
Great stories express great philosophies; they articulate the moral underpinnings of a time and place and pass certain norms, truths and values on through the generations. They endure beyond time and place and therefore possess a transcendent quality. And they are creative, inviting engagement and adaptation. The old tales gain renewed significance as their lessons are encountered and assimilated in the context of a continually unfolding life-story. Stories are thus part of the ecology of time and place and are woven into the fabric of the social and cultural landscape, shaping it and being shaped by it in turn. The great stories endure and continue to deliver a message that is able to withstand the passing of time; they possess a significance that is irreducible to a specific culture, but express the human condition and thereby speak to all human beings in all cultures. They thus become ciphers for all those who are dealing with the perennial questions of life and meaning and who are willing to take up these past answers and rethink them anew in present times. Tolkien’s work has thus been celebrated in terms of presenting a myth for our time.

As Peter Beagle writes in his introductory essay, Tolkien’s Magic Ring: 

‘Middle Earth lives, not only in The Lord of the Rings but around it and back and forth from it. I have read the complete work five or six times (not counting browsing, for which this essay is, in part, an excuse), and each time my pleasure in the texture of it deepens. It [The Lord of the Rings] will bear the mind’s handling, and it is a book that acquires an individual patina in each mind that takes it up, like a much-caressed pocket stone or piece of wood. At times, always knowing that I didn’t write it, I feel that I did.’ 

Peter Beagle, “Tolkien’s Magic Ring,” in The Tolkien Reader (New York, NY: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1966), xii.

The tale resonates at a personal level: ‘Something of ourselves has gone into reading it, and so it belongs to us.’ We see something of ourselves in the tale and in the struggles of the main protagonists. Their struggles are our struggles, and so we make the tale our own. Such is the creative quality of a story that takes the form not of prescriptive allegory but, as Tolkien expressed it, as ‘history, true or feigned, with its various applicability to the thought and experience of readers.’ (J.R.R. Tolkien, Foreword to The Lord of the Rings (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 5.) Whereas a prescriptive allegory engages only the mind, Tolkien’s storytelling engages the whole person and thus possesses the power to persuade and move people deep within their being. Whilst Tolkien’s enduring, timeless truths are not relative to time and place in being culturally specific, they do relate to time and place creatively and can therefore be taken up by people as agents involved in shaping their own life-story in a contextual sense. There is a flexibility to Tolkien’s narrative that gives the stories an applicability and adaptability which varies in accordance with the questions that different generations seek to answer with respect to their particular needs and demands for meaning. The tales are therefore capable of being assimilated, rethought and retold by successive generations as they come to encounter new problems and new issues. The stories allow people to address universal truths in their particular concrete manifestation in time and place.

The case for literary ecology
The environmental crisis we face possesses a multi-faceted character, and so will require multi-faceted modes of critical and practical engagement. The Earth’s community of life is being threatened with any number of problems, and these can only be addressed by a diversity of ways and means. Eco-philosophers have sought to uproot the dualisms that have worked to separate reason/culture and nature, subject and object, the individual and society, human beings and other non-human beings and bodies, all of which have gone to create a domineering anthropocentric outlook that has estranged us from the world, from others and from our own natures. It is surely too much to demand a resolution of these problems from the field of literary ecology alone, let alone from Tolkien in particular. I’ll not be making Tolkien’s work bear such a heavy weight. I will, however, argue that Tolkien’s tales of Middle-Earth do express an ecology of good based upon a notion of inherent worth, and that this moral ecology not only sheds critical light upon our contemporary environmental travails, but equips us with the motivation to carry on through the struggles to come and persevere to their successful resolution.

I shall therefore premise my commentary on Tolkien by making the case for literary ecology as a field which fosters and inculcates the environmental vision. I shall make the case for artists, writers, and poets in engaging the emotions in their work, firing the imagination and inspiring action. If we rely upon the enlightenment model of informing heads with facts and the scientific knowledge of ‘things’ then our technics will continue to misfire, for the simple reason that we are failing to address knowledge and know-how to the springs of human action, seeking an engineering or institutional workaround that merely reproduces the old problem of abstraction and diversion. Let me turn, then, to the artistic appreciation of nature and how this conflicts with the abstracting tendencies of the system world.

The disconnection and reconnection of all things

‘Artists throughout history have made significant contributions to social, political, and environmental challenges by using their creative practice to reflect upon and confront the issues at hand. If we are to alter, even reverse climate change, we need to reach out to people through their emotions to inspire action. Art is one of the ways of doing this.’

Christine Simpson, Everything is (Dis)connected
https://artistsandclimatechange.com/2017/07/20/everything-is-disconnected/

The ancestral connection of organised human existence to climate has been progressively unravelled through technological innovation, industrialisation and urbanisation. The modern lifestyle has severed its connections to the climate system, the connections that are critical in supporting life on earth. Human civilisation has been built upon a series of separations. Separation is identified as the key figure of modernity in the sociology of Max Weber, driving change and progress, but producing a fragmentation and specialisation of experience that is potentially lethal. Removed at an ever increasing distance from our biological and ecological matrix, human beings risk being disinherited in a world of their own making, disowned by their own creations, and having no other reality left to fall back upon. That is the real price of disconnection. Self-made man ruling in their self-made social world risk becoming masters of nowhere. They are unmoored and ungrounded, disconnected from true realities, the sources of life and meaning.

The loss of a direct relationship to the environment has been accompanied by a weakening of sensitivity to ‘weather’ as meteorology and climatology. The citizens of the modern world talk a lot about the weather, but only with a social and recreational purpose, weighing up the prospects for good and bad weather with respect to work, days and nights out, festivals, holidays. As techno-urban industrial civilisation has advanced, most jobs and activities have been further and further removed from the environment. The direct connection to the biological matrix has been severed. We have entered a self-made social world as a second nature, but are increasingly in danger of failing to appreciate that this Secondary World is not an independent world in its own right, but is intimately connected to the Primary World. In thrall to our own creativity and its products, we have lost that sense of intimate connection. We live inside our own created shells – houses, cars, buildings – insulated from the elements. We live indoors, in our own worlds. Our ability to regulate and control temperatures within our walls given us a kind of second skin in this second nature, but this has come at the expense of levelling our experience of real climate. Our talk about ‘the weather’ has become part of the pervasive subjectivisation of the world and the human experience of it. Our ability to adjust and readjust the indoor climate according to personal preference is indicative of the dominant human relation to the environment in the Secondary World – ‘external’ nature is something to be made subordinate to human will and control, and something to override whenever it comes to stand in the way of human desires and their satisfaction. 

The existential power of the ‘objective’ sciences is diminished in such a subjective world. In terms of natural science, climate can be analysed into the component parts of temperature, air pressure, humidity, wind force, and so on. The problem, however, is that it is difficult to conceive climate as a totality other than in subjective terms (Gernot Böhme, "Das Wetter und die Gefühle. Für eine Phänomenologie des Wetters," in Luft (Bonn, Germany: Wienand, Schriftenreihe Forum Band 12, 2003) pp. 148-161). It’s almost the same problem that we have with the attempts to give intellectual or rational expression to God, trying to define the indefinable. Climate may exist objectively but it can only be known subjectively through the phenomenology of (inter)subjective environmental experience. That’s not a view that would impress a natural scientist (no more than similar reasoning would impress a theologian with respect to God). There is a real world ‘out there,’ one that exists independently of our subjective perception of it. Whether that world embodies goodness, meaning, value and purpose is a question you can break your head on – hence attempts to locate value start with the human valuer, venture forth, fail to find objective grounding, and thus retreat back to the initial starting position – the human valuer. That’s not a question that can be resolved with mere philosophical tools – there is a reality beyond the limits of philosophical reason, beyond naming and framing.

But the truth of the claim that there is a real world ‘out there’ is one that is important to establish when it comes to the human recognition of ‘objective’ reality. The truth about reality cannot just be given, passively, but must be subjectively realised and recognised. That’s an important point to establish with respect to developing an existentialist environmentalism that is actually in tune with the environment. It is also an important point to establish with respect to the literary ecology I defend with respect to Tolkien in this piece.


Without the human eye, the environment has only an ‘objective’ existence. It is a reality that certainly exists outside of human experience and independently of the human species. But the human concern could only ever be with an environment that is humanly objective and hence shot through with will, consciousness, understanding and experience. These things may often be mistaken and misguided with respect to objective nature. But that does not make the phenomenological approach mistaken or misguided. And reason has a self-critical, reflexive character which means it is always capable of modification in giving itself a reality check. The task, then, is to ensure attunement between the objective world and our appreciation of it. As Julien Knebusch writes, ‘for such reasons, it seems obvious that climate change should not be apprehended through the sole climate models used by scientists. We need to get a deeper and more comprehensive experience of the phenomenon. It cannot remain out of our sphere of experience.’ (Julien Knebusch, Art and climate (perception) change: Outline of a phenomenology of climate, in Sacha Kagan et Volker Kirchberg (ed.), Sustainability: a new frontier for the arts and cultures, Frankfurt a. Main, Verlag fur Akademische Schriften, 2008, pp. 242-2610. 
https://www.olats.org/fcm/artclimat/phenomenologyclimate.pdf (​https:​/​​/​www.olats.org​/​fcm​/​artclimat​/​phenomenologyclimate.pdf​)).

Knebusch notes that this phenomenon is beginning to interest the contemporary art scene, with climate change becoming an influential theme in the work of artistic directors and cultural programmers. We are, indeed, seeing an increasing number of artistic exhibitions organised around climate change. Knebusch mentions a few of these: Art and Climate Change (Natural History Museum, London, 2006), New Climates (http://shanebrennan.net/climate/about/ (​http:​/​​/​shanebrennan.net​/​climate​/​about​/​​)), Weather Report: Art & Climate change (Boulder Museum of Contemporary Art, 2007) and many more since then. 

There is a need, then, to grasp climate and climate change as a multidimensional phenomenon to which understandings of nature, culture, history and geography all contribute. And that multidimensional appreciation includes an appreciation of the imaginary and the symbolic. These are the very things which are central to Tolkien’s environmental vision. The point to be established at this stage is that the perception of climate is the perception of an arrangement, a configuration of the real. 

Art could help us to question our perceptions and relationships to the climate and its modifications. Artistic explorations should not be restricted to illustrating our scientific discoveries, as in contemporary climate-change showcases…. Instead, a work of art may help us to experience and reveal our inner participation with climate, the rupture of its balance and its meaning for our inner world, in the same way as landscape artists who reframed the relationship of humans to their environment. Art questions the status of our perception of the phenomenon by deconstructing our common perception and revealing other possible perceptions of it.’

Julien Knebusch, The Perception of Climate Change (2008)

Knebusch’s argument for the phenomenology of climate points to the possibility of an art of climate change that is more than an illustration of the science of climate change, becoming a ‘presentification’ of climate change. Art can thus play a creative role in furthering and deepening understanding and advancing environmental appreciation, stirring us into reflecting upon what it is to be human and rethinking that question in light of the environmental crises we are living through and charged with the responsibility of resolving. The approach in this piece, with reference to art, imagination and literature, is to go beyond the facts of ecological degradation and planetary unravelling to go to the very heart of environmental issues in an existential sense – asking who we are and where we are. 

The environmental crisis is real enough, and there is a wealth of scientific evidence to testify to the fact. But I am concerned to do more than detail the facts and physical processes of eco-collapse and catastrophe, and instead contrast ecological devastation with the world we could have had and, possibly, could still have. This approach affirms the beauty of Creation and inherent worth of all living things. And it involves a call to us to live up to that beauty in order to counter the threats of environmental destruction, species extinction (including the human species), and global collapse. 

As natural beings, human beings are dependent upon Nature and its life-support systems in order to survive and flourish. Technological advance, industrialisation and urbanisation have removed us further and further from our biological matrix, but without land, air, water, food, sources of energy, human life and civilisation would be impossible. These sources of life are now being heavily compromised. There is no need to make predictions on this anymore, since the world is already experiencing the damaging impact of climate change in the shape of extreme weather events, more frequent floods, storms, droughts, ice-melt, the destruction of natural habitats, the loss of countless animals, birds, and bees. The Sixth Great Extinction is underway, grace of humankind. It’s a sorry tale of human beings coming to act in callous disregard of the environment. Not all humans equally, mind, but particular, identifiable, groups and classes of human beings within specific social relations; some humans are far more responsible than others for this devastation, and the point needs to be established firmly if we are to get to grips with the root causes in these iniquitous relationships. That tale of ecological degradation and destruction contains the threat of future ecological collapse, so telling it right matters. 

The objective reality of climate change is not in doubt. Where there is doubt is at the level of politics and perceptions, the world of practical reason (ethics, politics, economics) where human beings decide how they will act and organise their common affairs in light of their knowledge of the ‘objective’ world. That world of practical reason cannot just be dismissed as of ‘secondary’ significance, as though the environmental question could simply be resolved by dictating the facts pertaining to the primary reality to the world of politics and social organisation. We know that that doesn’t work, and we should be clear as to the reasons why it doesn’t work. Ethics and politics is known as the field of ‘practical reason’ for a good reason. Failure to understand that reason – and to think the truth can be simply dictated – will result in a political and social impotence. However wrong, it should come as no surprise that an objective truth pertaining to the physical world could come to be overridden in favour of a subjective truth that is politically and culturally dominant in the social world. The truth concerning the real world cannot just be objectively given, it must be subjectively apprehended and acted on. That observation contains a demand to make climate change real in an existential sense, that is, in the sense of absorbing the facts of objective reality into the practical understanding, experience, activity and organisation of human beings. 
How do those advocating climate action envisage change being effected? Through an elite of environmental philosopher-kings legislating action from above via already constituted authority? I would argue that the problem is not simply one of scientific illiteracy or ignorance, that it won’t be solved by scientific education alone (although that is a big part of it, I hasten to add), or by institutional action (although, again, that will be necessary for action to be effective). These things are necessary but not sufficient. The idea that a public could come to be ecologically educated through the informing of heads through the delivery of scientific facts is psychologically crude and socially and politically ineffectual. Such information could only be fully effective in the context of the formation of ecological character. And this is where the disconnection of techno-urban industrial civilisation from nature comes to have harmful and disabling consequences. That removal from the natural world has dimmed and dulled our ecological sensibilities, meaning that we are not as responsive to scientific facts sounding environmental alarm as we ought to be. This disconnection from the ecological matrix combines with the social divisions that mark the second nature we have created to undermine our attempts to address the climate problem collectively. 

That climate change is the greatest threat to civilised life on earth is easy enough to demonstrate with a wealth of research and facts. That this threat is the result of particular kinds of human activity is also easy enough to demonstrate. The iniquity of it all is also clear, in that those least responsible for the damage to the climate system will be hit first and hit hardest by climate change. Unfortunately, we have found that appeals to both fact and value are ineffectual with those who respect neither. In fact, that’s a moralising criticism that is in danger of badly missing the point to grasp. And it implies a very questionable politics – why, exactly, do we need to make a scientific and moral appeal to those with the power invested in present arrangements? It should be obvious that those deaf to rational appeal are indifferent not out of stupidity or immorality – even though failure to change and act will bring about consequences ruinous to each and all, and hence could be considered stupid and immoral. The point is that we are being challenged to restructure power and transform social relations to engender new social forms and patterns of behaviour, incentives, motives and identities. The reason that some are deaf to fact and value is because their immediate self- and social interest is served within prevailing arrangements, however collectively destructive these are in the long-run. These people do not identify with a collective interest and do not live in the long-run. The problem we face is that there is no way, within prevailing social relations, to make the long-term common good available in anything but abstract form – and that abstract form is not persuasive at the level of social interest and action. 
So the lament that certain individuals and groups are deaf to appeals to fact and value can be strengthened by being rendered in more precise terms. Socially, there is no such thing as ‘humanity’; humanity is a biological category, not a political entity. To present the facts on climate change and then issue a bland statement that ‘we’ now need to act is an appeal destined to fall on deaf ears. The problem standing in the way of the collective action we need is that there is no social and political ‘we’ to heed the call to action and there is no social and political ‘we’ that is capable of responding to that call. Human beings exist within socially structured patterns of behaviour, within social relationships between groups and classes and within relations to the environment creating specific social identities which shape understanding of what constitutes rational behaviour. In the contemporary social world, human beings live within a competitive market society which is constituted on the basis of instrumental relationships between individuals. This creates a form of social identity in which there is no direct connection between individual good and social good, let alone between the human good and the ecological good. To demand human action with a view to the long-term common good in this context is to demand a self-sacrifice that may be considered irrational. The dominant form of rationality within a market society is that of self-interest. Without the institutional, social, moral and psychological means and mechanisms of collective action, urgent demands to act for the common good lack social relevance and are destined to be felt as an irrational demand for self-sacrifice. The action we need will not, therefore, be taken. Ideals and objectives need to be related to the means and mechanisms of their realisation, and that means being clear with respect to the social agents of transformation.

Addressing this question demands that we pay serious attention to institution building, structural transformation and capacity to act, character formation, ethics, and what E.F. Schumacher called metaphysical reconstruction. This is what I try to do in my work on Being and Place. Here, I want to relate that work with an appreciation of literary ecology and its capacity to foster an environmental vision and imagination.

In the synopsis of Being and Place on my website I write this:





I am concerned, then, to examine the role of environmental vision in expressing and orienting ecological and social concern, in creating ecological sensibility and in fostering a (co)responsiveness on our part and as a result, hopefully, coming to resolve the crises we face. Examining the components of that environmental vision brings us to art and imagination, and to the field known as literary ecology. Tolkien belongs here. And the view he offers also falls under the designation of moral ecology. He offers an ecology of the good, combining art, aesthetics and ethics. That is very much in line with my thinking and acting. I very much affirm the power of the artistic and literary imagination. From within this field, the environmental visionary is able to see problems clearly, expose fault lines, ask questions, raise issues, identify creative avenues for exploration, shape perceptions of reality in a way that is attuned to the truth of that reality, open eyes to realities and open hearts and minds to new ways of knowing, thinking, feeling, intuiting, doing. This is the creative role of art and the artist in Tolkien, this seeing with a clear view, expanding thought and being, and broadening and deepening perspectives. It is an approach that presents and develops profoundly moral themes through stories that engage the active interest of the reader, and in words that have an immediate resonance. In such a way, reality is rendered accessible, not just intelligible at the level of the intellect, but something that goes straight to the ecology of the human heart. In the process, Tolkien inspires and cultivates an environmental vision that fosters a positive outlook that achieves practical effect through engagement, participation and, thereby, a creative unfolding via an artistic human sub-creativity. 

The precise meaning of these terms will become clear later in the text. For now, I am introducing the themes, establishing the contours of the terrain I shall shortly explore. And I think Tolkien is best explained as an exploration, a journey and an experience, not in terms of an abstract set of propositions. Art, for Tolkien, is present within nature and thus is unfolded from the inside; it is not an external intervention and manipulation to make the world better. The world is already good, it does not stand in need of improvement. Technology is embraced as a technics – artistic, cultural, social – to ease our task of living well, not as a device to change our way of life. That environmental vision, then, enthuses us, inspires us to appreciate the goodness of the earth, to express awe, wonder and gratitude for that gift, and act to defend and nurture it, to make a difference for the better.

Regaining a clear view
I understand Tolkien to be an ecological cipher in raising environmental awareness through moral depth and commitment. He raises the key issues of human relationships, our relations to our own selves, to each other, to Earth and to God. With this philosophical undercurrent running throughout his engaging stories, Tolkien challenges the way we see the world and, emphasising clear vision, gets us to view the world differently. We come to see reality in a certain way and act accordingly. Tolkien argues that we ‘need recovery. We should look at green again, and be startled anew (but not blinded) by blue and yellow and red …’ This ‘recovery’ ‘includes return and renewal of health.’ It ‘is a regaining – regaining of a clear view.’ (J.R.R. Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” in The Tolkien Reader (New York, NY: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1966), 77.) In the process, Tolkien shows the vital role that art and imagination play in shaping and orienting the relationships which constitute our reality, cultivating an ecological sensibility which fosters a sense of identity with the natural world, a sense of belonging within that world, and a sense of reality as seeing things clearly.
Tolkien proceeds to spell out what coming to see with a clear view entails:

I do not say ‘seeing things as they are’ and involve myself with the philosophers, though I might venture to say ‘seeing things as we are (or were) meant to see them’—as things apart from ourselves. We need, in any case, to clean our windows; so that the things seen clearly may be freed from the drab blur of triteness or familiarity—from possessiveness. This triteness is really the penalty of ‘appropriation’; … we laid hands on them, and then locked them in our hoard, acquired them, and acquiring, ceased to look at them.’

J.R.R. Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” in The Tolkien Reader (New York, NY: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1966), 77.

That’s a statement in favour of a return to contemplation over action, of disclosing the truth of things – through sub-creative activity rather than passivity - rather than imposing it upon the world. That this is the case becomes clear in the way Tolkien elaborates on these points in relation to fantasy. One of the central purposes of fantasy is the ‘recovery’ of a clear view of nature (the cosmos).

‘Fantasy is made out of the Primary World, but a good craftsman loves his material … By the forging of Gram cold iron was revealed; by the making of Pegasus horses were ennobled …
It was in fairy-stories that I first divined the potency of words, and the wonder of the things, such as stone, and wood, and iron; tree and grass; house and fire; bread and wine.’ 

Later on in On Fairy-Stories, Tolkien makes what seems like an epistemological point, but which is actually concerned with cosmology. He argues that whilst fantasy is creative, it is also realistic:

‘its truth conforms to the real world rather than (re)creating it. It is therefore a rational activity, in the ancient, deeper, more basic meaning of ‘rational’ (knowing reality). Since fantasy is rational, and since the cosmos is really full, fantasy too is full.’

Peter Kreeft, The Philosophy of Tolkien: The Worldview Behind ‘The Lord of the Rings.’

In fine, fantasy is not an escape from reality, it is a flight to reality, to true reality.

‘The keener and the clearer is the reason, the better fantasy will it make. If men were ever in a state in which they did not want to know or could not perceive truth (facts or evidence), then Fantasy would languish until they were cured …
For creative Fantasy is founded upon the hard recognition that things are so in the world as it appears under the sun; on a recognition of fact, but not a slavery to it .. If men really could not distinguish between frogs and men, fairy-stories about frog-kings would not have arisen.’

Tolkien, On Fairy-Stories pp. 54-55

Whilst Tolkien expresses his reluctance to engage with philosophers, these points are nevertheless philosophical, and offer the basis for a dialogue with ecological understandings of nature and the human relation to nature and place within it. They also point to the limits of philosophy and the need to balance reason and faith:

The Gospels contain a fairy-story, or a story of a larger kind which embraces all the essence of fairy-stories. … But this story has entered History and the primary world; … It has pre-eminently the ‘inner consistency of reality.’ There is no tale ever told that men would rather find was true, and none which so many sceptical men have accepted as true on its own merits. For the Art of it has the supremely convincing tone of Primary Art, that is, of Creation. …this story is supreme; and it is true.

That view returns us to the moral underpinnings of Tolkien’s environmentalism. I shall develop this in terms of an imaginal moral ecology. That view draws upon the work of Becca Segall Tarnas (Towards an Imaginal Ecology, 2016) but places a much greater accent on the ethical and, indeed, Christian underpinning of Tolkien’s values and vision. I will examine this aspect at length later. To begin, I wish to focus upon literary ecology and the imagination.

Literary ecology takes the physical world and sets off on a voyage of discovery that looks further than the objective facts to comprehend their existential meaning with respect to human life. Artistic visions, poetic revelation, musical inspiration, ideas form an imaginal space that expands the physical world into an imaginal landscape that is continually unfolding through the ongoing exploration of human-Earth interconnection. 
Literary ecology centres upon the important mediating role that the imagination plays in human-Earth interconnection and interaction. The natural sciences are important in delivering facts and yielding knowledge about the physical environment, but human life is about the psychic environment too, and that points to living as a quest to satisfy meaning. An ecology conceived in such a way integrates the scientific study of biology, climatology, ecosystems within an existential and experiential domain constituted by relationship and interconnection. The imaginal approach is exemplified by William Blake, who writes of seeing reality through the eye, not with the eye:

‘This life's dim windows of the soul
Distorts the heavens from pole to pole
And leads you to believe a lie




Plato in the Symposium writes of seeing through the eye of the mind. That is to use the intellect to penetrate the surface level of physical things to apprehend true reality. Goethe wrote that ‘The hardest thing to see is what is in front of your eyes.’ Psychically and emotionally, we may were blinkers that prevent us from seeing reality as it is, seeing only what we want to see and disregarding the rest. To see the physical world objectively through the intellect is the way of science. My point with respect to an existential ecology goes further than this to integrate subject and object through the eye of the imagination, moving us deeply through the connection between reason and emotion. The physical eye appreciating the things of the physical world can yield objective knowledge of physical reality, but can be blind to other realities. 

The eyes can be blinkers of the soul. Ravi Zacharias puts it this way: ‘We now learn to listen with our eyes and think with our feelings. . . . We are meant to see through the eye, with the conscience; when we start seeing with the eye devoid of the conscience, all kinds of belief can invade your imagination.’ In other words, our mind’s eye is not merely intellectual but also possesses an imaginal quality that is able to conjure up dreams and visions and pictures of alternate futures and possibilities that transcend the facts of objective reality. It is in inhabiting the imaginal space that we come to give material facts and processes an existential meaning.

Marcel Proust expressed the idea perfectly when he wrote, ‘The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes.’ These new eyes, of course, refer not merely to intellect but to a consciousness that is in connection with conscience and the soul. This is what Tolkien means when he writes of ‘regaining’ the ‘clear view’. He emphasises the point that this refers to something more than ‘seeing things as they are’, which is the job of scientific and philosophic reason with respect to our knowledge of the external world. Tolkien’s clear view is different, seeing things as we were meant to see them, as things independent of our possessiveness, beyond our naming and framing. Blake writes of ‘this life’s dim windows of the soul’ as distorting the reality we see with the physical eye. Tolkien points out that we need ‘to clean our windows.’ 

The artists, poets, visionaries and story-tellers who populate the world of literary ecology give us precisely the ‘recovery’ that Tolkien writes of. I would put this in terms of allowing us to inhabit an imaginal moral space. ‘Cleaning our windows’ is not just about envisioning alternate futures, it is about seeing the enchantment and beauty that is inherent in the world in which we live. I’m reminded of Socrates’ insight that beauty is the highest political category since it unites reason and emotion and lights the way for the heart as it seeks to find its way home.

Tolkien calls this imaginal moral space ‘Faërie’. It is no mere fantasy world, as in the land of make-believe, but is crafted out of the materials of the world in which we live. (Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” in The Tolkien Reader 1966: 78). The imagination, however, has a creative role in enabling us to see the world as if it were new again, eliciting feelings of awe and wonder on our part. (Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” in The Tolkien Reader 1966: 77).

Bachelard expresses the idea of an imaginative creation out of natural materials well when he writes:

I believe that there are objects which have integrative powers. 
Things which enable us to incorporate images.  
For me the tree is an integrating object.  
It is normally a work of art.  
Thus when I manage to confer upon the tree’s aerial psychology, 
the complementary concerning the roots, a new love suffuses the dreamer in me.  
The line generated a stanza.  The stanza a poem.  
One of the greatest verticals of man’s imaginary life 
took on the full range of its deductive dynamism, 
imagination then took possession of all the powers of plant life.
To live like a tree.  What growth, what depth. What uprightness.  What truth.
Immediately within us we feel the roots working.  
We feel that the past is not dead.  
That we have something to do today in our dark, subterranean, solitary, aerial life.  
The tree is everywhere at once.
 
The old root - the imagination (there are no young roots), will produce a new flower.  
The imagination is a tree.  
It has the integrated virtues of a tree.  
It is root and boughs.  
It lives between earth and sky.  
It lives in earth and in the wind.  
The imagined tree becomes imperceptibly the cosmological tree.  
The tree which epitomises a universe – which makes a universe 

Gaston Bachelard, 2005: 85

The poet Rumi advised: ‘Close both eyes to see with the other eye.’
In Active Hope, Joanna Macy and Chris Johnstone write that ‘seeing with new eyes reveals the wider web of resources available to us through our rootedness within a deeper, ecological self.’ It is an appeal to our creative imaginations to see the world beyond objective facts. ‘It opens us to a new view of what is possible and a new understanding of our power to make a difference.’ (Macy and Johnstone 2012: 38). 

Tolkien thus highlights the connection between Faërie, the enchanted world that imagination conjures up, and the material world we live in, and which we normally take for granted:

‘Faërie contains many things besides elves and fays, and besides dwarfs, witches, trolls, giants, or dragons: it holds the seas, the sun, the moon, the sky; and the earth, and all things that are in it: tree and bird, water and stone, wine and bread, and ourselves, mortal men, when we are enchanted.’

Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” in The Tolkien Reader 1966: 38

In coming to see with new eyes, we cease to be disenchanted beings, seeing through ‘dim windows’ to distort the real nature of the world in which we live, and become enchanted beings, once more appreciative of the world, alive to its beauty and its gifts. This is not so much the re-enchantment of the world as the re-enchantment of the human eye through the imagination. 

‘Man is an imagining being’, wrote Gaston Bachelard in The Poetics of Reverie (1960). In his lifetimes’s work, Bachelard was engaged in the recovery of imagination in an age which sought to restrict vision to seeing with physical eyes only.

‘I am a dreamer of words, of written words. I think I am reading; a word stops me. I leave the page. The syllables of the word begin to move around. Stressed accents begin to invert. The word abandons its meaning like an overload which is too heavy and prevents dreaming. Then words take on other meanings as if they had the right to be young. And the words wander away, looking in the nooks and crannies of vocabulary for new company, bad company.’

Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Reverie. 1960

The search for company expresses well why I too send so many words out into the world. That’s my approach, inhabiting an imaginal moral ecology and sharing that landscape/dreamscape with like-minded souls. On balance, I rather liked the way I've done it over the years, just working with people who appreciate ideas, visions and values.

Before hard-nosed ‘realists’ step in here and call a halt to such dreaming, let’s establish that Bachelard knew what he was talking about. He can’t be dismissed as some ineffectual literary type or poet – he is steeped in mathematics, physics and chemistry, starting his intellectual career in those fields, going on to hold a chair in the philosophy of science at the Sorbonne. In his work, Bachelard pioneered a new methodology which penetrated to the essential core of matter, merging the discourses of science, psychoanalysis and aesthetics merge. His poetics of Air, Water, Earth, Fire and Space are highly pertinent to the imaginal ecological existentialism I am developing here.

Coming to inhabit the imaginal space, we see the world anew and come alive to the aliveness of life. ‘The spiral provides a structure we can fall back on, and into, whenever we need to tap into the resilience and resourcefulness arising from the larger web of life.’ (Macy and Johnstone 2012: 40-41).

Cleaning our windows means closing the physical eye that sees only objective facts to come to see existential reality with the inner eye that can see meaning and soul. We will see our world with wisdom and insight only if we bring a growing consciousness born of a developed interior landscape to the physical landscape we apprehend, this seeing physical facts from the depths of the soul behind our eyes. In seeing from the depths behind the physical eyes, we become conscious of the world as being constituted by more than physical facts, and come to see ourselves as part of a reality that is humanly objective. It is this that gives the facts yielded by the natural sciences their existential focus, bringing them into a meaningful existence with respect to the way we live our lives as social beings.

In this respect, what Tolkien calls Faërie emerges not as a fantasy world but as the real world properly seen. The disenchanted human eye can see no worth, no goodness, no value, no meaning and no purpose in the world. The people who Weber dismisses as ‘big children’ are actually the enchanted humans who can see the cosmos as it truly is. Inhabiting the imaginal moral space, we see the world with new eyes, and see the world as animate, purposeful, meaningful and valuable. It is disenchanted humans, mired in problems of their own making, clinging to conceptual and rational tools they know to deficient, as cripples cling to crutches. Apologies for any offence the language may cause, but I am thinking of the words of Robert Ingersoll here:

‘A surgeon once called upon a poor cripple and kindly offered to render him any assistance in his power. The surgeon began to discourse very learnedly upon the nature and origin of disease; of the curative properties of certain medicines; of the advantages of exercise, air and light, and of the various ways in which health and strength could be restored. These remarks were so full of good sense, and discovered so much profound thought and accurate knowledge that the cripple, becoming thoroughly alarmed, cried out, “Do not, I pray you, take away my crutches. They are my only support, and without them I should be miserable indeed!” “I am not going,” said the surgeon, “to take away your crutches. I am going to cure you, and then you will throw the crutches away yourself.”

Ingersoll writes that ‘the mind necessarily clings to old ideas until it is prepared for the new. The moment we comprehend the truth, all erroneous ideas are of necessity cast aside.’ I wonder. Ingersoll proceeds to deliver a ringing declaration of faith in human advancement and progress through reason. His words are a direct challenge to everything I have written here on enchantment, affirming strongly the connection between the advance of reason and human freedom.

‘We are not endeavouring to chain the future, but to free the present. We are not forging getters for our children, but we are breaking those our fathers made for us. We are the advocates of inquiry, of investigation and thought.’

Read in light of what Weber writes of the ‘iron cage’ which confines each and all, Kaiser and proletarian alike, through the process of rationalisation, Ingersoll’s faith seems somewhat naïve. He expresses the humility of science and reason, a humility that is contradicted by the tyranny and violence of abstraction in a world in which power has grown anonymous and out of control. 

‘Philosophy has not the egotism of faith. While superstition builds walls and creates obstructions, science opens all the highways of thought,’ Ingersoll writes, oblivious to the citadel of hard steel and cold glass that has been erected on the basis of Descartes’ cogito. 

‘We do not pretend to have circumnavigated everything ….’ Discuss that claim in light of Weberian rationalization and a disenchanted world enclosed in a totalising reason. I think Ingersoll’s claims are naïve and delusional and utterly blinkered to their implications. As I have written elsewhere:

The towering edifice that Descartes and other seventeenth  century build around the ego or the cogito [‘I think therefore I am’] – the huge glass and steel cathedral of Reason – is one that has come to eclipse Montaigne’s more modest tower.. But Montaigne can be seen to offer an alternative philosophy to that of Descartes, a more human-centred conception that lays no claim to absolute certainty, but that is also free from what some have seen as the implications of such claims: the totalitarian political movements of the twentieth century, and the individualist anomie of modern Western life. For at the heart of Descartes’ philosophy is the intellectual principle of division, an attempt to offer clarity in a world made uncertain by religious and political unrest. He thus states as part of his ‘method’ that intellectual problems should be ‘divided’ into ‘as many parts as possible’ and that we should accept as true only that which we can perceive ‘very clearly and distinctly’ – i.e. separate from other things…

Being in Touch with Life, http://pcritchley2.wixsite.com/beingandplace/single-post/2015/05/26/Being-in-Touch-with-Life

Ingersoll continues: ‘but we do believe that it is better to love men than to fear gods ..’

Agreed. And it is better to believe in a loving God who made a good world for us to love, than that we live in a loveless, valueless world with no inherent purpose or meaning.

‘that it is grander and nobler to think and investigate for yourself than to repeat a creed …’
Again, agreed. Who would disagree? I take it that religious believers see themselves as doing much more than merely repeating a creed. I am thinking and investigating, using reason critically to examine the emancipatory and repressive potentialities of human powers. I have thought and investigated for myself, and my conclusions led me to the religious ethic, every time. I have studied Kant in depth and written at length upon his philosophy. I am steeped in Kant’s motto of enlightenment: have the courage to use your own reason. I have followed this. And my reason took me to St Thomas Aquinas and a realisation that philosophical reason alone is insufficient in the quest for meaning. In contrast, Ingersoll’s words are very much the staple of the humanist creed.

‘We are satisfied that there can be but little liberty on earth while men worship a tyrant in heaven.’
I am satisfied there will be little liberty and less love on earth unless men and women are alive to the inherent worth of an objectively valuable world as a sacred world created by a loving God. In rebelling against a supposed tyrant in heaven, humans have come to worship their own powers and creations and, in the context of the unequal power relations which have been all too typical of human civilisation, we have found we have lost touch with the God of Love and come to subject ourselves to tyrants in both personal and impersonal forms, rulers, capitalists and militarists on the one hand, systems, markets, institutions on the other. Ingersoll writes of advancing ‘the holy cause of human progress’ and ‘doing away with gods and supernatural persons and powers’ as a means to the end of the ‘happiness of man.’

Everything I have written in this piece suggests that people who argue so blithely for ‘human progress’ need to look again. We have seen too much and have come to know too much after a century of organised, routinized, systematised violence to take such noble sentiments at face value. I am arguing directly against the Cartesian ‘method’ that ‘divided’ intellectual problems into ‘as many parts as possible’ – and proceeded to do exactly the same to the world, so that, in the end, we could no longer see the whole. Disenchanted man may celebrate having overthrown a tyrant in heaven, but the result of Cartesian dissection and disconnection is that we have come to be ruled by the tyranny of abstraction. 

In the words of Hillman: 

‘Breaking vessels is the return, the turn again to the world, giving back what we have taken from it by storing inside ourselves its soul. By this return we regard the world anew, having regard for it as it shows its regard for us and to us its face. We pay respect to it simply by looking again, respecting, that second look with the eye of the heart.’ 

Hillman, The Thought of the Heart 129 (​https:​/​​/​beccatarnas.com​/​tag​/​joanna-macy​/​" \l "_ftn9" \o "​)

That’s a lot of eyes. The eye of the mind, the eye of the imagination, the eye of the conscience, the eye of the soul, the eye of the heart. That’s a lot of ways in which we are equipped to see from the depths behind the physical eyes. Those eyes lead us to what Christopher Bache calls ‘the deep ecology of the mind’ (2000).

The imagination opens the door to the reality that lies beyond philosophical reason and scientific examination, beyond naming and framing, beyond the limitations of our conceptual and axiological appropriation – beyond a disenchantment that leaves us with a bogus metaphysics which fools us into thinking the world to be objectively valueless. The imagination opens the doors to the real world and permits us to enter as re-enchanted beings coming alive once more to the aliveness of life.

Having spent a lifetime in reason and philosophy, I am somewhat sceptical of anything that smacks of postmodernist disdain of objective reality and morality. But I have grown even more sceptical of what Mick Smith criticises as ‘axiological extensionism’, the expansion of formal systems of allocating values determining the bounds of moral considerability, formalizing an ethical hierarchy that fails to reflect either reality or our actual values, distorting both, indeed. (Smith 2001: ch 1). Smith argues that ‘Codifying ethics is only necessary where people lack a moral sense, where they have not been able to cultivate a relation to surrounding others or when their moral sense does not agree with that of the law makers. Ethics is, at heart, antinomian and anarchic.’





I very much agree with this. It is the Greater Love that does the containing, enfolding us and the world, not we, no matter how much we attempt to enclose the world in our Reason. 

I’m reminded of Dante’s Love that moves the sun and the other stars here. I’m reminded, too, of St. Julian of Norwich:

‘All shall be well, all shall be well, and all manner of thing shall be well… 
For there is a Force of Love moving through the universe
That holds us fast and will never let us go.’

Smith makes no mention of God, but he mentions the love that escapes the capture of codification and rationalisation. And I find that to be highly significant. True mystics know that we are dealing with the unnameable and indefinable; and they know that we should cease striving to name and frame this force that will always evade capture by reason. The more we attempt to enclose the world by reason, the more we come to confine ourselves in a conceptual prison.

Mysticism orients us to the world around us. Taking up the invitation to the dance, we lose the yearning to capture and freeze the world with our reason, to conceptualise and codify the very things we are meant to know from the inside, by living them. In being actively oriented to the world around us, we come to appreciate that that world is suffused with the sacred. Philosophical reason and scientific examination cannot see it and cannot it show, and therefore declares that it doesn’t exist. But those who live it know it. Love and you will know. I just wonder who the ‘big children’ are in this – those who retain a naïve faith in the power of reason to see reality, or those who dance. 

Quaker John Woolman (1720-1772) expresses the same thought this way:

‘that, as the mind was moved by an inward principle to love God as an invisible, incomprehensible Being, so, by the same principle, it was moved to love him in all his manifestations in the visible world.’

Woolman drew the conclusion that we cannot, without falling into contradiction, say that we are loving an invisible God whilst inflicting cruelty upon any creature that God kindled life in. (Dalke and Dixson 2004: 35).

Seeing with the eye of the mind, then, is seeing from behind the physical eyes with the eye of the imagination, connecting visions, values and virtues deriving from the soul and conscience within with the earth in which we live as natural beings. Imaginal space therefore conjoins inner and outer landscapes, enabling is look more deeply than the physical facts to apprehend the potential of life as it could be, emergent properties and imaginal possibilities for alternative futures. The imagination enables us not only to see the potentially catastrophic consequences of the exploitative, utilitarian capitalist relation to the Earth, but to envision a feasible future alternative society in which humanity comes to live respectfully and amply within the Earth’s community of life. Imagination opens the world up to possibilities that transcend the narrow ‘realism’ of the given world; it is involves a vision backed by an appreciation of real possibilities, something which makes for a practical idealism.

The imagination thus plays a creative role in the human-Earth interconnection and interrelation. With evidence for planetary unravelling mounting, humanity is being called upon to act and strike a course headed to an alternate future. There has been extensive debate as to the ineffectiveness of informing heads with objective facts with respect to the planetary crisis. Many have noted that such climate information has met with poor response. Part of this, I would argue, is the absence of a clear and coherent path forward in terms of the social and institutional means and mechanisms of common action outside of the exploitative, extractive economy. Too many people are dependent upon that very economy for their livelihoods for them to be able to take effective climate action as convinced and committed eco-citizens. That’s a question of structural transformation, transitions and institution building. And that’s a crucial part of resolving the environmental crisis. The other part, which is my focus here, lies in the deficiencies of delivering climate information in a neutral way. That may be the way of science, but it speaks to only one part of the human character. Objective facts with respect to physical reality need to be rendered meaningful through an existential focus if human beings are to respond with their full being. Information impresses the intellect, but for effective and enduring climate action, we need to change behaviours, and that means engaging the whole person. With environmental crisis and potential eco-catastrophe as a result of industrialization and the impacts of an ever-expanding economy, humanity is being called upon to re-think its demands, needs, goals and purposes in relation to the Earth. The imagination has a key role to play here, mediating between past actions, present problems and future possibilities. The inner eye connected to conscience and soul serves to connect intellect and the scientific apprehension of objective reality with moral vision and spiritual insight, appreciating our connections with other beings and bodies on Earth, and with Earth itself, enabling is to see our true place in a re-enchanted world. Inhabiting imaginal space means living in active appreciation of the human-Earth interrelation. For this reason, the ecological imagination is also the moral imagination. Plato’s seeing with the eye of the mind is, through the imagination, seeing through the eye of the soul, creating a bridge between the intellect, and the way it apprehends the objective facts of the physical world, and the psyche, and the way it seeks and finds meaning in the world. 
	

An imaginal ecology makes us responsive to the transcendent call of the beautiful, our new eyes revealing the beauty of the world to us. In uniting intellect and emotion, imagination lights the path to the ecology of the human heart. 

Joanna Macy writes on the planetary crisis unfolding before our eyes:

‘Life on our planet is in trouble. It is hard to go anywhere without being confronted by the wounding of our world, the tearing of the very fabric of life. We are assaulted by news of tornadoes and hurricanes, fleeing refugees, an entire village buried in mudslides, thousands of bodies under the rubble, another species lost, another city bombed.
Our planet is sending us signals of distress that are so continual now they seem almost normal. Reports proliferate about the loss of cropland and the spreading of hunger, toxins in the air we breathe and the water we drink, the die-off of plant and animal species. These are warning signals that we live in a world that can end, at least as a home for conscious life. This is not to say that it will end, but it can end. That very possibility changes everything for us.

Joanna Macy, World As Lover, World As Self: Courage for Global Justice and Ecological Renewal 2007

Macy writes that “The imagination needs to be schooled in order to experience our inter-existence with all beings in the web of life.” (Macy, 2007: 112.) The moral-ecological imagination enables us to respond to the planet’s distress signals. Appreciating the human-Earth interconnection, we come to see ourselves in relation to the other beings and bodies with whom we share the planet, recognising their claims and responding to their needs and recognising their need for life as being one and the same as our own. Macy and Johnstone see the environmental crisis that is upon us in precisely these terms:

‘When seeing with new eyes, you know that it isn't just you facing this. You are just one part of a much larger story, a continuing stream of life on Earth that has flowed for more than three and a half billion years and that has survived five mass extinctions. When you sink into this deeper, stronger flow and experience yourself as part of it, a different set of possibilities emerges. Widening your vision increases the resources available to you, since through the same channels of connectedness that pain for the world flows, so also do strength, courage, renewed determination, and the help of allies.

With the shift of perception that seeing with new eyes brings, you can let go of feeling you need to sort everything out. Instead you focus on finding and playing your part, offering your gift of Active Hope, your best contribution to the healing of our world. As you move into going forth, you consider what this might be, and what your next step will be. Then you take that step.’

Macy and Johnstone 2012: ch 2

They argue this in terms of the ‘Work that Reconnects’ considered as a spiral to which we can keep coming back to a source of strength yielding fresh insights. ‘It reminds us that we are larger, stronger, deeper, and more creative than we have been brought up to believe.’

Seeing with the moral-ecological eye of the imagination, we apprehend the facts of material life with real spiritual and psychic depth, looking our potentially catastrophic future square in the face, but envisioning alternate possibilities. A literary ecology that cultivates the moral imagination allows us to envision a future that is more in tune with true realities, whilst cultivating the psychic centre and spiritual vision that holds us together and enables us to weather the crises to come. It is from this centre that creative solutions to the problems we face emerge and grow. They are rooted in the dance of life. Our task is to take up the invitation.

‘I consider myself fortunate to live in these times. To be alive in this wonderful self-organizing universe, involved in the dance of life with the senses to perceive, with lungs to breathe, with organs that can obtain their nourishment — this is a miracle for which there are no words. Furthermore, it is an incredible privilege that we have been given human life with a self-reflective consciousness that makes us aware of our own actions and enables us to make decisions. Now is the time we human beings can decide to consciously and actively participate in this dance of life.’

Joanna Macy, Pass It On

Human beings are story telling animals. We live by stories. Or die by them when we become trapped in narratives of our own making. We need a new story, a story that serves us rather than ensnares and enslaves us to our own powers. These stories will give expression to a standpoint or a worldview, a set of assumptions by which we live our lives and express our needs. This new narrative inspires rather than inhibits us, inspiring us to join together in common cause and take action, becoming alive to the aliveness of life and the possibility of flourishing well together.

This new narrative brings together all that has been rendered asunder with respect to fact and value, knowledge and meaning, thereby transcending all alienating dualisms and dichotomies with respect to science and religion, knowledge and understanding. Such a vision is buttressed by the virtues and values that give ideas their transformative power, enabling humanity to join together in love and act wisely with respect to their knowledge and know-how. That new story must embody and articulate the immanence of our experience as social and natural beings in intimate relation with others, other humans as well as the other beings and bodies with which we share the more-than-human world, as well as with that natural world itself. Such a story overcomes false dualisms of consciousness and being, mind and body, and points to the embeddedness of being and to the reflexive nature of intimate knowledge.

Joanna Macy refers to this transformative power of a new story as the ‘Great Turning,’ the growing appreciation that the health and well-being of the personal, the collective and the planetary are involved in inextricable relation. Macy analyses this transformatory process in terms of three dimensions of participation: i) popular ‘actions to slow the damage to Earth and its beings’ all over the world; ii) the ‘analysis of structural causes and creation of structural alternatives’; iii) ‘a fundamental shift in worldview and values’ (Macy and Young, 1998: 17).

‘Many of us are engaged in all three, each of which is necessary to the creation of a life-sustaining society. People working quietly behind the scenes in any of these three dimensions may not consider themselves activists, but we do. We consider anyone acting for a purpose larger than personal gain or advantage to be an activist.’

 — Joanna Macy & Molly Young Brown (2014: 6)

Ecophenomenology – the relation of self to setting




‘The whole world is simply fodder and feces to the consumer, in sharp contrast to the man who is in an environment in which he belongs and is of necessity a part. The tourist can grasp only the superficialities of a landscape, whereas a resident reacts to what has occurred. He sees a landscape not only as a collection of physical forms, but as the evidence of what has occurred there. To the tourist, the landscape is merely a façade, but to the resident it is ‘the outcome of how it got there and the outside of what goes on inside.’

The resident is, in short, a part of the place, just as the fish is a part of the water in which it swims. Evernden quotes Northrop Frye to make the point that the goal of art is to ‘recapture, in full consciousness, that original lost sense of identity with our surroundings, where there is nothing outside the mind of man, or something identical with the mind of man.’ He proceeds to write about the involvement of the resident with that place in which he or she belongs, deducing that an artist gives us an understanding of what a place would look like to us ‘if we “belonged” there, if it were “our place.”’ (Neil Evernden, “Beyond Ecology: Self, Place, and the Pathetic Fallacy,” The North American Review 263 (Winter 1978): 99; Cheryll Glotfelty, Harold Fromm eds, The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology). 

This view has affinities with the ecology that is present in Tolkien, but is slightly different. Evernden’s perspective dissolves the boundary between the human and the natural world. However, for Tolkien, the world as such can never be ‘our place.’ Tolkien affirms the existence of a world around us that can never be possessed and never be made ‘ours’ in the sense of appropriation. The relation is quite different. Art gives us ‘a glimpse of the character of the land that would otherwise require long experience to achieve,’ and creates, through personal engagement with the subject portrayed by art, the possibility of spectators ceasing to be passive and on the outside of a place to becoming active participants. As a result of this involvement, the human subject ceases to encounter the other in the art as objective since, as Evernden argues, ‘The artist makes the world personal—known, loved, feared, or whatever, but not neutral. We achieve, then, the sensation of knowing, the sensation of being part of a known place.’ (Neil Evernden, “Beyond Ecology: Self, Place, and the Pathetic Fallacy,” The North American Review 263 (Winter 1978): 99). 





3 Promethean and Orphic Approaches to Nature

The inner consistency of reality
I return here to Tolkien’s reference to ‘the inner consistency of reality’ as a bedrock truth at the heart of his ecology of the good. 

The mental power of image-making is one thing, or aspect; and it should appropriately be called Imagination. The perception of the image, the grasp of its implications, and the control, which are necessary to a successful expression, may vary in vividness and strength: but this is a difference of degree in Imagination, not a difference in kind.

The achievement of the expression, which gives (or seems to give) “the inner consistency of reality,” is indeed another thing, or aspect, needing another name: Art, the operative link between Imagination and the final result Sub-creation.

For my present purpose I require a word which shall embrace both the Subcreative Art in itself and a quality of strangeness and wonder in the Expression, derived from the Image: a quality essential to fairy-story. I propose, therefore, to arrogate to myself the powers of Humpty-Dumpty, and to use Fantasy for this purpose: in a sense, that is, which combines with its older and higher use as an equivalent of Imagination the derived notions of “unreality” (that is, of unlikeness to the Primary World), of freedom from the domination of observed “fact,” in short of the fantastic.

I am thus not only aware but glad of the etymological and semantic connexions of fantasy with fantastic: with images of things that are not only “not actually present,” but which are indeed not to be found in our primary world at all, or are generally believed not to be found there. But while admitting that, I do not assent to the depreciative tone. That the images are of things not in the primary world (if that indeed is possible) is a virtue, not a vice. Fantasy (in this sense) is, I think, not a lower but a higher form of Art, indeed the most nearly pure form, and so (when achieved) the most potent.

Fantasy, of course, starts out with an advantage: arresting strangeness. But that advantage has been turned against it, and has contributed to its disrepute. Many people dislike being “arrested.” They dislike any meddling with the Primary World, or such small glimpses of it as are familiar to them. They, therefore, stupidly and even maliciously confound Fantasy with Dreaming, in which there is no Art; and with mental disorders, in which there is not even control: with delusion and hallucination.

But the error or malice, engendered by disquiet and consequent dislike, is not the only cause of this confusion. Fantasy has also an essential drawback: it is difficult to achieve. Fantasy may be, as I think, not less but more sub-creative; but at any rate it is found in practice that “the inner consistency of reality” is more difficult to produce, the more unlike are the images and the rearrangements of primary material to the actual arrangements of the Primary World.

It is easier to produce this kind of “reality” with more “sober” material.

Fantasy thus, too often, remains undeveloped; it is and has been used frivolously, or only half-seriously, or merely for decoration: it remains merely “fanciful.” Anyone inheriting the fantastic device of human language can say the green sun.

Many can then imagine or picture it. But that is not enough—though it may already be a more potent thing than many a “thumbnail sketch” or “transcript of life” that receives literary praise.

To make a Secondary World inside which the green sun will be credible, commanding Secondary Belief, will probably require labour and thought, and will certainly demand a special skill, a kind of elvish craft.

Few attempt such difficult tasks.





These words make it clear that, for Tolkien, art brings ‘the inner consistency of reality’ to the creations of the imagination. Art is an elvish craft that permits entry to the created world and which sees its applicability to our own world. This sets Tolkien’s notion of ‘regaining the clear view’ in creative, dynamic light, not merely contemplative in a passive sense. 

Philosopher Pierre Hadot does something similar in the way that he emphasises the capacity of art to create continuity between humanity and nature. Hadot points out that there were several models available to ancient philosophers and scientists in investigating nature, the choice between them being guided by the way that the relation between humanity and nature was represented and the way in which the ‘secrets of nature’ were perceived. He writes:

‘If man feels nature to be an enemy, hostile and jealous, which resists him by hiding its secrets, there will then be opposition between nature and human art, based on human reason and will. Man will seek, through technology, to affirm his power, domination, and rights over nature.
If, on the contrary, people consider themselves a part of nature because art is already present in it, there will no longer be opposition between nature and art; instead, human art, especially in its aesthetic aspect, will be in a sense the prolongation of nature, and then there will no longer be any relation of dominance between nature and mankind. The occultation of nature will be perceived not as a resistance that must be conquered but as a mystery into which human beings can be gradually initiated.

Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature, trans. Michael Chase (2006), 92.

Such a view offers a way of avoiding setting object and subject in antithetical relation, and it offers a way of mediating nature and reason, ‘reality’ and the appreciation of its ‘inner consistency’ on the one hand, and human art and will on the other. It is a view which sees the Earth as alive, and which sets human life within a sea of Earth energies: 'The Earth is indeed a living being. If we relate to her harmoniously, respecting her etheric organs, she will speak to us, inspire us, nourish us, work and co-operate with us.' (Adam McLean 1980). It is a view which resists the encroachment of a techno-urban industrial machine over the land.

Industrial encroachment
Tolkien wrote at a time of rapid transformation, with industrialisation and urbanisation coming to eat up the landscape of his rural home. His stories convey all the melancholy of someone who has borne witness to the loss of the earthly paradise of his youth. There is something in Tolkien’s personal experience that resonates with all of us. True, some of that is indeed nostalgia for the time when we, like the earth, were young, (although the earth’s youth was long before ours). Life is a series of mini-deaths, and the loss of youth is the first. Human beings are ontologically nostalgic, argued Martin Heidegger. But there is more than this going on. The loss of one’s youthful paradise at the hands of ‘progress’ and economic development points to the despoliation of an ecological beauty that is all too real. It is in this respect that Tolkien’s words strike a chord deep within us as we see increasing swathes of the Earth being enclosed and put to exploitative use by some humans. Tolkien’s words lamenting the loss of his rural home thus stand as a warning to succeeding generations that their world is at risk too. There is, therefore, an ecological sensitivity at the heart of Tolkien’s which, born of living in a world that was in the process of being lost, resonates in an era standing on the brink of ecological catastrophe. We are still losing the world, piece by piece, year by year, to anthropogenic enclosure and ecological degradation. Tolkien’s nostalgia is our own lament for a world we have lost or are losing. 

Middle Earth – Promethean and Orphic relating to the natural world
This experience of paradise lost – or, more precisely, paradise enclosed, expropriated, exploited, used, abused and despoiled - calls for an examination of the various forms by which human beings have sought to relate to the natural world, and the various forms involved in anthropocentric mastery. Pierre Hadot distinguishes between Orphic and Promethean attitudes:





The words of Rainer Maria Rilke, speaking of Orpheus, are worth quoting in this respect:

Song, as you teach it, is not covetousness
Or the quest for something one might finally obtain.
Song is existence.

Sonnets to Orpheus (1923)

Those words reference the seductive power over living and non-living beings which singing and playing the lyre give to Orpheus. The Orphic view takes us beyond the possessiveness and appropriation that Tolkien sees as central to the dominant view and which he urges human beings to leave behind. An Orphic attitude is an end in itself and does not establish Nature for us as something to enclose and exploit. 
In contrast, possessiveness and appropriation are central to the Promethean view. Hadot identifies the three primary methods of the Promethean attitude, experimentation, mechanics, and magic, each of which involve the manipulation of nature with a view to some end. In Middle-Earth the Promethean approach is exemplified by the Dark Lord Sauron, and then by the wizard Saruman, who both use technology in order to achieve power and dominion over others. As Hadot notes, this attempt to master nature is based upon a view which sees nature as ‘an enemy, hostile and jealous.’ That view sees an ‘opposition between nature and human art’, with the result that ‘Man will seek, through technology, to affirm his power, domination, and rights over nature.’ (Hadot, 2006: 92). 

As Treebeard says in explaining who Saruman is to the Hobbits: ‘I think that I now understand what [Saruman] is up to. He is plotting to become a Power. He has a mind of metal and wheels; and he does not care for growing things, except as far as they serve him for the moment. And now it is clear that he is a black traitor. He has taken up with foul folk, with the Orcs.’ (Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers, II, iv, 76). The negative connotations of ‘metal and wheels’ with the pursuit of power associates technology here with the evil of overriding ‘growing things.’ The point is that technology is neither good nor bad in itself, but in accordance with its relation to power, nature, growing things, and corrupting domination, to ends that are natural and respect the diversity of peoples and lands, or to ends of personal aggrandizement. 

Saruman’s lust for power echoes that of Sauron. Of course, in The Lord of the Rings, the evil nature of technology as power is symbolised by the One Ring. The Ring expresses the technological temptation, the promise to empower all those who possess it, but which, in turn comes to possess in being a machine or an instrument that removes the free will of all those who come to use it.

Hadot treats magic as another expression of the Promethean attitude, which is consistent with Tolkien’s view. Tolkien makes a distinction between magic, considered as the technological manipulations undertaken by the Enemy, and enchantment, as the exquisite creations of peoples such as the Elves. The distinction is nuanced and not always clear cut, as Tolkien acknowledges in his letters. This letter sets the distinction in a context that makes the nuances clear.

Anyway all this stuff is mainly concerned with Fall, Mortality, and the Machine. With Fall inevitably, and that motive occurs in several modes. With Mortality, especially as it affects art and the creative (or as I should say, sub-creative) desire which seems to have no biological function, and to be apart from the satisfactions of plain ordinary biological life, with which, in our world, it is indeed usually at strife. This desire is at once wedded to a passionate love of the real primary world, and hence filled with the sense of mortality, and yet unsatisfied by it. It has various opportunities of 'Fall'. It may become possessive, clinging to the things made as 'its own', the sub-creator wishes to be the Lord and God of his private creation. He will rebel against the laws of the Creator - especially against mortality. Both of these (alone or together) will lead to the desire for Power, for making the will more quickly effective, - and so to the Machine (or Magic). 

Tolkien therefore sees Mortality as connected with the real primary world. There is a passionate love of this world, but also a lack of satisfaction, impelling desire to push beyond it. The Machine (or Magic) is an attempt to cheat Mortality and gain immortal life, as expressed in the desire for Power.

Tolkien proceeds to clarify precisely what he means by the Machine (or Magic):

By the last I intend all use of external plans or devices (apparatus) instead of development of the inherent inner powers or talents - or even the use of these talents with the corrupted motive of dominating: bulldozing the real world, or coercing other wills. The Machine is our more obvious modern form though more closely related to Magic than is usually recognised.

Tolkien this differentiates between the realisation and use of immanent natural potentialities and powers, which, being natural, would be part of wider nature’s flourishing, and the imposition of external forces upon this nature, which is a distortion of nature and inhibits its flourishing. There is a clear distinction here between a natural anarchy that proceeds from within the world and an instrumental domination that is imposed from the outside. It is the division between an internal moral coordination of affairs and an external abstract-systematic imposition. Tolkien writes that the Elves are there to demonstrate the difference between magic and enchantment. 

I have not used 'magic' consistently, and indeed the Elven-queen Galadriel is obliged to remonstrate with the Hobbits on their confused use of the word both for the devices and operations of the Enemy, and for those of the Elves. I have not, because there is not a word for the latter (since all human stories have suffered the same confusion). But the Elves are there (in my tales) to demonstrate the difference. Their 'magic' is Art, delivered from many of its human limitations: more effortless, more quick, more complete (product, and vision in unflawed correspondence). 

By Magic, then, Tolkien is not referring to spells and such staples of Fantasy and Fiction:

‘Anyway, a difference in the use of 'magic' in this story is that it is not to be come by 'lore' or spells; but is in an inherent power not possessed or attainable by Men as such. Aragorn's 'healing' might be regarded as 'magical', or at least a blend of magic with pharmacy and 'hypnotic' processes.’

Their magia the Elves and Gandalf use (sparingly): a magia, producing real results (like fire in a wet faggot) for specific beneficent purposes. Their goetic effects are entirely artistic and not intended to deceive: they never deceive Elves (but may deceive or bewilder unaware Men) since the difference is to them as clear as the difference to us between fiction, painting, and sculpture, and 'life'.

From: Letter #155 to Naomi Mitchison (draft)

Magic is something quite distinct and sophisticated, underscoring a profound point concerning power, the opposition of internal (natural) and external (mechanistic) power, and its promise, possession, use and perversion. Tolkien makes a clear distinction between ‘inherent inner powers or talents’ and ‘external plans or devices (apparatus).’ Immanent powers are potentialities which are to be realised and exercised as part of the natural flourishing of any being, bringing that being to full development within and in tune with other beings and bodies within natural surroundings. This is a natural growth and development in which beings are at one with the earth’s commonwealth of life. Against this, the ‘plans or devices (apparatus)’ of the Machine are external impositions which express ‘the corrupted motive of dominating’: ‘bulldozing’ and building over the real primary world, and coercing the wills of others, perverting their natural immanent development in the process. For Tolkien, all beings have their ‘inherent inner powers or talents’ and these, in a natural anarchy or pacifism, are to be respected. These powers or talents may appear to other races as magic, but they are not, in the sense that they are natural rather than mechanical, external and instrumental. They are natural aptitudes or gifts that are used naturally and effortlessly, without much ado. As Tolkien writes, ‘their 'magic' is Art, delivered from many of its human limitations: more effortless, more quick, more complete.’ He goes on to write:

And its object is Art not Power, sub-creation not domination and tyrannous re-forming of Creation. The 'Elves' are 'immortal', at least as far as this world goes: and hence are concerned rather with the griefs and burdens of deathlessness in time and change, than with death. The Enemy in successive forms is always 'naturally' concerned with sheer Domination, and so the Lord of magic and machines; but the problem: that this frightful evil can and does arise from an apparently good root, the desire to benefit the world and others - speedily and according to the benefactor's own plans - is a recurrent motive.

From: Letter #131 to Milton Waldman

To put this in terms of the Promethean and Orphic distinction, Elvish enchantment is the very antithesis of mechanical Magic, and expresses the Orphic approach to nature. In contrast, the Promethean approach to nature is one of external imposition and domination for instrumental ends, relating to nature as an enemy to be conquered by technique and organisation. The Orphic approach is characterised by a growth from the inside through poetry, music, art, holistic science, myth and contemplation. As Tolkien argues, the magia that the Elves use produces ‘real results … for specific beneficent purposes.’ The effects are ‘entirely artistic’ and ‘not intended to deceive.’ 

There is a profound philosophical issue at stake here, one that pertains to the very nature and status of philosophy itself. And it is an issue that goes back to the origins of philosophy in the switch that Socrates effected from the natural philosophy of the first philosophers to moral philosophy and its concern with human affairs, relations between people and the question of what it is to live well together. Heraclitus said that ‘Nature loves to hide.’ Contemplating what he meant by this begs the question of whether we should be concerned with a physics obsesses over unveiling the secrets of nature, or whether we would do better simply being what we naturally are, and let our own nature unfold within the mystery of it all – if nature wants to hide, then let nature hide! Nature as a whole might not be ours to know, let alone possess!

‘If one accepts that nature hides and conceals its secrets from us, then one can adopt several attitudes with regard to it. One can simply reject all research relating to nature. This was the attitude of Socrates …. In the words of Cicero, “Socrates was the first to turn philosophy away from the things that have been hidden and wrapped up by nature itself, with which the philosophers previous to him concerned themselves, and to bring it back to the level of human life.” This amounted to a refusal to discuss things that, on the one hand, transcend human beings, because they are inaccessible to their investigative powers, and, on the other hand, have no importance for them, since the only thing that must interest them is the conduct of moral and political life. As would be said, for different reasons, by Seneca, Rousseau, and Nietzsche, if nature has hidden certain things, then it had good reasons to hide them. If, for philosophers such as Socrates, Aristo of Chios, and the Academic Arcesilas, no research on nature is possible, this means that for them, unlike for other philosophical schools, there is no “physical” part of philosophy, since physics is precisely the study of nature (phusis).’

That’s one approach. It is an approach that considers the primary question of philosophy to be the one of how we may to live well together. That’s the approach of moral and political philosophy. And it is the Orphic approach. It is unconcerned with knowing the ‘secrets’ of nature, and eschews all attempts to control, possess, dominate and manipulate nature through tools and technologies.

An alternative to the Orphic approach has ambitions to unveil the secrets of nature, and considers humankind to be capable of succeeding in that ambition.

‘From this perspective, physics becomes the part of philosophy that assigns itself the task of discovering what nature wants to conceal from us. This conception of physical philosophy appears explicitly with Antiochus of Ascalon (the end of the second to the beginning of the first century BCE), a Platonist on whose doctrine Cicero reports in his Academics. According to Antiochus, the subject of physics is “nature and secret things.”’

Pierre Hadot, 2006 The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature 91-92

The choice between the two approaches depends upon how way we see nature and our relation to and place within it. As Hadot proceeds to point out, if we see nature as something that resists us by hiding its secrets, then we see it as an enemy whose resistance is to be broken down. ‘There will then be opposition between nature and human art’ and ‘man will seek, through technology, to affirm his power, domination, and rights over nature.’ That’s very much the idea of technology as an external intervention and manipulation in the Promethean approach. 

The Orphic approach holds that ‘if nature has hidden certain things, then it had good reasons to hide them.’ Accepting this, we do not see nature as an enemy but, instead, adopt a contemplative approach that exults in the wonder that things are, rather than being concerned to know what things are. This is an approach that comes to understanding through the contemplation of the whole, as against a reductionism that breaks this whole down into single, discrete parts.

The distinction being made here between Orphic wonder and Promethean investigation is the distinction between Elvish enchantment and mechanical magic, and is the difference between the Wizards of the Middle-Earth: Gandalf, who wears a grey robe, and Saruman, who wears white. Saruman renounces his rank as White Wizard to become Saruman of Many Colors in making a bid for power, expressing disdain for his former colour and all that it symbolizes. The exchange between Gandalf and Saruman illuminates the two distinct approaches at work here.

‘“For I am Saruman the Wise, Saruman Ring-maker, Saruman of Many Colours!”

I looked then and saw that his robes, which had seemed white, were not so, but were woven of all colours, and if he moved they shimmered and changed hue so that the eye was bewildered. 

“I liked white better,” I said. 

“White!” he sneered. “It serves as a beginning. White cloth may be dyed. The white page can be overwritten; and the white light can be broken.”

“In which case it is no longer white,” said I. “And he that breaks a thing to find out what it is has left the path of wisdom.” – Gandalf’

Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring, I, ii, 272.

In his concern for power, its possession and use, Saruman goes from being one of the Wise, one who expresses an Orphic approach in the relation to others and to the world, to becoming an evil figure adopting a Promethean approach in pursuit of power, control and domination over others and over the world. This demonstrates possessiveness and appropriation with a view to manipulate others and nature. It betrays an instrumental approach to the world, seeking to use others as means to the end of personal aggrandisement. This instrumentalism and the reduction of nature to its component parts has its roots in an anthropocentrism that sees nature as an enemy withholding its secrets:

‘In anthropocentric culture, nature’s agency and independence of ends are denied, subsumed in or remade to coincide with human interests, which are thought to be the source of all value in the world. Mechanistic worldviews especially deny nature any form of agency of its own.’









Under the shadow of rationalisation

Here we gain some insight into what it is, precisely, that we, the little folk, are fighting against in fighting the long defeat. The Promethean approach to mastering nature by means of technique and organisation has brought about the rationalisation and instrumentalisation of the world. In the words of Max Weber:

The fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the disenchantment of the world.

Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’ in Gerth and Mills 1977:155

Weber puts the key questions to us on this disenchanted terrain of capitalist modernity– where does value lie?

‘Who — aside from certain big children who are indeed found in the natural sciences - still believes that the findings of astronomy, biology, physics, or chemistry could teach us anything about the meaning of the world? If there is any such 'meaning', along what road could one come upon its tracks? If these natural sciences lead to anything in this way, they are apt to make the belief that there is such a thing as the 'meaning' of the universe die out at its very roots.’

Weber is clear and consistent on this point, which is why I return to it over and again. This is the testing ground of our views – here is the disenchanted terrain upon which we have erected the modern world. In Weber’s view, scientific advance has rendered the world objectively valueless and has cut the grounds from underneath views that hold that we live in a good, meaningful and purposeful world. 

I have written at length on this question over the years, an examination that continues to the present day. (Peter Critchley, Scientific and Moral Truth, http://pcritchley2.wixsite.com/beingandplace/single-post/2017/05/08/Scientific-and-Moral-Truth (​http:​/​​/​pcritchley2.wixsite.com​/​beingandplace​/​single-post​/​2017​/​05​/​08​/​Scientific-and-Moral-Truth​)). In my view, the split between fact and value which Weber shows to have opened up in the modern world is untenable in itself, and unsustainable with respect to social living, in that it reduces life to the factual (neutral), technical and instrumental, and cannot satisfy questions of meaning. 

But it is worth spelling out Weber’s views clearly and concisely – for the very reason that we live under Weber’s shadow – this is the world we live in, and it is a world in which values have been shorn of their objective foundations. Weber is clear that the more we have gained in terms of scientific knowledge, the more the world has been emptied of meaning. The world is thus declared to be objectively valueless – it contains nothing by way of inherent value, goodness, meaning, and purpose. Science has no meaning and must restrict itself to ‘the purely practical and technical.’ There is no transcendence of the (neutral) facts of an objectively valueless world. I am continually engaged in the attempt to bridge the fields of theoretical reason (science, knowledge of external reality) and practical reason (ethics, politics), integrating these with economics (system of exchange with nature), art (aesthetic experience), and the spiritual dimension (the cosmic longing for meaning). With Weber, this project lies in ruins, the connections to sources of truth, value and meaning have been severed, and the whole has been shattered. We live in a disconnected world. The rationalist idea that science or theoretical reason might be the ‘way to true being’ (the ancient Greeks), the ‘way to true art’ and hence the ‘way to true nature’ (the Renaissance), the ‘way to true God’ (my own natural law view, exemplified by St. Thomas Aquinas, of a rational science of human and social order) are repudiated by Weber as mere ‘former illusions.’ The idea that science is the ‘way to true happiness’ is dismissed as a modernist fallacy, believed in only by ‘a few big children in university chairs.’ (1970: 139-43). Science is a means of establishing the facts of the world, neutrally, without reference to values, and nothing more. Weber proceeds to establish that between the realm of facts and the realm of values there is a 'logical gulf’ that can never be bridged (1949: 51-63). 

My answer to this scientistic neutralism can be found all over my work. I repeat myself far too much, and so refer people to investigate the writings where I develop my response at length. Here, I need to be brief. In a nutshell, the problem is this, with the separation of the realms of fact and value, we have come to exalt a conception of (scientific) rationality that has no meaning in itself, cannot transcend its value neutrality, and which finds no meaning in the world. That is the dominant conception of rationality, and it is one that restricts reason to the factual and the technical. It delivers on knowledge and know-how, which give us the ability to act. However, these things do not make us want to act, and they do not answer the question as to why we should act. The expansion of means is accompanied by a diminution of meaning, hence our technical capacities continually misfire. This scientistic conception of rationality cannot pronounce on ends. And here we come to the second part of the problem – the realm of values has been dissolved into a series of value judgments. Without an objective standard provided by transcendent norms, truths and values, morality is merely irreducible subjective preference and opinion, with no criteria available to decide between competing values. As Weber argues, we are free to choose our own gods – or devils. My criticism of this position is that, without objective standards of evaluation, it is impossible to distinguish between gods and devils, and makes no difference. Weber’s ethics of responsibility placing so much emphasis on individual choice is, ultimately, empty, as devoid of meaning as the objective world he describes scientistically. This is the world in which people lose the ability to tell the difference between good and bad, and lose the will so to do. This is the moral and psychological terrain bringing about the normalisation and routinisation of evil. It is the world headed for self-destruction, imploding from within through a subjective self-assertion that takes the form of a mutual self-cancellation leading to mutual self-annihilation. It is a world that, with ecological catastrophe staring it in the face, lacks the nous to put aside the narcissism of petty differences and stand together in common cause. It is the world that Tolkien challenges. 
I have a wealth of books here from the fields of biology, physics, mathematics, neuroscience, many of which claim that science shows how amazingly unlikely is our existence, so unlikely, indeed, that it could only be a miracle created by God. I also have books from the same fields which point to accident and evolution and natural selection. And I am increasingly disinclined to wade into the struggle – because I don’t think science is about such questions, and certainly cannot settle them. Certainly not in the context of the fact-value dualism adumbrated above. It is addressing that dualism that is key to my own view. Bridge that chasm, and the facts of natural life will then feed into the practical realm of living.

There are reasons to be cautious. Weber cites the naturalist Swammerdam, and his claim to have found ‘proof of God’s providence in the anatomy of a louse.’ This tendency to natural theology replaced the metaphysics of a previous age, the idea we could elaborate the science of human and social order as a work of reason. Protestant and Pietist religious believers revolted against such rationalism, and scientists influenced by them likewise turned away from philosophical deduction. And so we get the likes of Swammerdam, and the idea that we can detect God’s intelligence and design and purpose at work in physical nature. And I have shelves of books along these lines – the believers outweighed by the non-believers, the very same facts and figures being cited to show a) there is a God and b) there is no God. And, in those terms, neither side can refute the other. In the end, for me, it comes down to which side can offer the most plausible account of human life in all its richness, passion and meaning – because the fact is simply this – human beings are not indifferent and are never neutral with respect to facts – they think it matters. But the choice is made for reasons other than science, on that I am clear. 
Weber may be right about science and what it reveals about the objectively valueless world. But in human terms, he is plain wrong. If the world has no purpose and meaning, then the science that establishes this fact is as valueless as the world it describes. Of course, the response to that criticism is that science has no pretensions to pronounce on value, it is merely deflating the illusions of metaphysics and ethics in believing there could be such a thing as transcendent standards and objective foundations. Science, says Weber, is restricted to practical and technical matters. The problem, however, is that the separation of fact and value has also been accompanied by the exaltation of the former as the dominant conception of rationality, with respect to the objective facts of physical nature, and the diminution of the latter, as mere subjective preferences, opinions, likes and dislikes. 

And this divide and inversion is unsustainable. With science and the world of fact as the realm of reason and morality as the realm of non-rational value judgements, truth-seeking – the very basis of science – rests on insecure foundations. We have just witnessed scientists in the U.S. marching against the devaluation of science by the Trump administration. The march affirmed the value of science and the value of truth-seeking. And here is the problem: in light of the fact-value distinction ushered in by the disenchanted scientistic viewpoint, the value of science can now only be defended in non-rational, subjective terms as merely one preference amongst others. As Weber put it, we choose our own gods or devils. And that is why I state that in such a world, morality becomes not merely conventional, it reflects conventions which embody and express the power and resources of the dominant class. It’s unethical, it’s wrong and it’s unsustainable – we had to meet and overcome Weber’s challenge – because Weber’s world cannot hold. 

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming

The world, which seems,
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.
Matthew Arnold, 'Dover Beach'

No one but ‘big children’ believes that the natural sciences can teach us about the meaning of the world – other than the fact that the world is meaningless. That’s the Weberian view of the modern world. It’s not a scientific question but, if anything, the sciences serve to eradicate the belief that the world contains purpose and meaning. And it is in this context, Weber notes, that previous hopes for a natural theology replacing deductive rationalist metaphysics crashed. Far from revealing the hand of God, modern science has emerged as the principal enemy of God and religion. Weber refers to the yearning of some to escape the austere discipline of scientific rationalism, either through religious experience or the cult of the irrational. I think this yearning and its expression is an understandable reaction against meaninglessness. Weber, however, considers these things to be mere evasions. In this ‘godless and prophetless time’, all that can be created is an ‘ersatz’ religion which is capable of generating 'fanatical sects but never a genuine community' (Weber 1970: 153 155 199). Weber is also dismissive of the view that scientific knowledge and technical know-how can so transform existence as to bring heaven on earth and make us all happy. Against this view, he cites Nietzsche’s critique of ‘the last human beings who have invented happiness.’ (Weber 91-92).

Weber sums his view of science and meaning up:





Tolstoy is right that “What shall we do? How shall we live?” are the most important questions of human life. If science has nothing to say on these questions, then so much the worse for science. 





Is the meaning of life a question that can be answered? With what tools? The question of how we are to live is not a meaningless question at all, human beings have been answering it practically all the time of their existence. In asking the question properly, we need to establish the right relation between means and ends. Knowledge and know-how are the realm of the empirical and instrumental – concerning the practical, factual and technical. At best, science yields the empirical knowledge that we may take into account when it comes to determining the most effective means of working towards and reaching ends we have set ourselves. Science cannot provide an ‘absolute ethic’ of ultimate ends but may come to serve those who choose to live by an 'ethic of responsibility.’ (Weber 1970:118f.). 

That’s a pretty meagre philosophy of life, in my view, and one that is insecure and unguarded. To remain silent on ultimate ends leaves entirely open the question of the ends which practical means may come to serve. Think of Adolf Eichmann’s defence and the emphasis he placed on railway timetables and engineering efficiency. If science cannot provide or evaluate ends themselves, that does not in itself mean that we cannot do so by using other resources. Weber says we cannot ‘”refute scientifically” the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount’ (Weber 1970:148), and he is right. But neither can we prove or vindicate that ethic, or any other ethic, scientifically since, according to this view, science cannot transcend the factual and therefore has nothing to say on questions of value. 

In short, when it comes to everything that gives human life and human acts their meaning, science is silent. And when the objective facts of meaningless things in an objectively valueless world is presented as the dominant conception of rationality and exalted over the subjective experience of human life, the latter devalued as a congeries of warring gods, then the world becomes silent on ultimate values and we become subservient to false gods. In disenchanting the world, we move from a conception of inherent value to a conception of human subjects as projecting value upon the world. The world is stripped of its inherent worth, dis-godded of the true objects of worship, and instead value is projected upon it by the human valuers. And the things valued are human creations, the new gods which we worship and sacrifice to. Marx refers to human beings becoming the ‘playthings of alien powers.’ (Marx, On the Jewish Question). Weber puts it in terms of renascent gods in the guise of modern powers: 'Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces' (Weber SV 1991:149). These are the new idols that Pope Francis speaks of. And we need to know where they come from and uproot them at source. Because their demands for human sacrifice are real and are exacted through irresistible impersonal force. And the power of these new idols can be seen in the way that they frame the world and claim the lives of each and all within that world.

I’m reminded of A.N. Whitehead’s comment in Science and the Modern World: 

‘But if men cannot live on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants.’ 

We have been looking at things the wrong way around – with the splitting of fact and value, the realm of the former has been raised as the dominant conception of rationality whilst the latter has been downgraded as the realm of subjective opinion. We cannot live on disinfectants; we cannot just dismiss the question of how to live as philosophically meaningless. In order to live well together we stand in need of an ethic of ultimate values and ends.

Weber is well aware of the extent to which the process of rationalisation operates to suppress the distinctive values of western civilisation, authenticity, spontaneity, creativity and autonomy (Turner 1993:228). He just didn’t think that overarching notions of ultimate values would suffice to create anything but ‘ersatz’ or surrogate forms of meaning and commonality. That leaves us with the question of how to resist the normalisation and routinisation of evil within a system that proceeds ‘without regard for persons’ (Weber 1991:215). The idea of evil as the lack of autonomy or spontaneity, as an enslavement to a totalising power, is something that is distinctively modern. The old difference between good and evil remain, but has become more difficult to identify, embrace or resist. Tolkien himself had fought in the First World War and had been at the Battle of the Somme. That war, and all that followed in its aftermath, would seem to count as an obvious evil. There is nothing new about war but what was distinctive about war in the twentieth century was the scale and intensity on which it was organised and fought. War became ‘total war.’ And the most remarkable thing about it was that this total war was undertaken by completely sane and normal people, people who, personally, you would consider good rather than evil, and who would ordinarily settle into a mundane everyday existence. Whatever their personal character, it seems that modernity has come to entangle individuals in patterns of behaviour that compel actions and cause effects that generate evil collective consequences. We are living in the realm of ‘alien power,’ under the sway of vast impersonal forces. The result is that the nature of evil has come to assume curiously impersonal forms in the modern world. We live under the tyranny of an abstraction unfettered of all social, moral, ecological and personal constraint, a tyranny whose immeasurable violence and destruction can only be dimly seen in the wars and their victims the world over, as well as in the ecological catastrophe to come. These events will stand as a permanent memorial to the sacrifices demanded by, and given to, the false idols of money and power, the myriad totalizing rationalisations which have enclosed life on earth and claimed the lives of each and all, human and non-human alike. 

Here we come to Tolkien's Middle-earth legendarium. The Wraiths are the nine men who succumbed to Sauron's power and attained near-immortality as servants bound to the power of the One Ring. They are completely under the dominion of Sauron.








In this sense, ‘the long defeat’ that we are fighting to preserve the environment is fought against the depersonalisation and disenchantment of the world, against the way that the rationalising forces of capitalist modernity remove us further and further away from our biological matrix and draw us deeper into a world of institutional and technological abstraction. That is the impersonal world that proceeds ‘without regard for persons,’ without regard for anything, person, planet, the other beings and bodies that compose the more-than-human world that enfolds and nourishes us. That’s the world in which important decision makers and change-agents become indifferent to the appeal of fact and value.

That’s the collective force we are fighting against, the violence and tyranny of abstraction. But it matters that it is a ‘we’ that is fighting this ‘long defeat.’ Frodo acts heroically against overwhelming odds, but he is not alone and therefore is not overwhelmed. The heroic actions and support of all the protagonists enable us to keep on fighting the fight. In other words, Tolkien is not giving us the classic story of the triumph of heroic individualism over huge forces, but something very different – a fight against the long defeat that we undertake together and in which the fates of each and all are interconnected. 

Hannah Arendt wrote on the banality of evil in the twentieth century. With this phrase, she captures the normalisation of actions that do real harm to others, a moral and cultural desensitising to the reality of evil. The most salient characteristic of evil in a century of total war has been its impersonal nature. Since the First World War, society has been characterised by the mass mobilisation of people and their participation in the organised hatreds of entire nations. People look at the consequences of war and express horror as though someone or something else is responsible. It is as though nobody wants consciously to do evil, but evil gets done anyway. The shadow of death and its active production lies over us. 

It is not just the scale of death that is striking in the modern world but its organisational and psychological preparation. Gil Elliot writes of the Twentieth Century Book of the Dead. Death, war and all that follows it in terms of famine and disease, not to mention the psychological scars, is ‘the central moral as well as material fact of our time.’ Elliot wrote these words before the threat of climate change came to be appreciated, describing, in 1972, the twentieth century as the ‘century of death.’ The Twenty-First Century Book of the Dead threatens to dwarf the scale of death of the twentieth century. It may well be that the twentieth century has been the organisational, technical, political and psychological preparation for the universal destruction to come. It should come as no surprise that a society which produces death as an active principle of organisation, that routinizes that production, and that normalises it through death-dealing delusions, should issue in a collective threat to the conditions of civilised life in the form of global heating. 

The crisis in the climate system is an expression of the crisis in the social system, a loss of purpose, meaning and value. We find ourselves imprisoned within specific social relations within which certain powerful agents and decision-makers, in the grip of systemic and institutional imperatives, undertake actions that create a veritable world of the dead that first rivals, then subverts, overwhelms and finally eclipses the world of the living in size and substance. In the end, we all become complicit at various levels in the major atrocities that mark the modern world, atrocities undertaken not merely by clearly evil leaders and followers, but by bureaucrats and accountants, by impersonal institutional and economic routine, by engineers and economists concerned with ensuring the efficiency of the means to given ends, by laws and force. 

Death on this scale is not accidental but is the result of deliberate, organised purpose embedded in the social and institutional fabric. We live in a psychic prison that generates a sociopathic insanity as the normal character structure of the society we live in, a systematic corruption of thought and values and senses. 
We have to come out of those shadows. Here, Elliot makes a perceptive comment. Whilst the massive numbers of those who have met violent ends is the central moral and material fact of our time, ‘this will not be greatly meaningful unless we can bring the dead into existential focus.’ (Elliot 1972). I agree very much that we need to bring objective material facts into existential reality for them to become meaningful at the level of morals and motivation. But this begs the question I raised earlier with respect to the demand that ‘we’ need to act in respect to the scientific evidence for climate change. Who, within specific social relations that divide humanity unequally between different groups and classes, is this ‘we’? And where is this political ‘we’ that is capable of undertaking action for the collective good? In a world divide between groups, classes, nations and economic interests, we stand in need of constituting this ‘we’, both socially and politically, that is capable of bringing the world of physical fact into existential focus. The evidence of death as the central moral and material fact of our times is clear enough, as is the evidence for the crisis in the climate system and myriad environmental threats to civilised existence. The creation of the means and mechanisms for addressing these facts existentially is much the more difficult question. But not impossible to answer. The demand to bring material fact into existential focus is to recognise the depth of the crisis we face – it demands nothing less than a change in patterns of social behaviour making for a new way of life.
We have to protest, reject and overthrow the corruption and, indeed, self-corruption of our ideals and aspirations and the way that this corrupting process generates a deep and far-reaching despair amongst those who would normally be expected to seek change for the better. We must not let the defeat and destruction of our hopes turn into a hopeless cynicism, recover the courage and show the commitment to turn this inverted social world around. The frustration, defeat and perversion of our hopes through co-option within the routinisation and normalisation of evil within the megamachine cannot ever revoke the natural force of human beings, the inextinguishable fire within, that future promise of health and happiness that could always, one day, come to be incarnated in the peaceable kingdom. 

...Your name and your deeds were forgotten
Before your bones were dry,
And the lie that slew you is buried
Under a deeper lie;

But the thing that I saw in your face
No power can disinherit:
No bomb that ever burst
Shatters the crystal spirit.

George Orwell, The Crystal Spirit

The system may thwart our hopes, but a spark of defiance will always remain; it may co-opt us at various levels, but we remain intransigent; it may beat us, but we are never completely defeated; it may deceive us as to where our best interests lie, but those interests remain our birthright, and can never be permanently taken away; they may be perverted and diverted, but they remain our possession, to be reactivated in moments of self-activity and self-creativity. In short, alienation is an active condition, never a permanent ossification, and a process that can be turned around. We remain in contact with the irrefutable touchstone of truth; the force and myth of the megamachine can always be challenged, subverted and overthrown. Certainly, time and again we have witnessed human beings implicated in evil and madness in response to external imperatives, orders, desperate situations. And we have seen the times of the megamachine grow ever madder with the progress of unreason, rationalisation as an advanced malady that originates from the hollow heart of the disenchanted world. In the end, though, the grounds for hope lie in that unshatterable crystal spirit that contains the ineliminable potential for human recreation and recovery of being. The realisation of social justice, ecological health, sanity, solidarity, peace, freedom, democracy, and equality begins with a call for any one of them alone, or any combination of them, ultimately for all of them together. And that realisation for all humankind begins when some give voice to our hope. Co-opted, deceived, beaten, we can never be completely defeated, but engage in a protracted struggle and return to contest the terrain with those who would empty it of all value and meaning.

In Tolkien’s terms, the architects of such evils are ‘wraiths,’ and those who go along with their machinations are culpable in some way in the wraithing process that normalises evil. Weber refers to the disenchantment of the world to describe a world emptied of meaning and value. We live in an objectively valueless world, a world lacking in any intrinsic meaning, purpose and goodness. Such a world is shorn of objective foundations for morality and is, in the words of Nietzsche, ‘beyond good and evil’. Nietzsche embraced this nihilism as a joyous freedom from overarching moralities lacking in content. I’m not so sure. Instead of a world of existential freedom, I see human beings as social beings caught up in routines and practices which come to implicate them in patterns of behaviour that blur the moral boundaries. If truth, justice and goodness are merely conventional, with no objective grounding, then it is the conventions of the prevailing society that will dominate – and as Marx pointed out in The German Ideology, the ruling ideas of every age are the ideas of the ruling class, since those who own and control the means of production own and control, also, the means of communication. That existential freedom from an objective morality located in the good world is not, after all, so liberating an experience, certainly not within asymmetrical relations of class power. This is the world of sophistry, in which justice is the interests of the strongest, might is right, and rich and powerful prevail over the bulk of humanity. In time, people no longer know what’s good and evil and stop trying to tell them apart. Evil, like good, is a practice, a process, and, when normalised, doing evil becomes a job or a routine. No one starts out to do evil but, within prevailing relations, constrained by systemic imperatives, good intentions turn bad and things start to go wrong. The distinctive quality of evil in a modern world governed by institutions that proceed ‘without regard for persons’ is its strangely neutral and anonymous character. Systems, institutions, and bureaucratic procedures all seem to be the things that are acting rather than individuals. Individuals are passive agents within a system in which no-one is responsible, mere functionaries working towards ends which are external to them. People struggle to admit the impersonality and banality of evil, lest that category apply to them too to as they go about fulfilling their social roles. The charge of evil could apply to any of us in this job or that position, obeying those orders, as part of that routine. We are all caught within socially structured patterns of behaviour engaging in actions that are beyond our choosing and comprehension. And the worrying thought is that, with a slight change in circumstances, it could very easily be you or I in the dock being charged with doing evil when we merely thought we were doing our job or our duty. And the truth is that, indeed, it could easily be you or I, merely by the act of doing the right thing in the wrong circumstances. 

With respect to Tolkien, it would be a grave error to dismiss his work as merely fictional, a fantasy escape world that evades the hard realities of the world. For it confronts a moral predicament that many would prefer not to confront. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings enchants in the way that it allows us to leave our world and enter into another world called ‘Middle Earth.’ However, this is no mere escapism, an evasion of hard realities – this fantasy world is a real world that brings us face to face with moral truths we may well have been avoiding in our normal, everyday life. Tolkien’s fantasy world delivers an important message for the world we live in. People who may be evading moral responsibility in the anonymous forces and processes of the impersonal order within which they act are brought face to face with the real world. 

The ring is central to Tolkien’s story, but what can we say about it? The beginning of the wraithing process lies in the hearts of each and all of us. That is the temptation to power. No-one can be trusted, nor trust themselves, to be able to resist that temptation. People may begin with good in their hearts and with the best of intentions, and they may come to seek power in order to realise their highest ideals. However, once they come to possess that power, they are reluctant to give it up, they become possessed by it and the good intentions turn increasingly into bad effects. What was once considered a mere means soon become an end in itself.

Tolkien’s view on government and politics are worth citing here. He expresses a belief in ‘Anarchy’ (Peace requires anarchy, The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien p 74). 

‘My political opinions lean more and more to Anarchy (philosophically understood, meaning abolition of control not whiskered men with bombs) – or to ‘unconstitutional’ Monarchy.’ He declares himself against tendencies to invest ‘the state’ and, by extension, all other human social and political creations, with an existential significance apart from the individuals composing and creating them. ‘I would arrest anybody who uses the word State (in any sense other than the inanimate realm of England and its inhabitants, a thing that has neither power, rights nor mind).’ That’s a direct statement against alien politics. In a depersonalised world, Tolkien demands repersonalisation as a condition of (co)responsibility:

‘If we could get back to personal names, it would do a lot of good. Government is an abstract noun meaning the art and process of governing and it should be an offence to write it with a capital G or so as to refer to people. If people were in the habit of referring to ‘King George’s council, Winston and his gang’, it would go a long way to clearing thought, and reducing the frightful landslide into Theyocracy.’

Tolkien expresses his hostility to politics defined as the bossing of some by others:

‘Anyway the proper study of Man is anything but Man; and the most improper job of any man, even saints (who at any rate were at least unwilling to take it on), is bossing other men. Not one in a million is fit for it, and least of all those who seek the opportunity. And at least it is done only to a small group of men who know who their master is. The mediævals were only too right in taking nolo episcopari [I do not want to be bishop] as the best reason a man could give to others for making him a bishop. Give me a king whose chief interest in life is stamps, railways, or race-horses; and who has the power to sack his Vizier (or whatever you care to call him) if he does not like the cut of his trousers. And so on down the line. But, of course, the fatal weakness of all that – after all only the fatal weakness of all good natural things in a bad corrupt unnatural world – is that it works and has worked only when all the world is messing along in the same good old inefficient human way. The quarrelsome, conceited Greeks managed to pull it off against Xerxes; but the abominable chemists and engineers have put such a power into Xerxes’ hands, and all ant-communities, that decent folk don’t seem to have a chance.’

But the special horror of the present world is that the whole damned thing is in one bag. There is nowhere to fly to.’

At this point, having distanced himself from the anarchism of ‘whiskered men with bombs’, Tolkien ends his letter, somewhat playfully, with praise for ‘the growing habit of disgruntled men of dynamiting factories and power-stations’ as ‘the only bright spot’ in the political world. ‘I hope that, encouraged now as ‘patriotism’, may remain a habit! But it won’t do any good, if it is not universal.’ That savours a great deal of oikophilia, affirming the love of place, and favours a politics grounded in such love, a universalism rooted in particularism, as against a globalisation that hollows out places. Either way, Tolkien evidently has little time for the techno-urban industrial system and the way it extends itself over the world in which we live.

Technology
Technology and the way it impacts upon and shapes our lives and how we relate to it is at the centre of Tolkien’s saga. The Quest to destroy a ring that possesses incredible powers carries a clear message concerning technology, its appeal, its power and its impact. 





Throughout the Lord of the Rings Tolkien casts evil in technological forms. Thus Saruman, a Wizard and one of the major villains of the tale, lives in a place called ‘Isengard, meaning ‘iron yard.’ The lands of Isengard had been green in the past, a pure and pristine place with a river running from the mountains to form a lake. But Sarumon camped his armies here, felled all of its trees and despoiled the land. Where once all green things would grow, with the treason of Saruman the place became an ‘iron yard’, what may be called an industrial park; all green and growing things were removed and the river dammed.

A great ring-wall of stone, like towering cliffs, stood out from the shelter of the mountain-side, from which it ran and then returned again. One entrance only was there made in it, a great arch delved in the southern wall. Here through the black rock a long tunnel had been hewn, closed at either end with mighty doors of iron. They were so wrought and poised upon their huge hinges, posts of steel driven into the living stone, that when unbarred they could be moved with a light thrust of the arms, noiselessly. One who passed in and came at length out of the echoing tunnel, beheld a plain, a great circle, somewhat hollowed like a vast shallow bowl: a mile it measured from rim to rim. 

J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings, The Two Towers, "The Road to Isengard"

Within this world of iron, Saruman devotes his energies to cutting down trees, blowing things up, and building mills. Tolkien refers to the ‘wheels and engines and explosions’ that ‘always delight’ Saruman, as he creates a system of tunnels and dams, and vents for poisonous gases and fires. Describing Saruman as having ‘a mind of metal and wheels’, Tolkien is clearly characterising evil as technology in a machine world. 

In private letters, Tolkien declared his fondness for forests and expressed his sadness at tree-felling, and those who have written biographies of Tolkien or analysed The Lord of the Rings have concluded that he came increasingly to appreciate the value of wild and untamed nature, being concerned to protect this nature against the encroachment of the industrialized world. (Lobdell 2004; Underwood 2000; Stoddard 2003). In contrast to the evil of Saruman in his world of iron, the Hobbits are the little people who live a simple life in an agrarian economy. And this was the life that Tolkien favoured personally. He’s an unusual character is Tolkien. As a devout Roman Catholic and life-long Tory, he doesn’t quite fit the bill as an eco-communalist anarchist. Those Hobbits do, though. How much of a Hobbit was Tolkien? He claimed to be a Hobbit, writing to a friend:





Tolkien openly confessed to being old-fashioned, archaic even. It’s difficult to avoid the conclusion that Tolkien was anti-technology. He possessed an intense hatred for industrialization and the way it was eating up the countryside and destroying possibilities for living the simple life. He lived his life as little reliant on technology as was possible, rejecting trains, television and refrigerated food. He loathed cars as he came to appreciate the damage they and the roads that served them were doing to the landscape, selling the one he owned at the beginning of World War II. According to biographer Humphrey Carpenter:

‘Tolkien became a familiar figure cycling along the Banbury Road, travelling between home and Pembroke College on his extraordinarily high-seated bicycle while wearing cap and voluminous gown.’

Carpenter, J.R.R. Tolkien: A Biography, 2006

I’ve never even driven a car, let alone owned one. I walk as much as I can, and use public transport when necessary. I’ve never even owned a mobile phone. This may merely be an expression of personal idiosyncrasies and be of no general significance. But I think there is such a thing as a Hobbit-like existence, and such choices fit a certain way of life. I think I could count as something of a Hobbit. I think Tolkien’s decision to get rid of his car was quite deliberate and fitted his belief system. Hostility to the machine world can be found throughout Tolkien’s work, most clearly in the characterisation of the forced ‘industrialization’ of the Shire in The Lord of the Rings as evil. 

Tolkien’s scathing comments derive from personal experience. He grew up in the hamlet of Sarehole, which was ‘his imaginative heartland, a small village near Birmingham which was the starting-point for his fictional Shire in both The Hobbit and Lord of the Rings.’ ‘It was a kind of lost paradise’, Tolkien reminisced. ‘There was an old mill that really did grind corn with two millers, a great big pond with swans on it, a sandpit, a wonderful dell with flowers, a few old-fashioned village houses and, further away, a stream with another mill. I always knew it would go — and it did.’ Don’t we all have such a paradise in our backgrounds? I did. Even if they come to be destroyed in the physical sense. such paradises can never be lost but will always live on in the psychic sense.

Tolkien the Hobbit
Tolkien disliked allegory and declined to draw analogies between his writings and the political and social reality of his times. However, although his work is rarely allegorical in the strict literary sense, Tolkien did intend his work to have practical implications in being applicable to real world situations. But I think the analogy between the forces of evil at work in Tolkien’s stories and the process of rationalisation at work in the world holds. Tolkien admitted that he could not but draw on his own experience when he came to write: ‘Though, the spirit of ‘Isengard’, if not of Mordor, is of course always cropping up. The present design of destroying Oxford in order to accommodate motor-cars is a case.’ (The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, 2000, Humphrey Carpenter).
Mordor and Isengard represent evil, the corruption of natural goodness, and express Tolkien’s deep mistrust of modern town planning. Dickerson (chapter 8) examines the way that Tolkien deals with environmental destruction, in its most extreme form in Mordor, in a rational and industrialized form in Isengard, and, finally, in our own backyard, as it were, in the Shire. For Tolkien, these acts of environmental destruction raised practical questions of responsibility and response. Dickerson (chapter 9) shows how the characters in Middle earth, the Hobbits, principally, are roused to action by the environmental damage inflicted on the Shire and determine to confront the causes of this damage. In chapter 10, Dickerson addresses the question of how we can respond practically to overcome the works of ‘Mordor’ in our own contemporary world. At the heart of this practical response are the stewardship responsibilities that come with living well on this good earth. 

Tolkien expresses his distaste of despoiling nature to make way for the personal automobile arises in a letter to his son in 1944.





That’s possibly unfair to engineers, I must protest, ever so gently. The problems come when we focus upon the perfection of means at the expense of clarity over the right ends, and that’s a problem for society as a whole. Anyhow, as one who has had cause to engage in lengthy criticism of ambitions for planetary engineering, I can only say I sympathise with Tolkien’s general point here, even if it needs to be sharply qualified.

Tolkien made a conscious decision to give up the car and travel by bicycle (which is itself a form of technology, just to qualify views of Tolkien as anti-technology). But he refused also to have a refrigerator. It would be easy to dismiss Tolkien's antagonism toward cars, industrialisation and technology as a nostalgic yearning for the pastoral England of his childhood, even a reactionary rejection of modernity as such (he didn’t much like gadgets, not even in the house). But it would be a mistake to see Tolkien as a grumpy old man who set his face against the modern world through nothing more than a personal reaction. His words go deeper and issue a warning with respect to how easily human nature may be corrupted by power and its promises of dominion over others and over the world. Tolkien was prescient in seeing through the facile identification of technological advance with progress, and queried the idea that technology as such was sufficient to solve all the problems of living. Technology is part of the solution, but it isn’t the solution in itself. In the very least, Tolkien was drawing attention to other essential aspects of a meaningful life and cautioning us to examine closely any promises made with respect to ‘progress.’

Tolkien’s dislike of technology and distrust of its power were coloured by his experience in the trenches during the First World War, where he confronted technology in the form of tanks, fighter planes, bombardment, and flame-throwers. ‘By 1918,’ he once said, ‘all but one of my close friends were dead.’ Tolkien knew the immense power of technology, and he knew too much of its destructive force to be overimpressed by promises of its liberatory potential. 

In this respect, we could identify the central theme of the Lord of the Rings as the lesson that no one ought to have dominion over the world; knowledge and technological know-how may give someone the power to exercise this dominion, but not the character. In that sense, The Lord of the Rings is a quest for anti-power, to subvert universal power and its temptations for good, disabusing us of the illusions of power and causing us to appreciate the virtues of the simple life within natural reach. It is this lesson with respect to power and its scaling to natural and human dimensions that rings true and delivers a message for us today. Tolkien refused to let the technological, economic and institutional forces of the self-made human world to set the parameters of life as it is lived. Through his small creatures, the Hobbits, and the affirmation of the simple life, Tolkien asserted the every individual's right and responsibility to make choices, take decisions, shape the structures and determine the forces that govern life and its boundaries. Creating the social forms and the means and mechanisms of collective control that enable (co)responsiveness and responsibility that make that assertion a reality is a social and institutional question that Tolkien did not address, but rather evaded with his dismissal of all forms of ‘planning’ and ‘socialism.’ That’s an institutional question for us to resolve. Here, I wish to examine further Tolkien’s critical view of technology and the machine.

Against the tyrannical reformation of the Megamachine

Tolkien’s son Christopher has spoken well of the nature of Tolkien’s world, the secondary world which Tolkien spent a lifetime working on, giving it an ‘extraordinary vastness, solidity and coherence.’ This world is Tolkien’s world, containing his experiences, hopes, and griefs, his concepts of beauty and ugliness, good and evil. But it is also in some way an archaic world. ‘Its archaism shows itself at once in the relatively small space that the man-made takes in it in relation to the world which we inhabit now, and for him the man-made was the great problem.’ Christopher recalls his father saying to him that it isn’t the ‘not-man’, as in things like the weather, nor ‘man’, even at the bad level, but the ‘man-made that is so ultimately daunting and insupportable.’ Tolkien’s secondary world is comprehensive but is extraordinarily small compared to our world dominated by the man-made. Tolkien’s well-known dislike of the modern world stems not from a reactionary nostalgia but from something much more deep rooted, from the same source from where his desire for fantasy comes. In saying that Tolkien disliked the modern world, we need to emphasize the word ‘modern.’ Tolkien loved the world and people and loathed what the modern, in the sense of the machine, was doing to both. By the machine, Tolkien understood something much more than things such as cars, trains and planes. Christopher recalls Tolkien expressing this larger understanding of the machine more than once to him, declaring it to be one of the underlying themes in The Lord of the Rings. Against the machine, Tolkien emphasized ‘the development of the innate and inherent powers and talents of human beings.’ (Christopher Tolkien). The machine, for Tolkien, meant ‘the wrong solution, the attempt to actualize our desires, like our desire to fly.’ It meant ‘coercion’ and ‘domination’ which, for Tolkien, were ‘the great enemy.’ For Tolkien, the machine involved ‘the coercion of other minds and other wills’ and thus represented ‘tyranny.’ He thus saw the characteristic activity of the modern world as being that of coercion, the ‘tyrannous reformation of the Earth,’ and of our place in it. And that, Christopher explains, is why Tolkien hated machines.

We should distinguish the repudiation of machines and technology as such from their misuse and misapplication. As seen above, Tolkien doubts that the internal combustion engine could have been put to ‘any’ rational use. Tolkien’s attitude to machinery and technology is revealed also in Letter #75, written to his son Christopher, who was training to be an air force pilot in Africa during World War II:

I wonder how you are getting on with your flying since you first went solo-- the last news we had of this. I especially noted your observations on the skimming martins. That touches to the heart of things, doesn't it? There is the tragedy and despair of all machinery laid bare. Unlike art which is content to create a new secondary world in the mind, it attempts to actualize desire, and so to create power in this World; and that cannot really be done with any real satisfaction. Labour-saving machinery only creates endless and worse labour. And in addition to this fundamental disability of a creature, is added the Fall, which makes our devices not only fail of their desire but turn to new and horrible evil. So we come inevitably from Daedalus and Icarus to the Giant Bomber. It is not an advance in wisdom! This terrible truth, glimpsed long ago by Sam Butler, sticks out so plainly and is so horrifyingly exhibited in our time, with its even worse menace for the future, that it seems almost a world-wide mental disease that only a tiny minority perceive it. Even if people have ever heard the legends (which is getting rarer) they have no inkling of their portent. How could a maker of motorbikes name his product Ixion cycles! Ixion, who was bound for ever in hell on a perpetually revolving wheel! Well, I have got over 2 thousand words onto this little flimsy airletter; and I will forgive the Mordor-gadgets some of their sins, if they will bring it quickly to you. 

Letter #75, The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien

(I have to admit, learning that Tolkien went to bed late and got up late, which is my normal habit, I already had a natural affinity with the man. Reading that he squeezed 2,000 words onto an airletter only increases my admiration further – I did some such thing on the first airletters I wrote to a friend who had emigrated to New Zealand, who apologized for the few months it took to respond, claiming it had taken him all that time to read it).

The contrast between the natural flying of the martins and the way they fly with their mouths open as they skim insects on the water and the work and effort that goes into flying airplanes (bombing the land from the sky) gets to the heart of things indeed. Tolkien decried the use of aircraft in this sense: 'the heavens are full of war and riot' (Letter # 64). He expressed his disquiet to Christopher:





That’s quite a statement which expresses Tolkien’s revulsion for war and the mechanical means of violence. In the same letter, he goes on to describe airplanes as ‘Nazgul-birds.’

It is indeed true that Tolkien hated the internal combustion engine, Christopher says, and for perfectly good practical reasons, noise, congestion, the destruction of cities, ‘and many people greatly agree with him now.’ But this was no simple anti-technological prejudice born of nostalgia. It was rooted in his organic understanding of people and place. And many people agree with that view too:

Reinhabitation means learning to live-in-place in an area that has been disrupted and injured through past exploitation. It involves becoming native to a place through becoming aware of the particular ecological relationships that operate within and around it. It means understanding activities and evolving social behavior that will enrich the life of that place, restore its life-supporting systems, and establish an ecologically and socially sustainable pattern of existence within it. 

Peter Berg and Raymond Dasmann

George Will writes of place as a mental habitat and an intellectual and moral landscape. This comes close to Tolkien’s meaning set out above:

‘In politics "the place" is a mental habitat, an intellectual and moral landscape. To know clearly, perhaps even for the first time, the defective philosophic premises of our nation should not mean loving the nation less. . . . Because a nation is, to some extent, a state of mind, knowing a nation in a new way makes the nation into a new place.’

George Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft (1983)

Tolkien’s criticism of the machine is thus based on an appreciation of innate and inherent potentialities and thus expresses an organicist and holist view of life. And that leads him to reject the machine for its impersonalism. This comes out in Tolkien’s critical words on modern labour saving machinery. For Tolkien, this is a more effective form of slavery in being put out of sight, in places like factories where no one can see them and hence no one knows what is going on. 

Christopher quotes from a letter that Tolkien wrote to him on this. 

‘Unlike art, which is content to create a new secondary world in the mind, it attempts to actualize desire and so to create power in this world, and that cannot be done with any real satisfaction. Labour-saving machinery only creates endless and worse labour. But in addition to this fundamental disability of a creature is added the fall which makes our devices not only of their desire, but turn to new and horrible evil, and so we come inevitably from Daedalus and Icarus to the giant bomber.’

In the machine, despair and tragedy go hand in hand. In Tolkien’s secondary world, Christopher continues, the machine is ‘mythologized in the mythological mode, because he is dealing entirely in the representation of his perception of the primary world in the secondary world form, in the Middle-Earth, and I think it is undoubtedly true that in this very large sense of the word machine, the supreme machine in the mythological terms is the Ring, is the one Ring.’ To those who would say that the Ring is this magic in itself, Tolkien would reply that magic is very close to the machine. As Christopher puts his father’s views: ‘Magic is coercion,’ it ‘is the coercion of the world, the attempt by apparatus to transform the world.’ 

This, Christopher says, is precisely how Tolkien expressed the view to him. The elves represent an aspect of humankind, of the humane, ‘but raised in certain directions to a higher power, with powers that men don’t actually possess, and the ultimate aim of the elves is art, and not power, whereas men have taken the solution of power, represented by the machine.’ The Ring is thus the ultimate machine because it was made for coercion, made by Sauron to coerce. And that is why the only way to resolve the problem of the Ring was its destruction. That’s why, after lengthy debate, the Council of Elrond decided to destroy it. If the Ring were not destroyed, it wouldn’t matter in the long run whether Sauron got it or not. As Christopher recalls Tolkien saying to him once, ‘Gandalf, if he had the Ring, would be far worse than Sauron, because he would be righteous and self-righteous, and order, coerce the world, to its own good.’ One of Tolkien’s greatest fears was this coercion for good ends. 

The lesson, which Tolkien proceeds to deliver in the Lord of the Rings, is that the attempt to improve the world through technological innovation is doomed to bring about an automation that ensures the destruction of that world, and our destruction, in the end. Technology is bound up with war and the instrumentalisation of the world.

In this vein, Tolkien criticized the use of machines in war, singling out the Allied use of total war tactics against civilians from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. With the Russians 60 miles from Berlin, Tolkien writes of the tragedy of the destruction of Germany:

We were supposed to have reached a stage of civilization in which it might still be necessary to execute a criminal, but not to gloat, or to hang his wife and child by him while the orc-crowd hooted. The destruction of Germany, be it 100 times merited, is one of the most appalling world-catastrophes. Well, well,—you and I can do nothing about it. And that [should] be a measure of the amount of guilt that can justly be assumed to attach to any member of a country who is not a member of its actual Government. Well the first War of the Machines seems to be drawing to its final inconclusive chapter—leaving, alas, everyone the poorer, many bereaved or maimed and millions dead, and only one thing triumphant: the Machines. As the servants of the Machine are becoming a privileged class, the Machines are going to be enormously more powerful. What's their next move? 

January 30, 1945, Letter 96

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki filled Tolkien with horror. His letter to Christopher points up the potentially lethal disparity between technical and moral/intellectual capacities:

The news today about 'Atomic bombs' is so horrifying one is stunned. The utter folly of these lunatic physicists to do such work for war purposes: calmly plotting the destruction of the world! Such explosives in men's hands, while their moral and intellectual status is declining, is about as useful as giving out firearms to all inmates of a gaol and then saying that you hope 'this will ensure peace.' But one good thing may arise out of it, I suppose, if the write-ups are not overheated: Japan ought to cave in. Well, we're all in God's hands. But he does not look kindly on Babel-builders.

9 August 1945, letter  102

Tolkien feared a time in which moral dwarves were technologists exercising dominion over the world. In a letter to his publisher Unwin, he writes:

You can make the Ring an allegory of our own time, if you like: an allegory of the inevitable fate that awaits all attempts to defeat evil power by power. But that is only because all power magical or mechanical does always so work.

31 July 1947, letter 109

Tolkien elaborates on this theme in Letter #155, which begins with a discussion on the use of ’magic’, contrasting what Galadriel and rustic folks like the Hobbits would call ‘magic’ with the ’magic’ connected with machinery and technology and put to evil ends:

The Enemy, or those who have become like him, go in for ’machinery’ – with destructive and evil effects — because ’magicians’, who have become chiefly concerned to use magia for their own power, would do so (do do so). The basic motive for magia – quite apart from any philosophic consideration of how it would work – is immediacy: speed, reduction of labour, and reduction also to a minimum (or vanishing point) of the gap between the idea or desire and the result or effect. But the magia may not be easy to come by, and at any rate if you have command of abundant slave-labour or machinery (often only the same thing concealed), it may be as quick or quick enough to push mountains over, wreck forests, or build pyramids by such means. Of course another factor then comes in, a moral or pathological one: the tyrants lose sight of objects, become cruel, and like smashing, hurting, and defiling as such. It would no doubt be possible to defend poor Lotho’s introduction of more efficient mills; but not of Sharkey and Sandyman’s use of them.

Tolkien’s views on the internal combustion engine – on motor cars, airplanes, magic and mechanism are set out in detail in Flieger and Anderson's On Fairy Stories (pp.275-277) (Tolkien On Fairy Stories ed. Flieger and Anderson 2008; Flieger and Anderson quote Bodleian Tolkien MS. 14 Folios 22-3.)

The Note on Internal Combustion Engine throws Tolkien’s views on two of the most impact making products of the ‘Machine - the motor car and the airplane – in sharp relief:

This curious device, in its motor-car form, affords some pleasures, either minor and inferior, or drug-like and obsessive. It may have some practical uses, though one suspects that these consist rather in alleviating problems whose radical cure lies elsewhere; and certainly from the supposed profits a multitude of new problems and disadvantages have to be deducted. But the motor-car is, essentially a mechanical toy that has run off the nursery -floor into the street, where it is used as irresponsibly as before and much more dangerously. It is a dubious piece of 'escape mechanism'. For of course it would not be made in 'mass' (which means that it would hardly be made at all), nor would millions be made out of its purchasers, but for its invention at a time when we have made our towns too horrible to live in - a process which it has itself accelerated. The motor-car attracts, because it enables people to live far away from their noisome and inhuman 'works', or to fly from their depressing dormitories to the 'country'. But it cheats: for the motor-factories, and their subsidiaries (garages, repair-shops, and pumps), and the cars themselves, and their black and blasted roads, devour the 'country' like dragons. This is the splendid gift of a magician: he offers to a caged bird that has defiled its cage and perch - what? a little length of chain so that it can flap to a near-by twig and foul that. Magnificent! This is freedom! And to make the chain hundreds of the magician's prisoners sweat like morlocks. This is the Real Life that is so beneficial to the University of Oxford. It might seem simpler to clean the bird cages.

As for the aeroplane, that has been even more unfortunate. It was fledged just in time to be baptized in blood, to become a chief exemplar in our time of the dreadful potency of Original Sin. Clumsy, and, in spite of its growing complexity, inefficient machine, in comparison with its high object, it has taken the menacing shape not of birds but of fish-like or saurian monsters, and it defies and overrides all privacies, and scatters over all quietitudes the deadly roar of its parent den; at unawares it may fall in ruin on the frail houses of men, burning and crushing them at play, or by their hearths, or working in their gardens. This 'in peace'. War it has raised to a mass-production of slaughter. Yet a man- yes, in the middle of this war - trotted out this argument to me: 'You can talk,' he said, 'but if your child was dangerously ill, and the only specialist was in America, you would be only too glad to use a plane.' That dates it: a little earlier the specialist lived in Vienna. So to save the life of that hypothetical child by the supposed skill of an imaginary specialist (who might not succeed), hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children, are to be blown to rags and burned, and half the remaining beautiful things of saner centuries with them. It would seem rather more economical to have a few more doctors more handily placed. I would be too brutally 'realistic' to suggest that the poor child must die, if it can only be saved by a machine with so terrible a potential of murder. It is all right if it is done by a machine. It might be regarded as odd if I sacrificed even one other man on an altar to gain the favour of the gods.

The question to be asked, of course, is not "Would you try to save your child's life by using an aeroplane now- in a situation that you did not make or will?; but "Would you will such a situation to save your child's life?" The answer to the first question is: yes, let Moloch bring doctors for once, if he can. The answer to the second is just: no.

The Myth of the Machine and The Technological Bluff

I want to explore some similarities between Tolkien’s view and those of Lewis Mumford and Jacques Ellul. I refer people here to my own work on Lewis Mumford. 

Critchley, P. 2012. Lewis Mumford and the Architectonics of Ecological Civilisation [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books

Critchley, P. 2004., Lewis Mumford and the Search for the Harmonious City [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books

In these books I argue that whilst condemned the ‘Myth of the Machine’, his critical attack was focused upon machine culture, not myth, and in that sense was an attempt to reclaim myth for its proper end. For Mumford, myth has a crucial place in a truly human life. Mumford thus denounces the view of the all-powerful and irresistible machine not as myth as such but as a false myth, something which needs to be replaced by the true myth of Life. In The Story of Utopia, Mumford thus notes that human beings seem always to put aside old myths only to create new ones. 

‘In turning away from obsolete and disastrous social myths I do not suggest that we give up the habit of making myths; for that habit, for good or bad, seems to be ingrained in the human psyche. The nearest we can get to rationality is not to efface our myths but to attempt to infuse them with right reason, and to alter them or exchange them for other myths when they appear to work badly.’

Mumford exposes the chief characteristics of modern machine civilisation to be unnatural, myths of the prevailing system that are detrimental to health, life and meaning: the regularization of time, the increase of mechanical power, the multiplication of goods, the contraction of time and space, the standardization of performance and product, the transfer of skill to automata. The mechanical culture is thus diametrically opposed to the organic, diverting, distorting and suppressing innate and inherent powers. The machine has undergone a perversion in the translation of technical improvements into social processes: ‘instead of being utilized as an instrument of life, it has tended to become an absolute’. Mumford thus identifies the inversion of means and ends in the modern process of rationalisation. The means have become so enlarged as to constitute ends in themselves, with function serving the system replacing a purpose immanent in the organic world: 





Such comments suggest a clear similarity of Mumford’s views and those of Tolkien with respect to machine culture. Mumford would develop these views in fullest form in The Myth of the Machine. The problem was not merely a matter of social arrangements but ‘was also due to a weakness of the entire philosophy upon which the new techniques and inventions were grounded.’ Mumford thus wrote at length at the displacement of values: 





Mumford proceeds to argue that ‘the machine is ambivalent. It is both an instrument of liberation and one of repression. It has economized human energy and it has misdirected it’ (FTC 1986:32). The task is to realise the liberatory potential of the machine by redirecting human energy according to organic values.





For reasons given above, Tolkien would be sceptical, at best, and fearful at worst. I shall come shortly to Jacques Ellul, who condemned the coupling of human beings and technology as a terrorism proceeding within an ostensibly humanist discourse.

Mumford points to an increasing scepticism with respect to the promises associated with a machine philosophy, not least because technological progress has come to be associated with increased instruments of destruction, threatening the existence of organised society:





In advancing with such haste, human beings have failed to assimilate the machine organically by coordinating it with human capacities and needs. Human beings have thus ‘outreached’ themselves and are deluded to think that the problems caused by the machine could be solved by the machine (FTC 1986:115).

In The Culture of Cities (1938), Mumford writes that ‘The change from a life economy to a money economy greatly widened the resources of the state.’ To escape the confines of the megamachine requires that the money economy be converted into a life economy. In The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development (1967) and The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power (1971), Mumford launched the mental and psychic counter-attack on ‘the Machine’, the pentagon of power, by exposing its power to rest on a false myth. Mumford sought to affirm myth that counted as true in being in tune with the psychic realities of human beings as against the myths by which power sought to capture and confine human beings. Mumford’s intention was to create the psychic autonomy amongst individuals and their communities that would foster the revolution against the bureaucratic conception of power, control and rule that characterised the modern mechanical social order. 

In identifying instrumental, institutional and technical power with progress, human beings made themselves psychic prisoners of a power-worshipping society dominated by the myth of total control. Mumford conceived the modern megamachine as a new god which ‘cannot be approached or argued with, as Moses approached the burning bush or Jonah bargained with God to recall his threat to Ninevah’ (Mumford to Roderick Seidenberg 30 August 1965, Mumford Papers). It is this myth of an all-powerful, all-controlling machine culture that Mumford sought to induce people to overthrow, with all that it involved in terms of a loss of spontaneity, creativity and well-being. The challenge, as Mumford pointed out, is to find a way to convert a "power economy to a life economy."

Technics come to be systematically applied within the modern megamachine. The modern megamachine is a congealed power-oriented consciousness, materialised to form its dynamic imperative. The megamachine has now formed itself as the state, a totally integrated public and private realm, with institutions such as parties, parliaments, associations belonging to it rather than to the individuals who compose them. The people are induced to accept this power monopoly by means of a bribe. It pays to stay within the megamachine and do its bidding as one of its human cogs. Of course, Mumford is not arguing that the destructive, autonomy-impairing, pathological megamachine is all-powerful. On the contrary, Mumford’s point is that the megamachine appears to be all-powerful and that its human members are seduced by the appearance of power and the promise of reward. At bottom, the megamachine’s power is nothing more than a bribe, a bribe which human beings have the moral, intellectual and social capacity to refuse. 

The belief that the machine was ‘absolutely irresistible’ whilst in any case being ‘ultimately beneficial’, so long as it was not opposed and so long as one goes along with its imperatives, constitutes ‘the Myth of the Machine’. And here is Mumford’s payoff. This myth need not be accepted. The megamachine, contrary to impressions of its vast power, is not unbeatable. The machine is not beneficial and is not concerned with the general good; the machine is not irresistible and unbeatable. This is the ‘myth’ that Mumford seeks to expose, encouraging people to shed their irrational beliefs. The machine can be opposed and rejected; the machine can be beaten. 

Mumford’s ‘myth’ of the all-powerful machine is also what Jacques Ellul called The Technological Bluff. We can call that bluff and refuse the notion of the machine as an irresistible power as a myth.

Cristopher Tolkien refers to the ‘coercion’ of the machine. It is this that Ellul calls terrorism.

In The Technological Bluff, Ellul looks at the wreckage of humanist claims in a world characterised by ‘deadly exploitation, the armed invasion of the whole world by colonization, two monstrous world wars with millions more dead than ever previously, concentration camps, police states, a mad development of torture, blind terrorism, scores of local wars during the past fifty years, and finally an imbalance of wealth and poverty that makes a joke of the wealth of the nobility in comparison with the misery of their peasants.’ And that was before the first attack upon Iraq in 1990 and the events that have followed in its wake. In fine, experience contradicts the claims made in the humanistic discourse which speaks blithely of progress. In Ellul’s view, inflated talk about the value or virtue of a project is a sign of the absence of those very qualities. ‘They talk about it because the reality is the opposite.’ ‘The darker the reality, the brighter the speech,’ writes Ellul. Ellul’s meaning here could come straight from Tolkien:

“All that is gold does not glitter,
Not all those who wander are lost;
The old that is strong does not wither,
Deep roots are not reached by the frost.

From the ashes a fire shall be woken,
A light from the shadows shall spring;
Renewed shall be blade that was broken,
The crownless again shall be king.”

― J.R.R. Tolkien, The Fellowship of the Ring

The horrors of the twentieth century would not have surprised Tolkien. He was concerned with power and its temptations in connection with domination and control. And he would be alive to Ellul’s understanding of the role that technique has played in the horrors of the modern world. Ellul is not arguing anything so crude as technique being the direct or immediate cause of these horrors, his point is that it makes possible the broader scale of these disasters and it also leads up to the political decisions. ‘It is because technique is always demanding more and more raw materials and makes possible better methods of control that there are police states. It is because technique provides more efficient means of killing that there are millions of dead. Nor is the making of these means of killing simply a political decision. Military techniques have to be developed in order to improve peacetime techniques. The one is linked to the other. Technique also gives such possibilities of action to political organisms that they are induced to become totalitarian. None of the atrocities of our age would have been possible without technique. Technique is not responsible? No, that is true; people alone are responsible. But look! People have put all their passion and hope and desire into the development of techniques and techniques alone.’ (Ellul 1990 ch 5). And that misplacing of human passion, energy, creativity, talent, hope and desire through the temptations of power is precisely Tolkien’s concern. 

Tolkien is concerned with coercion and the link between power, technology and the reshaping of the world in pursuit of inflated and distorted desire. Ellul describes this coercion as ‘terrorism.’ In chapter 20, he writes of ‘Terrorism in the Velvet Glove of Technology.’ He acknowledges that such a claim will scandalize ‘the technicians who use it peacefully or who invent means to make life better and who have no thoughts of terrorism.’ But here is where Tolkien’s point that Gandalf would be worse than Sauron in possession of the Ring, precisely because he would be so righteous and self-righteous in using power for good ends. The good stands in no need of such power in its service. Tolkien’s great fear was that such powerful means would come to be enlarged to the status of an end in itself, using the good as a cloak for its own imperatives. Ellul’s contention is that the discourse of technique, or technology in the strict sense, is ‘terrorist.’ By this, he does not mean the act of setting off bombs. Instead, he refers to the usage from around 1968 ‘when a professor might be called a terrorist because his status enabled him to influence his students with lectures which no one could contest, or when teaching the mother tongue was terrorist because, along with the language, images and symbols and judgments were impressed upon the minds of children that they could never cast off, so that they were not allowed to develop freely.’ (Ellul 1990 ch 20). Terrorism, then, refers to moulding the unconscious with no possibility of resistance. And this entails coercion in precisely the same sense argued above with respect to Tolkien’s critical attitude to technology, the tyrannous reshaping of the world and of our place in it. ‘This terrorist discourse rests on a picture of tomorrow's society’ that is ‘incontestable.’ ‘This is why I talk of terrorism. All children must now learn to use computers. They are shaped by them and adapted to them. This adaptation will one day go so far that orthography itself will have to be changed to fit computers. The computer will mediate all things intellectual and the whole intellectual formation of the child. What we hear repeated a hundred times is always the same. Children must be able to use computers because tomorrow they will be the universal work environment.’ And this, Ellul writes, is a ‘transformation of intelligence.’ It is a fitting of human beings to the demands of the Megamachine. ‘It changes our way of imaging things (whether they be physical, economic, linguistic, or biological). It gives us a new way of coding images, words, ideas, language. Everything must go into a code for the machine. It imposes its own language and its own way of putting problems. It produces principles and new concepts.’ 

Ellul’s concern is precisely that of Mumford and of Tolkien, the replacing of an organic growth based on innate and inherent human potentials with a mechanical culture based on inflated desires as expansionary systemic imperatives. 

'Cannot you see, cannot all you lecturers see, that it is we that are dying, and that down here the only thing that really lives is the Machine? We created the Machine, to do our will, but we cannot make it do our will now. It has robbed us of the sense of space and of the sense of touch, it has blurred every human relation and narrowed down love to a carnal act, it has paralyzed our bodies and our wills, and now it compels us to worship it. The Machine develops – but not on our lives. The Machine proceeds – but not to our goal. We only exist as the blood corpuscles that course through its arteries, and if it could work without us, it would let us die.' 

E.M. Forster, The Machine Stops

In this replacement of an organic culture by a mechanical culture, the transformation of the world through the domination of the man-made, that which has enabled human beings to survive, their versatility, is being lost. For Ellul, the coupling of human beings and machines imposes a true terrorism. Whatever the promises contained in the humanist discourse in which this despotic reshaping of the world is covered, such terrorism is neither benevolent nor gentle, but constraining and incontestable. Ellul thus refers to terrorism as imposing great transformations on human and social relations without the involvement and consultation of the interested parties and as eliminating old means whether we like it or not. As to the agents of this technical or technocratic terrorism, Ellul refers to the political powers acting either by constraint or by massive propaganda, and to the technocrats and the technostructure who see clearly that the more indispensable they become in the functioning of society, the more power they will have, the more difficult they will be to uproot. ‘Their propagation of all techniques and their crushing of nontechnicians and nonspecialists by their science and authority is an expression of both their self-interest and the strengthening of their situation. They cannot act in any other way. They are forced to reject increasingly what remains of democracy.’ Finally, Ellul writes of the complicity of the public against whom this terrorism and propaganda is aimed. ‘This is how things are today. There is complicity on the part of the public. Being badly informed—that goes without saying— the public is full of admiration for all that modern means can do and blinded by their obvious achievements. There can be no discussion with the man who walked on the moon or with the robot; we are struck dumb by such marvels. Because they are spectacular, all the techniques have become obvious. Evidence of this kind cannot be questioned. This is why the terrorism can be in a velvet glove. Its rests on advance evidence.’ (Ellul 1990 ch 20). 

Christopher Tolkien speaks of the ‘archaism’ of Tolkien’s world. He remembers them sitting together on the White Horse Hill in Berkshire, looking down over the vale of the White Horse, through which the Great Western Railway line goes towards Bath and Bristol. 

‘I appreciated his intense awareness of that hill, the archaic carving in the chalk of the white horse, the bones of the hill .. but I also loved the sound and sight in the valley of the train with the line of smoke from it, but he didn’t. He saw it as the intrusion of coercion into the vale, carrying people at high speed to destinations that they would have been very much better off going by other means.’

These are strong views and need to be set in a moral context which gives full expression to Tolkien's feelings. I have to admit that I share Tolkien's dislike of the motor-car, have never learned to drive, and could happily live without the mechanical things dividing up my community. I’m less than keen on airplanes too, and only flew for the first time in 2015. But they take you to some nice places and people. I just wish the world was closer to hand. And I think that that is Tolkien’s message to us. I find Tolkien’s simple life somewhat reassuring, living at a civilised pace, with all things close by and within natural reach. I like the idea of a society knitted together in ties of friendship, kinship and neighbourliness. According to the Anglo-Saxon etymology, a 'neighbour' is one who 'builds nearby'. So what things did Tolkien value enough in the primary world as to bring into his secondary one? Here is Christopher Tolkien:

‘I think that the answer to that lies in the intensity of his love for the primary fundamental simplicities, not necessarily only of the natural world but of the materials of the natural world, as used by men, using tools and not machines. Food, bread, cheese and wine, the materials of craftsmanship, stone, wood, and so on. But there was also his intense feeling and amazing ability to visualize landscapes, although he travelled very little, it seems that a little went a very long way and he had a great range of taste. Many people would rightly associate him with trees, which has in a certain sense been exaggerated. But trees are a part of a much larger thing. Or one associates him with the Shire because he so often said he was hobbit-like …

These are views which suggest to me no one more than Martin Heidegger.

Heidegger, building and dwelling in the fourfold
Building is a sacred activity. The old German root of the verb 'to build' refers both to the process of making and to dwelling within. Martin Heidegger developed the connections between the German root, buan, and the cognate, Ich bin, ‘I am.’ To be is to build. 

‘What then does ich bin mean? The old word bauen, to which the bin belongs, answers: ich bin, du bist mean: I dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is Buan, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. it means to dwell.’

Heidegger 2001 ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’

In discussing the house, Norberg-Schulz refers to Heidegger’s writings on dwelling and the etymological roots of ‘building’ which go back to ‘dwelling’, emphasising the role of the house as the ‘central place of human existence’:





Norberg-Schulz concludes by arguing for the necessity of re-appropriating the elements of existential space into the foundation of architecture. The inability of modern man to dwell by making a home on earth emerges as the problem at the core of our predicament. Against the idea of a nostalgic return to pre-modern conditions of dwelling, Cacciari reads Heidegger as pointing to the ‘impossibility of dwelling’ in modern conditions, entailing a critical-radical demand for humans coming to dwell on earth. (Cacciari 1980: 107).

Heidegger criticised the anthropocentric approach that has characterised Western civilisation since Plato for its will to dominate and conquer nature by technique and make it serve human ends. Conceiving themselves to be apart from and superior to Nature, humans have sought freedom, power and happiness through the exploitation of Nature. In the process, human beings have fallen victim to their own technocratic mentality, turning themselves as well as all other beings into objective, quantifiable and disposable material. In the modern era:

the object-character of technological domination spreads itself over the earth ever more quickly, ruthlessly and completely .. the humanness of man and the thingness of things dissolve into the calculated market value of a market which not only spans the whole earth .. but also .. trades in the nature of Being and thus subjects all beings to the trade of a calculation that dominates most tenaciously in those areas where there is no need of numbers.

Heidegger, ‘What are Poets For?’, Poetry, Language, Thought New York 1975:114/5

Heidegger thus criticises technology as a ‘setting-upon’ and ‘ordering’ of nature, a violation which must necessarily have a detrimental effect upon human beings as parts of nature. There is a profoundly ecological concern to Heidegger’s understanding. In 1949 he wrote:

The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well? No. It sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it. 
 In contrast, a tract of land is challenged in the hauling out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears different from how it did when to set in order still meant to take care and maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In sowing grain it places seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released for destruction or for peaceful use.

Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question concerning Technology’ 1954, Basic Writings, op cit 296

Heidegger’s point was that human beings, no more than any other beings, are not the masters of nature. There can be no such mastery. Instead, all beings should be free to display themselves and reach their fruition within nature. Heidegger’s existentialism is ecological and holistic, very different to Sartre’s anthropocentric humanism.

I argue for a stewardship ethic in this piece. Such an ethic still gives too much of a priority to humans for Heidegger. Heidegger has no truck with the careful husbanding of nature for human ends. Heidegger demands that we put aside humanistic conceptions to embrace the thoroughgoing ecologism of true being, the ‘ecstatic dwelling in the nearness of Being. It is the guardianship, that is, the care for Being’ (‘Letter on Humanism’ 1947, Basic Writings 221 222).

Heidegger argues that if we listen to what language says in the word bauen we hear three things:

1. Building is really dwelling.
2. Dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth. 
3. Building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things and the building that erects buildings.

Heidegger’s thought on building and dwelling is worth examining further:

‘Mortals dwell in the way they preserve the fourfold in its essential being, its presencing.’ 
‘Mortals dwell in as much as they save the earth.’
‘Mortals dwell in that they receive the sky as sky.’
‘Mortals dwell in that they await the divinities as divinities.’
‘Mortals dwell in that they initiate their own nature.’

Qtd in Norberg-Schulz 1971: 114

These statements are worth drawing out with respect to dwelling in the fourfold:

‘To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature. The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving. It pervades dwelling in its whole range. That range reveals itself to us as soon as we reflect that human being consists in dwelling and, indeed, dwelling in the sense of the stay of mortals on the earth.
But "on the earth" already means "under the sky." Both of these also mean "remaining before the divinities" and include a "belonging to men's being with one another." By a primal oneness the four - earth and sky, divinities and mortals - belong together in one.’

There is, therefore, a creative role for human beings to play in Heidegger’s ecological existentialism. As conscious beings playing their true part in nature, human beings are capable of living as authentic natural beings, thereby playing a role in saving the earth. 

‘This simple oneness of the four we call the fourfold. Mortals are in the fourfold by dwelling. But the basic character of dwelling is to spare, to preserve. Mortals dwell in the way they preserve the fourfold in its essential being, its presencing. Accordingly, the preserving that dwells is fourfold.
Mortals dwell in that they save the earth-taking the word in the old sense still known to Lessing. Saving does not only snatch something from a danger. To save really means to set something free into its own presencing. To save the earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from spoliation.’

‘Mortals dwell in that they receive the sky as sky. They leave to the sun and the moon their journey, to the stars their courses, to the seasons their blessing and their inclemency; they do not turn night into day nor day into a harassed unrest.
Mortals dwell in that they await the divinities as divinities. In hope they hold up to the divinities what is unhoped for. They wait for intimations of their coming and do not mistake the signs of their absence. They do not make their gods for themselves and do not worship idols. In the very depth of misfortune they wait for the weal that has been withdrawn.
Mortals dwell in that they initiate their own nature-their being capable of death as death-into the use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good death. To initiate mortals into the nature of death in no way means to make death, as empty Nothing, the goal. Nor does it mean to darken dwelling by blindly staring toward the end.
In saving the earth, in receiving the sky, in awaiting the divinities, in initiating mortals, dwelling occurs as the fourfold preservation of the fourfold. To spare and preserve means: to take under our care, to look after the fourfold in its presencing. What we take under our care must be kept safe.’

‘Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from boundless spoilation’ (‘Building Dwelling Thinking, BW 328). 

The earth is not some inanimate astronomical entity, a mere mass of matter or stock of resources: ‘In the things that arise, earth occurs essentially as the sheltering agent’ (‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, Basic Writings 169). Dwelling on the earth, human beings should make themselves open to and achieve the ‘fourfold of Being’: To repeat: ‘By a primal oneness the four – earth and sky, divinities and mortals – become together in one’ (Building Dwelling Thinking BW 327). Heidegger brings his essay to a conclusion:

‘Enough will have been gained if dwelling and building have become worthy of questioning and thus have remained worthy of thought. 
But that thinking itself belongs to dwelling in the same sense as building, although in a different way, may perhaps be attested to by the course of thought here attempted.
Building and thinking are, each in its own way, inescapable for dwelling.’

I think, therefore I am; I build, therefore I am.

Certainly, Heidegger urged people to listen to the soundless voice of being. Such philosophy is reverential and primordial and asks no questions: ‘the meditative man is to experience the untrembling heart of unconcealment’ in ‘the place of stillness’ (‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’ 1966 BW 387).

Heidegger asks: ‘what is the state of dwelling in our precarious age?’

Heidegger points out that ‘on all sides we hear talk about the housing shortage, and with good reason.’ ‘We try to fill the need by providing houses, by promoting the building of houses, planning the whole architectural enterprise.’ However, Heidegger notes, the problem is not merely the lack of houses: ‘The real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell. What if man's homelessness consisted in this, that man still does not even think of the real plight of dwelling as the plight? Yet as soon as man gives thought to his homelessness, it is a misery no longer. Rightly considered and kept well in mind, it is the sole summons that calls mortals into their dwelling.
But how else can mortals answer this summons than by trying on their part, on their own, to bring dwelling to the fullness of its nature? This they accomplish when they build out of dwelling, and think for the sake of dwelling.’

Do you hear the summons? How to respond to the call? Hobbit houses, anyone?
Simon Dale, Being Somewhere, hobbit houses as simple shelters that are in harmony with the natural landscape, ecologically sound and are a pleasure to live in.
http://www.simondale.net/

Could humanity live a hobbit existence? I think humanity may have to if it wishes to survive. I think I could live as a Hobbit. Come to think of it, I probably already do. I have an affinity for the Elves of Eregion, living in harmony with a Dwarven civilization. But what of ‘magic?’

Technology has power, the power to change and control things, and is therefore very seductive in its pull, and highly addictive in its possession. It is very easy for society to become dependent upon technology as it weaves its way through the entire fabric for daily living. Technology can do a great deal. But technology, like all human inventions, is fallible and can backfire. The danger is that when something does go wrong, a great deal of harm can be done.





4 From technological rationalisation to biospheric politics
We cannot simply turn and blame technology for our ills. Technology not an alien imposition; technology is us, an extension of who we are. To the extent that we experience it as an external force, we are being confronted by our own power in alien form, the product of an inverting process at the heart of our productive interchange with nature. To scapegoat technology as the cause of our ills is to fail to identify and uproot the problem where it lies, in alienative social relations that lead to powers escaping human control and comprehension. We have been happy to transfer responsibility for the consequences of our actions and for the resolution of our problems to technology. But any failure here lies not in technology but in the irresponsible nature of that transfer and in the passive dependence upon ‘things’. Technology is only as good as we are, or as bad. If we are aggressive, violent, destructive and greedy, then technology will be so too. The problems we face are not external to us but are profoundly human ones magnified by technological power. Left to follow its own imperatives, technological change, industrialisation and urbanisation will destroy places, people and planet. We need to humanise that technology and, in the process, naturalise ourselves, otherwise alien power out of control will consume us. That is the tyranny and violence of abstraction. 
The idea of human self-creation in the historical process certainly sounds liberatory, human beings ending up as masters in a world of their own making. The only problem is that, divorced from realities, humans risk becoming the masters of nowhere and the possessors of nothing. Losing touch with those realities, self-creating humans will come undone. Should we set out to create a new commonwealth or fellowship of all beings, one that is in tune with planetary realities, then technology equips us with powerful tools for the task. But the challenge before us requires both a spiritual revolution and social transformation and cannot be merely an institutional and technological fix. The issues we face have brought the study of nature out of the research institutions to political centre-stage, with profound implications as we attempt to create a biospheric politics fitted to planetary realities.

So where does the devout Roman Catholic and life-long Tory Tolkien fit in this creation of a biospheric politics? Actually, it’s quite an easy fit. Tolkien had a profound love for the Earth, and saw places as something distinct from, and more than, the political entities which sought to enclose them in an abstract form of governance and control. I have no trouble in reading Tolkien in bioregionalist terms. Although he wasn’t vocal in expressing his views, Tolkien argued for the British Empire, and even the United Kingdom, to be dismantled. In a letter from 1936 to Belgian linguist Simonne d'Ardenne, he wrote:

‘The political situation is dreadful... I have the greatest sympathy with Belgium—which is about the right size of any country! I wish my own were bounded still by the seas of the Tweed and the walls of Wales... we folk do at least know something of mortality and eternity and when Hitler (or a Frenchman) says 'Germany (or France) must live forever we know that he lies.’

March 13 1936 

Tolkien did not see nature as passive and inanimate, a mere set of resources available for human beings to use as they sought fit. His viewpoint was profoundly ecological. Tolkien’s Middle Earth is a living thing, it has a character and an existential significance in itself, possessing autonomy and subjectivity as a living place.
He bemoaned the effects of industrialisation and urbanisation that he saw all around him, and he watched with trepidation the urban sprawl that was continuing to eat up the countryside. The city was expanding, and Tolkien watched it creeping up the hill with fear and dread. The place where he lived, that he remembered as lush and beautiful as a boy, was doomed to become a paradise lost to all but memory as it came to be swallowed up into the ever-expanding industrial city. These processes have continued apace and do so with seemingly inexorable force. To the extent that we seem destined to live on a city planet, Tolkien’s words are bound to become ever more poignant.

“I wish it need not have happened in my time,” said Frodo.
“So do I”, said Gandalf, “and so do all who live to see such times. But that is not for them to decide. All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us.”

The invisible magic
So what is the deeper magic at work outside of the mechanical world? Is there such a thing as ‘magic realism?’
I read that a ‘realist’ is someone who looks at a picture as a picture, and sees it for what it is, not for what is hidden inside it. That begs an awful lot of philosophical questions with respect to mistaking the surface level of appearance for the true reality that underlies it. Which in turn begs the question as to how we could ever come to know that reality. Can appearances be all we ever know? Is reality only to be known by sense experience? 
Tolkien writes of the ‘inner consistency of reality.’ Which begs the question of how we can access and come to know that consistency. In the words of sociologist Herbert Blumer, reality is ‘that in which one has sufficient confidence to base an action.’ Blumer was a pioneer of symbolic interactionism, which holds that human beings act towards things, and other persons, in the basis of the meanings they have for them. The view places emphasis on the consciousness of the individual actors as they interpret their actions, having an internal conversation and revising their meanings as they go. For Blumer, it is people engaging in meaningful social interaction that creates society. It follows from this that reality is social and only exists in the context of the human experience. (Low, Jacqueline (2008). "Structure, Agency, and Social Reality in Blumerian Symbolic Interactionism: The Influence of Georg Simmel". Symbolic Interaction. 31 (3): 325–343.) That view points to the phenomenology of intersubjective experience as setting the parameters of the only reality we could know in conscious thought. In pointing to the ‘inner consistency of reality’, Tolkien is indicating the existence of something within reality that goes deeper than subjectivism and intersubjectivism in meaning. What is this deeper reality and how could we come to know it outside of intersubjective experience? Entering the forest of Lothlórien, Sam turns to Frodo and suggests that there’s strong magic at work, even though you can’t see anybody working it. Sam says:

'It’s wonderfully quiet here. Nothing seems to be going on, and nobody seems to want it to. If there’s any magic about, it’s right down deep, where I can’t lay my hands on it, in a manner of speaking.'

Frodo replies: ‘You can see and feel it everywhere.’

‘Well,’ said Sam, ‘you can’t see nobody working it. No fireworks like poor old Gandalf used to show. I wonder we don’t see nothing of the Lord and Lady in all these days. I fancy now that she could do some wonderful things, if she had a mind. I’d dearly love to see some Elf-magic, Mr. Frodo!’

The Fellowship of the Ring: The Mirror of Galadriel

So what is the nature of this strong magic? Galadriel joins them and takes them to see the Mirror of Galadriel. Frodo doesn’t know what to make of it. Galadriel turns to Sam and asks: ‘And you?’:

‘For this is what your folk would call magic, I believe; though I do not understand clearly what they mean; and they seem to use the same word of the deceits of the Enemy. But this, if you will, is the magic of Galadriel. Did you not say that you wished to see Elf-magic?’

The Fellowship of the Ring: The Mirror of Galadriel

Elves and magic – Elvic Enchantment

“On the edge of a valley one of Professor Tolkien’s characters can pause and say: ‘It smells like elves.’ It may be years before we produce another author with such a nose for an elf. The professor has the air of inventing nothing. He has studied trolls and dragons at first hand and describes them with that fidelity which is worth oceans of ‘glib’ originality.”

– C.S. Lewis, Review of The Hobbit 
C.S. Lewis, qtd. in Philip Zaleski and Carol Zaleski, The Fellowship: The Literary Lives of the Inklings (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 209.

O Elbereth! Gilthoniel!
We still remember, we who dwell
In this far land beneath the trees,
Thy starlight on the Western Seas.

– J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 78.

So what is this magic at work? According to Arthur Clarke's Third Law:

Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.

Arthur C. Clarke Hazards of Prophecy: The Failure of Imagination

But Tolkien’s ‘Elf-magic’ is not quite the same as ‘technology’ in the human understanding. ‘Elf-magic’ is not worked by technology as the ‘hard culture’ of physical tools but through the understanding of the way the natural world works. Through this intimate knowledge, the elves come to create things that seem impossible, and therefore ‘magical’, to outsiders like us, but which are quite natural to them.

But there’s something else going on when Sam and Frodo say that there’s strong magic pervading the place, although you can’t see who is working it. That observation is true not just of the forest of Lothlorien, but refers to a magic that runs through the whole of The Lord of the Rings, and, for a Christian, through the whole of the world. ‘Bidden or unbidden, God is always present,’ as the Latin motto Jung found in Erasmus goes. The presence of God is everywhere. God is so ubiquitous as to be invisible. We don’t notice God in the same way that fish don’t notice the water they swim in. God just ‘is’, and stands in need of no further proof than that. When all is at it should be, we don’t notice the air that we breathe. Only when something goes wrong do we notice and start to ask questions. In this respect, the symbolic interactionism and the phenomenology of intersubjective meaning referred to above are part of the cosmic longing for meaning which defines the reality of human beings. Human beings are meaning-seeking creatures, made to be in tune with reality. We have a natural bent to be in touch with ‘the inner consistency of reality.’ But what is that ‘reality?’ Those who live in reality, will know reality intimately, will know good and will do good, for no other reason than it is good. And that is ‘good enough,’ and ‘God enough.’ As with Art, and the technics of natural understanding, so God is present in nature. Unseen, unstated, undefined and indefinable, God is ubiquitous as a guiding presence giving our lives their consistency with truth.

Sub-creation – the Art present in nature

To describe the human desire to create and experience Art, Tolkien employed the term ‘sub-creation.’ He was concerned to designate the process by which imaginal experience came to be crafted and shaped into an artistic form. In using the prefix ‘sub-’ in the words ‘sub-creation’ and ‘sub-creator’, Tolkien was conveying the idea that the human desire to create arose within us on account of being created beings made by a divine Creator: 

‘We make in our measure and in our derivative mode, because we are made: and not only made, but made in the image and likeness of a Maker.’

J.R.R. Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories” in The Monsters and the Critics, ed. Christopher Tolkien (London, England: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006), 145.) 

We are hearing a lot in contemporary theoretical circles about human beings as co-creators in an endlessly creative universe (the idea runs throughout theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman’s book Reinventing the Sacred). The notion of sub-creation is not quite the same of co-creation, but is cognate. In Tolkien’s sense, human beings are sub-creators, working under the creative imagination of God; for Kauffman, human beings are co-creators working within the creative universe. As he expresses the idea: ‘A central implication of this new Worldview is that we are co-creators of a universe, biosphere, and culture of endlessly novel creativity.’ (Stuart Kauffman 2008 Reinventing the Sacred ch 1). We therefore create a culture and a human social world as part of the ceaselessly creative matrix of the universe. Tolkien’s idea is slightly different. For him, Art, like God, is ever-present in Nature, and as sub-creators, we come to make a Secondary World. This Secondary World (called Arda), is a world of other divinely created beings, other sub-creators with stories, creating in their own way. So we have worlds within worlds, sub-creators under sub-creators working under the creative imagination of God. Other than the fact that it proceeds under God the primary creator, Tolkien’s view has all the hallmarks of Kauffman’s ceaselessly creative universe, exhibiting an energy or force that is forever igniting creativity in a world that is always in movement, going beyond itself and bringing more beauty into being.

To explain these worlds within worlds, sub-creation within sub-creation, I turn to Becca Segall Tarnas and her detailed explanation of Tolkien’s cosmogonic myth, called the Ainulindalë, the Music of the Ainur. ‘The Ainulindalë began with Eru, the One, who first made the Ainur, spirits of divine thought. Eru, called also Ilúvatar in the world of Arda, inspired the Ainur to make music—and they did. Their singing, unbeknownst to them, shaped the world they would eventually build.’ The Ainur are thus the first sub-creators under the divine imagination of Ilúvatar, shaping the divine imagining they received from Eru. The musical strands wove together and came to form the first harmonies:

. . . a sound arose of endless interchanging melodies woven in harmony that passed beyond hearing into the depths and into the heights, and the places of the dwelling of Ilúvatar were filled to overflowing, and the music and the echo of the music went out into the Void, and it was not void. 

J.R.R. Tolkien, The Silmarillion (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001), 15.

But one of the Ainur, by the name of Melkor, didn’t want to be a sub-creator, weaving his musical threads seamlessly into the melodies of all others, but sought to be a creator in his own right. ‘He had gone often alone into the void places seeking the Imperishable Flame; for desire grew hot within him to bring into Being things of his own . . . . Yet he found not the Fire, for it is with Ilúvatar.’ (Tolkien, The Silmarillion, 16.) Some of the Ainur follow suit, but the new music that Melkor’s thoughts and desires brings into being comes to clash with the harmonies already in motion and produce ‘a sea of turbulent sound.’ (Tolkien, The Silmarillion, 16.) Ilúvatar responds to this ‘raging storm’ (Tolkien, The Silmarillion, 16.) by bringing forth a new theme. But once more, Melkor’s discord incited a disruptive clashing and brought about disharmony, drawing Ilúvatar into a third theme. The two melodies played simultaneously, conflicting yet interwoven: ‘there were two musics progressing at one time before the seat of Ilúvatar, and they were utterly at variance. The one was deep and wide and beautiful, but slow and blended with an immeasurable sorrow, from which its beauty chiefly came.’ (Tolkien, The Silmarillion, 16-17). Melkor’s music was loud, violent and repetitive, ‘but it seemed that its most triumphant notes were taken by the other and woven into its own solemn pattern.’ (Tolkien, The Silmarillion, 17.) ‘The rebellion of Melkor, the desire for individual creativity apart from the Creativity of the One, was ultimately woven into the very patterning of the third theme of music making it all the more beautiful. For it was the sorrow of the third theme, sorrow in response to the violence of the disharmony, that gave it its profound beauty.’ (Becca Segall Tarnas, Trickster: At the Boundary Between Creator and Sub-Creator). In its cycle of rebellion and response, this tale indicates a never ending creativity forever subverting the boundaries between Creator and sub-creator. ‘The Music of the Ainur is the moment of Creation, when the world is first imagined into being. It cannot be done again, and there are no mistakes. Disharmony is part of the world’s story from the beginning, and the suffering it causes gives rise to greater beauty than if all were melodious.’ (Becca Segall Tarnas, Trickster: At the Boundary Between Creator and Sub-Creator). Segall Tarnas refers to the figure of the Trickster here as one who makes or shapes this world by being many agents of creativity in succession. As she proceeds to argue, Melkor’s desire to create is the gift bestowed on him by the Creator, a gift that he misuses by wresting it to his own devices. The violence of his attempt to wrench that gift away from the divine imagination of the Creator and make it his sole possession to be used to his own ends altered the course of all subsequent actions. Ilúvatar revealed to the Ainur a vision of their Music, so that they could come to see how their melodies each unfolded into form. Ilúvatar responds: ‘And thou, Melkor, wilt discover all the secret thoughts of thy mind, and wilt perceive that they are but a part of the whole and tributary to its glory.’ (Tolkien, The Silmarillion, 17.)

In ceasing to be identified as a sub-creator under the One, Melkor became a being marring the sub-creations of the other powerful Ainur. He ceased to be known as Melkor, a name meaning ‘He who arises in Might,’ (Tolkien, The Silmarillion, 340.) but as Morgoth, ‘the Black Enemy.’ (Tolkien, The Silmarillion, 341.) As Becca Segall Tarnas explains, the creative energy moved on, and ‘found its home in other sub-creators who walk the fine line between good and evil, following the ambiguous path of ingenuity and clever creativity.’ (Trickster: At the Boundary Between Creator and Sub-Creator).

Another among the Ainur who desired to make his own independent creations was Aulë. He longed for beings to whom he could teach craft and wisdom. He recognized that the third themes of the Music signified the coming of the Children of Ilúvatar, the Eldar and Edain — Elves and Humans — but, impatient for their coming, he crafted a new race of beings, the Naugrim, called also the Dwarves. As a result, Ilúvatar came to him, and in this moment we see the true relationship between Creator and sub-creator. Ilúvatar spoke to Aulë: ‘For thou hast from me as a gift thy own being only, and no more; and therefore the creatures of thy hand and mind can live only by that being, moving when thou thinkest to move them, and if thy thought be elsewhere, standing idle. Is that thy desire?’ (Tolkien, The Silmarillion, 43.)  (​https:​/​​/​beccatarnas.com​/​category​/​essays​/​j-r-r-tolkien-the-inklings​/​" \l "_ftn17​)Aulë sought to explain his apparent rebellion as arising not from a desire for power and lordship for himself but from a desire for ‘things other than I am, to love and to teach them.’ (Tolkien, The Silmarillion, 43.) Aulë here expresses the inherent desire to create as a sub-creator, which is the true relationship to the divine imagination: ‘Yet the making of things is in my heart from my own making by thee; and the child of little understanding that makes a play of the deeds of his father may do so without thought of mockery, but because he is the son of his father.’ The effect of the seeming rebellion of the sub-creator is to bring into existence something new, the Naugrim as beings with their own autonomous life and wills, independent of their maker. 

‘A sub-creator shapes a world within a world, Art from the raw material of Imagination. A world within a world naturally has its boundaries, but while within the world it can be difficult to see where the boundaries lie, if it is possible to see them at all. Only when a new world is created do we see that boundary drawn, the moment sub-creator and Creator work together to breathe life into new form. The Trickster waits at the boundaries, the crossroads, the borders, leaping between those who dare to draw a line against what has come before to make something new and different.’

Becca Segall Tarnas, Trickster: At the Boundary Between Creator and Sub-Creator

But in this world, the Trickster seems particularly evasive, ‘changing names and changing shapes, crossing from good to evil and back before there was good and evil to cross between.’ And when the one who appears to be a Trickster falls from grace, the Trickster energy moves on, finds somewhere else to be. This sounds like the ceaselessly creative universe I mentioned earlier with respect to Stuart Kauffman’s work, the biologist who argues for biological self-organisation as ‘order for free.’ That’s ‘God enough’ argues Kauffman (2008). But there are a lot of unanswered questions here. ‘The Trickster seems to be Creativity itself, the Imperishable Flame that gives life, that is within Ilúvatar and yet is not Ilúvatar. And what is the Imperishable Flame, the Secret Fire? Why was there a great Music to begin with? Why were the Ainur brought into being? For no apparent reason . . . Is that not the sign of the Trickster?’ (Becca Segall Tarnas, Trickster: At the Boundary Between Creator and Sub-Creator).

Mythopoeia
There is a chapter in Carpenter’s book on C.S. Lewis entitled ‘Mythopoeia.’ The subject of the chapter concerns Lewis’ conversion to Christianity, which began with his recognition of a divine presence, when he ‘admitted that God was God,’ (C.S. Lewis, qtd. in Carpenter, The Inklings, 40). The key to his conversion was the recognition of the truth of myth. Tolkien was a key influence in this conversion. So too was the book Poetic Diction, in which Barfield examines language in correlation with the evolution of consciousness from mythical perception to rational intellect. “In the dawn of language, said Barfield, speakers did not make a distinction between the ‘literal’ and the ‘metaphorical,’ but used words in what might be called a ‘mythological’ manner.” (C.S. Lewis, qtd. in Carpenter, The Inklings, 41.)

Barfield uses the example of the Latin word spiritus to make the point. Translated into English, spiritus can mean ‘wind,’ ‘breath,’ or ‘spirit,’ according to context. However, in the ancient world, the word meant all three things – ‘they were a unified whole in which the physical is indistinguishable from its psychical, ensouled presence.’ (Becca Segall Tarnas, Becoming Acquainted with “The Inklings”). 

This is the standpoint from which Tolkien argued when he came to persuade Lewis the truth of myths. Lewis was delighted by certain myths, but he did not belief them to be true. They were beautiful and moving stories, but ultimately, Lewis said, they were untrue. Myths are ‘lies and therefore worthless, even though breathed through silver,’ he told Tolkien. ‘They are not lies,’ Tolkien replied. Just then, as Lewis recalled, there was a ‘rush of wind which came so suddenly on the still, warm evening and sent so many leaves pattering down that we thought it was raining. We held our breath.’ (C.S. Lewis, qtd. in Carpenter, The Inklings, 43.) 

Tolkien proceeded to press his point by referring to the trees, the night sky, all that surrounded them, as if the world were speaking to them, providing evidence in support of the words. Myths are not lies, Tolkien says, they live all around us in the world we see, feel, touch, smell, breath; they make their presence known through the rush of wind, spiritus. Spirit is ever present.

To you, a tree is simply a vegetable organism, and a star simply a ball of inanimate matter moving along a mathematical course. But the first men to talk of “trees” and “stars” saw things very differently. To them, the world was alive with mythological beings. They saw the stars as living silver, bursting into flame in answer to the eternal music. 

C.S. Lewis, qtd. in Carpenter, The Inklings, 43.

This view portrays human beings as sensing, intuiting, feeling beings who are awakened through contact with the animate world around them. But Becca Segall Tarnas doesn’t think that Carpenter’s words here do justice to the depth of Tolkien’s understanding. For Tolkien, the stars were not ‘as living silver’, they were living silver. ‘Not only did the first humans to speak of trees and stars “see” them differently, they were different because they were in participatory relationship to these ancient people.’ (Becca Segall Tarnas, Becoming Acquainted with “The Inklings”).

Lewis’s conversion to Christianity followed later that night when Tolkien explained first that ‘not merely the abstract thoughts of man but also his imaginative inventions must originate with God, and must in consequence reflect something of eternal truth,’ (C.S. Lewis, qtd. in Carpenter, The Inklings, 43.) and then that not only is ‘the death and resurrection of Christ . . . the old ‘dying god’ story all over again,’ but that ‘here is a real Dying God, with a precise location in history and definite historical consequences. The old myth has become fact.’ (C.S. Lewis, qtd. in Carpenter, The Inklings, 44.) In showing the truth of myth and in showing how myth entered history through the story of Christ, Tolkien brought about the conversion of C.S. Lewis to Christianity. We live in more than a ceaselessly creative universe; what Kauffman calls ‘God enough’ points to an invisible presence, with no need to prove anything more beyond this participation in creative activity. 

We could leave it there, at the level of invisible magic and presence. What would be changed by engaging in an intellectual or theological process of naming and framing?


“For Equilibrium, a Blessing:
Like the joy of the sea coming home to shore,
May the relief of laughter rinse through your soul.

As the wind loves to call things to dance,
May your gravity by lightened by grace.

Like the dignity of moonlight restoring the earth,
May your thoughts incline with reverence and respect.

As water takes whatever shape it is in,
So free may you be about who you become.

As silence smiles on the other side of what's said,
May your sense of irony bring perspective.

As time remains free of all that it frames,
May your mind stay clear of all it names.

May your prayer of listening deepen enough
to hear in the depths the laughter of god.” 





5 The Ethic of Christian Stewardship

Christian sources
Tolkien was a devout Roman Catholic, and Christianity pervades his thinking. It isn’t stated explicitly in his writing, and trying to work out where it is expressed and how may be the subject of academic treatment. For example, Amber Lee Peace, in Medieval Philosophy in Tolkien’s Writings, argues that Tolkien’s fictional world raises philosophical questions and answers which are deeply-seated in Tolkien’s Catholic faith and which are best appreciated through the lens of Boethius and St. Thomas Aquinas. ‘Tolkien’s resources were vast and varied. Tolkien scholars have given attention to Tolkien’s resources of Norse philology and Platonic philosophy, but less attention has been given to the Christian philosophical foundations of his writings.’ I agree. But I would suggest that Tolkien himself preferred it that way. That is, Tolkien’s ethic is more effective for being implicit rather than being rendered in explicit form. Those Christian roots give Tolkien’s work a particular flavour, a flavour we can all taste and respond to. That doesn’t mean that Tolkien wrote to teach Catholic ideals. He disliked allegory. His values are present because they were part of who he was. But to present these values as ideals and persuade people to live by them was not his primary purpose, and his writing is all the more effective for that.
It is difficult to write about the Christian sources of Tolkien’s work and how these make their presence felt in The Lord of the Rings. In the first place, there is the question of what could be gained by making an explicit religious statement. That would invite debate on religion, dividing people into rival camps, for and against religion, and then to divisions within the religious camp, rehearsing and repeating the all too familiar arguments that excite the partisans, and leave the rest of us stone cold and apatheist. In the second place, there is nothing overtly religious about the book. There is no God, no prayers, no churches, none of the external trappings of religious worship. So much so that I have heard some state that the ethic in the book is essentially a pagan one. That is a superficial understanding. Everything that happens in Lord of the Rings happens for a reason. Nothing is left to chance. Religion, specifically a Christian worldview, pervades The Lord of the Rings. Christian themes are so deep in the soil of Middle-Earth that they are as natural as the physical elements we take for granted. Religion is implicit in the entire terrain and is expressed as naturally as the rain that falls, the rivers that flow, the air we breathe. Religion does not stand out and is not flagged up. It is deep in the infrastructure, not explicitly stated as a superstructure raised above reality and its living. That, for me, is the really interesting aspect – the possibility of a religious faith that is all the more active and effective in being unstated and implicit, proceeding directly through the motivational economy.

Entering the forest of Lothlorien, Sam turns and says to Frodo that there’s strong magic at work in this place, but you can’t see who is working it. That is how the magic works in the world as a whole. Bidden or unbidden, God is always present. God is so ubiquitous, so all-pervading, that the presence or the magic is assumed and goes unnoticed and unremarked, in the same way that we don’t notice or remark upon the air that we breathe – until it is polluted or withdrawn. In that sense, like the Nature and the ecosystems upon which we depend for life and its flourishing, God is a necessary presence for a healthy life, but works as something of a background assumption. 

Unseen, unnoticed, unnamed, seemingly inactive and absent, God is the central character of The Lord of the Rings. That is a challenging claim, since the book contains not a single solitary reference to God. God is never mentioned, but is ever-present. A little thought shows why this is the case. The books very title is revealing – The Lord of the Rings. The idea of a Lord has definite religious connotations, and takes us into the basic theme of good and evil and the struggle between the two. One would think that the Lord of the Rings would be the most important character of the book. But the fact that this Lord is Sauron should make us think more deeply on the question. Sauron is important as the personification of evil; not as a heroic figure fighting for the triumph of good over evil, but the very epitome of evil. And the reason Sauron merits the designation of evil is precisely because he craves the power of God, scheming to attain that power and use it to his own devices. This is the ‘men as gods’ theme that lies behind the ‘disenchantment of the world.’ A strain of this crops up in Kauffman’s Reinventing the Sacred, the idea that God is a human invention, a symbol of human power that we need to reappropriate and use consciously to our own ends via scientific knowledge, technological know-how, organisation, technique, tools and instruments. That does not sound evil in itself, and Kauffman presents it in terms of human beings coming to assume responsibility for their actions by taking morality into their own hands. He makes the argument as an attempt to get humans to see the evil that they do, and to stop doing it. I can only agree with his intentions here. 

I have Alvin Toffler’s Future Shock, which ends with a call for us to design a new civilisation. Similar statements abound in the work of others, such as Buckminster Fuller. The evil lies not with the concern for design, but with the desire for power as a means to an end. The problem lies in the temptations of power, and the tendency for a mere means to take possession, change motivations and become an end in itself. 
At some point following the gifting of the rings, a verse was written among the Free Peoples regarding them:

Three Rings for the Elven-kings under the sky,
Seven for the Dwarf-lords in their halls of stone,
Nine for Mortal Men doomed to die,
One for the Dark Lord on his dark throne
In the Land of Mordor where the Shadows lie.
One Ring to rule them all, One Ring to find them,
One Ring to bring them all, and in the darkness bind them,
In the Land of Mordor where the Shadows lie.





I wish to address the question of Christian themes in Tolkien’s work by returning to literary ecology and the need for art and imagination. Tolkien’s environmentalism is an ecology of the good which unites art, aesthetics and ethics. I shall now weave Tolkien’s literary ecology together with notions of Christian stewardship, to develop an environmental vision and ethical commitment. Here is a caution against reading too much into Tolkien by way of prescriptive ethics and intellectual propositions – and against reading too little into his work either.

‘One final warning … we are addressing primarily his fiction. These are works of myth, fantasy and fairy tale and are intended to be understood as such, not as ecological tracts. Avoid treating as intellectual propositions. Tolkien was interested primarily in writing good stories, and these must succeed imaginatively, not as propaganda. Our goal is to elucidate Tolkien’s vision, not to reduce that vision to a set of environmental principles or Christian doctrines.
At the same time, however, Tolkien ardently defended the applicability of myth and fantasy, as well as its foundation in religious and moral truth. We believe that there are environmental principles to be drawn from Tolkien’s fiction as well as from the underlying doctrines on which those principles are based. Thus, while we want to avoid reducing Tolkien’s vision to a mere list of principles or propositions, we hope to point out to readers what some of these might be: Tolkien’s brilliance lies not only in capturing our imaginations, but – and perhaps more importantly – in what he reveals after we have been caught.’

Matthew Dickerson, Ents, Elves, and Eriador: The Environmental Vision of J.R.R. Tolkien

Tolkien is indeed writing stories, not ecological and ethical tracts. And I agree that Tolkien is writing good stories. But a good story is grounded in a sound philosophy, and this certainly exists in Tolkien. Dickerson is right to focus on Tolkien’s vision, and not reduce it to a set of ecological or religious principles or doctrines. But there is indeed an environmental vision in Tolkien, one that he expresses through myth and fantasy, one that is expressed through art and imagination, and one which, as Dickerson acknowledges, has its ‘foundation in religious and moral truth.’ Tolkien’s work, then, embodies and articulates a clear set of environmental principles, from his literary creation and from the underlying doctrines on which that work is based.

I proceed, then, by reinforcing a point made earlier with respect to literary ecology – the importance of art in fostering environmental responsiveness, vision and sensibility. In the introduction to Part III: Art and Creation Consciousness, Philip N Joranson and Ken Butigan, editors of Cry of the Environment: Rebuilding the Christian Creation Tradition argue strongly that the resolution of the ecological crisis requires an ability to ‘see through’ and see further than the ‘realism’ of given facts and that art and imagination are crucial in the formation of the necessary environmental vision and consciousness:

‘The present ecological crisis we are facing is due in part to an impoverishment of imagination – creative solutions to admittedly complex ecological difficulties are rarely proposed and even more rarely taken seriously as ‘realistic.’
Artistic resources must be an integral part in the development of genuine creation consciousness. Art works – in every medium – can symbolize for us our deepest concerns: they can be documents of what is and what is not meaningful in human existence. When we are engaged by a work of art, we begin to participate in a new vision of the world … They help us to see our place in it – in a new way.

Joranson and Butigan seek to revalue an often overlooked, or underappreciated, factor that plays a key role in fostering a responsiveness to ecological crisis: the importance of art, stories, meanings, culture in mediating our engagement with the material world, coming to shape our consciousness and transform our relation to the world. This explains how we can give the material facts of the environmental crisis an existential focus within a humanly meaningful frame of reference and action. This would be to give ‘objective’ realities a subjective force by going to the heart of the motivational economy – bringing the environmental crisis alive within the ecology of the human heart, overcoming tendencies to instrumentalism, institutional tinkering and technological fixing. Like the intellect, the imagination, is not a ‘thing’ to be put to instrumental use, nor a mere problem-solver to be set to work by those in the know; it must also be revered, fostered and formed. In his introduction to The Art of the Commonplace: The Agrarian Essays of Wendell Berry, Norman Wirzba spells out the relevance of this formation of the imagination when it comes to addressing environmental problems:

‘First, we must recognize that an agrarian transformation of contemporary culture will require the work of the imagination. We need to be able to envision a future that is markedly different from today’s world, and be creative in the implementation of economic, political, religious and educational reforms.’

Addressing problems is not just a matter of analysis and diagnosis, but of considering such problems as capable and worthy of being solved. That requires an ethical commitment. Motivating people to resolve these problems also requires a vision of a future that is, in the very least, feasibly better than the present. It requires that we hold in the mind’s eye the idea of an alternative future beyond current facts. Before strategies are devised, actions are taken, plans are implemented and reforms attempted, the imagination has been at work to give us a vision of a new way of doing things, something that transcends given facts, and this vision is fostered and formed through art and literature. And myth (among other things.) And that is where Tolkien does his work as the maker of myth. In creating a highly engaging work of incredible stories and characters, he fires the imagination in such a way that it could come to play a shaping and (self) transformative role in contemporary culture. And that is a form of environmental envisioning.

Cal DeWitt, the president emeritus of the Au Sable Institute of Environmental Studies and a professor of environmental science at the University of Wisconsin, uses story to teach environmental studies. Ironically, when Professor DeWitt stopped teaching for the sake of teaching evaluations and started telling stories, his evaluations rocketed and he won the Chancellor’s Award for outstanding teaching. He therefore swears by the storytelling approach. ‘I teach environmental science from stories now’, he says. ‘They have within them what students should understand, but all delivered in story. Because that’s the way our minds work. The only way we really comprehend things in an integrated way is through story.’

Art, aesthetics and ethics go together for Tolkien. Tolkien affirmed the inherent value of the Creation, and of creation, specifically literary creation. Tolkien expressed his moral and environmental vision through story and myth rather than through a set of abstract propositions. Tolkien presents his fundamental truths not objectively in terms of a set of abstract philosophical principles, but subjectively in the form of stories. His work is mythopoeical rather than scientific, moral, metaphysical or historical. He works creatively by writing narratives that are to be understood mythically within a fictional world. He is the maker of myths to elaborate key values. A myth expresses in story form the primordial, elemental and foundational truths upon which a culture rests, by which the view of and relation to reality is established. 

Tolkien’s environmentalism falls within the field of literary ecology, fostering a creative and imaginative approach to the world. Rather than drifting into utopian fantasy and wishful thinking in a way that evades the deep questions and controversies of the real world, such literary concerns enable exploration of the ‘dark continent’ within the ecology of good and evil. Resolution of deep existential crises require a (self) examination of real metaphysical depth and breadth, something more than a winning strategy, political victory or technological fix. And it requires imagination. This is where Tolkien works his magic.

In The Philosophy of Tolkien: The Worldview Behind "The Lord of the Rings", philosopher and professor at Boston College, Peter Kreeft, unearths the philosophical and moral underpinnings of Tolkien’s literary work. He writes:

‘All literature incarnates some philosophy. Thus all literature teaches. In allegory, the philosophy is taught by the conscious and calculating part of the mind, while in great literature it is done by the unconscious and contemplative part of the mind, which is deeper and wiser and has more power to persuade and move the reader. Allegory engages only the mind, while great literature engages the whole person; for allegory comes from only the mind, while great literature comes from the whole person.’

This engaging of the whole person is crucially important. To address the environmental crisis as an existential crisis – a crisis in a way of life as well as a personal crisis – requires that all human faculties be engaged. There is much debate with respect to environmental response and motivation, with what it takes beyond the statement of facts, to incite people to action. In my own work, I argue the case in terms of character-construction, forms of the common life, social identity connecting individual and common good, communities of practice and social formation making means and mechanisms of collective action available. The point being that we need all our faculties working in tandem if we are to address the environmental crisis in an integral and multi-dimensional way. And art, imagination and culture have a key role to play in fostering environmental awareness and insight. A literary ecology recognises that human beings are meaning-seeking story-telling creatures. The stories we tell go straight to the motivational economy of human beings and possess the power to persuade and move people in a way that scientific knowledge and technical know-how do not. We can identify problems and devise solutions, but making people want to act requires something more than analysis and strategy, it requires the fostering of response and the creation of consciousness and will. 

If environmental action is to succeed in its goals, it must proceed through the active participation of people in transforming the way in which they live, and this involves much more than the presentation of facts and strategies; it involves changing modes of thinking and doing, the ways in which people see the world – in short, to be effective, profound and enduring, environmental action must persuade and move people, and it must do that by offering a vision of a world that transcends the facts given in time and place. This is precisely what stories do. 

That Tolkien’s stories are also about ethics and philosophies is also vitally important. All civilisations and societies are based upon a standpoint or a worldview, and all attempts to understand nature and the world we live in express some viewpoint, whether consciously, elaborated in some abstract system of principles, or unconsciously as a philosophy of life. Stories articulate these philosophies and establish their sense, or otherwise, by embodying them. 

As Kreeft goes on to argue:

‘Literature not only incarnates a philosophy; it also tests it by verifying or falsifying it. One way literature tests philosophy is by putting different philosophies into the laboratory of life, incarnating them in different characters and then seeing what happens. Life does exactly the same thing. Literature also tests philosophy in a more fundamental way. It can be expressed by this rule: a philosophy that cannot be translated into a good story cannot be a good philosophy.’

Tolkien writes a good story and tells a good tale. And there’s a good philosophy for living behind it all.

‘Young people in general sense the difference between the real and the phony. They don’t know it—when they begin to know that difference, and to try to articulate it, then they are adults and subject to all the pains and fallibilities of that state. They can be misled by fools or madmen, but they sense the preacher who doesn’t feel a word of his sermon, the mountebank who is putting them on, the society that does not believe in itself. They rarely take a phony of any sort to their hearts.
Tolkien believes in his world, and in all those who inhabit it. This is, of course, no guarantee of greatness—if Tolkien weren’t a fine writer, it could not make him one—but it is something without which there is no greatness, in art or in anything else, and I find very little of it in the fiction that purports to tell me about this world we all live in.’

Peter Beagle, Tolkien's Magic Ring from The Tolkien Reader

Whether you agree or disagree with him, Tolkien is no phony. His fantasy is no escape but an attempt to bring us to face realities many would prefer to shy away from. Tolkien believes in his world, and he believes in the philosophical underpinnings of that world. He makes his world believable. He persuades and moves. That’s the power of writing, of course. But, more than that, it is the power of what is being written about.


To write of Tolkien’s ‘environmentalism’ requires qualification. Tolkien’s environmental concerns are of a certain implicit kind, part of his wider commitments rather than an explicit ecological goal or understanding. The positions that Tolkien takes and the values he expresses are far from exhausting all aspects of environmentalism, and fit certain aspects only in a coincidental sense. Tolkien wrote before the emergence of an organised environmental movement. Further, his words possess a moral rather than a scientific character. That said, insofar as environmentalism expresses a concern that people should come to think and act in an environmentally responsible way, then much of Tolkien’s words express an environmental concern.

Tolkien’s books contain an inherent environmental thread, and I shall be concerned with highlighting the ecological and environmental implications of key themes in Tolkien as I develop the argument. Tolkien makes for interesting reading. The interest that his work is generating, particularly through the world of film, where Tolkien adaptations are generating mass audiences and making his characters household names, contains the potential to spread his ideas and values amongst the great public. This cuts a number of ways. If films encourage people to come to read Tolkien’s works directly, then that is a positive impact to be welcomed. But it is bringing out the flavour of the works that interests me. The incredible popularity of Peter Jackson’s cinematic interpretations of Tolkien’s works coincide with a climate crisis and the threat of an ecological catastrophe looming ever larger on the close horizon. The time is ripe to encourage people to enter into a deeper examination of Tolkien’s ‘environmental’ concerns. For Tolkien’s concerns are our own, as, too, are the moral struggles running throughout Tolkien’s stories. 

The environmental crisis we face is multi-faceted and complex and it will require all our human faculties to be able to pull through to the other side. I think art, literature and ethics have a big role to play in expanding the imagination, envisioning alternative futures and fostering the active hope that brings about endings other than those given in ‘objective’ facts. The future is always more than the present enlarged, and I affirm the power of a literary ecology – the ecology of hope, dream and vision – to inspire, motivate and activate human beings to journey forth in pursuit of a better land. I also agree with Wittgenstein’s insight that aesthetics and ethics are ‘one and the same’, to the effect that a vision doesn’t just inspire effort but obligates actions. My longstanding view is that ethics and aesthetics should be reunited, and necessarily, since the separation of the two has resulted in a gap between theory and practice which inhibits and obstructs sustainable behaviour. The result is hard to summarise – moral ecology, ecological virtue, aesthethics (Stefanie Lehner’s term to express the reunion of aesthetics and ethics – but the idea will become clear enough. My hope is that this understanding will come to gain acceptance among a new generation of film goers and book readers and, through them, will come to have a positive environmental impact through extending an environmental ethos throughout the culture. Culture is the mediating term between nature and society, enabling us to negotiate the terms by which we live in relation to biological laws on the one hand and institutional and systemic imperatives on the other. We need to think and act strategically and ethically with respect to environmental issues. All historical change is a combination of material interests and moral/metaphysical motives, and if we lose sight of the one through a focus on the other then we will fall short of the actions we need to undertake and the changes we need to make. We need to respond to crisis creatively, imaginatively and intelligently, and I believe that Tolkien’s works are both insightful and inspiring in these respects.

I would certainly hope that those whose interest has been sparked by the movies would come to appreciate the key themes of Tolkien’s environmentalism. And, at the same time, come to appreciate the distinctly moral flavour of that environmentalism. There is a distinctively ethical quality that is embedded in Tolkien’s environmental concerns, and this needs to be highlighted so that we read Tolkien aright, and not simply through the filter of our own ecological commitment and understanding. Tolkien’s take on the natural world is one that is coloured by his Christian outlook on life. Miss that, and you miss the real significance of Tolkien’s words. Anyone who appreciates Tolkien’s work, and possesses a reasonable awareness of environmental questions, will be amenable to the ethical perspective which coloured Tolkien’s view of the world. I believe that concern for the environment is implicitly a moral concern, in that what people think and do possesses an environmental impact and makes a difference. An environmental concern contains the view that is matters that we make a difference for the better and not the worse and seek to do non-harm. My point is that an acquaintance with Tolkien’s words reveal that concern in Tolkien, and that reading Tolkien can serve to expand environmental understanding as a moral awareness. I work in the tradition of virtue ethics and attempt to bring this ancient tradition of the virtues over into the field of ecology, not as a science but as a field of practical reason. That is, my concern in this respect is not with ecology as a science but as a practice, as something that human beings do in terms of everyday living. In that sense, the virtues are the qualities that human beings need to have in order to flourish well as human beings at one with their environment. Virtues are thus qualities for successful living. When I argue for an implicit environmentalism embedded in Tolkien’s works, it is precisely this notion of ecological virtue I am thinking of, the way that living right and living well in tune with the land is embedded in Tolkien’s ethical standpoint.

Environmentalism as a moral ecology – White’s critique
Where there is a distinctive outlook, there is a standpoint, an underlying vision that colours and orients thoughts and deeds. Tolkien’s standpoint is that of a devout Catholic whose Christianity shapes his fundamental outlook on life. Tolkien’s environmentalism is a moral ecology, an ecology of good that is embedded in place and person. His view of a responsible environmental stewardship is very much the product of his Christian viewpoint. This observation opens up a contentious issue, for it challenges the view that Christianity and other such dualist religions foster an attitude which encourages and justifies damaging environmental practices. Tolkien’s expression of Christian stewardship suggests precisely the opposite view; that, properly understood and acted upon, values central to the Christian tradition establish clear and cogent foundations for responsible environmental behaviour. 

Anyone acquainted with Tolkien’s works cannot but be impressed with the way he expresses a profound moral concern with the destructive impacts of industrialisation, urbanisation and technology upon natural spaces and small-scale cultures and communities. Many of the serious and important concerns and criticisms that modern environmentalism expresses with respect to the environmental impact of techno-urban industrial civilisation were raised by Tolkien more than half a century ago. ‘Tolkien wrote in an era long before modern environmentalism had been conceived as a body of intellectual and political ideas, making his approach to some of the most important environmental issues of our day all the more remarkable.’ (Dickerson). That concern can only be described as an environmental concern, but it is at one with his Christian viewpoint. What is interesting about that is that Tolkien not only wrote as a Christian but wrote long before modern environmentalism had come into being as a consciously social and political movement, and therefore before the criticisms that have been made upon Christianity as dualistic and anthropocentric, denigrating nature and justifying its domination and exploitation. These themes arose in Tolkien as elements integral to his moral view of the world. ‘Tolkien simply understood these concerns as an important part of any serious Christian understanding of the world.’ Dickerson concludes that ‘Tolkien was addressing important concerns shared not only by Catholics but also by a broad spectrum of his fellow Christians.’

In time, however, that notion of a Christian understanding of the world as compatible with a truly ecological ethic came to be forcefully challenged. Some six years before Tolkien’s death, historian Lynn White jr published an article entitled The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis which put the blame for this crisis squarely upon Christianity, arguing that the Christian worldview justifies and encourages an aggressive approach on the part of a human species raised above other species to dominate and exploit nature for its own ends, denying and violating the ancient view that nature was sacred. Christianity systematically expunged these older views in favour of the idea that all things were made for humanity's 'benefit and rule'. At the core of White’s charge is that the technological conquest of nature that has brought about the contemporary ecological crisis has its roots in the dualistic and anthropocentric Christian world-view. In being uniquely made in the image of God, humanity had a right of ‘dominion’ as power and control over all the creatures of the earth (Genesis 1.26-30). White contends that ‘Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen.’ (White, 'Ecologic Crisis', p. 1205.) 

White puts the charge against Christianity directly:

[Christianity] not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is God’s will that man exploit nature for his proper ends… Man’s effective monopoly…was confirmed and the old inhibitions to the exploitation of nature crumbled… Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects.

Lynn White Jr., ‘The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis’, Science 155 (1967) 1203-207 (p. 1205)

For these reasons, White concludes that Christianity 'bears a huge burden of guilt’ for the damage that human beings have done to nature. (White, 'Ecologic Crisis', p. 1206). 

White’s thesis would seem to render notions of a responsible Christian stewardship dead in the water. Which begs the question as to why Tolkien could be so profoundly mistaken in so vehemently criticising a techno-urban industrial expansionism that has its roots in his own Christian standpoint. There’s something wrong here. I think White’s criticisms focus on key problems in the human relation to nature, but are too strong and one-sided in the sense of their intellectual determinism. (At the same time, bear in mind the comments I made earlier with respect to Heidegger’s ecological existentialism and how this criticised stewardship for not going anything like far enough in the direction of a thoroughgoing earthcare.)

Many environmentalists will look at a work like Cry of the Environment: Rebuilding the Christian Creation Tradition by Philip N. Joranson; Ken Butigan and express incredulity that there are still people who could think that there is a Christian Creation Tradition, let alone many who are engaged in the attempt to rebuild it. Many would be inclined to think that Lynn White jr’s indictment of Christianity had decisively placed the blame for our environmental predicament on Christianity’s dualistic, anthropocentric, domineering approach to nature. I shall seek to explain how White’s charges can be countered, and why this Christian Creation tradition is other than charged – and other than its dominant historical expression - and may indeed be recovered from within the social forms of historical expression. 

That may sound as though I consider Christianity to be guilty as charged. I do believe that religion, like all organised social forms, including government and law and, indeed, the scientific establishment, is bound up with prevailing socio-institutional relations and structures and will express the biases and norms of the dominant culture. A science tainted with ideology is not science, will come the response from critics, and I agree. And the same applies to ethics, religion, law etc – there are transcendent norms, truths and values which define all these things in ideal form, and these embody a permanent significance beyond time and place. To examine in greater depth the point I am making here with respect to truth, I strongly recommend reading Roger Trigg’s book Beyond Matter: Why Science Needs Metaphysics (2015).

Critics may consider the attempt to recover the authentic Christian Creation tradition doesn’t so much explain as explain away the Christian tradition, rationalising its complicity in the environmental crisis we face. I don’t have the time or space to go deeply into those issues. A short response would be that critics would do better to focus on a capitalist economic system that sought to liberate production and consumption in the service of an accumulative dynamic from limits of all kinds – social (working class organisations, the commons, customary rights), political (laws, regulations), ecological (planetary boundaries) and, religious and ethical (the cardinal virtues were turned into sins against the GNP). Here, my concern is merely to present Tolkien’s environmentalism as an expression of the Christian Creation tradition of responsible stewardship, one capable of delivering a profoundly critical view of the techno-urban industrial paradigm. I consider Tolkien’s view to be a faithful expression of that Christian Creation tradition and that notions of Creation care make perfect environmental sense. The source of ecological degradation and destruction lie elsewhere, in alienative and exploitative social relations that are as much a violation of God and humanity as they are of Nature. I am more inclined to locate our environmental problems in a specific political economy and an alienated system of production than in metaphysics – frankly, we are dealing with the deleterious effects of a bogus metaphysics, demanding that we take E.F. Schumacher’s call for metaphysical reconstruction seriously. And I read White’s criticisms as to demand this very thing.

Is Christian environmental stewardship and Creation Care possible and worth recovering? I say yes (and proof lies in Pope Francis’ Laudato Si). It is worth making a quick detour here to clarify these points, because they go to the heart of addressing Lynn White’s charges.

Etienne Gilson argues that the charge that Christianity desacralized nature cannot be upheld in terms of the practice. The orthodox philosophy of nature, as taught by the cathedral schools and medieval universities, was animistic. All living creatures possessed souls. Further, body was in the soul, not vice versa, permeating the whole body. (Gilson 1930: 215.) This viewpoint is not dualistic. Conceiving the human soul this way serves to connect human life with the life of animate nature. Human beings have qualities of thinking and free choice along with those aspects of the soul that are shared in common with animals and plants. The human intellect or mind is not separate from the animal and vegetative souls but is connected to animal and bodily aspects of the same soul. In short, the human soul comprises both conscious mind or spiritual essence and the life of the body, senses, bodily activities and animal instincts. (Gilson 1930). 

This is all expressed in Aquinas’ view of the soul as the substantial form of the living body. Aquinas affirms the substantial union of body and soul. The soul is a collection of living faculties, with all potency ordered to its act. And Aquinas also makes it clear that the charge of anthropocentricism is also mistaken if it is understood as necessary principle rather than historical misreading. 

It is natural that God would make some intelligent creatures. If it was open to God to create something or to create nothing, then it was also open to God create a world with or without intelligent life. It follows that whilst all human beings are a partial manifestation of God, just by being, only intellectual beings manifest God in their mode of operation (St. Thomas Aquinas SCG II.46.3/1231). Aquinas thinks it fitting that there are creatures with minds. God acts through will and intellect. God can make the created world resemble himself through the creation of intellectual beings. Such beings have the potential to resemble God, not just by being, but also in their thoughts. Intelligent beings can form thoughts and volitions about God and, in doing so, form an element of goodness in the created world. Aquinas thus argues that ‘the highest perfection of the universe requires there to be some creatures in whom the form of the divine intellect is expressed by existing within intellect’ (SCG II.46.5/1233). Given God's choice to create, it would have been inconsistent with His goodness not to have created intellectual beings. But, this intelligence on the part of the human species has to be seen in the context of the whole Creation, as part of the integral vision, not as something outside or raised above, something exalted and privileged. 

To argue for a stark dualism here is to fail to appreciate the nuances in the argument and set these differentiations within a holistic and integral perspective. Aquinas argues explicitly that creating a diversity among species is better than making many things of the same kind: ‘Many species adds more to the goodness of the universe than many individuals of a single species’ (SCG II.45.6/1224). The anthropocentric idea that God made the Earth just for the human species, with the uniqueness of human rationality giving licence to human beings to dominate and exploit the Creation, has no warranty in Aquinas’ understanding of Christianity. I think Aquinas’ understanding is fundamentally correct – anthropocentrism makes no sense from a Christian perspective. To be clear, ‘anthropocentric’, deriving from the Greek word ‘anthropos’, meaning ‘human’ or ‘person’,  means 'human-centred.’ The Christian viewpoint is not, however, human-centred, it is God-centred. And this God is universal in the most expansive of senses. 

God wants creatures to exist so that in them his goodness is manifested, and so that his goodness, which by its essence cannot be multiplied, is at least spread out over many by participation in his likeness. 

QDV 23.1 ad 3

Since any choice that God makes must be suited to His perfect goodness it follows from God’s choice to create the world that the world must be good. The things that God chose to create must have been chosen with a view to making the universe good. For Aquinas, the most salient characteristic of the created world is its variety. The rich array of species supports Aquinas’ general principle that ‘a higher nature at its lowest connects with a lower nature at its highest’ (SCG II.91.4/1775). That’s an argument for biodiversity and for interconnection. 

In fine, there are ample grounds for recovering the view of a responsible Christian stewardship, one that recognises human ethical intelligence as something integral to environmentalism, not as something that raises the species above nature, but as something crucial to the conscious recognition of being part of a greater whole in which all beings and bodies are interconnected. That’s the view I see in Tolkien, and I do not believe that Tolkien was mistaken about the nature of his Christianity. 

I think the technological developments that have been instrumental in the domination and exploitation of nature have some connection with ideological rationalisations, many of them religious, but insofar as they involve the degradation and destruction of Creation, they are in flagrant violation of the purpose of the Creator. And that points to the dangers of the abuse and misuse of a religious ethic. The historical roots of the ecological crisis are to be traced in social relations and the material life-processes by which human beings mediate their practical interchange with nature. 

Further, I don’t believe that ‘dominion’ means domination in the crude sense of human power and control over nature either. Matthew Scully’s Dominion (2002) makes it clear that the real meaning of ‘dominion’ is a responsible and respectful stewardship. And that is certainly the environmental ethic that Tolkien expresses in his work. 
I think that it is significant that Lynn White jr himself doesn’t reject Christianity or the religious viewpoint in favour of a secularism that empties nature of its sacred meaning and value. Instead, White seeks to fundamentally transform that religious viewpoint. That would seem to indicate that White is aware of the historical nature of the charges he brings against Christianity, related to specific social relations and practices, rather than their intellectually or ethically necessary character. His view is aimed more precisely against what Max Weber called ‘the disenchantment of the world’ through scientific and technological advance and the spread of instrumental relations:

What people do about their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them. Human ecology is deeply conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny - that is, by religion…  More science and more technology are not going to get us out of the present ecologic crisis until we find a new religion, or rethink our old one.

White, 'Ecologic Crisis', pp. 1205-206

That’s my view too. We could, here, return to Martin Heidegger and pay close attention to what he meant when, towards the end of his life, he expressed lamentation at the extent to which technological civilisation had removed meaning and purpose from our lives and replaced them with the main signifiers of capitalist industrialism such as use, efficiency, exchange-value, profitability, economic growth, production and productivity.





‘I think the only possibility of salvation left to us is to prepare, through thinking and poetry, for the appearance of the god or for the absence of the god during the decline; so that we do not, simply put, die meaningless deaths, but that when we decline, we decline in the face of the absent god.’

We owe it to ourselves to take up Heidegger’s challenge and think deeply as to what those words mean. I’ll premise this with a few words of caution. One of the contemporary philosophers I have most time for is Jurgen Habermas. I very much admire his commitment to reason and freedom in an era of scarcely reasoned nihilisms, and have praised his work in precisely that respect. Habermas was a central figure in defining the conception of ‘rational freedom’ in my doctoral work. In the interviews collected in The Past as Future he argues:





That struck me as a very sane and sober view all those years ago as I set out to write my thesis on Rational Freedom. I admire Kant’s cool analytical mind too, and have written extensively on him. Nearly a quarter of a century later, Habermas’ view strikes me as even more pertinent in its focus on practising solidarity, on resolidifying social relations, and in its concern with the rational reconstruction of the institutions and forms of a social freedom within the common life. And I do very much believe that democracy, in the context of reconstituting public life, is crucial to resolving seemingly intractable problems with respect to the nature of the good society as well as to ontological controversies bearing upon nature and objective foundations. And I also argue that all large scale ambitious projects concerned with the common good can only succeed if they are grounded in small scale practical reasoning, communities of practice and love of place involving a concept of virtue that is not overly moral and prescriptive and does not make strenuous demands upon the individual. 

Where I would dissent from Habermas here, however, is in his dismissal of Heidegger. I’m not as well versed in Heidegger as I am in ‘rationalist’ philosophers, beginning with Plato. Indeed, Heidegger is very much the opponent of my favourite thinkers. For one reason or another, he has always managed to escape my close attention. But he strikes me as pertinent when I do read him. And poetic. He seems to be pointing us to a deeper reality outside of philosophical reason, something surplus left over after philosophy has done its work, something that is core to our being, something that will always evade capture by reason. I don’t have a ‘tin ear’ for Heideggerian melodies of the 'only a god can save us' variety. I think Heidegger was addressing the contemporary crisis in the only way that did it true justice – with real moral and metaphysical depth. And it surely has to be significant that in the years since Habermas wrote these words, he has himself shown serious interest in religion. 

Heidegger takes us to the heart of the contemporary environmental crisis as an existential and moral crisis. Weber’s ‘disenchantment of the world’ refers to the way that human technical and instrumental advance has rendered the world objectively valueless. Mackie thus expresses the ‘queerness’ of the view that there could be some objective good or value or meaning in the world. (Mackie 1977: 38-42). The only value that the world possesses is the one that the human valuers project upon it. Mackie refers to this in terms of ‘inventing right and wrong.’ That may sound liberatory, along the lines of Kauffman’s demand that human beings need to take morality into their own hands, rather than transferring responsibility for their acts elsewhere. The problem is that human beings don’t just invent morality and God, but also the state, money, capital, commodities – and they have a strange way of determining value. To take up Adam Smith’s old question, if water is more valuable than diamonds, then why do diamonds command a higher price? My point is that inventing ethics, God, right and wrong, good and bad sounds liberatory until we come to appreciate that invention always proceeds within specific – and frequently exploitative and iniquitous – social relations. Within such relations, the value projected upon the world will tend to reflect the power and interests of the dominant class. I would agree that such projection of value is not merely subjective, but that intersubjective experience generates a certain objectivity that binds each and all. The only problem is that this experience of human beings within asymmetrical relations of class power is not equal. And the continued fight for justice and equality within these relations presupposes a moral standard that is higher than those relations.

As Jonathan Clatworthy argues in Why Progressives Need God:

‘Climate change, poverty, war. The problems facing modern secular world are getting bigger all the time. Mountains of literature detail what needs to be done but it remains undone. The governments of our modern democracies fail to achieve it, and perhaps do not intend to.
By denying any moral authority higher than humanity, at least on public matters, it leaves the ruling classes as the decision makers, not only on what we do, but on what we ought to do. What they want becomes right by definition. Being humans, just as flawed and selfish as the rest of us, they view the world’s problems through the lenses of their own vested interests. Until we admit – publicly, not just behind church doors – that there are better ways of doing things, we shall continue to destroy ourselves and our children’s future.’

Clatworthy 2017 : 3

The question of ethics, therefore, is not simply solved by ‘taking morality into our own hands’, as Stuart Kauffman argues in Reinventing the Sacred. Any such ‘invention’ or ‘reinvention’ presupposes a human agency that proceeds within specific social relations – and within the asymmetrical relations that have been the norm in history, that means that some human agents are much more powerful and influential than others in determining moral codes and standards. We need an objective standard that is higher than particular and transitory human relations and actions in time and place. (I would, at the same time, develop the demand to take morality into our hands as a demand for overcoming inequality in human relations, so that we could, indeed, come to take of humanity as a moral ‘we’). 

Jonathan Clatworthy continues: 

The biggest problems we face are well known. The most urgent is environmental destruction … overshadowed by the greatest threat of all, climate change … [4-5]
Vested interests in the old ways work hard to prevent change… [5]
Much the same can be said of poverty …
Militarisation continues apace … an alien from outer space might have asked whether it would have been better to learn how to live together before we learned to split the atom… [6]
So we live at a time of competing crises. Countless publications tell us the things we need to do, but we do not do them…
To do better, we need to believe that there are right answers that transcend every government. There must be moral truths competent to pass judgment on the ruling classes, higher standards to which others can appeal against governments.’ [7]

Far from saving us, ‘taking morality into our own hands’ is implicated in the loss of a higher moral standard and the reduction of transcendent norms, truths and values to the prevailing norms and values of the dominant classes. In place of God, we have human powers of thought or practice, ‘Reason’, ‘Capital’, ‘Money’, the state, bureaucracy, etc. And the worship of these false idols has brought us to the brink of ecological collapse. That’s the problem with human inventions – they have the power to react back against their human inventors, enslaving them to a new necessity, without the transcendent hope and power that gives us a vision and standard beyond that necessity.

We see this most of all in the monetary terms of capitalist relations. The universe in itself is nothing, and only means something in terms of human naming and framing. This, most certainly, is not the Christian view, nor is it a religious view. This profoundly human-centred view is the ‘men as gods’ thesis, a bastardized religious ethic that distorts and perverts true relations within the whole. This view asserts that human beings are now the masters of the universe, recognising no limits to human freedom as self-realisation. This conquest of natural necessity through technique and organisation is the human declaration of independence from all constraints upon freedom. This is the liberation of humanity from all things considered greater than the human person, from religion and metaphysics, from tradition and custom, from mythology, superstition and dogma, from history, from society, from law, government, regulation. And it is a liberation from natural ecology. 

More than two thousand years ago Plato put the key question to us when he asked whether democracy is capable of supplying itself with a principle of self-limitation. Answering that question correctly is the key to human survival and flourishing. Unfortunately, we are so in thrall to a definition of democratic freedom as self-realisation against restraints, thinking powered by an expansionary economic system, that we can recognise no limits to desire. Human civilisation thus crashes through planetary boundaries, bringing about its own destruction in the name of liberation. The sky is no longer the limit, since we reserve to ourselves the power to define what ‘sky’ means, what limits we should recognise with respect to nature, and how all natural things are to be balanced and weighed against human choices. 

I recently read that the Environmental Protection Agency administrator Scott Pruitt is proposing that scientists should come to debate the science of climate change upon television. ‘There are lots of questions that have not been asked and answered (about climate change)’, he claims. As though a television ‘debate’ is the place to resolve such questions! Name and frame it whichever way you like politically, the sky doesn’t care who wins such a political ‘debate.’

EPA chief wants scientists to debate climate on TV
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-epa-pruitt-idUKKBN19W2D0 (​https:​/​​/​uk.reuters.com​/​article​/​us-usa-epa-pruitt-idUKKBN19W2D0​)

I’m more interested in the deeper questions concerning the price of human-centred liberation than the games of political sophistry. These are the questions that concerned Heidegger throughout his life. Heidegger poses a key question:

‘What if it were possible that humanity, that nations in their greatest concerns and deeds are linked to Being and yet had long fallen out of Being, without knowing it, and that this was the most powerful and most central cause of their decline?’ 

Heidegger, Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, 1987: 28

‘We have forgotten Being,’ Heidegger declared, the Being which is greater than any of us, rich and powerful, intelligent and educated alike, the Being which is beyond our naming and framing, domination and control, possession and exploitation. Only an understanding – a god – based on that awareness that true freedom or happiness is an expansion of being through communion with something greater than us can still save us. That’s precisely how I read Heidegger’s dwelling in the fourfold I discussed earlier. ‘By a primal oneness the four - earth and sky, divinities and mortals - belong together in one.’

That’s how I would respond to Lynn White’s suggestion that we need to find a new religion. White also suggests we could come to rethink our old one. And here he identifies St. Francis of Assisi as a ‘patron saint for ecologists.’ (White, 'Ecologic Crisis', p. 1207). That points to the potential for a renewed Christianity modelled upon humanity's kinship with all other creatures in a community that practises Creation Care. That is my view of an authentic Christianity, involving an environmental ethic that is integral and holistic rather than anthropocentric. That’s the view I have presented for many years now. (Rainbow Rising https://www.academia.edu/12561925/Rainbow_Rising (​https:​/​​/​www.academia.edu​/​12561925​/​Rainbow_Rising​)). And it is the view that Pope Francis has stated strongly in Laudato Si. A god or the old one, something new or something rethought - it amounts to the same to me, since we ought always to be thinking of our relation to God – material sufficiency, a theology of enoughness, nature’s plenitude, the cardinal virtues, virtuous action and communing with something greater than we are through right relationships (God, Nature, Society, other beings and bodies) point to an ethos, a way of living, that can still save us.

In Laudato Si, Pope Francis calls for ‘a new dialogue about how we are shaping the future of our planet’, pointing to the need for a ‘conversation which includes everyone, since the environmental challenges we are undergoing, and its human roots, concern and affect us all’ (Vatican, 2015). Such a dialogue involves restorying as both a moral and ecological restoration leading to a globally regenerative civilization in which all beings and bodies, human and non-human, can flourish within the planetary boundaries that contain, nourish and sustain all life on Earth. In this sense, ecology and spirituality are seen to be connected, expressing the wholeness of the world, the interconnections which compose that world, and our participation within them.

As Daniel Christian Wahl argues:

‘The stories we tell as expressions of the meta-narrative of interbeing need to educate our systemic understanding of the converging crises and their root causes, thereby opening up perspectives on how to do things differently. Even more importantly they need to nurture our collective capacity for design conversations that create visions and practical examples of a regenerative and thriving human presence on Earth. These visions and ‘pockets of the future in the present’ will invigorate individual and collective creativity, inspire our aesthetic and moral imagination and offer everyone an opportunity for finding meaningful work inspired by active participation in the project of the century: creating regenerative cultures everywhere.
As we lend our voices, our hearts, our minds and our creativity to living the narrative of interbeing we change humanity’s design-conversation to the guiding intentions of salutogenesis, the healing of the whole system and to co-creating win-win-win solutions in a world that works for all. As we join others in the process and learn together how to come home, how to design as nature, and how to cooperate in elegant adaptation to the uniqueness of place, the narrative of interbeing will unfold in its full fractal diversity. No longer one story, but a tapestry of stories in many languages, carrying the wisdom of cultural diversity woven together by the threads of life’s fundamental interbeing, of diversity in unity, the pattern that connects.’

Wahl, Designing Regenerative Cultures, Triarchy Press, 2016

Tolkien’s Christian stewardship – natural pacifism and anarchy
Tolkien embraced all of these good things, relating to the good earth created by the good God. In arguing this, I am highlighting his idea of responsible Christian stewardship based on a belief in God. He did not raise God above Nature, exalting the spiritual world above physical creation. On the contrary, he explicitly affirmed the positive value of the material world. He expressed this in terms of a sensuous everyday materialism grounded in the culture, customs and mores of a place, extolling the virtues of simple pleasures such as working the land, the satisfaction of a day’s work, the products of one’s hand, food and drink, music, song and dance. He ascribes mythic importance to the two primordial trees of Valinor, Laurelin and Telperion, each bringing light (Laurelin's gold and Telperion's silver) to the Land of the Valar in ancient times, and whose last flower and fruit after being destroyed by Melkor and Ungoliant, were made by the Valar into the Moon and the Sun. The tale has affinities with Persian mythology, in which:

‘there is a legend of two cypress trees, the Trees of the Sun and Moon, that are said to have been planted by Zoroaster himself. Alexander the Great, hearing of these trees, visited them when he conquered Persia. He asked the oracle of the trees what his future would be. The oracle told him that he would go on to conquer India but that he would then die soon afterward. In some versions of the legend the trees themselves speak to Alexander. According to Marco Polo, the Khalif Motawakkil had one of the trees cut down in the 9th Century CE (when the tree was said to be 1450 years old) and sent to Baghdad. The Khalif was subsequently murdered by his own guards (Cf. The Book of Ser by Marco Polo, the Venetian).’

Michael Martinez, "Is There a Source for the Tale of the Two Trees?" dated 29 November 2011, Middle-earth.Xenite.org (accessed 31 December 2011).

Clyde S. Kilby suggests that the concept of the Two Trees shows an influence from the Biblical description of the creation of the world ("Let there be Light!"):

‘The Two Trees in The Silmarillion are at first the source of light. After the destruction of the Two Trees there is a long period of twilight in Middle-earth and it is during this time that first Elves and then Dwarves awaken. It is only long afterwords, with the rising of sun and moon, that Men awaken.’

Clyde S. Kilby, Tolkien and the Silmarillion, "Tolkien as Christian Writer", pp. 59-60.

Tolkien gives us the character of Tom Bombadil, whose merry, whimsical way and wit indicates a selfless love and knowledge of the world as something valuable in itself, independently of any power, use or advantage it may yield him. He knows all about the power of the Ring, but it has no appeal to him, being more concerned with keeping his own ‘country’ around the river Withywindle in right order. Gandalf describes Tom Bombadil as the eldest being in existence, and this gives the clue to his identity. His Sindarin name Iarwain Ben-adar means ‘Eldest and Fatherless.’ Dwarves called him Forn (Old Norse, meaning ‘Ancient’ or ‘Belonging to the distant past.’)

Tolkien explained the character in terms which express his own environmental ethic as a ‘natural pacifist view’ aimed against the exaltation of the means of power, control and domination over all that is vital and healthy:

I might put it this way. The story is cast in terms of a good side, and a bad side, beauty against ruthless ugliness, tyranny against kingship, moderated freedom with consent against compulsion that has long lost any object save mere power, and so on; but both sides in some degree, conservative or destructive, want a measure of control. But if you have, as it were, taken 'a vow of poverty', renounced control, and take your delight in things for themselves without reference to yourself, watching, observing, and to some extent knowing, then the questions of the rights and wrongs of power and control might become utterly meaningless to you, and the means of power quite valueless...
It is a natural pacifist view, which always arises in the mind when there is a war ... the view of Rivendell seems to be that it is an excellent thing to have represented, but that there are in fact things with which it cannot cope; and upon which its existence nonetheless depends. Ultimately only the victory of the West will allow Bombadil to continue, or even to survive. Nothing would be left for him in the world of Sauron.

Boyd, Ian, ed. (February–May 2002). "J.R.R. Tolkien - Mythos and Modernity in Middle-Earth" (PDF). The Chesterton Review. Seton Hall University (XXVIII). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2006-02-14. Retrieved 2006-07-03.

That view deflates the myth of the machine, by refusing its bribe of money and by resisting its bullying through power. By valuing the things that lie within our natural reach, we disempower the Megamachine and re-empower our social connections. Eschewing control, domination and exploitation, Tolkien adumbrates a way of life lived outside of the machine, unconcerned with its political struggles over the terms on which the earth is to be possessed. That vision is, indeed, a natural pacifism aimed against war, domination and the tyranny and violence of abstraction. And it is based upon the practical reappropriation of a social power we have alienated to the system world. It’s also a vision of a world we are losing. In a letter to Stanley Unwin, Tolkien described Tom Bombadil as the spirit of the vanishing landscapes of Oxfordshire and Berkshire. (Carpenter, Humphrey, ed. (1981). The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien. Houghton Mifflin. 19.) 

In all of this, we see the essence of an environmental way of life as grounded in a belief in the goodness of the earth, and decidedly not in the valuations projected upon that earth by human valuers bent on possession and control, whether in calculations of political power or economic gain. Tolkien affirms the goodness of the earth as the handiwork of its creator, Eru Illuvatar. A good God creating a good Earth. Some have raised objections to Tolkien on religious grounds here. Peter Hastings, manager of the Newman Bookshop (a Catholic bookshop in Oxford), objected thus with respect to the reincarnation of Elves:

God has not used that device in any of the creations of which we have knowledge, and it seems to me to be stepping beyond the position of a sub-creator to produce it as an actual working thing, because a sub-creator, when dealing with the relations between creator and created, should use those channels which he knows the creator to have used already.

Tolkien defended his ideas as an exploration of the infinite ‘potential variety’ of God in a way that does not misrepresent the essentially – and fundamentally creative - nature of the divine:

We differ entirely about the nature of the relation of sub-creation to Creation. I should have said that liberation "from the channels the creator is known to have used already" is the fundamental function of "sub-creation", a tribute to the infinity of His potential variety [...] I am not a metaphysician; but I should have thought it a curious metaphysic — there is not one but many, indeed potentially innumerable ones — that declared the channels known (in such a finite corner as we have any inkling of) to have been used, are the only possible ones, or efficacious, or possibly acceptable to and by Him!

Carpenter, Humphrey, ed. (1981), The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, #153, ISBN 0-395-31555-7

Hastings also criticised Goldberry’s description of Tom Bombadil as ‘He is’ for its implicit reference to the Biblical quotation ‘I Am that I Am’, implying that Bombadil was God. Tolkien considered Hastings to be over-analysing somewhat:

I really do think you are being too serious, besides missing the point. [...] You rather remind me of a Protestant relation who to me objected to the (modern) Catholic habit of calling priests Father, because the name father belonged only to the First Person.

Tolkien, J. R. R. (1984), Christopher Tolkien, ed., The Book of Lost Tales 1 or The History of Middle-earth, Volume 1, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Appendix, "Names in the Lost Tales-Part 1," Ilúvatar, 

("There can be no doubt that the original meaning of Ilúvatar was 'Sky-father'...")

The environmental ethos revealed by these observations can best be described in terms of a responsible and concerned Christian stewardship. Like ‘sustainability’, ‘stewardship’ is a term that has been used in so many ways as to dilute its meaning. My meaning is simple and relates to the idea of a good God creating a good earth, an earth that is inherently and objectively valuable and is to be valued, created by a loving God who enjoins us to love all that is good. Question begging, I know – like every other ontology I have examined and found wanting. This one makes the most sense of the richness of human experience and the cosmic longing for meaning, and is far more humane than views which take their stand on a Weberian disenchantment that empties the world of meaning, value, goodness and significance. To paraphrase mathematician and process philosopher A.N. Whitehead: Man cannot live on disinfectants! And needs more than bread.

Stewardship in this sense is independent of notions of economic valuation and environmental protection of nature as a resource to be used out of commercial, corporate or personal interest, but simply refers to a benevolent, selfless and custodial care on our part for the physical creation of which we are a part. In this respect, stewardship is beyond negotiating the terms on which the earth is to be possessed, exploited and used, but concerns exercising responsibility for the care of the earth. A steward, then, is a custodian of the earth rather than a property owner or lord of the manor. And I think that expresses Tolkien’s environmental concern perfectly.

In The Lord of the Rings, Gandalf frames the ethos of the ecological way of life not in terms of freedom of choice but in terms of a moral imperative. As Matthew Dickerson argues: 

‘we are not granted the freedom to decide whether to discharge our stewardship responsibilities but we are required to decide how we will discharge those responsibilities. We must choose whether to act destructively or constructively toward an environment that we do not own, and this decision must be made within the purview of our function as custodians of the world during the brief time we are in it. We are stewards of this earth whether we like it or not. In this respect, we share much in common with environmentalists of many faiths and those of no faith in particular who perceive our stewardship responsibilities as duties owed to something or someone higher than ourselves.’

Dickerson, 2003 Ents, Elves, and Eriador: The Environmental Vision of J.R.R. Tolkien

Gandalf expresses this ethic clearly when he says that we must give up ambitions to master the universe and simply do our best so that those who come after us will have good soil to till. 

‘Yet it is not our part to master all the tides of the world, but to do what is in us for the succour of those years wherein we are set, uprooting the evil in the fields that we know, so that those who live after may have clean earth to till. What weather they shall have is not ours to rule.’

Gandalf, The Return of the King, The Last Debate

In Tolkien’s trilogy, Gandalf passes on this model of stewardship to Faramir and Frodo, two of his disciples, and to Aragorn, whose kingship he helps to secure. It is a model of living right and living well that Tolkien passes on to his readers. ‘Following Gandalf’ entails living in accordance with an environmental ethos in which respect and reverence for the world are of a piece with the exercise of free will, moral responsibility and a recognition of ethical absolutes. In Following Gandalf: Epic Battles and Moral Victory in The Lord of the Rings (2003), Matthew Dickerson expresses clearly the extent to which Tolkien offers an ecology of the good as an objective morality:

‘In contrast to subjective morality, or moral relativism, objective morality is independent of the individual subject.... Feanor's evil deeds, for example, especially the tragic Kinslaying at Alqualonde, are going to be judged.’

Tolkien enjoins us to reject self-aggrandizing glory and possession and to refuse the temptations of the Ring's evil power. That is an absolute ethic that recognises transcendent truths and norms as against the idea that morality is merely conventional. There are objective standards by which we may evaluate our actions and orient our behaviour; justice is more than the interests of the strong and powerful. Dickerson reveals the theological underpinnings of Tolkien’s moral ecology.

A belief in objective morality lies at the heart of Tolkien’s environmental vision. Tolkien’s environmental ethic is based on an ontology and an ecology of the good. Dickerson describes Tolkien’s morality thus: ‘It is transcendent, based on objective values that transcend any one particular personal or cultural value system.’ He describes this as ‘probably the most important’ aspect of Tolkien’s environmental vision:





In making these arguments, Dickerson hopes to bring together two supposedly contrary positions united by a common concern with protecting and respecting the health and well-being of this good earth. Thus the environmentalist, who may be ‘religiously sceptical’, should find that Tolkien’s Christianity is not at all at odds with a modern environmental consciousness but is, on the contrary, ‘an allied perspective corroborating many doctrines and a priori assumptions of modern environmentalism.’ At the same time, the Christian or person of faith should find in Tolkien’s understanding of the biblical worldview ‘a powerful argument – and, we hope, a compelling motivation – for a deep and meaningful environmentalism often ignored in some circles of Christendom.’ ‘At its best,’ Dickerson concludes, ‘the Christian faith … is “green.”’ A genuine religious ethic contains enjoins us to respect creation and exercise Creation Care as a responsible and reverential stewardship. That is, indeed, how I have argued the case for Tolkien’s environmental vision.

Christian sources – good and evil – against the power system
To return to the basic point, the argument is set up as a struggle between good and evil. That affirms the existence of transcendent standards with respect to value and truth. And it is evil to subvert or pervert those stands, to appropriate transcendent norms and assert the right to impose value and truth over against the disclosure of a value and truth that exists objectively. That is evil in that it asserts that value and truth are not objective properties of a good world, but that the world is objectively valueless and that truth and value are creations projected upon that world. Why is that evil? Because not only is it wrong for anyone to play at being God, the dominant ‘players’ will be those who have the power and resources to persuade or compel others that their values and truths are the right ones to prevail. That’s not a good order, that’s a power system, and the effect of its operation is to routinize and normalize behaviours that may not be evil in intent, but are evil in effect.

Why is this power system evil? For the same reason that Sauron is evil. In imposing its own truths and values, it is playing at being God. Lord Sauron is not the true Lord; he is not God. In terms of establishing the Christian character of the Lord of the Rings, the title and theme only makes sense in terms of the existence of God. 

But here is an interesting point. Not only is there no reference to God in the book – we have to infer God’s presence as the true Lord as against Lord Sauron whose evil lies in playing at being God – Sauron is the one character in the book that you never see. Tolkien describes the appearance of all characters but Sauron. Nothing of Sauron is portrayed other than his eye. He sees us, but we don’t see him. As to why that is the case, I would draw an analogy between Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, a prison designed so that all inmates can be seen, and will adjust their behaviour in the knowledge that they could be being watched at any time, and Weber’s ‘iron cage’ of an impersonal bureaucratic order of systemic control. In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault examined ‘panopticism’ as a modern principle of organisation concerned with the surveillance and regulation of individuals, bodies and populations. This surveillance and regulation involves new forms of thought and new institutions designed to render people docile and useful to the system. Foucault thus identifies the exercise of a micro-politics based on a convergence of rational knowledge and power. As a result, society becomes a carceral in which individuals are subject to a variety of institutions moulding and manipulating their behaviour and character from cradle to grave. This growing surveillance and regulation of the individual is accompanied by the diminution in the ethical autonomy and responsibility of the individual. This is not the simple liberal argument that the extension of state power comes to dwarf the individual. That view invites a moralising assertion of individual liberty against the state which is not merely misconceived and impotent but, paradoxically, reinforces state authoritarianism and individual powerlessness before collective forces if acted upon. The liberal rejection of all collective constraint as an infringement upon individual liberty very easily becomes a rationalisation of impersonal external force and personal impotence. 

The disenchanted world
We live under the shadow of Weber’s modernity, an institutional-systemic metabolism that confines each and all within the ‘iron cage.’ To identify Sauron as the embodiment of evil actually underestimates the real nature of evil in the modern rationalised, routinized, regularized world subject to institutional and systemic imperatives. That’s the world in which means are elevated to the status of ends, relations become instrumental, and human beings cease to be able to tell the difference between good and bad. That’s the world characterised by the normalisation of evil. It is a world characterised by the anonymity of power and of evil. To point the finger at Lord Sauron as the personification of evil is much easier than trying to identify the pervasive nature and source of evil in the world as a whole. This is a world in which not only can human beings not tell the difference between right and wrong, good and evil, it makes no difference whether or not they do – no one, not even Lord Sauron, has power, choice and control with respect to the system world that encompasses all:





Weber thus portrays modernity as a meaningless and nihilistic world that is beyond good and evil. There can be no natural rights when the natural law no longer applies. We have reached a stage where the problem is not merely men playing at being gods, but human powers have escaped human comprehension and control and acquired collective force exercised, not personally, as with Lord Sauron, but impersonally, systemically and institutionally. Sauron as the personification of evil allows us to grasp the struggle between good and evil in terms of clear division, but the problem is actually much more complex, which is why I refer to Marx’s alienation and Weber’s rationalisation throughout. It’s not so much persons who are playing at being gods in the modern world as ‘things’, human creations that escape human control and acquire a living, autonomous significance in their own right, that come to take the form of gods and which seem to us to be as powerful as gods. Instead of human ends consciously recognised by and agreed between us, we are governed by external imperatives. The problem is not so much that of actual persons playing god as an impersonal system that determines our lives as external collective force; it is the system that is the one Ring that binds and rules all; the Land of Mordor where the Shadows fall is the Weberian rationalised world of the iron cage that confines each and all, the powerful and the strong, the rich and the poor, the Kaiser and the proletarian together in a universal enslavement.

My point traces evil and its normalisation to the way that social relations escape human control and come to create an impersonal order that confines each and all within. The recovery of ethical autonomy and moral responsibility involves deep institutional and structural transformations, their mere assertion against collective force is utterly lacking in social relevance. In other words, the effective resolution of this problem requires that it is correctly diagnosed in the first place. That individual liberty and ethical autonomy is increasingly circumscribed by the extension of regulation, bureaucracy and government intervention has been the familiar cry of anti-government neoliberal ideologues who have sought to dismantle the public realm so as to leave iniquitous private power unrestrained. In the cause of promoting liberty and responsibility, individuals are left powerless in face of collective impersonal forces; institutional regulation is thus replaced by impersonal and anonymous regulation. The political clash here can reduce to an endless cycle of accusation and counter-accusation, each side accusing the other of precisely the same charge. Weber considered socialism not to be a coherent response to the problems of a bureaucratised rationalised world but as the culmination of that order; he called socialism a housing for the new serfdom. Hayek wrote The Road to Serfdom in precisely that vein. Against that, individuals are incarcerated in Weber’s iron cage. 

To resolve the political conflict, we return to the fundamental questions as to the nature of things, power and the location of value. And that is to affirm transcendent standards that lie outside of the political realm of power relations. And this is where the Christian themes of The Lord of the Rings become significant. The ‘disenchantment of the world’ holds that the world is objectively valueless, not inherently good, meaningless. The only value in the world is the one that the human valuers project upon it. The same with truth. We do not disclose the truth of things but impose it through praxis. And it is this that makes God an unavoidable question. The idea that God is no more than a human invention, a symbol we have created to serve our interests amounts to saying that there is no objective value, truth or goodness in the world, that value, truth and goodness are not disclosed but imposed. And that begs the question of who the valuers are. To say humanity is to be beg the question – which humans precisely, given the organisation of social life within power relations. This is the invitation to a would-be Lord to lust and plot for power, to make-up truth and value, and to take the place of God and reduce that power/knowledge and responsibility to private ends. This playing of being God is the primal sin, involving rebellion, pride and idolatry. And this is precisely what characterises the figure of Sauron. That does not, however, make him the most important character. His evil nature is defined precisely in his aspiration to possess the knowledge and power of God. And that makes God the central character.

For that reason, God is a ubiquitous presence in The Lord of the Rings. Since this is so, we would expect divine providence to run through the book. And that is indeed the case. The assertion that you can sometimes here in commentary that the book expresses a pagan ethic is an error that can only be based on the fact that God and religion are not explicitly stated, and that these events occur in a pagan setting. Conspicuous by its absence is the key pagan category of chance. Everything happens for a reason, mirroring the divine plan for the world. Seemingly meaningless things, that baffle and bewilder people as they try to make sense of them, are never without meaning. These things are not the result of chance, and even the bad things come to make sense in terms of the good. When Frodo acquires the Ring he asks ‘why me?’ Gandalf replies that such questions cannot be answered, but since nothing happens by chance, there will be a reason. What is this reason? In the book, there is the power of the Ring, there is the will of Sauron to take possession of that power, then there is the will of Bilbo and of Frodo. But the greatest power at work is unstated and unnamed, the invisible magic that is divine power. Things happen for a reason, serving the purpose of the greater good that prevails in the end. (Peter Kreeft writes well on this aspect of Tolkien).

The book gains its existential drama from the tension between claiming the Ring and the Ring claiming its bearer. Sauron, Isildur, Déagol, Gollum all claimed ownership of the Ring. Bilbo Baggins too: ‘It is mine, I tell you. My own. My Precious. Yes, my Precious.’ Until he gave it up. Frodo Baggins claimed it, too, in a moment that is profoundly shocking. Frodo, we would have thought, could not be corrupted by the Ring and the allure of power. But when he comes to Mount Doom he says: ‘I have come,’ he said. ‘But I do not choose now to do what I came to do. I will not do this deed. The Ring is mine!’ And Frodo puts on the Ring to be as Sauron, and there it remains until it was cut from his hand. The lesson is that the Ring can be claimed for a short while, and then it claims or betrays its bearer.

This returns to the point I made earlier with respect to the temptation to make Faustian bargains with the new idols of the industrialised power system. It is not just the allure of power that corrupts, or its possession, it’s the possibility of exchanging a dependent and marginal condition for a share of some of that power through compromise that keeps people in the service of these new idols. It is a system of human sacrifice, as demonstrated not merely in the millions who have died in the age of total war, but in the giving up of bodies to an economic system that determines the lives of each and all with what Weber calls ‘irresistible force.’

So who is heroic enough to resist the Ring’s temptations? Gandalf, yes; and the Ring has no power over Tom Bombadil, he isn’t remotely interested in it. Not many refuse to make the claim to ownership. Then there is Sam Gamgee, in this significant passage: 

‘I wish I wasn’t the last,’ he groaned. ‘I wish old Gandalf was here, or somebody. Why am I left all alone to make up my mind? I’m sure to go wrong. And it’s not for me to go taking the Ring, putting myself forward.’
‘But you haven’t put yourself forward; you’ve been put forward. And as for not being the right and proper person, why, Mr. Frodo wasn’t, as you might say, nor Mr. Bilbo. They didn’t choose themselves.’

I’m thinking here of the natural anarchy that Tolkien expressed in the letter to his son Christopher, when he wrote: ‘the most improper job of any man, even saints (who at any rate were at least unwilling to take it on), is bossing other men. Not one in a million is fit for it, and least of all those who seek the opportunity… The mediævals were only too right in taking nolo episcopari [I do not want to be bishop] as the best reason a man could give to others for making him a bishop.’ (J.R.R. Tolkien, Letter to his son Christopher, Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, ed. Humphrey Carpenter.) 

That’s the paradox of power: those who seek and desire power over others are those least qualified to hold it. Those most reluctant to seek and exercise power are emotionally the most qualified, but rule themselves out or are overlooked. Sam’s humility makes him reluctant to put himself forward, and thus he is able to resist the temptation to claim the Ring: 

‘In that hour of trial it was the love of his master that helped most to hold him firm; but also deep down in him lived still unconquered his plain hobbit-sense: he knew in the core of his heart that he was not large enough to bear such a burden, even if such visions were not a mere cheat to betray him. The one small garden of a free gardener was all his need and due, not a garden swollen to a realm; his own hands to use, not the hands of others to command.’

Excerpt From: J. R. R. Tolkien. The Lord of the Rings.

Those who claimed the Ring did so out of greed (Gollum and Déagol) or out of a desire for power (Sauron and Isildur). They lacked the humility that alone could make their intent virtuous. And that humility stems from the love that held Sam firm. In the end, not even Sam is the main hero – the real hero is God, unseen, unstated, unnamed, working the invisible magic of divine providence. The true Lord and the true power.

Christian ethic – fellowship
The first volume of The Lord of the Rings trilogy is called The Fellowship of the Ring. And that word ‘fellowship’ gives us a key to understanding Tolkien’s social ethic. His concern was with the warm and affective ties and bonds that knit and hold people together in time and place. 

We can understand Tolkien’s fellowship in relation to Aristotle’s analysis of friendship. For Aristotle, friendship was the highest value in human life and the glue that holds society together. A wise ruler cares for justice, he argues, but cares even more for friendship. For Aristotle, the quality of friendship varies in inverse proportion to social proximity – the closer the range, the stronger the friendship, the more extended the ties, the more diluted is the quality. Friendship is constituted by close personal ties that foster trust in each other. Beyond those ties, friendship becomes ‘watery’, says Aristotle. That is something that those motivated by calculations of success and private gain and interest in relation to others don’t understand. Those who engage in the zero-sum politics that divides people into winners and losers, thereby dissolving the public community, cannot conceive of placing one’s trust in others. They lack the faith in others that creates fellowship and sustains it over time. They see interpersonal relations in instrumental terms, seeing others as being of use to them in some way. As a result, a society is little more than a mutual insurance or military pact to them, something that lasts only so long as self-interest is served. When society is constituted by friendship, each and all are connected by trust, faith, loyalty and solidarity. People work together, make sacrifices for each and work to a common end. That friendship points to a solidarity in cooperation that free-riders have cause to fear the most. Marx writes well on this in On the Jewish Question. Whereas, man regards himself as a ‘communal being’ when living in the political community, ‘in civil society, … he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers.’ (Marx EW OJQ 1975). 
Put in the terms being discussed here, when instrumental relations, based on the separation of individuals from each other, subvert the place of friendly relations, human affairs are overtaken by the external rule of alien powers, a collective force that comes to govern the affairs of divided, competing individuals externally. To overcome this domination by alien powers is to overcome the free-riding of those practising a zero-sum politics and economics, and that requires that we come to create clusters of co-operators, network them and extend trust relations through social proximity. It requires, in short, that we create a society of friends – a fellowship. The worst times we face are when we divide amongst ourselves, put self-interest first, and lose sight of the common cause and purpose. That is when fellowship dissolves and things come to seem hopeless. We seem isolated and alone in face of overweening power. With the dissolution of internal connections to each other, our social power comes to take alien form and reacts back against us as external collective force. We feel powerless. By reconstituting fellowship, we come to empower ourselves, and disempower the forces ranged against us. So faith, personal trust, counts more than anything else.

I like the idea of fellowship. I would extend the idea, too, to affirm the notion of the fellowship of all beings and bodies, setting human society within the more-than-human world that enfolds and sustains us. I have written in praise of seventeenth century philosopher Anne Conway and her idea of the ‘fellowship of all creatures.’ (Anne Conway and the Fellowship of all Creatures, https://www.academia.edu/12342161/Anne_Conway_and_the_Fellowship_of_All_Creatures_Reworking_the_Western_Philosophical_Canon (​https:​/​​/​www.academia.edu​/​12342161​/​Anne_Conway_and_the_Fellowship_of_All_Creatures_Reworking_the_Western_Philosophical_Canon​)). 

I also like the view expressed by Montaigne in his Essays: 

‘All this I have said to establish the resemblance there is in all living things, and to bring us back and join us to the great mass of creation. All that is under heaven, says the sage, is subject to the same law and the same fortune.’ 

That’s the kind of fellowship I embrace. And I think it fits Tolkien’s view too. I would present Tolkien as someone who affirmed the fellowship of all beings and bodies. Of all creatures, certainly. He wrote of holding ‘communion with other living things.’ (J.R.R. Tolkien, On Fairy-Stories, ed. Verlyn Flieger and Douglas A. Anderson (London, England: Harper Collins Publishers, 2014), 4.)

The fellowship of all beings and bodies

In the very least, Tolkien believed in the company of friends. Writing an obituary on Tolkien, C.S. Lewis says: “He was a man of ‘cronies’ rather than of general society and was always best after midnight (he had a Johnsonian horror of going to bed) and in some small circle of intimates where the tone was at once Bohemian, literary, and Christian.” (C.S. Lewis, “Professor J.R.R. Tolkien: Creator of Hobbits and Inventor of a New Mythology” in J.R.R. Tolkien, Scholar and Storyteller: Essays in Memoriam, ed. Mary Salu and Robert T. Farrell (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1979), 15.) As someone who shares that horror of going to bed, and who does somewhat come alive by the light of the moon, those words somewhat endear Tolkien to me. But the important point is that he was a man of ‘cronies,’ that is of close friends, companions or intimates, and not of general society. The point savours of Aristotle, for whom we can only truly be friends with a degree of close proximity, beyond which friendship becomes diluted and watery. We cannot be friends with everyone. So this fellowship of all creatures I refer to can only refer to a fellowship constituted by social proximity, not by some abstract universal society. If we want to know who Tolkien is, we will have to meet him in his own Fellowship. And the same goes for the rest of us. It is that closeness that bonds of love and loyalty are nurtured and protected.

Christian ethic - love
The strongest force in The Lord of the Rings is Love. It is love that moves the tale. But this love is much more than a feeling, some involuntary sensation that occurs in response to circumstances. Love is a choice and is part of our existence as moral beings. As St. Paul says: ‘If I give all I possess to the poor and give over my body to hardship that I may boast, but do not have love, I gain nothing.’ (1 Corinthians 13:3). If there is no love, there is nothing, only a meaningless act. Giving our bodies out of love is a call for sacrifice, the giving of ourselves and surrender of our egos for something greater. We are called upon to fight for good against evil, a task that, despite not having complete knowledge or understanding, requires that we fight anyway. Because it is the right thing to do. That is precisely what ‘fighting the long defeat’ entails. And that task comes to us from divine providence and presumes faith, hope and charity as an unconditional love. This is something that Sauron is incapable of understanding – evil cannot comprehend good, and this is its undoing. In the end, it is not knowledge or power that triumphs but love. Love has the more enduring quality, and the truth of that story is more mysterious than the knowledge of how the universe turns. 

That’s how I read Dante’s words on the love that moves the cosmos. Coming to see the true nature of things, Dante describes being turned by the love that moves the sun and the other stars. That points to an affective quality at work, the power that persuades and moves people. That’s the divine love that Dante identified as behind it all. And that’s the invisible magic at work in The Lord of the Rings. The love that moves the sun and the other stars is the love that moves the story of The Lord of the Rings as it unfolds. And we are invited to share in the Greater Love, participating in the song and dance of Creation. In participating in this ceaselessly creative universe, we expressing the Greater Love that is God. And that is why we can never lose, because beyond the fight against the ‘long defeat’ lies the ‘final victory.’ And the only appropriate response to that mystery is one of awe and wonder, and giving of thanks for the sheer miraculous unlikeliness of it all, our existence, life and the world in all its beauty. And that’s precisely the response that The Lord of the Rings invokes. 

Tolkien joins this love and fellowship to art and imagination and the idea of sub-creating under God’s divine love and imagination. Here, human creative agency is shown to proceed within the Greater Love, moving the universe from within. This shows how human creativity is not an autonomous, assertive activity, creating a universe of its own, independent of the primary real world, but cooperates with and shares in the love that moves the universe. Here, art, like God, is shown to be present and active in the world.

Christian sources and message
I remember having to read C.S. Lewis’ books at school and never caring for them. I twigged that there was an undercurrent to the tales, a theme that was actually so overt as to get in the way of the story for me, and I felt like someone was slipping something past me. I never believed the characters. And I resented it. It seemed underhand and rendered the details of the story secondary, as merely contrived and phony. I think it is interesting that Tolkien did not like allegory, and objected to any overt presence of religion in myth. For Tolkien, religious themes should be implicit within Fantasy, not explicit, and permeating the character, morality and deeds of the protagonists. As he writes in criticism of the Arthurian myth:





Like religion, language plays a foundational role in the crafting of Middle-Earth, ‘rooted deeply into the world’s symbolism and structures.’ (Becca Segall Tarnas, The Fantastic Imagination: Sub-creating Tolkien’s Middle-Earth).

The sub-creative ability of human beings derives from our having being made in the image of God.  (​https:​/​​/​beccatarnas.com​/​category​/​essays​/​j-r-r-tolkien-the-inklings​/​" \l "_ftn82" \o "​)As Tolkien writes: ‘Fantasy remains a human right: we make in our measure and in our derivative mode, because we are made, and not only made, but made in the image and likeness of a Maker.’ (Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” 75.) Whilst human sub-creation is the imagining of God’s world after God (Duriez, Tolkien and C.S. Lewis, 72, 198), this creative activity expands the ‘limited boundaries of the real world in which we presently live by creating something really new, never experienced by humans before’ (Clarke, “The Creative Imagination,” 205.), thereby enhancing human life in a distinctive way. As Tolkien writes: “liberation ‘from the channels the creator is known to have used already’ is the fundamental function of ‘sub-creation,’ a tribute to the infinity of His potential variety.” (Tolkien, Letters, 188.) (​https:​/​​/​beccatarnas.com​/​category​/​essays​/​j-r-r-tolkien-the-inklings​/​" \l "_ftn86" \o "​) In this sense, Middle-Earth was created not so much by Tolkien as by God working through Tolkien. This explains why Tolkien felt himself not so much to be creating Middle-Earth as discovering it as an already existing world.

Towards the end of his life, Tolkien addressed the words of someone who identified a ‘sanity and sanctity’ in the Lord of the Rings, ‘which is a power in itself.’ This gives us the clue to the source of the vision, hope and joy that is embodied and expressed in Tolkien’s work. ‘I was deeply moved’, Tolkien says at this recognition of the source of his inspiration. In reply, he refers to a letter he had received from a man who classified himself as ‘an unbeliever, or at best a man of belatedly and dimly dawning religious feeling.’ To Tolkien, this man wrote perceptively ‘you create a world in which some sort of faith seems to be everywhere without a visible source, like light from an invisible lamp.’ In response, Tolkien said he can only answer thus: 





The words at the end refer to the scene in The Lord of the Rings where the Orcs are investigating the captured Frodo’s possessions and come across the ‘lembas’, the Elvish way-bread wrapped in leaves from Lorien. Their hatred of the Elves is so great as to extend to even the leaves from ‘Elf-country.’ To the Orcs, the lembas that have sustained Frodo and Sam on their journey are mere ‘dust and ashes’. In the letter, Tolkien is referring to those who reject his vision in an Orcish spirit. Many of Tolkien’s critics may well have no time either for God or for Elves – I’ve heard religion dismissed as a fairy-story and God as a sky-fairy, having no evidence to support their existence and no basis in real life. And I’ve heard this too many times to find the provocation anything more than a tedious irrelevance. Both religion and fairy-stories are easily dismissed as escapism if we just want to stick to facts. I’m a historian by training and come from the world of facts. And I know that the dismissal of anything lying outside of the world of empirical evidence is the Orcish spirit Tolkien was referring to in the last line. It’s not how history is made. And it is not how human beings live their lives. Historical change is always a combination of material interests and moral and metaphysical motives, and anyone who thinks otherwise will never be fully effective in advancing their concerns and causes. As criticism, the dismissal of God and religion is ignorant, abusive and irrelevant and not worth a moment’s thought. More substantial are the critics who, whilst rejecting Tolkien’s Christianity, are large enough of spirit to accept Tolkien’s secondary world as just that, a secondary world, an imagined world that, they agree reflects a reality in the primary world for Tolkien, but does not do so for them. 

‘So those who do not accept Christianity will see Tolkien at best as an artist giving new imaginative expression to an outmoded view of the universe. Even as that, he is a counterexample to LeGuin’s suggestion that desire for immortality “kills” art. (If another one were needed – almost all the great art ever created was created by believer in some form of religion.)’

Richard L. Purtill, J.R.R. Tolkien: Myth, Morality, and Religion

Even some of those who share Tolkien’s religious views may well come to reject his art out of scepticism that the Christian message could be adequately expressed through fantasy. However, ‘many will see him as in his own way an evangelist, someone who has expressed God’s truth in a new form.’ It may not be philosophically sound to return to the aesthetic religious view to consider something to be true because it can be expressed beautifully (see Benson and Stangroom 2006 on this), ‘But it is highly reasonable in a wider sense of “reason” to consider more than linear, logical, argumentative thinking in making a decision on matters of great importance. That a Christian philosophy has so often led to great beauty of artistic expression is evidence. That in Christian art we find joy and in non-religious art we often find “anger and wrath” is evidence. That those who love Tolkien tend to be nicer people than those who hate him is even evidence.’ (Purtill, J.R.R. Tolkien: Myth, Morality, and Religion). 

I’m not sure how extensive Purtill’s research is here to justify those claims. I think it is a fair assumption that those who love would tend to be nicer people than those who hate, whatever it is being loved or hated (of course, some love cruelty, others hate it, but you take my general point.) But I think a stronger argument for Tolkien can be mounted along these lines (which is what I hope I am doing here). Purtill goes on to say that not the least of Tolkien’s attractions is a certain Hobbit-like humility on his part. This comes out in the letter quoted above, returning to the theme of God or the creative spirit working through Tolkien the writer:

‘A few years ago I was visited in Oxford by a man … who said “Of course you don’t suppose, do you, that you wrote that book yourself?”
Pure Gandalf! I was too well acquainted with G to ask what he meant. I think I said, “No, I don’t suppose so any longer.” I have never since been able to suppose so. An alarming conclusion for an old philologist to draw concerning his private amusement. But not one that should puffup any one who considers the imperfections of “chosen instruments,” and indeed what sometimes seems their lamentable unfitness for the purpose.’

Whether Tolkien was God’s ‘chosen instrument’ is a question in which our answer, obviously, depends upon whether or not we believe in God. Whether Tolkien was ‘unfit’ for the purpose is a question only God can answer. But that there is a purpose at work, a force, which inspires Tolkien to write what he does, is something that Peter Beagle identifies in Tolkien’s work, referring to the music that ‘springs from the center of this world.’ (Beagle, “Tolkien’s Magic Ring,” xv.) Tolkien’s imagination is something that arose from within the living heart of Middle-Earth. As Beagle writes: Beagle ‘This is the world that J.R.R.Tolkien has explored and chronicled in The Lord of the Rings. I do not say created, for it was always there.’ And this idea that Tolkien didn’t so much create as discover Middle-Earth fits with his wish, expressed in the lecture that would eventually become the essay “On Fairy Stories,” that one day people would come to discover that the mythology of Middle-Earth is ‘true.’ (Carpenter, J.R.R. Tolkien: A Biography, 195). In the same way, he considered it possible that all myths may exist in a realm other than our own. (Reilly, Romantic Religion, 2006: 214.) And the point is that it was precisely because of the connection he considered to exist between human and divine creativity that Tolkien held that ‘all tales may come true.’ (Tolkien, qtd. in Duriez, Tolkien and C.S. Lewis, 2003: 176.) (​https:​/​​/​beccatarnas.com​/​category​/​essays​/​j-r-r-tolkien-the-inklings​/​" \l "_ftn92" \o "​) 

And this is the real rebuttal to those critics who accuse Tolkien of escapism, of peddling a religious and a fantastic view that has no relation to real life, and of having nothing to say to the modern world. As Curry argues, Tolkien’s vision “offers not an ‘escape’ from our world, this world, but hope for its future.” (Curry, Defending Middle-Earth, 2004: 33.) I’d put the point stronger and say that Tolkien is in touch with the realities of the enchanted world, realities which the disenchanted modern world has long since departed from through its abstracting tendencies. Removed further and further from those primary realities, the self-made humans of the disenchanted world risk becoming orphans of their technological and institutional powers and becoming disinherited in their own self-made social world. Tolkien heard the charges of escapism and accepted them as true, his stories were escapist, in the true sense of a man escaping prison. That prison I understand as Weber’s ‘iron cage’ of modernity and the process of rationalisation that enslaves each and all, both ruling class and subalterns, the Kaiser and the proletariat. Not escapism in the sense of fantasy but as a standpoint that brings us back to true realities is Tolkien’s purpose, moral, psychic and ecological realities that expose modern objectives and imperatives to be the pathetic fantasies they are, fantasies as ‘men as gods’ delusions. 

In the end, then, the hope that all myths may come true, and that Middle-Earth will become a reality, and that we may well pull ourselves back from the brink of self-destruction and ‘regain a clear view’ is grounded in the understanding that myths are true and that Middle-Earth is a reality, and that these hopes are to be realised not in another dimension but some time in our future. Tolkien’s ‘Leaf by Niggle’ makes precisely this point. In this tale, Niggle is joined in the country he painted by his neighbour Parish. Parish hadn’t appreciated the painting when they were both living. But now, he comes to understand that it was Niggle who dreamt up the country they are in.

"Don't you know?" said the man. "It is Niggle's Country. It is Niggle's Picture, or most of it: a little of it is now Parish's Garden."
"Niggle's Picture!" said Parish in astonishment. "Did you think of all this, Niggle? I never knew you were so clever. Why didn't you tell me?"
"He tried to tell you long ago," said the man; "but you would not look. He had only got canvas and paint in those days, and you wanted to mend your roof with them. This is what you and your wife used to call Niggle's Nonsense, or That Daubing."
"But it did not look like this then, not real," said Parish.
"No, it was only a glimpse then," said the man; "but you might have caught the glimpse, if you had ever thought it worth while to try."

Tolkien, “Leaf by Niggle,” 117.

By the word ‘glimpse’, Tolkien tends to be drawing our attention to the glimmer of truth that shines out through Fantasy, which he defines as ‘the making or glimpsing of Other-worlds.’ (Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” 64) But that glimpse also occurs with respect to religious roots, as in the glimpse of ‘final victory.’

Tolkien took this all very seriously indeed, in a way that had naught to do with escapism. For Tolkien, “there is no higher function for man than the ‘sub-creation’ of a Secondary World” (Carpenter, J.R.R. Tolkien: A Biography, 195.) since ‘it might be mankind’s one chance to create a vision of Paradise which would be true in the future if never in the past.’ (Shippey, The Road to Middle-Earth, 2005: 53.) That takes us right back to the claims for the imagination and for a literary ecology, for an ecological vision that art and literature inspire, craft and develop. But we should remember here the way in which the Secondary World brought into being by sub-creative activity is bridged to the Primary World through the human imagination. This imagination and sub-creative activity thus has the power to create a new Paradise, not as a purely self-made human world detached from the primary real world, but as a world grounded in that primary reality. And this is possible because Tolkien identified the Secondary Imagination of human beings to be an echo of the divine creative Imagination, working under God at the same time as God worked through them. In the end, then, the sub-creative human agents are not becoming as gods at all, to be masters of their own self-made world, in thrall to their own self-creations, but are doing the creative work of God in coming to discover the world and the truth about it. 

To conclude here, I return to Tolkien’s allegory, ‘Leaf by Niggle.’ Those who have read to the end, I will take to be sympathetic, and capable of understanding, appreciating and even accepting the message:

"I did not give you much chance," said Niggle. "I never tried to explain. I used to call you Old Earth-grubber. But what does it matter? We have lived and worked together now. Things might have been different, but they could not have been better. All the same, I am afraid I shall have to be going on. We shall meet again, I expect: there must be many more things we can do together. Good-bye!" He shook Parish's hand warmly: a good, firm, honest hand it seemed. He turned and looked back for a moment. The blossom on the Great Tree was shining like flame. All the birds were flying in the air and singing. Then he smiled, and nodded to Parish, and went off with the shepherd.
He was going to learn about sheep, and the high pasturages, and look at a wider sky, and walk ever further and further towards the Mountains, always uphill. Beyond that I cannot guess what became of him. Even little Niggle in his old home could glimpse the Mountains far away, and they got into the borders of his picture; but what they are really like, and what lies beyond them, only those can say who have climbed them.’





6 The Truth of Story Telling 

I come now to the truth of stories, the importance of story-telling, and the role of Imagination in accessing a reality deeper than mere physical fact.

‘The realm of fairy-story is wide and deep and high and filled with many things: all manner of beasts and birds are found there; shoreless seas and stars uncounted; beauty that is an enchantment, and an ever-present peril; both joy and sorrow as sharp as swords.’

– J.R.R. Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories” in The Monsters and the Critics, ed. Christopher Tolkien (London, England: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006), 109 

These are the words with which Tolkien introduces us to Faërie, the realm of fairy-stories, encountered through Imagination. Typically, fairy-stories are considered to be tales for children, of little or no import in the adult world. A crude way of dismissing religion is to dismiss it as a fairy-story, with God as the supreme sky-fairy. Not only does that abusive view fail to properly engage with religion, it betrays an ignorance of fairy-stories, part of a dismissal of myths and mythology, revealing a paucity of imagination under the austere rule of Logos. It was a view Tolkien argued against in exploring Truth and Imagination, the ‘inner consistency of reality’ and the laws of morality that enable the imaginal world to come into being.

Fairy stories and story telling – sub-creative activity
The importance of stories and the existence of human beings as story-telling beings has long been recognised, but the fact has not been given the central weight it deserves. Stories have the power to persuade and move people from within, they express moral and psychic truths that make them appealing to people. It is not abstract principles and concepts or some scientifically engineered strategy that draw people to a cause or an issue and keep them there, but the concrete particulars and experiences and how they are rendered personal through a tangible and comprehensible atmosphere and sensation. Story puts us in touch with the root of the matter.

As C.S. Lewis writes:

We do not enjoy a story fully at the first reading. Not till the curiosity, the sheer narrative lust, has been given its sop and laid asleep, are we at leisure to savour the real beauties. Till then, it is like wasting great wine on a ravenous natural thirst which merely wants cold wetness. The children understand this well when they ask for the same story over and over again, and in the same words. 

C.S. Lewis, “On Stories,” in Of Other Worlds (San Diego, CA: Harcourt, Inc, 1994).

Lewis is writing here of the way that children relate to fairy-stories, but the point applies generally in that fairy-stories are not restricted to children. As Tolkien puts it:

At least it will be plain that in my opinion fairy-stories should not be specially associated with children. They are associated with them: naturally, because children are human and fairy-stories are a natural human taste.

Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” 135-6.

As a ‘natural human taste’, fairy-stories are for all humans, young and old: ‘If fairy-story as a kind is worth reading at all it is worthy to be written for and read by adults.’ (Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” 137.) These stories remain with us throughout our adult lives, and we return to them continually over time, using them to bring out our personal character, expressing who we are in the world. The fairy-story that succeeds in this respect does so on account of possessing an ‘inner consistency of reality,’ a quality bestowed by the power of Imagination. (Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” 138.) The successful storyteller thus ‘makes a Secondary World which your mind can enter. Inside it, what he relates is “true”: it accords with the laws of that world. You therefore believe it, while you are, as it were, inside.’ (Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” 132.) As George MacDonald writes with respect to this internal consistency: ‘To be able to live a moment in an imagined world, we must see the laws of its existence obeyed.’ (George MacDonald, “The Fantastic Imagination,” in A Dish of Orts (Hazleton, PA: The Electronic Classics Series, 2012), 233.) In an interview, Christopher Tolkien spoke of his ‘father’s extraordinary power of compelling literary belief in an unreal world,’ the secondary world that cannot be seen, that exists only in the mind. In entering this world, people discover the delight of this world as ‘an extraordinarily interesting place, with a long imagined past.’ This world of Tolkien’s devising, with its strange beings, places events, beautiful, noble, terrifying, hideous, in being encountered is true. So long as we are in this world, the existence of these things cannot be doubted, because they in accord with the laws that govern that world. Behind Tolkien’s enduring popular lies the quality of imagination. It is this that strikes a real chord with people, reaching deep into the psyche and making the deepest imaginings real. Tolkien invented things that are, or became, real. As Tom Shippey comments, ‘hobbit’ sounds like a proper English word, something ancient, but it wasn’t, Tolkien made it up. We use the word hobbit now, even people who have never read the books, and we know what it means. Tolkien gave us creatures and characters that sound real because, in a psychic sense, they are real, they are invested with reality. In other words, fairy-stories are not mere fantasy without any connections with realities. Without laws and obedience to them, the imaginal world would dissolve into meaningless disconnection. These internal laws are what Tolkien calls the ‘inner consistency of reality,’ and they are given by the power of Imagination. It is Imagination which gives access to Truth, and it is this Truth that gives the imaginal world its reality.

Law is the soil in which alone beauty will grow; beauty is the only stuff in which Truth can be clothed; and you may, if you will, call Imagination the tailor that cuts her garment to fit her, and Fancy his journeyman that puts the pieces of them together, or at most embroiders their button-holes. 

George MacDonald, “The Fantastic Imagination,” in A Dish of Orts (Hazleton, PA: The Electronic Classics Series, 2012), 233.

Tolkien’s view is related to Coleridge’s theory of Imagination as presented in his Biographia Literaria, which distinguishes the Primary and Secondary Imagination from Fancy. Whereas Fancy is concerned to reassemble aggregates of remembered experience, Imagination is involved in creating new life: the Primary Imagination brings forth the Primary World of creation, the Secondary Imagination brings forth the Secondary Worlds of human Art and creativity. The Secondary Imagination is thus the Primary Imagination engendering new life and new worlds through the sub-creative activity of human beings. (Becca Segall Tarnas, Perspectives on Fairy-Story: Tolkien, Lewis, MacDonald, Chesterton and Clark). In creating under the Primary Creator, the one who creates a Secondary World is described by Tolkien as a ‘sub-creator.’ For Tolkien, that Primary Creator is the divine imagination:

Fantasy remains a human right: we make in our measure and in our derivative mode, because we are made: and not only made, but made in the image and likeness of a Maker.

Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” 145.

Human creativity is therefore the gift of Divine creativity, and ought to be used as such; it is not to be wrested away from its source and used by human agents to serve their own independent ends as gods. There is a moral law at the heart of fairy-stories, a law that is more pronounced than the moral law of the Primary World. Thus Chesterton writes: ‘I think poets have made a mistake: because the world of the fairy-tales is a brighter and more varied world than ours, they have fancied it less moral; really it is brighter and more varied because it is more moral.’ (G.K. Chesterton, “Fairy Tales,” in G.K. Chesterton (New York, NY: Catholic Way Publishing, 2014). 

As Becca Segall Tarnas argues, the clear morality present in the imaginal world is a sign of their enchantment; the disenchantment of the world follows when this connection is severed. This may explain why, with the dismissal of myths and mythology in a world under the sway of a disenchanted world view, fairy-stories retain an appeal beyond demands of fact and logic. 

The acquiescence in the disenchanted view may also explain the tendency to dismiss religion as mere fairy-stories, the presumption being that fairy-stories are unreal, fantastical, mere comforts for children. It’s a Weberian view, certainly, and we live in a Weberian world, as I have been concerned to establish throughout. It’s not a view I care for. Weber’s ‘realism’ proved to have some disturbing consequences in practice, of which more later. Suffice to say, that kind of ‘realism’ will be our ruination.

People intuit that fairy-stories give access to Truth in a way that transcends the sensuous experience of the everyday world. Tolkien makes precisely this point, writing that: “The peculiar quality of the ‘joy’ in successful Fantasy can thus be explained as a sudden glimpse of the underlying reality or truth. It is not only a ‘consolation’ for the sorrow of this world; but a satisfaction, and an answer to that question, ‘Is it true?’” (Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” 155.) These points relating to fairy-stories are important with respect to establishing the grounds for Tolkien’s religious understanding. Those who dismiss religion as a fairy-tale and God as a sky-fairy are close to the truth, although to appreciate the connection requires the revaluation as against the devaluation of fairy-tales, myths and religion. Here and there, within the storytelling, we are given glimpses of the Truth pertaining to the underlying reality of our experience. 

Tolkien writes of the need to see things clearly, the ‘regaining of a clear view.’ (J.R.R. Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” in The Tolkien Reader (New York, NY: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1966), 77.) ‘We need … to clean our windows,’ Tolkien goes on to say. The fairy-story cleanses our vision and allows us to see through clean windows, through the clouds of ordinary, everyday perception to access reality and glimpse the Truth that transcends the anopsia of a disenchanting materialism. Clark describes the regaining of clear vision as a reenchantment:

It is to take folk-stories seriously as accounts of the “dreamworld,” the realm of the conscious experience of which our “waking world” is only a province, to acknowledge and make real to ourselves the presence of spirits that enter our consciousness as moods of love or alienation, wild joy or anger. In W.B. Yeats’s philosophy fairies are the moods and characters of human life, conceived not as alterations in a material being, but as the spiritual rulers of an idealistically conceived world.

Stephen R.L. Clark, “How To Believe In Fairies,” Inquiry, 30:4: 337

I once heard someone argue that the old fairy-tales contain a truth about an animate nature that the new science is coming to confirm, proceeding to explain fairies as quarks. I found the view appealing, but that’s not the argument being made here. The naturalist explanation renders fairy-tales and mythologies – and religion – redundant. All we need is natural science. (One should always be careful about dismissing the fairy folk – even if one is a leading archaeologist and ‘expert’ of the times! Disdain the daoine sídhe at your peril! Never dismiss the folklore...http://blog.mythicalireland.com/2017/07/eschewing-little-people-one.html).

A good book here is Peter Tompkins’ The Secret Life of Nature: Living in Harmony with the Hidden World of Nature Spirits, from Fairies to Quarks (1997) (also Tompkins’ The Secret Life of Plants.) If you don’t believe in fairies, Tompkins may persuade you otherwise. Tompkins goes beyond the normal fairy dialogue to make connections with the natural world, his book showing how earthcare and soulcare go together and how we can achieve planetary health and sanity through communion with the natural Guardians of the animate Earth.

It’s an appealing message, one that rests purpose and meaning and all that fairy folklore embodies upon natural science. But Clark shows that to believe in fairies, devas, dragons, elves, gnomes, sylphs, sea nymphs, mermaids, and all such beings that inhabit the realm of Faërie in air, water, fire, and earth does not require that they be reduced to the known material world— such as quarks, now, or manatees or insects in the past. These are merely glimpsed and mistakenly identified animals and natural things and occurrences. The world may well be animate, but an essential aspect of Faërie is to accept, indeed embrace, the very mystery of things as an essential part of these other beings and bodies constituting the more-than-human world. In other words, the praise for Tompkins in going beyond the usual fairy dialogue begs the question – is this really going back, or is it going back to a reductionist naturalist explanation. The fairy dialogue transcends such naturalism and does so for the reasons Tolkien gives. Thus Tolkien argues that the inhabitants of Faërie are ‘true’ “even if they are only creations of Man’s mind, ‘true’ only as reflecting in a particular way one of Man’s visions of Truth.” (Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” 113, n. 2.) The creatures of Faërie are not to be reduced to perceptions, mistaken or otherwise, of the physical world, and neither are they to be dismissed as flights of Fancy. They are born of the comingling of Truth and mystery, and are all the more real for that.

For Tolkien, fairy-stories enable ‘a regaining of a clear view’ and a ‘recovery’ of the Primary World. (Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” 146), allowing us to ‘clean our windows; so that the things seen clearly may be freed from the drab blur of triteness and familiarity.’ (Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” 146). That is a claim to be able to see through ordinary sense experience of the everyday world. We return from the imaginal world to our everyday world and see that world with new eyes. Imagination revitalises the most mundane of our actions and experiences, reawakening us from within our old habits. As a result, our mundane patterns of behaviour give way to the patterning of story, and we come to appreciate the extraordinary qualities of our ordinary existence, food, drink, the company of others, the sea, the skies, the trees, the wind. As C.S. Lewis puts it, ‘the whole story, paradoxically enough, strengthens our relish for real life.’ 

There is, therefore, no distinction between fantasy and reality. In arguing for the presence of Art in nature, Tolkien is pointing to the existing of the fantastical, the mythical, the imaginal within real life, which art elicits and renders explicit. It is the habit and routine of mundane experience that clouds our vision with respect to the immanence of the fantastical within real life. Paradoxically, it is the ‘desperately practical perspectives of real life’ (C.S. Lewis) that enables us to come to understand the world of Faërie:

Only those who have lived out of water know what water is. Only those whose ordinary human life is structured by ceremonial and human meaning, who know of their duties and their perils, their friends and children, can clearly conceive that form of life which is fairy. 

Clark, “How To Believe In Fairies,” 349.

And only those who know what a frog is and what a prince is can understand the magic of a frog-prince. 

For creative Fantasy is founded upon the hard recognition that things are so in the world as it appears under the sun; on a recognition of fact, but not a slavery to it .. If men really could not distinguish between frogs and men, fairy-stories about frog-kings would not have arisen.’

On Fairy-Stories pp. 54-55

Is the craving for meaning in the world merely for ‘certain big children’ as Weber says? Weber’s world is a gloomy one. 






Recall once more A.N. Whitehead’s statement that ‘if men cannot live on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants.’ What Weber calls the ‘disenchantment of the world’ not only has us viewing the world in an impoverished way, focused upon immediate practicalities, but has us wearing moral, aesthetic and anthropological blinkers to the extent that these practicalities are delivered through institutional and systemic imperatives that denote not true reality so much as the alienation and abstraction of power beyond human control and comprehension. Such disenchantment is a deliberate amnesia, the systematic erasing of memory so that we come to forget, and neglect, the enchantment that is immanent in the real world, the magic that is always present in the garden. Such forgetfulness is an alien enchantment, creative human agents, in thrall to their creative powers, falling under the spell of their own creations, creations that have slipped free of human hands and obtained an existential significance all of their own. 

A genuine reenchantment is a ‘regaining’ and a ‘recovery’ of clear vision, allowing us to see and appreciate true realities. And the appeal of fairy-stories lies in some subconscious need and desire on our part to remember and return to the primary reality of the world. ‘The primal desire at the heart of Faërie,’ Tolkien argues, is ‘the realisation, independent of the conceiving mind, of imagined wonder.’ (Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” 116.) Through story and the way the imaginal world draws out the fantastical inherent in the real world, we come to experience wonder, feel reverence, and give thanks for the miracle and mystery of it all once again.

Creators and creations, independent life – sub-creation
Tolkien described the Middle-Earth he brought into being as Sub-creation. Although Middle-Earth is rooted in realities of time, space and culture, the landscape and peoples described on every page seem to be have an independent life of their own, as though a Primary Creator had breathed life into the realm, in the same way that an ultimate Creator brought the earth into existence and gave humanity the ability to create in its own right. The alienation thesis of Hegel and Marx shows how, with the inversion of subject and object, human creations come to be invested with an existential significance of their own, obtaining an autonomy and a reality to rival, and even to dwarf, that of their human creators. Creative human agency is thus at work to create a second nature out of primary nature, a self-made social and institutional world that comes to prevail over the primary reality and operate according to its own laws and imperatives. Thus we can present the environmental crisis of the age in terms of the way that the technosphere, brought into existence by human action, is transgressing the boundaries of the biosphere which sustains life. Translated back into Tolkien’s terms, whilst these human creations may come to acquire a life and significance of their own, they continue to exist within a Secondary World that may be accessed by the imagination that establishes the bridge to our Primary World. In explaining why some human creations come to acquire a life of their own, Marx would refer to alienative social relations. For Marx, as for Hegel before him, alienation is an instrument of progress, driving development through separation and its overcoming. This view is teleological in that it suggests a purpose at work in history. There is a teleology at work in Tolkien, too, but one that relates to a much different kind of purpose – some things are meant to have a life and significance of their own. This is expressed in the way that Gandalf speaks to Frodo about Bilbo’s finding of the Ring of Power:

Behind that there was something else at work, beyond any design of the Ring-maker. I can put it no plainer than by saying that Bilbo was meant to find the Ring, and not by its maker. In which case you also were meant to have it. And that may be an encouraging thought.

J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 54-55.)

In the same way, Becca Segall Tarnas suggests, ‘Tolkien was meant to bring the mythology of Middle-Earth into being through his writing, and as such it was given the authenticity and truth that so many feel when they traverse its woods and mountains, and converse with its inhabitants as they walk along their roads.’ (The Fantastic Imagination: Sub-creating Tolkien’s Middle-Earth).


Although the term ‘imaginary’ is typically equated with the unreal, ‘with something that is outside the framework of being and existing’ (Henry Corbin, “Mundus Imaginalis, or The Imaginary and the Imaginal,” trans. Ruth Horine, En Islam Iranien: Aspects Spirituels et Philosophiques, tome IV, livre 7 (Paris, France: Gallimard, 1971), 1.), the opposite may well be true: ‘the imaginary, or the imaginal, exists in the innermost place of our souls, and thus is internal and intrinsic to the outer world we call reality.’ (Becca Segall Tarnas, The Fantastic Imagination: Sub-creating Tolkien’s Middle-Earth). That is the realm which Tolkien calls Faërie, and which he declares to be real. (J.R.R. Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” in The Tolkien Reader (New York, NY: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1966), 33.) 

Accessing reality through the imagination, Tolkien viewed the world symbolically and mythically. (Colin Duriez, Tolkien and C.S. Lewis: The Gift of Friendship (Mahwah, NJ: Hidden Spring, 2003), 178.) And this world was very much real. ‘I believe that Tolkien has wandered in Middle-Earth, writes Peter Beagle. Tolkien ‘believes in his world, and in all those who inhabit it.’ Middle-Earth was not ‘created, for it was always there.’ (Peter Beagle, “Tolkien’s Magic Ring,” in The Tolkien Reader (New York, NY: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1966), xvi ix). In writing, Tolkien thought himself to be “recording what was already ‘there,’ somewhere: not of ‘inventing’.” (J.R.R. Tolkien, The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, ed. Humphrey Carpenter, with Christopher Tolkien (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000), 145.) Tolkien also expressed a view that many writers have given over the years, to the effect that ‘the thing seems to write itself once I get going, as if the truth comes out then, only imperfectly glimpsed in the preliminary sketch.’ (Tolkien, Letters, 104.)

Writing on these creative experiences, Norris Clarke writes: ‘It felt, they say, as though they were tuned in or connected to some higher power which somehow took over and flowed through them.’ (Norris Clarke, “The Creative Imagination: Unique Expression of Our Soul-Body Unity,” in The Creative Retrieval of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2009), 203.) 

Becca Segall Tarnas explains what this higher power could be, and how it relates to the imagination, with reference to Coleridge’s discussion of Primary Imagination, Secondary Imagination, and Fancy. ‘Faërie is a creation of the Secondary Imagination, which in turn is an echo of the Primary Imagination, what Coleridge holds ‘to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.’ (S.T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (1906: 159.) The Primary and Secondary Imaginations differ from each other only in degree and mode but not in kind, yet the Secondary is ‘co-existing with the conscious will’ of the human being. (S.T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (1906, 159.) While the Primary Imagination can be understood as operating in the mind of the divine Creator, and thus bringing the world as we know it into being, the Secondary Imagination is that same imaginative power operating through the human mind. Owen Barfield, a friend of Tolkien’s and a fellow member of their literary circle ‘the Inklings,’ explored Coleridge’s thought deeply in this area. Barfield explains that the Primary Imagination is an act that we, as human beings, are not conscious of, and when we are conscious of it as our own creative agency it becomes the Secondary Imagination. (Owen Barfield, What Coleridge Thought (1971: 77.)

The Secondary Imagination “dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate” (Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 159.) and “struggles to idealize and to unify.” (Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 160.) As an extension of the Primary Imagination responsible for creating reality, the Secondary Imagination also has the ability to create reality, but of a different degree: imaginal reality. This is, for example, why Corbin chose the term mundus imaginalis to differentiate what is just “made up” from “the object of imaginative or imagining perception.” (Corbin, “Mundus Imaginalis,” 10.) This concept indicates that the product of the Secondary Imagination has a reality of its own, because its ultimate source, like reality, is the Primary Imagination, only it is created through the agency of the human being. Tolkien uses the term “Sub-creation” to refer to the product of the Secondary Imagination, because the result is created under an ultimate Creator. In addition to the Primary and Secondary Imaginations, Coleridge also writes of Fancy, which is “no other than a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and space.” (Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 160.)’ (Becca Segall Tarnas, The Fantastic Imagination: Sub-creating Tolkien’s Middle-Earth).

The difference between Imagination and Fancy is the difference between the mundus imaginalis as a living and true imaginal world and a world that is merely ‘made up.’ 

Art gives Imagination the ‘inner consistency of reality’ to produce Sub-creation. (Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” in The Tolkien Reader, 68.) ‘Fantasy,’ ‘the making or glimpsing of Other-worlds’ (Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” in The Tolkien Reader, 64), encompasses Imagination and the Sub-creative Art. (Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” in The Tolkien Reader, 68.) To be true, fantasy the inner consistency of reality must flow through the sub-creator’s imagination into the Secondary World. ‘A successful sub-creator brings into being a world which both the spectator and designer may enter, a world that has its own laws by which it operates. As long as every facet of the imaginal realm follows these laws, the inner reality of the world remains intact and the world is true.’ (Becca Segall Tarnas, The Fantastic Imagination: Sub-creating Tolkien’s Middle-Earth; Tolkien, ‘On Fairy Stories,’ in The Tolkien Reader, 60.) Since this is so, the stories relating to the Secondary World are not dreams or some unreal whimsy, merely made-up, but are to be presented as truth. (Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” 41-42.) In the same way that the painter or sculpture works with materials drawn from nature, so fantasy is crafted out of the elements of Primary World, enabling us to see the world anew, marvelling once more at its many wonders. (Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” 77-78.) The Secondary World and Primary World thus overlap each other:

Faërie contains many things besides elves and fays, and besides dwarfs, witches, trolls, giants, or dragons: it holds the seas, the sun, the moon, the sky; and the earth, and all things that are in it: tree and bird, water and stone, wine and bread, and ourselves, mortal men, when we are enchanted.

Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” 38

That overlap thus includes human beings, but on the crucial condition only ‘when we are enchanted.’ Faërie is thus the real cosmos which includes human beings, in that ‘history, chance and desire’ are the forces that shape lives in both our world and in Middle-Earth. (Beagle, Tolkien’s Magic Ring, x.) Faërie thus includes human beings when they are enchanted, but not human beings when they are disenchanted. Since it is the level of our enchantment that determines the extent to which we live in the expansive realm of Faërie, Tolkien’s vision amounts to a call for reenchantment against the disenchanting forces of modern techno-urban industrial civilisation.

Fairies, Gods and God – the creative universe and infinite oneness

I want to link these comments on quarks and the transcendence of naturalism to the themes addressed in Jake Owensby’s article ‘Fireflies and Transfiguration.’ 
https://jakeowensby.com/2017/08/04/fireflies-and-transfiguration/ (​https:​/​​/​jakeowensby.com​/​2017​/​08​/​04​/​fireflies-and-transfiguration​/​​)

Owensby begins with a childhood recollection of fireflies, what he called ‘lightning bugs.’ ‘At dusk, scores of tiny lanterns gently lit the backyard of my childhood home, each fading slowly on and off according to its own rhythm. A sea of twinkling lights would surrounded me, lift my heart’s heaviness, and still my racing mind.’ He recalls how these lights stirred in him ‘a feeling of the deep goodness of the trees and the grass and the cicadas and even me despite the terrors that sometimes stalked my daytime. Anything seemed possible …’ He imagined that ‘the light came from a source at once beyond and within them,’ the bugs become ‘lightning bugs’ when something or someone inhabited them and shined through them to illuminate the environment. Of course, scientific explanation points to a biological process called bioluminescence. But Owensby proceeds to examine what the theological imagination has to say on this question. He quotes the thirteenth century Franciscan theologian, Bonaventure, for whom every creature comes into being as a result of an expenditure of divine energy. All created things thus have vestiges or footprints of the Maker. Owensby invites us to think about this idea slightly differently, such that every created thing gives off a sort of afterglow, a glow that points back to the Creator. Whereas glow-in-the-dark toys stop glowing after a while, the Creator’s glow within created things does not diminish with time. ‘That’s because God is actively sustaining everything that is at each instant. Unless God expends energy to keep something in existence, it collapses into nothingness.’ Owensby explains that whilst God created everything out of nothing, He did not create the universe so as to walk away or to observe from a distance. ‘God created everything that is in order to be in relationship.’ ‘And God’s first thought in this whole creation business was none other than Jesus. God created everything for Jesus.’ And Christians believe that Jesus redeems us by transforming us. This is the clear meaning of the mysterious story called the Transfiguration. But Owensby goes further to discuss relationship in the most intimate terms with respect to Jesus and creation.

‘God’s purpose in the creation is intimate relationship. In the Incarnation, God becomes a human being and remains God. Jesus is both divine and human. One being. Two completely different natures. You can’t get any closer than that.’

At the end of the second century, St. Irenaeus argued that is because Jesus shares our humanity that we can participate in the divine life. Pope John Paul II summarizes the idea thus: ‘God passed into man so that man might pass over to God.’ (Orientale Lumen of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II, https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/1995/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_19950502_orientale-lumen.html (​https:​/​​/​w2.vatican.va​/​content​/​john-paul-ii​/​en​/​apost_letters​/​1995​/​documents​/​hf_jp-ii_apl_19950502_orientale-lumen.html​); St. Iranaeus, Against Heresies III, 10, 2: SCh 211/2, 121; III, 18, 7, l.c., 365; III, 19, 1, l.c., 375; IV, 20, 4: SCh 100/2, 635; IV, 33, 4, l.c., 811; V, Pref., SCh 153/2, 15.)





In the Transfiguration, Peter, James, and John received a brief glimpse of journey’s end when they saw the divinity of Jesus shining through his humanity (Luke 9:29b, 32b). What they see is the way that Jesus’ identity is changing their and our humanity in a way that will be completed in the resurrection.

‘The Way of Jesus is the Way of dying to old ego-driven, self-centered ways. Dying to a life devoted to possessions, power, and prestige. Over time, we rise to a life in which God’s love increasingly shines through us to our neighbor.




I want to examine these ideas further with respect to immanence and transcendence, going beyond not simply naturalistic explanations, but checking the tendency to read a spiritual or transcendent (as supernatural) significance into natural entities and phenomena. The importance of this point is directly related to the idea of reenchantment as a revaluation of a world disenchanted by scientific reductionism, commercial exploitation and commodification. There is, therefore, a distinction to be made between ‘gods’, as natural entities and phenomena of the material world, and God as all of that world and something more, as infinite ground, well-spring and actuality. I proceed, therefore, to go beyond naturalism, beyond reenchantment as a revaluation of the natural world, through quarks and fairies, to God as an infinite oneness. I would also make a comparison between this definition of God and theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman’s thesis that the ‘endlessly creative universe’ is ‘God enough’ (Reinventing the Sacred 2008). Kauffman is an atheist seeking to go beyond the reductionism of mechanistic science. He sees value and meaning in the universe. 


‘We are beyond reductionism: life, agency, meaning, value, and even consciousness and morality almost certainly arose naturally, and the evolution of the biosphere, economy, and human culture are stunningly creative often in ways that cannot be foretold, indeed in ways that appear to be partially lawless.’

Kauffman, Reinventing the Sacred 2006 ch 19

Kauffman’s explanation is entirely naturalistic, in that it refers to natural phenomena and nothing transcendent in the sense of being supernatural. But his notion of an ‘endlessly creative universe’ savours a great deal of the conception of God as infinite being I wish to defend here. Kauffman challenges the view that natural laws will be sufficient to explain what is real in the universe. ‘The new view of emergence and ceaseless creativity partially beyond natural law is truly a new scientific worldview in which science itself has limits.’ 

That comes close to the view I am presenting of ‘God’ as infinite being and oneness, but not close enough to be the identical. It fits the idea of a reenchantment as a revaluation of the things of natural reality. It is an immanentist ethic. I go further than this and make the case for a transcendent ethic. In other words, there is a distinction to be made between the ‘gods’ which populate the endlessly creative universe and ‘God’ as that infinite oneness itself.

I would also refer readers to the lively exchange I had with language and mathematics professors on this very theme, ‘from core to infinity.’ 
http://pcritchley2.wixsite.com/beingandplace/single-post/2017/07/26/From-Core-to-Infinity (​http:​/​​/​pcritchley2.wixsite.com​/​beingandplace​/​single-post​/​2017​/​07​/​26​/​From-Core-to-Infinity​)

That discussion was concerned with the core that cannot be demonstrated but upon which we may build truths to infinity. That’s infinite creativity. The ceaselessly creative universe, then, to which Kauffman refers is the infinite ground, well-spring and actuality that David Bentley Hart refers to in his article ‘God, Gods and Fairies’ - the transcendent God as the infinite whole encompassing the naturalist gods that exist in the enchanted world. Re-godding overcoming Weberian disenchantment, then, involves two aspects, revaluing the natural entities of the natural world – ‘gods’ – and recognising the existence of infinite being and oneness which embraces but transcends that world – ‘God.’

‘God, Gods and Fairies’ by David Bentley Hart, https://www.firstthings.com/article/2013/06/god-gods-and-fairies

Hart proceeds by challenging the claims often made by purveyors and consumers of today’s popular atheism that the disbelief in God involves ‘no particular positive philosophy of reality, much less any kind of religion or creed, but consists merely in neutral incredulity toward a certain kind of factual asseveration.’ He describes this as ‘an utterly nonsensical claim’ based upon mistaking the word ‘God’ for the name of some discrete object that might or might not be found within the fold of nature. Such a claim can be made only in complete ignorance of what is entailed by theistic belief. Hart thus grounds his argument firmly in the distinction between ‘God’ as the one transcendent source of all things particular ‘gods’ referring to the plurality of divine beings inhabiting the cosmos. That is a distinction between two qualitatively incommensurable kinds of reality, belonging to two wholly disparate conceptual orders. He quotes the Swami Prabhavananda: ‘Gods, though supernatural, belong . . . among the creatures. Like the Christian angels, they are much nearer to man than to God.’ Only the one transcendent God is ‘the uncreated.’

‘God’ is thus the one infinite ground of all that is: absolutely immanent to all things on account of being perfectly transcendent of all things - eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, uncreated, uncaused. ‘God so understood is neither some particular thing posed over against the created universe, in addition to it, nor is he the universe itself. He is not a being, at least not in the way that a tree, a clock, or a god is; he is not one more object in the inventory of things that are. He is the infinite wellspring of all that is, in whom all things live and move and have their being.’ That may savour a great deal of Stuart Kauffman’s idea of an endlessly creative universe, but is more than that. Kauffman’s notion is entirely naturalistic, focusing on the immanence of things, whereas ‘God’ possesses also a transcendent quality. 

Kauffman is aware of the distinction. He puts the key questions clearly:

‘If, as I advocate, we rename God, not as the Generator of the universe, but as the creativity in the natural universe itself, the two views share a common core: we are responsible, not God. But the two views do differ in their most fundamental aspect. One sees a supernatural Generator God as the source of the vastness around us. The view I discuss, beyond reductionism, partially beyond natural law, sees nature itself as the generator of the vast creativity around us. Is not this new view, a view based on an expanded science, God enough? Is not nature itself creativity enough? What more do we really need of a God, if we also accept that we, at last, are responsible to the best of our forever-limited wisdom?

Kauffman 2006 ch 19

In light of the argument presented here, the answer to Kauffman’s question is that natural creativity, however ceaseless, is not ‘God enough.’ That endless creativity of the universe is not quite the same thing as the infinite oneness of God. If by ‘being’ we mean the totality of finite things, then ‘God’ is ‘beyond being’ in being ‘the inexhaustible source of all reality, the absolute upon which the contingent is always utterly dependent, the unity underlying all things.’ That endless creation of which Kauffman writes, then, is something in the universe but also much more than the universe. Kauffman’s ‘God enough’, then, is not, after all, ‘enough.’ Kauffman’s view of a ceaselessly creative universe pertains only to natural phenomena and their continuous unfolding in time. This is the world of ‘gods’, a higher, more powerful or more splendid dimension of the natural world. The view is wholly immanentist, in that the ‘gods’ who populate the world do not transcend nature but belong to it. ‘Their theogonies can be recounted—how they arose out of the primal night, or were born of other, more titanic progenitors, and so on—and in many cases their eventual demises foreseen. Each of them is a distinct being rather than “being itself,” and it is they who are dependent upon the universe for their existence rather than the reverse.’ (Hart). There may well be an endless diversity of such ‘gods’ as natural entities and phenomena, and their creative unfolding may make for an endlessly creative universe, as Kauffman defines it. But of ‘God’ as such, there can be only the one. Indeed, as Hart points out, God is not merely one, in the sense of being singular or unique, but is oneness as such, ‘the sole act of being by which any finite thing exists and by which all things exist together.’

Hart’s point is that it is the transcendent God in whom it is ultimately meaningful not to believe. The existence or otherwise of ‘gods’ is not a question of belief or of metaphysics but of the taxonomy of nature (terrestrial, celestial, and chthonic). To be an atheist is to be a truly intellectually and emotionally fulfilled naturalist in philosophy. That is how I understand biologist Stuart Kauffman’s argument in Reinventing the Sacred. His argument is appealing, but in making the case for the endlessly creative universe being ‘God enough’, Kauffman is conflating two completely different things – ‘gods’ as natural phenomena and entities in the creative universe and ‘God’ as the infinite being and oneness. To present the one – ‘gods’ – as occupying the terrain of the other – ‘God’ - is inadmissible, conflating two distinct conceptual orders, indicating a failure to recognise the distinction between ‘gods’/natural entities and phenomena and ‘God’ as two qualitatively incommensurable kinds of reality. To be an atheist, Hart argues, ‘one must genuinely succeed in not believing in God, with all the logical consequences this entails.’

Kauffman writes of life, agency, meaning, value, and consciousness as immanent in the creative universe. He also describes living with the creativity in the universe that we partially cocreate as ‘living into mystery:’ ‘Because we cannot know, but must live our lives anyway, we live forward into mystery.’ Whilst the argument is appealing, the appeal lies in the way it draws upon transcendent notions of ‘God’, but lacks those transcendent foundations. To repeat, there is a qualitative distinction between ‘gods’ and ‘God’, and the former cannot serve in the place of the latter. They are not ‘God enough.’ Kauffman writes of ‘living into mystery’ on account of the impossibility of possessing complete knowledge. Hart writes of existence itself being mysterious: the question of ‘God’ is ‘one that is ineradicably present in the mystery of existence itself, or of consciousness, or of truth, goodness, and beauty. Philosophical naturalism is supposed to have answered this question. But Kauffman admits that we can only ever have partial knowledge of a ceaselessly creative universe in which we are involved as co-creators. We must live with ‘faith and courage’ he adds. That sounds like a restatement of a religious ethic. Except that he proceeds to argue that ‘the long history of life has given us tools to live in the face of mystery, tools that we only partially know we have, gifts of the creativity that we can now call God.’ And that’s the problem – Kauffman is mixing up two entirely different things and, worse, using ‘gods’ to displace ‘God.’ Worse, Kauffman clearly thinks that human gods are sufficient to take the place of God: ‘Then let us talk to ourselves consciously, let us choose our own sacred with the best of our wisdom, always knowing that we cannot know.’ (Kauffman 2008 ch 19).

Kauffman’s error is clear. But it is not always recognised as an error. On the contrary, it is frequently considered the height of insight and wisdom. As Hart points out: ‘any speaker at one of those atheist revivalist meetings need only trot out either of two reliable witticisms — “I believe neither in God nor in the fairies at the bottom of my garden” or “Everyone today is a disbeliever in Thor or Zeus, but we simply believe in one god less” — to elicit warmly rippling palpitations of self-congratulatory laughter from the congregation.’ I have heard God repeatedly dismissed as a ‘sky fairy’ too many times now for my reaction to be anything other than utter tedium. Far from being clever, the comparison betrays a complete ignorance of elementary conceptual categories. Hart puts it this way:

‘Beliefs regarding fairies concern a certain kind of object that may or may not exist within the world, and such beliefs have much the same sort of intentional and rational shape as beliefs regarding the neighbors over the hill or whether there are such things as black swans. Beliefs regarding God concern the source and end of all reality, the unity and existence of every particular thing and of the totality of all things, the ground of the possibility of anything at all. Fairies and gods, if they exist, occupy something of the same conceptual space as organic cells, photons, and the force of gravity, and so the sciences might perhaps have something to say about them, if a proper medium for investigating them could be found.
God, by contrast, is the infinite actuality that makes it possible for photons and (possibly) fairies to exist, and so can be “investigated” only, on the one hand, by acts of logical deduction and conjecture or, on the other, by contemplative or spiritual experiences. Belief or disbelief in fairies or gods could never be validated by philosophical arguments made from first principles; the existence or nonexistence of Zeus is not a matter that can be intelligibly discussed in the categories of modal logic or metaphysics, any more than the existence of tree frogs could be; if he is there at all, one must go on an expedition to find him.
The question of God, by contrast, is one that must be pursued in terms of the absolute and the contingent, the necessary and the fortuitous, act and potency, possibility and impossibility, being and nonbeing, transcendence and immanence. Evidence for or against the existence of Thor or King Oberon would consist only in local facts, not universal truths of reason; it would be entirely empirical, episodic, psychological, personal, and hence elusive. Evidence for or against the reality of God, if it is there, pervades every moment of the experience of existence, every employment of reason, every act of consciousness, every encounter with the world around us.’

Hart makes these points to establish the absurdity of professing atheism without thereby assenting to an entire philosophy of being, something which entails a vast range of purely metaphysical commitments:

‘Principally, it requires that one believe that the physical order, which both experience and reason say is an ensemble of ontological contingencies, can exist entirely of itself, without any absolute source of actuality. It requires also that one resign oneself to an ultimate irrationalism: For the one reality that naturalism can never logically encompass is the very existence of nature (nature being, by definition, that which already exists); it is a philosophy, therefore, surrounded, permeated, and exceeded by a truth that is always already super naturam, and yet a philosophy that one cannot seriously entertain except by scrupulously refusing to recognize this.’





7 Rationalisation as the Promethean approach
I return here to the process of rationalisation as the central problematic of the modern world, and the question of how to recover connection in a world of disconnection. 





"This thing all things devours:
Birds, beasts, trees, flowers;
Gnaws iron, bites steel;
Grinds hard stones to meal;
Slays king, ruins town




What is this thing?
The simple answer is time, although strictly speaking Bilbo was asking for more time when he answered the riddle. Time is the great equalizer. In the spirit of Tolkien, though, I think we can say more and relate this levelling of all qualities and differences to an homogenisation that is not natural, but is driven by institutional and systemic imperatives arising from within the techno-urban industrial heat machine we have erected over the ‘real primary world.’ I may be forcing a meaning somewhat here, but not by much. And I think this reading is warranted in the context of fighting the long defeat in the form of an environmental crisis caused precisely by human activity and, more specifically, by the ecologically damaging actions of certain classes of humans within specific social relations. So if we answer ‘time’ to the riddle, I would say that nature’s endless cycles of birth, life, death, regrowth and regeneration do not level and homogenize the manifold qualities and multiform diversity of the world, it is the Megamachine that those hell-bent on power and domination have erected over nature that has done that.

In The Technological Bluff, Jacques Ellul describes technology as a terrorism, referring to ‘terrorism in the velvet glove of technology.’ (Ellul 1990 ch 20). Arguing that the discourse of technique, or technology, is terrorist, Ellul explains:

‘It is in this abstract sense of molding the unconscious with no possibility of resistance that I am adopting the word terrorism in this context. My point is that the discourse on technique which we encounter everywhere and which is never subjected to criticism is a terrorism which completes the fascination of people in the West and which places them in a situation of twofold irreversible dependence and therefore subjugation.
This terrorist discourse rests on a picture of tomorrow's society. It is clear, incontestable, and beyond a shadow of a doubt that the society of 2000 will be an entirely computerized society, a communication society, a high-tech society, a society of space colonization, of unlimited energy, of radically transformed production thanks to industrial automation and robotics, a society in which artificial intelligence almost completely replaces human intelligence, and in which material shortages will be largely made up by the creation of new materials …, which are just as good as the old and even better. This society will also be one in which the methods of production are so different that it will be impossible to think of work as we know it today, in which communities and transport will be completely changed, in which the main problems of birth, living, and aging will have been solved, and in which nutritional problems will also have been solved thanks to new and inexhaustible foods. It will be a society in which eventually questions of consumption will be pointless because new products and services will make possible new and balanced budgets both public and private.’

Ellul 1990 ch 20

The solution to all our ills! Why complain? And why is this terroristic?

‘This is why I talk of terrorism. All children must now learn to use computers. They are shaped by them and adapted to them. This adaptation will one day go so far that orthography itself will have to be changed to fit computers. The computer will mediate all things intellectual and the whole intellectual formation of the child. What we hear repeated a hundred times is always the same. Children must be able to use computers because tomorrow they will be the universal work environment.
What is demanded of children, however, is a transformation of intelligence, for the computer claims to be not only a technique but also a science. It changes our way of imaging things (whether they be physical, economic, linguistic, or biological). It gives us a new way of coding images, words, ideas, language. Everything must go into a code for the machine. It imposes its own language and its own way of putting problems. It produces principles and new concepts.’

It’s the reduction of all things to the one way that is terroristic. Sauron thus seeks to subdue Middle-Earth to his own devices, thereby reducing the diversity of the land and its peoples to being mere instruments of his homogenizing power, extinguishing all difference expressed by diverse beings and bodies. Sauron’s evil is homogenous, in intent and impact, encompassing all beings and bodies and using them as instruments in advancing his plans, removing all that do not. That’s a world of homogeneity and uniformity that proceeds without regard for the diversity of places, persons and things; it is Max Weber’s bureaucratised, routinized, rationalized and instrumentalized world of monolithic control. (Peter Critchley, Reason and Rationalization in Marx and Weber, 2001).
https://www.academia.edu/784946/Reason_and_Rationalisation_in_Marx_and_Weber
To repeat Weber’s description of modern times, which has run as a central thread throughout this piece:

The fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the disenchantment of the world.

Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’ in Gerth and Mills 1977:155

And that leads to a world which proceeds ‘without regard to persons’ (Weber 1991:215), a world characterised by the objective discharge of roles and tasks within a bureaucratic order that proceeds according to calculable rules. One measure, one rule, One Ring.
Standing in contradistinction to this ‘disenchantment of the world’ through scientific reductionism and technical mastery is the Orphic approach. In seeing ourselves as a part of nature, we see nature not as an enemy but as something that is us. There is no opposition between human art and nature because art is immanent in nature, and human artifice is itself therefore natural, insofar as desire is restrained to its natural span. We thus give up the power of machines to control and dominate, and refuse the promises of mechanical immortality. Instead, human art, skill and artifice will be creatively continuous with nature, and the relation of possession, control, domination and manipulation between humankind and nature will cease and be replaced by a respectful, reverential understanding based on the appreciation of the fact that we are part of a greater whole.

Technology and its use – against alien rationalisation]
It would be a mistake to come away with the view that Tolkien was anti-technology in any simple sense. I have been able to do no more than highlight key themes, simplifying enormously, but even in this short space I have drawn attention to the distinctions and nuances in Tolkien’s argument. I would be wary of making too much of the distinction between contemplation and action, and would emphasise the notion of sub-creation. I would also underline the notion of art as being present in nature. That view is not against action or artifice as such. The point is that in being at one within nature, creativity is natural and is part of a general flourishing. Thus Tolkien’s dwarves are great builders and machinists, as are the elves. Elvic enchantment thus involves a technology that works with intimate knowledge of nature. We could refer here to the works of elves of the First Age (Noldor particularly), or the elves of Eregion in the Third Age. The way Tolkien explains the point highlights the critical comment with respect to the artificial corruption of natural things through power, control and domination:

‘Sauron was of course not “evil” in origin. He was a “spirit” corrupted by the Prime Dark Lord (the Prime sub-creative Rebel) Morgoth. He was given an opportunity of repentance, when Morgoth was overcome, but could not face the humiliation of recantation, and suing for pardon; and so his temporary turn to good and “benevolence” ended in a greater relapse, until he became the main representative of Evil of later ages. But at the beginning of the Second Age he was still beautiful to look at, or could still assume a beautiful visible shape – and was not indeed wholly evil, even before pride and the lust to exert their will eat them up. The particular branch of the High-Elves concerned, the Noldor or Loremasters, were always on the side of 'science and technology', as we should call it: they wanted to have the knowledge that Sauron genuinely had, and those of Eregion refused the warnings of Gilgalad and Elrond. The particular 'desire' of the Eregion Elves – an 'allegory' if you like of a love of machinery, and technical devices – is also symbolised by their special friendship with the Dwarves of Moria. 

The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, Letter 153 To Peter Hastings

The elves are no less industrious than other races, it is just that their industry is effortless, a part of the natural order of things, and not an attempt to escape that order and subordinate it to extraneous power and purpose.

Tolkien goes on in this letter to make a point that is full of radical and critical implications with respect to the rationalized social system in which we live and which sets the parameters of human actions and shapes the character and use of technological powers:

‘I should regard them as no more wicked or foolish (but in much the same peril) as Catholics engaged in certain kinds of physical research (e.g. those producing, if only as by-products, poisonous gases and explosives): things not necessarily evil, but which, things being as they are are, and the nature and motives of the economic masters who provide all the means for their work being as they are, are pretty certain to serve evil ends. For which they will not necessarily be to blame, even if aware of them.’

The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, p. 90, Letter 153 To Peter Hastings

I would refer readers here to my work on Karl Marx and Max Weber, where I deal at length with the separation of human agents from their various means of action – not just the means of production, but the whole range of means of living – with the result that the sphere of human choice and decision is narrowed and determined by external institutional and systemic imperatives. We are dealing with the pathos of means and ends here, the enlargement of mere means to the status of ends in themselves, bringing about the displacement of true ends, and involving the replacing of purpose by function. The result is the normalisation and routinisation of evil that Tolkien contests. This is a world in which human beings can no longer tell the difference between good or evil, in which choice between them becomes arbitrary and ceases to matter. We choose on the basis of subjective preferences, but cannot give good reasons to justify these preferences as against others. This is a world in which human beings are caught up in patterns of behaviour within which evil is perversely wrought, without being consciously sought. This explains the ecocide in which people are complicit, without making a conscious commitment or choice. 

This is the unconscious, unsought ecocide that is at the heart of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1961). The first chapter is entitled “A Fable for Tomorrow,” and it has all the qualities of a fairy tale: ‘There once was a town in the heart of America where all life seemed to live in harmony with its surroundings.’ It’s a tale of innocence and its loss, of an idyllic, pastoral community set within an abundant nature and wild biodiversity, overcome by an evil, invisible malady that spreads across the land until nature falls silent. No transcendent force is responsible for the loss of paradise. ‘No witchcraft, no enemy action had silenced the rebirth of new life on this stricken world.’ Carson concludes, ‘The people had done it to themselves.’

That self-destruction describes a world in which the creative human subject has fallen under the external control of its objective creations. It’s Weber’s modernity as a world of collective force lacking means and mechanisms of conscious collective choice. It’s the world that confines human agency within the ‘iron cage.’

‘The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In Baxter's view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the "saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment". But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage.’

Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 1985: 181

If we wait until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt to resolve what is in fact a moral predicament, not a technical problem, then eco-catastrophe will have resolved it for us. We have to engage in the work of reconnection, and come to live in accordance with a collective constraint resting on ultimate values we submit to voluntarily, or face having to survive an external collective force imposed upon us involuntarily in the shape of environmental collapse.
 
Earlier I referred to Tolkien’s criticism of the desire to push beyond the real primary world in an attempt to cheat Mortality and gain immortality through the power of the Machine (or Magic). I wish to return to this point and broaden it out in terms of the alienated system of production as the source of what Tolkien called ‘the corrupted motive of dominating.’ 

Tolkien writes that desire ‘may become possessive, clinging to the things made as “its own.”’ The worship of the products of one’s own hand is, of course, the sin of idolatry. And Tolkien proceeds to criticise the way that ‘the sub-creator wishes to be the Lord and God of his private creation’, which amounts to rebellion against the laws of the Creator – and ‘especially against mortality.’ It is that latter aspect that interests me. Because the point savours a little of the alienation thesis in Marx, the inversion of subject and object indicating the way in which human creations come to acquire an independence from their human creators, gaining an existential significance at their expense. In an alienated world, the human subject is reduced to being the appendage of the machine:

In handicrafts and manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool; in the factory, the machine makes use of him. There the movements of the instrument of labour proceed from him, here it is the movements of the machine that he must follow. In manufacture the workers are the parts of a living mechanism. In the factory we have a lifeless mechanism which is independent of the workers, who are incorporated into it as its living appendages.

Marx Capital I 1976: 548

Marx is worth quoting at length on this inverted world. His views express perfectly the distinction between the internal natural development consistent with flourishing and the external imposition upon the real primary world that characterises the domination of the machine world and its corruption of the good:

within the capitalist system all methods for raising the social productivity of labour are put into effect at the cost of the individual worker; that all means for the development of production undergo a dialectical inversion so that they become means of domination and exploitation of the producers; they distort the worker into a fragment of a man, they degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, they destroy the actual content of his labour by turning it into a torment; they alienate [entfremden] from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour process in the same proportion as science is incorporated in it as an independent power; they deform the conditions under which he works, subject him during the labour process to a despotism the more hateful for its meanness; they transform his life-time into working-time, and drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the juggernaut of capital. But all methods for the production of surplus-value are at the same time methods of accumulation, and every extension of accumulation becomes, conversely, a means for the development of those methods. It follows therefore that in proportion as capital accumulates, the situation of the worker, be his payment high or low, must grow worse. Finally, the law which always holds the relative surplus population or industrial reserve army in equilibrium with the extent and energy of accumulation rivets the worker to capital more firmly than the wedges of Hephaestus held Prometheus to the rock. It makes an accumulation of misery a necessary condition, corresponding to the accumulation of wealth. Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and moral degradation at the opposite pole, i.e. on the side of the class that produces its own product as capital. 

Marx CI 1976 ch 25

Although his metaphysics and politics are quite different, Tolkien’s critical comments on technological devices and instrumental means and their subordination to political and economic means are complementary with the key themes in the work of Marx and Weber. In The Lord of the Rings, we see the corruption of innocence through the pursuit of knowledge as power, we see the homogenisation of the world through the One Ring, we see humanity in a state of decline, we see ‘the primary real world’ under assault, corrupted. And what of the Hobbits? They give us the glimpse of an idyllic country village, hugging the land, employing technology to reduce their workload and give more time for them to take their ease and get on with the main business of enjoying life. That’s the point of technology, isn’t it? To reduce time spent in necessary labour, and expand time to enjoy life. That’s how the Hobbits use technology, not as a means to transform their way of life, which contains the danger of technological change becoming an end in itself, but to support that way of life.
And the Hobbits, smart beings they are, have it right. They understood something that troubled the minds of the greatest political economists of the nineteenth century. In his Principles of Political Economy, John Stuart Mill writes: ‘It is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day's toil of any human being.’ In response, Marx points out that lightening the day’s toil ‘is, however, by no means the aim of the application of machinery under capitalism.’

Like every other instrument for increasing the productivity of labour, machinery is intended to cheapen commodities and, by shortening the part of the working day in which the worker works for himself, to lengthen the other part, the part he gives to the capitalist for nothing. The machine is a means for producing surplus-value.

Marx CI 1976 493

That struck Marx, and would have struck Mill, as a waste of technological ingenuity. To be fair to Mill, his idea of the stationary state is most congenial to a Hobbit philosophy of living.

I cannot, therefore, regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with the unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political economists of the old school. I am inclined to believe that it would be, on the whole, a very considerable improvement on our present condition. I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life held out by those who think that the normal state of human beings is that of struggling to get on; that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, which form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of human kind, or anything but the disagreeable symptoms of one of the phases of industrial progress…

It is scarcely necessary to remark that a stationary condition of capital and population implies no stationary state of human improvement. There would be as much scope as ever for all kinds of mental culture, and moral and social progress; as much room for improving the Art of Living, and much more likelihood of its being improved, when minds ceased to be engrossed by the art of getting on. Even the industrial arts might be as earnestly and as successfully cultivated, with this sole difference, that instead of serving no purpose but the increase of wealth, industrial improvements would produce their legitimate effect, that of abridging labour. Hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened die day's toil of any human being. They have enabled a greater population to live the same life of drudgery and imprisonment, and an increased number of manufacturers and others to make fortunes. They have increased the comforts of the middle classes. But they have not yet begun to effect those great changes in human destiny, which it is in their nature and in their futurity to accomplish. Only when, in addition to just institutions, the increase of mankind shall be under the deliberate guidance of judicious foresight, can the conquests made from the powers of nature by the intellect and energy of scientific discoverers, become the common property of the species, and the means of improving and elevating the universal lot.

Mill, Principles of Political Economy






8 The Radical Critique of Tolkien

I didn’t know whether to leave this section out or relegate it to an appendix, or just squeeze it in somewhere where it doesn’t get in the way of the positive argument. It’s worth leaving in, though, because it raises questions of politics, ethics and freedom, making it clear that there are very different standpoints underlying the expressed views of people engaged in political or public controversy. In the end, I decided to retain this section, because it allows me to distinguish my own views from certain left liberal or libertarian criticism of anything that smacks of authority, law, obligation, restraint and limit. I don’t see how any viable society or economic system, socialist or any other kind, can operate without those things. So I consider libertarian critics to be decadent, parasitic on the very culture they criticise, incapable of constituting a social order of their own. But that just might be me and my bad temper having just waded through acres of politically motivated vulgarisation, misrepresentation and false accusation. No, I don’t think Tolkien is a fascist, and I don’t think morality is repressive and authority oppressive. And I don’t think general statements, either as accusations or defences, mean much either.
Tolkien has been portrayed as a reactionary, nostalgic and complacent apologist of the forces of law and order, putting everything and everyone in their place, and presenting a static vision of a world insulated against the forces of Chaos. It is worth examining these criticisms and orienting a view of environmentalism.

Raymond Williams’ Critique
I shall begin with Raymond Williams, a Marxist literary critic whose writings I very much admire. Williams has no time for Tolkien’s pastoralism. In The Country and the City, Williams discusses Tolkien in relation to ‘country-based fantasy.’ His problem with such fantasy is this:





I admire Williams’ work, and I am not alone. His criticism proved influential. Others repeat the charges against Tolkien, writing of ‘the ultimate, deeply conservative, ambition of pastoral’ that ‘falsifies the actual relations of non-city communities just as much and for the same reason that it falsifies city communities.’ (John Lucas (1990:118). Barrell and Bull point not merely to a nostalgic yearning for the past, which is passive enough, but an active resistance to social change that is highly political: ‘The Pastoral allows for a direct opposition to social change, a reactionary clinging to a static present, and an often desperate belief in future improvement.’ And it ‘fades away with the possibility of social mobility and of economic progress.’ (1974: 5, 8) 

That commitment to ‘future improvement’, ‘social mobility’ and ‘economic progress’ reveals that these critical comments are made from the standpoint of a progressive politics that has since been rendered problematical, to say the least, by the failures of party-state socialism and by the seemingly intractable issues raised by the contemporary environmental crisis. In the very least, notions of what constitutes ‘economic progress’ are being reworked, with strategies for degrowth advanced against the economics of growth, and notions of ‘progress’ being abandoned. Having hooked economic progress to a global heat machine, radicals have been forced to retreat and reassess. In light of this, Williams’ critical words now seem incredibly dated and deluded:

‘In Britain, identifiably, there is a precarious but persistent rural intellectual radicalism: genuinely and actively hostile to industrialism and capitalism; opposed to commercialism and the exploitation of the environment; attached to country ways and feelings, the literature and the lore.’

That sums up Tolkien neatly. The problem comes when Williams forces us to make a choice: ‘in every kind of radicalism the moment comes when any critique must choose its bearings, between past and future...’ OK. It is in this sense that Lewis Mumford distinguished between utopias of escape (into the past) and utopians of reconstruction (pointing to the future). (Critchley 2012: pp36). Utopias of the past trap us in nostalgia and deny us a future. Williams presses his criticism further, leaving us in no doubt as to the choice to be made: ‘We must begin differently: not in the idealisations of one order or another, but in the history to which they are only partial and misleading responses.’ Given the crises we are charged to resolve, myth and revolution must be seen as ‘alternative’ rather than complementary responses. Instead of a ‘myth’ dreaming of a past that never was, we require ‘real history’ geared to delivering a revolutionary future.

In response, I could argue that such revolutionary notions themselves engage in myth, however concealed in claims to be grounded in ‘real’ science. There are a whole number of false binaries here that set things that really are complementary – the mythical and the real, the ideal and the material - in opposition to each other, forcing us to silence a part of what we know to be true in order to remain on the side of revolution. I think the criticism is philosophically crude and reductionist and is plainly motivated by a political ideology that stands in tatters in the aftermath of the collapse of party-state socialism, not to mention the onset of environmental crisis. And I think it also neglects the way that Marx incorporated the active dimension of idealist philosophy into his own materialism. 

Patrick Curry writes that: ‘Williams doesn’t even seem to realize that people do not live by factual and physical bread alone, but also by ideas, values and visions of alternatives.’ (Curry 2004: 34-35).

That’s not true of Williams at all, as anyone acquainted with Williams’ work knows. But Curry is right, human life is a more than empirical universe shot through with ideals, dreams, aspirations, and beliefs, which Williams well knows. Williams’ criticism of Tolkien does seem to be blinded by political motivations. It’s the dismissive tone that upsets most. Williams’ criticism of Tolkien is ill-tempered. Whatever else Tolkien may be, he is not ‘half-educated.’ But what about ‘suburban’? 

Middle Earth – Morton’s Critique
Raymond Williams is far from alone in taking a critical view of Tolkien’s pastoralism. These critics on the left are sceptical of the environmental vision that Tolkien offers. 

Middle-Earth brings us to the Shire, remote, secluded from the wider world, the land of the Hobbits, creatures who are at peace with the land and with themselves, and oblivious to the world outside. Unknown to the Hobbits, the borders of the Shire are guarded by human Rangers of the North. The Lord of the Rings tells a story of a coming to an awareness that one’s world – and worldview – is merely partial, and that we are part of a whole involving other beings and bodies. This is the understanding the four Hobbits who leave the Shire to venture into the various landscapes of Middle-Earth come to acquire. As Morton argues:

The strangeness of Middle-Earth, its permeation with others and their worlds, is summed up in the metaphor of the road, which becomes an emblem for narrative. The road comes right up to your front door. To step into it is to cross a threshold between inside and outside.

Timothy Morton, Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 98
 (​https:​/​​/​beccatarnas.com​/​2013​/​12​/​18​/​crossing-the-threshold-the-ecological-road-into-mordor​/​" \l "_ftn9" \o "​)
Morton criticises Tolkien for creating Middle-Earth as a closed world, akin to the very industrialised machine world that Tolkien sees as instrumental in eating up the natural world. Wherever we go in this world, Morton charges, ‘however strange or threatening our journey, it will always be familiar, insofar as it has all been planned in advance, mapped out, accounted for.’ Morton’s critical perspective undercuts the hopes that many, such as I, have had that Peter Jackson’s films, and the moviegoing experiences of millions who have appreciated Jackson’s cinematic presentation of Tolkien, may come to create a generation alive to the distinctive environmentalism of the books. Morton’s view is that the movies, the money-making machine and Tolkien’s closed environmental vision are all of a piece.

‘This planning is not quite as narrowly rational as a modern factory. Still, the recent film of The Lord of the Rings, with its built-in commentaries on the special edition DVD about the craftsmanship and industrial processes that went into making it, reveals something true about the book. This Umwelt is a function of holistic, total design, total creation: Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk with a how-to booklet thrown in. The holistic world that ‘goes ever on and on’ is exciting and involved, but in the end, it is just a gigantic version of the ready-made commodity.’ 

Timothy Morton, Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 98

If this is true, then Morton is right to comment that ‘this is ironic’, since, as he points out, ‘one of the themes of the work is the resistance to industrialism and specifically to commodity fetishism, in the form of the hypnotic ring itself.’ 

This is the very antithesis of Tolkien’s affirmation of the power of fantasy to free things ‘from the drab blur of triteness or familiarity—from possessiveness.’ Morton’s criticism fails to make sense of Tolkien’s aims with respect to art and the humanities. If Morton is right, then Tolkien has not only failed in his ambitions, but that his ambitions with respect to literary (moral) ecology could not but fail. That moral undercurrent to which I draw attention in this piece is considered in this criticism to give Tolkien’s environmental vision a certain fixed and static quality. I shall shortly address Moorcock’s view that Tolkien’s vision is fascistic for precisely this reason. My view is that Morton is insufficiently alive to the nuances in Tolkien’s work. Earlier I showed precisely why Tolkien’s work is creative and can be applied and rethought anew by each generation, universal truths being apprehended in different times and places. 

But Morton makes a valid point that is worth investigating further.

Morton’s criticism is based on this observation of the Shire:

The Shire in J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings depicts the world-bubble as an organic village. Tolkien narrates the victory of the suburbanite, the ‘little person,’ embedded in a tamed yet natural-seeming environment. Nestled into the horizon as they are in their burrows, the wider world of global politics is blissfully unavailable to them. Tolkien’s work embodies a key nationalist fantasy, a sense of ‘world’ as real, tangible yet indeterminate, evoking a metonymic chain of images – an anamorphic form. The Lord of the Rings establishes not only entire languages, histories, and mythologies, but also a surrounding world. If ever there was evidence of the persistence of Romanticism, this is it.
In Heidegger’s supremely environmental philosophy, the surrounding ambience created by Tolkien’s narrative is called Umwelt. This is the deep ontological sense in which things are “around” – they may come in handy, but whether they do or not, we have a care for them. It is a thoroughly environmental idea. Things are oriented in relation to other things: “The house has its sunny side and its shady side.” Others (elves, dwarves, men) care for their surroundings differently. The strangeness of Middle-earth, its permeation with others and their worlds, is summed up in the metaphor of the road …

Timothy Morton, Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 97-98

The idyllic pastoralism of the Shire at the start of the tale is indeed a sheltered innocence, a paradise about to be lost through the Fall. But the Shire is not Middle-Earth as a whole, and Morton misses the whole point of the four Hobbits who leave this secluded world to venture into the diverse landscapes of Middle-Earth, coming to appreciate that the Shire is but part of a greater world. The Hobbits thus evince a shift in worldview, from being ‘little suburbanites’ to seeing the bigger picture, crossing the ‘threshold between inside and outside’ and leaving the world of innocence forever. There can be no going back home. To phrase the point that way is, actually, misleading, because in a sense, this crossing of the threshold involves seeing home as something greater, more expansive than the little, parochial home where our experience begins. In that sense, crossing the ‘threshold between inside and outside’ involves overcoming the dualisms that estrange humanity from other beings and bodies in the more-than-human world that enfolds, nourishes and sustains us. 
This is precisely the move that humanity is today being called upon to make in order to resolve the contemporary environmental crisis in such a way as to ensure the unity of human and planetary flourishing. And that calls upon the human species to leave behind the anthropocentric perspective that sees human freedom in terms of a mastery of the natural world, crossing the threshold that separates the self-made human world from the surrounding natural world to yield an understanding and appreciation of the greater world of which we are a part, not apart from.

I have written in favour of oikophilia in this piece, the love of place that creates emotional attachments and motivates us to fight when the things we love and value are threatened. Tolkien expresses that oikophilia. But is it narrow-minded and suburban? I have shown how Tolkien contested the abstracting tendencies of the modern age. And I have also argued that climate change as a global problem requires global action for its solution. Does that entail a globalism that contradicts the commitment to oikophilia? Given our predicament, I say not – we live in a global world, and our actions vis the collective forces that govern that world need to be appropriate and commensurate in order to be effective. In Tolkien’s terms, that savours too much of fighting power with power for comfort, reproducing and reinforcing the very evil we are supposed to be contesting. 

For my part, I always qualify the case for concerted global action within a comprehensive framework by arguing that large scale ambitious projects initiated above can only succeed by being founded upon small-scale practical reasoning and a self-socialising communitarianism from below. And Tolkien? He would seem plainly to be on the side of communities of local resilience against commercialising, industrialising and globalising forces. But since that resistance has proven incapable of resisting encroachment, we are forced into more ambitious actions. 

Tolkien is actually not the narrow provincialist or suburbanite he is portrayed by some to be. In 1943, he complained to his son that ‘the bigger things get the smaller and duller or flatter the globe gets. It is getting to be all one blasted little provincial suburb.’ Tolkien’s oikophilia, then, does not idealise the small-scale community, still less project it globally upon the entire world. Tolkien, evidently, was against a false universalism and the ersatz globalisation of the ‘world in one city’ – something which gave us neither a genuine world nor a genuine city, only their fakes and substitutes.

Nor is Tolkien’s pastoralism narrow. As Gildor says to Frodo:

‘it is not your own Shire … Others dwelt here before hobbits were; and others will dwell here again when the hobbits are no more. The wide world is all about you: you can fence yourselves in, but you cannot for ever fence it out.’

Does that ring any bells with respect to nationalism and isolationism, the retreat behind the walls of the nation state to protect against the storms of a world mired in economic, political and ecological crisis? Think about what Tolkien is saying here: this is a call to humanity to abandon both its anthropocentrism as a biological entity and its nationalism and self-interest as a political entity. It is a call to reconfigure human self-interest in a much more expansive sense, in relation to human and non-human others and in relation to the planet as a whole. The hobbits live in a more-than-hobbit world, just as we live in a more-than-human world, a world that supports and sustains us. We are being called upon to appreciate that fact, and adjust our ways of living accordingly. And that call is grounded in the very oikophilia I have defended, but in a way that makes clear our commitment to other beings and bodies in the more-than-human world. The struggle for a world that is at peace begins with the love of place, but it does not end there. As Merry says:

‘It is best to love first what you are fitted to love, I suppose: you must start somewhere and have some roots, and the soil of the Shire is deep. Still there are things deeper and higher; and not a gaffer could tend his garden in what he calls peace but for them, whether he knows about them or not.’ 

Tolkien knew that oikophilia, pastoralist or otherwise, is not enough, and that if we are to succeed in protecting the places and people we love and value, we are called upon to engage in greater actions. My query about global action to address global problems, and the danger of using power to fight power, finds its answer here:

‘The Shire is not a haven, and the burden of the tale is that there are no havens in a world where evil is a reality. If you think you live in one, you are probably naïve like the early Frodo, and certainly vulnerable.’

A detailed rebuttal of the charge that ‘Tolkien is a Fascist’ (Fred Inglis) can be found in Patrick Curry’s Defending Middle-Earth. It’s a nonsense based on (wilful) ignorance and political prejudice. (Curry 2004: 36ff). I have no time for any of it, and hesitate to comment further. I’ll let others deal with the specifics, they don’t concern me. If I thought Tolkien was a Fascist, I’d be nowhere near his work – and nor would the millions who enjoy his work. I’m more interested in what the charge reveals about the rival conceptions of freedom at work.

To say the least, Tolkien was ‘very suspicious’ of ‘imperialistic nationalism’ (Curry 2004 38). And he ‘positively hated’ the technological modernism that was common to all strands of fascism, and particularly Nazism. ‘That antipathy is obvious throughout his works, down to the background detail of, say, the fall of Numenor (Tolkien’s Atlantis) through hubris, which consisted of both domestic political autocracy, including the suppression of dissent, and a foreign policy based on technological and military supremacy.’ (Curry 2004: 38-39). If you want it spelling out: Tolkien was against all these things, which are all too typical of modern geopolitics, and he was not a Fascist.

Moorcock’s Criticism
In 1978, Michael Moorcock made a number of charges against Tolkien in a piece entitled “Epic Pooh.” ‘I think he’s a crypto-fascist,’ says Moorcock. ‘In Tolkien, everyone’s in their place and happy to be there. We go there and back, to where we started. There’s no escape, nothing will ever change and nobody will ever break out of this well-­ordered world.’

I have heard these very same charges before with respect to Plato and all those influenced by Plato’s vision of a ‘well-tempered harmony.’ It is a vision I present myself in terms of attunement. And I have heard the same accusations levelled at Dante too, another figure I write on at length. And I think the criticisms originate in a very different conception of freedom, one that I consider to be superficial and misguided – liberty as licence to do what one wants. It’s a view that exalts individualism and hedonism but, paradoxically, results in an enslavement to empirical desire and necessity. I’ve criticised that view at length in my work, and refer people there. My view can be accused of proposing an internal totalitarianism, in turn, I accuse the libertarian view to expose each and all to the external totalitarianism of a collective anonymous force outside of democratic comprehension and control. Suffice to say, I consider Moorcock’s libertarianism to be a fake freedom that seduces at the level of immediate interests only to deliver us bound hand and foot to empirical necessity, enchained to physical desire. And that criticism doesn’t necessarily make me a conservative, let alone a reactionary. (And even if it did, the question would still be whether or not the argument was right). In After Theory, Terry Eagleton rightly emphasises that Marx well understood how desire can serve to enslave human beings under capitalism.

Moorcock continues with his assertions against Tolkien:

‘Lord of the Rings is outrageously conservative, sexist, and (above all else) anti-urban fascist. When Tolkien ranted about Hitler, he was protesting too much - because he was at war with the beast in himself... I'll never understand the 60s love affair with Tolkien. He wasn't an environmentalist (unfortunately), he was an anti-urban fascist. He stood for all the crap we hippies despise: Victorian virtue, national obligation, and Wagnerian racism. All this poison finds its way into Lord of the Rings.’

Well, that diatribe probably applies to me too – because I certainly reject the way that ‘we hippies’ like Moorcock claim to speak for freedom and environmentalism. And I do despise pretty much everything about the shabby intellectual standards displayed by this kind of rant. I do not believe that hippies are the arbiters of truth and morality, and I do not believe that hippiedom can supply any kind of benchmark for a viable society beyond a selfish hedonism and subjective libertarianism that very soon collapses into self-concern and a pandering to the oafish physical self. Moorcock perfectly expresses the selfish hippie view:





Words can’t express how pleased I am for Mr Moorcrock! So long as he has a nice view, then all is well in the world. What on earth is everyone complaining about? And it is indeed true that enough people have benefitted from the neoliberalism of the past few decades for them to close their eyes to the social and ecological costs. Give me virtue and obligation any day over such freedom. As for Moorcroft’s accusation that Tolkien subscribed to ‘Wagnerian racism’, it is repeated by others, but is plain wrong. The idea of a Wagnerian influence in Tolkien is absurd – ‘Both rings were round, and there the resemblance ceases,’ was Tolkien’s disdainful response.

If anyone is protesting too much here, then it is Moorcock. I’m not remotely impressed by his oppositional rhetoric – his view is merely the cultural wing of capitalism – a system of self-regard, self-interest and self-delusion. He has a vested interest in the politics of permanent protest – it saves ‘we hippies’ the task of coming together and staying together in the hard labour of constructive a viable alternative social order. I exempt those anarchists who are digging in where they live to resolidify social connections, those who stand in the tradition of Colin Ward and Communitas and such like. I just don’t like juvenile politics and flamboyant language and gestures. And I don’t like argument by caricature.






It’s the politics of permanent protest, a leftist indulgence that goes back an awful long way (Meister 1990). There should be nothing more surprising than that ‘we hippies’, the ‘beautiful people’ so in love with themselves in the 1960s, should have prepared the psychic ground for the ‘me’ generation of the 1980 and after. I can well believe such people would break out in a cold sweat at the mere mention of the words ‘virtue’, ‘obligation’, and at any notion of collective purpose and common commitment backed by work, effort, solidarity and sacrifice. Such words and principles hold no terror for me, still less the hard work of living in accordance with them. I’ll argue in unashamedly natural law terms that ‘being a person is a lifelong job.’ (Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, 1974, Beyond the New morality). 

Excuse my harsh words, but I consider such libertarianism to be the cultural wing of economic liberalism and supports a very self-regarding politics, indulgent and decadent and a positive menace to the politics of justice, equality and democracy. Of no help at all to the working people of the world. Of course such people see anyone talking about the public realm, virtue and obligation as ‘fascist’, all evidence to the contrary. In the same way that anti-government free-market libertarians see all regulation and law as an infringement on private property (corporate power). They are all of a piece as far as I’m concerned, in that the effect of their libertarianism is the same – the anarchy of the rich and powerful and the destruction of public purpose and common commitment.

Others join the assault, though. Neil Camberly sums up the attitude of egalitarian critics who have attacked The Lord of the Rings for being racist and fascist:

‘The films are "fascist"... They hold up beauty as something inherently good, and ugliness as something inherently bad. Their heroes are strong men and women of honor, decency and moral character. The films glorify ethnic collectivism and nationalism, self-sacrifice on behalf of one's biological community, and courage in the face of overwhelming odds and overbearing evil. Like the 20th century's fascist philosopher-kings, Tolkien's kings spend little time taking votes from their nervous soldiers and citizens over whether their kingdoms should perish with honor or perish with each man desperately trying to save his own skin. But most of all, the films earn their "fascist" credentials by clearly delineating good and evil in the tradition of Western literature's great adventure stories.’

I wonder if such critics have actually ever read Tolkien, as opposed to reading their own political categories into him. I want to give this stuff short shrift. I remember being a young teenage boy and shouting ‘fascist’ and ‘Hitler’ at any elderly adult who stood in the way of young people doing what they wanted to do. Camberly’s charge sheet is depressing to read, because it is so general, and doesn’t engage at all in any moral and philosophical depth. I waste far too much as it is responding to errant nonsense – argument by caricature and simplification, cheap shots, slogans, intellectual short-cuts and crude reductions, casual use of hackneyed vulgarizations, misinterpretation and false accusation. I’m interested in building a viable public community, building with firm principles and ideas. The criticisms they make of Tolkien here are no different to those that right-wing ideologues level against socialism and communism in the name of individual liberty. Each, any and every collective purpose can be condemned in these terms as an infringement on liberty. Well-tempered harmony as fascist, everything and everyone in its place? What on earth do you think the functional representation of Marx’s associated producers is about! Same with, for example, Gramsci’s citizen-producers or, frankly, any serious vision of a self-managed associative democracy or attempts to constitute what Gwyn Williams called ‘proletarian order.’ (Williams 1975). These ‘leftist’ libertarian critics are not politically serious – they have no idea how to constitute public order and a viable socialist economy. It’s a politics of permanent protest, rehearsing the defeats that are sure to come. They are cultural parasites on the public efforts of others, big on individual rights, but turn pale whenever anyone mentions duty and responsibility. And they run a mile if anyone tries to put a spade in their hand to get them to dig and do a real day’s work. The fake fantasy freedom these characters seduce others with plays right into the hands of those who present libertarianism in terms of untrammelled markets and private power, generating an external fascist constraint that falls on each and all. I don’t care how self-deluded they are, it is when their delusions spread over and start to mislead others that their effect becomes pernicious. So I make no apologies for my slight outburst of temper.

Tolkien was no fascist. Simple. And those who throw the term around with respect to any and all kinds of authority, obligation, morality and notions of public order are a positive menace to the building and rebuilding of public life. They devalue the terms of political debate, they advance a false notion of freedom, they denigrate public life, and weaken the public imagination. So forgive me the harsh words, because I treat such people with the contempt they deserve. Tolkien railed against Hitler, not because, as Camberly puts it, preposterously, he was ‘at war with the beast in himself’ but precisely because, with a belief in inherent good, he was ‘at war’ with the corruption and perversion of the good and the way that this issued in evil. And that belief in fighting for good against evil doesn’t make a person a fascist, whatever the context. In 1941 Tolkien expressed himself clearly enough in a letter to his son Michael, who served in an anti-aircraft role during the Battle of Britain, receiving the George Medal:





Unfortunately, there are far too many ruddy little ignoramuses in this world. A noble, northern spirit does not mean Nazi-fascist, and neither does inherent goodness, truth, virtue, and morality, nor a belief in authority and public order. That it does to some reveals more about their flabby and self-indulgent notions of liberty than it does about the things they criticise. Tolkien's themes are simple enough to be understood by all without political or cultural implication: courage in the face of hopeless odds; loyalty, trust and friendship; love of places, persons and things; being and doing good for goodness sake. Of course, the deeper point is that these things are not neutral, since moral characteristics are indeed bound up with social contexts and class relations. I’m steeped enough in Marxism to know that. And Tolkien is undoubtedly a conservative gentleman. We can treat those issues without resorting to demonization and caricature. I am looking at ideas and values without reducing them to political ideology. Which side are you on? What of the world outside of different political sides?

I’ve had the argument before with respect to the ideal that Dante presents in his work, the idea of a world ordered in accordance with a conception of the good in which everyone has a place and a role to perform, and everything is in its place. That could take an elitist and hierarchical turn, no doubt – but it could also adumbrate a functional representation and social democracy based on aptitudes and capacities and roles rather than subjective opinions and preferences. Failing to make the fine distinctions, it is easy to see why people could mistake any kind of ordered society proceeding according to some standard of the objective good could be construed as fascist. I’d just ask, as untrammelled greed, self-interest and individual choice is generating the collective constraint of climate change, how, with some kind of order and attunement, we are going to avoid ecological catastrophe? Here, the ‘hippie’ philosophy draws a complete blank. Mediation must take place, institutional questions cannot be evaded; politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and any gaps in organisation here will be filled by power, bureaucracy and vested interests.





Thank you for your letter ... I regret that I am not clear as to what you intend by arisch. I am not of Aryan extraction: that is Indo-iranian; as far as I am aware noone of my ancestors spoke Hindustani, Persian, Gypsy, or any related dialects. But if I am to understand that you are enquiring whether I am of Jewish origin, I can only reply that I regret that I appear to have no ancestors of that gifted people. My great-great-grandfather came to England in the eighteenth century from Germany: the main part of my descent is therefore purely English, and I am an English subject -- which should be sufficient. I have been accustomed, nonetheless, to regard my German name with pride, and continued to do so throughout the period of the late regrettable war, in which I served in the English army. I cannot, however, forbear to comment that if impertinent and irrelevant inquiries of this sort are to become the rule in matters of literature, then the time is not far distant when a German name will no longer be a source of pride.

Your enquiry is doubtless made in order to comply with the laws of your own country, but that this should be held to apply to the subjects of another state would be improper, even if it had (as it has not) any bearing whatsoever on the merits of my work or its sustainability for publication, of which you appear to have satisfied yourselves without reference to my Abstammung.

I trust you will find this reply satisfactory, and remain yours faithfully

J.R.R. Tolkien (Letter #30)	

That is clear and conclusive. 

As for this authoritarian and implicitly racialist division between good and evil, I’m not at all sure that Tolkien even considered orcs to be inherently evil. Further, it is clear that the problems with southrons and easterlings lie not in their race but in their acceptance of evil ideologies. With the defeat of Sauron, and the evil ideologies associated with him, the men of the west could make their peace with these groups. There is no racial division at work, only an ideological one. Miss that point, engage in false reduction, and of course you misinterpret what is being argued – people need to stop forcing arguments through their own politically prejudiced filters.

The only charge against Tolkien that I can see as having any substance is the charge of misogyny. 

‘How quickly an intelligent woman can be taught, grasp the teacher’s ideas, see his point—and how (with some exceptions) they can go no further, when they leave his hand, or when they cease to take a personal interest in him. It is their gift to be receptive, stimulated, fertilized (in many other matters than the physical) by the male.’

J.R.R. Tolkien, qtd. in Carpenter, The Inklings, 169.

It’s not a view I share, and not a view I would defend or explain away. It’s wrong. I think, given all the good things Tolkien offers, we can be generous here. Becca Segall Tarnas has the right response: ‘I do recognize that such sexist views are, in large part, a product of the time in which these men lived. Yet I also cannot help but feel their words with pain, and recognize the countless women whose voices have been silenced, again and again, by such mistaken and degrading beliefs. It is an injustice to recognize at once how much Tolkien and so many other male writers have shaped who I am through their words and imaginal creations, and then to know that they regarded ‘the female mind as inferior to the male.’ (Carpenter, The Inklings, 164). And the best way out of this pain is to identify, check and uproot an obvious injustice whilst continuing to respond positively to the imaginal creations and inspiring words, which is what Becca Segall Tarnas does in her work. 

I want to bring this section on the charges against Tolkien the reactionary, fascist, elitist, racist and sexist to a close, though, and return to developing Tolkien’s themes positively through substantive questions. There are too many ill-informed and ill-intended views being expressed here that reflect the modernist progressive predilections (prejudices) of the critic rather than any genuine engagement with the work criticised. 

Gwydion M. Williams takes Moorcock’s criticisms apart in the most emphatic terms. I don’t think Moorcock’s rant merited the length of rebuttal. But here it is: 

‘Defending Tolkien Against Michael Moorcock’s Condemnation: Cock-and-Bull about Epic Fantasy’ by Gwydion M. Williams
https://gwydionwilliams.com/my-science-fiction/defending-tolkien-against-michael-moorcocks-condemnation/ (​https:​/​​/​gwydionwilliams.com​/​my-science-fiction​/​defending-tolkien-against-michael-moorcocks-condemnation​/​​)







Patrick Curry asks how could so many otherwise intelligent critics be so slapdash, unfair and just plain wrong? 

‘First, let's notice that they are so in significantly similar ways. The specific charges against Tolkien and the values in whose name they are made make up a strong family resemblance, and I have suggested we call it modernism. Indeed, Williams's Marx, Jackson's Freud, Brooke-Roses's Saussure - these are among the very avatars of modernism, whose the "grand narratives" of modernity - secularised versions of divine revelation - were supposed to supply essentially complete accounts of our progress towards the realisation of the truth. But there have been too many broken promises by now, and too many terrible "successes". The human being has become a stranger not only to the cosmos and the Earth but to each other, and him- and herself. By now, "man himself has become, after God and nature, an anthropomorphism" (Schnadelbach 1992:314).’

Not Tolkien, but his radical and modernist critics who now seem reactionary, wedded to what we now know to be not only a false prospectus, but committed to a ‘progress’ that is sending us to a catastrophe of our own making. That ‘progress’ belongs to the past, to the history of misplaced hopes. As indeed will we be if we don’t call a halt.

‘Ironically, therefore, it is his critics who belong to the past, and Tolkien the future. It is they are nostalgic for the past, including their role as legislators (in Zygmunt Bauman's terms) rather than the interpreters they have become. Behind their instinctive antagonism lies an uncomfortable sense that here is a coherent fictional critique and alternative, in every major respect, to the exhausted myth of modernity which has so far underwritten their own professional status; and worse still, it is a popular one. Not for the first time, those who claim to speak for universal truth and reason are lagging behind "the people" whom they often claim to represent, and whose interests to know better than the people themselves.’


Divine Vision beyond Political Division
We live in a political world and are forever at risk at being drawn into political rivalry and conflict, becoming entangled in the divisions and controversies of political ideology. So which side is Tolkien on? And does coming to know Tolkien’s politics affect your understanding and appreciation of his work? 

Tolkien explains his political views thus:

‘I am not a “socialist” in any sense – being averse to “planning” (as must be plain) most of all because the “planners,” when they acquire power, become so bad – but I would not say that we had to suffer the malice of Sharkey and his Ruffians here. Though the spirit of ‘Isengard,’ if not of Mordor, is of course always cropping up. The present design of destroying Oxford in order to accommodate motor-cars is a case. But our chief adversary is a member of a “Tory” Government.’

Tolkien here was referring to the proposal in 1956 to put a ‘relief road’ through Christ Church Meadow – the familiar encroachment of the industrial system upon local place and people. 

Tolkien’s view is plain enough. I think it is mistaken. But I understand it. Socialism is not to be identified with ‘planning’ as such, and planning itself is not inherently bad and corrupting. I’ll put it simply, the incremental actions of human beings generate social consequences and forces that, without some form of collective control, exert an oppressive external force upon social life. Either we design a form of internal common restraint from within – some form of ‘planning’ embedded in a moral and social matrix – and thereby live consciously by ends which we have a hand in choosing; or we will be subject to external anonymous force, our lives determined by imperatives that lie outside of common control and comprehension. I don’t doubt that that is nothing less than a difficult question to answer institutionally, but answer it we must. The broad dismissal of planning on account of the tendency of power to corrupt is a non-answer, an evasion that leaves us exposed to the systemic constraint of anonymous and irresponsible collective force (‘you cannot buck the market.’)

But power is corrupting, and planning, like all human inventions and institutions, is subject to the social infrastructure within which it is set. That’s why we need a moral authority standing about power relations in time and place. All human powers can rebound upon their holders. I don’t take that as an argument against ‘planning’, mind, just a caution to undertake planning well and be ever-vigilant in its use. (I always like Pat Devine’s idea of ‘participatory planning’. (2002). 

Curry argues that Tolkien can be classed as an anarchist, libertarian and/or conservative, ‘not at all in the contemporary sense of the last (which has been almost entirely taken over by neo-liberalism), but in the sense of striving to conserve what is worth saving.’ I’d agree, except to point out that a blanket rejection of ‘planning’ is precisely one of the things that fired the neoliberalism reaction – with the use of government for the social good being dismissed as costly and ineffectual ‘dreams of utopia’ that turned into nightmares, and ‘bureaucrats’ being routinely blamed for the problems that they were struggling to deal with – problems created by the private economy and market forces. To reject planning and the use of government for social ends is, de facto, to be a neoliberal, it invites the neoliberal reaction. If we are seriously about conserving things of value, we need to get serious about ‘planning’ and public life.

Curry is correct to argue that none of the political categories applying to Tolkien ‘can easily be assimilated to either Left or Right, which is itself usually sufficient cause to be dismissed by those who like to have these things cut and dried.’ It is interesting that Tolkien doesn’t so much define himself politically in terms of what he is for as in terms of what he doesn’t stand for – he is not a socialist in any sense of the word. I am a socialist. But I can appreciate Tolkien’s work. And I think that’s an important point to make. We can appreciate a wide range of thinkers and artists and poets for what it is that they have to offer. And it is in that spirit I find that Tolkien has plenty to offer. Much more than people who divide the world according to political ideology. The ideologists are dull and uninteresting, you know their views once you know which side they are on.

The truth is that Tolkien is drawing on truths and standards that lie outside of the parameters of modern politics, and we shouldn’t try to make him fit. ‘In a consistently pre-modern way, Tolkien was neither liberal nor socialist, nor even necessarily democrat; but neither is there even a whiff of “blood and soil” fascism. In this, he contrasts strongly with modernists such as T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, D.H. Lawrence and Wyndham Lewis …’ (Curry 2004: 38-39).

The surest way to get Tolkien wrong is to approach him through a political filter. He is not a political writer. His concerns lie elsewhere. In the end, I think the controversy is all about the sacrificing of ideals, values and visions to the interests, conceits and deceits of political ideology.

Patrick Curry suggests that the political controversy in which Tolkien is embroiled here is due to ‘the richness and centrality of the natural world in Middle-earth (and not just pastoral nature).’ I think he has a point here. I have cited passages from Tolkien which present a message that whilst human beings may be the measurers of all things, they are not the measure of all things – there is a greater world outside of human beings, certainly a natural world that was here before the human species, and that will be here long after we have gone. As for other notions of the transcendent … a belief in God sees human beings as parts of a God-centred universe. With that message, humanity is enjoined to abandon notions of anthropocentrism and enter into unity with the other beings and bodies of the more-than-human world. Tolkien’s Middle-earth is outside notions of ‘progress’ and development and human interests and goals. This is no mere pastoralism but a distinctly ecological viewpoint. And it jars politically with that section of the Left which is committed to optimistic modernist ideas of ‘progress’ through scientific advance, technological innovation and economic development combined with strong governmental action and ambitious public programmes of social change. It depends what we mean and how it is done – but we live in the aftermath of state socialism and top-down programmes engineering change from the outside. Those committed to such a politics – whether in Stalinist or Social Democratic form – would no doubt find Tolkien an awkward customer. Politically, he is a plain nuisance in fact. 

As a socialist strongly committed to the reconstitution of public life, who argues for government as the pooling of the collective sovereignty of the people, and law as a legitimate constraint, codifying subjective recognition of objective truth, that we subject ourselves to in order to govern our common affairs with a view to the common good, I find the political controversy regretable. I don’t come to Tolkien for his big or high Politics, I come to him for the insight he offers into ‘little politics’, the supporting community and moral infrastructure that creates the conditions for doing politics well. He creates the connections making for a society of friends. And politics needs that, preventing the divisions in high politics from becoming entrenched and insurmountable. 

Patrick Curry makes an interesting suggestion that I warm to here:

‘Had Marxist socialism accepted William Morris’s generous offer to meet halfway (as E.P. Thompson put it), this tragedy would never have happened.’

I wholeheartedly agree with those words (whilst making the point that the offer needs to go both ways). E.P. Thompson is one of my favourite historians for the way he gets to the beating heart of human history in the actions, thoughts, visions, beliefs and motivations of the individuals who made history, the ‘ordinary’ folk rather than the ‘big’ names. History as lived experience. I love Thompson’s book on William Morris. He closes the final chapter with these words on Morris, words I wholeheartedly agree with:

‘The society of the future he saw not as a rupture of all continuities but as a resolution of past contradictions: it must grow out of the older positives in human labour, art and sociability.

"Intelligence enough to conceive, courage enough to will, power enough to compel. If our ideas of a new Society are anything more than a dream, these three qualities must animate the due effective majority of the working-people; and then, I say, the thing will be done." (Morris, "Communism", Works, XXIII, p. 270.)

The power is the power of the organized working class. The intelligence is their revolutionary theory, Marxism. The courage—that is a moral quality. And it is here, above all, that we need William Morris to-day. 

"Think of it a little!" he exclaimed in one of his lectures on Communism:

"What amount of wealth we should produce if we are all working cheerfully at producing the things that we all genuinely want; if all the intelligence, all the inventive power, all the inherited skill of handicraft, all the keen wit and insight, all the healthy bodily strength were engaged in doing this and nothing else, what a pile of wealth we should have! How would poverty be a word whose meaning we should have forgotten!   Believe me, there is nothing but the curse of inequality which forbids this." (Morris, 'Communism", Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 45331)





That’s my politics. And that’s my kind of socialism. And it involves much more than ‘planning’, whatever form it takes (democratic and participatory is my kind), and however important it may well be. Thompson writes that ‘the Romantic critique of industrial capitalism, the work of Ruskin and of Carlyle, assumes a new kind of significance in the light of Morris's transformation of the tradition.’ I think those words could also apply to my appreciation of Tolkien (I also appreciate Ruskin and Carlyle – and judging by Marx’s line in the Communist Manifesto referring to the reduction of human relations to the ‘nexus of callous cash payment’, so too did Marx – that line comes straight from Carlyle’s Past and Present from 1834). 

We need the vision of William Morris. Like Tolkien, William Morris spoke well of fellowship: 

‘So now I heard John Ball; how he lifted up his voice and said …

Ah, my brothers, what an evil doom is this, to be an outcast from the Church, to have none to love you and to speak with you, to be without fellowship! Forsooth, brothers, fellowship is heaven, and lack of fellowship is hell: fellowship is life, and lack of fellowship is death: and the deeds that ye do upon the earth, it is for fellowship's sake that ye do them, and the life that is in it, that shall live on and on for ever, and each one of you part of it, while many a man's life upon the earth from the earth shall wane….’

Morris’ famous words on John Ball’s speech are pertinent:

‘I pondered all these things, and how men fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they meant under another name …’

William Morris, A Dream of John Ball

We need, too, the generous approach of E.P. Thompson, whom Curry describes as ‘a passionate critic of economism and class reductionism, defender of William Blake’s mythos, and, perhaps not so coincidentally, a passionate gardener.’

I love Thompson’s book on William Blake too. And the conclusion to that book delivers some lessons to us with respect to the spirit of this piece:





No compromise. No Faustian bargains with the new gods/devils of the modern age. No complicity with the Megamachine – that’s clear the message. And it expresses an ethic that derives from ‘sources far older than the Enlightenment.’ It derives from sources outside of time and place, from a moral authority which stands about the politics, culture and institutions of time and place, enabling us to judge those things, hold them to account, and orient them towards truth, goodness and justice. In such way do we keep the ‘divine vision in time of trouble.’ 

That ‘time of trouble’ is upon us again. And our job is to keep the Divine Vision that helps people to recover clear sight and rediscover the sources of hope. Blake’s Jerusalem tells of the poet Los’ witness in ‘time of trouble’:

Therefore the Sons of Eden praise Urthona’s Spectre in Songs
Because he kept the Divine Vision in time of trouble.

Blake, Jerusalem, E 193, 255 (30: 14; 95: 19) (Samuel Foster Damon, A Blake Dictionary: The Ideas and Symbols of William Blake)

In her biography of Blake (1948), Mona Wilson associates Blake as poet-artist with Los. S. Foster Damon identifies Los with Urthona’s Spectre. Urthona is ‘Earth Owner.’ Keeping the Divine Vision in ‘time of trouble’ is subject of the Act of the Apostles, of Blake’s work in Jerusalem and elsewhere, and it is the task of the prophet, the visionary, the radical, the artist and the poet living through a time when the external trappings of life are in collision. 

Having written on both William Morris and William Blake (Critchley 2006; 2013), on St. Thomas Aquinas (2013) and Dante (2013), having studied Marx at doctoral level (2001), and, as a socialist who is penning this appreciation of J.R.R. Tolkien the lifelong Tory, I think I could count as one who has taken up the ‘generous offer’ to ‘meet halfway’, without thereby compromising either religious principle or revolutionary spirit. And I think it is the right way. It’s a difficult road to walk, with protagonists on either side trying to pull you back into the trenches to make clear and definitive political statements and speak manifesto speak. I like to roam the no-man’s land in the middle, to see if we can claim it as a common ground for each and all of us, whatever our lesser differences. It’s difficult. You suffer some bruising from those who want you on their side in the fight against the other side. But it’s possible. Bear in mind, behind all the heavy theory, strong principle, religion and talk of metaphysical reconstruction, I am an ardent admirer of that most sane, sober and generous-minded of all philosophers, Michel de Montaigne:

‘All legitimate intentions are temperate and equable of themselves; if otherwise, they degenerate into seditious and unlawful. This is it which makes me walk everywhere with my head erect, my face and my heart open. In truth, and I am not afraid to confess it, I should easily, in case of need, hold up one candle to St Michael and another to his dragon, like the old woman; I will follow the right side even to the fire, but exclusively, if I can.’

As a model for living, this statement cannot be bettered. And that’s the spirit I am trying to convey here in pointing to a vision that transcends political division. As Curry writes: E.P. Thompson ‘is one powerful reminder than in order to be progressive it is not helpful, let alone necessary, to adopt the po-faced dogma of materialist and rationalist modernism.’ (Curry 2004: 36). I’ll defend Morris’ aesthetic appreciation of the world, too, and Blake’s mythos; and I’ll potter about in nature and in my local community. And keep the Divine Vision in time of trouble. St Michael is fine, and he shall return later in the story. I’m less keen on St George. But I am fond of dragons.


This is me in the Dragon Snug at Cae Mabon, Snowdonia, the Welsh Shangri-la, a magical place. http://www.caemabon.co.uk/

And E.P. Thompson sounded like a man who was on good terms with Urthona, too. Here is his description of his garden on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday: 

‘there is: rasps, strawbs, red, white and black currants, worcester berries, wineberries, gooseberries, loganberries, lettuces, radishes, asparagus, tomatoes, globe artichokes, Jerusalem artichokes, marrow, cucumber, broad beans, peas, runner beans, french beans, rhubarb, cabbage, broccoli, carrots, leeks, spring onions, celery, CORN, apples, peaches, nectarines and weeds.’

This is the garden where Thompson found practical riches against ‘The Poverty of Theory’ and the failures of politics. And it is in this garden where he died on 28 August 1993. I remember it well. Three days before my birthday. His last book was posthumously published: Witness Against the Beast: William Blake and the Moral Law. I looked forward to it immensely, and it didn’t disappoint. Like Blake, Thompson kept the faith.

That’s my socialist tradition, that’s my ‘side’ in politics. It doesn’t put me off Tolkien. I see how he too ‘kept the Divine Vision in time of trouble.’ That gives his work a deep emotional, moral and intellectual pull. And I think it is that that lies behind the immense appeal of his work. If we are serious about social change, then we need to see what it is that can appeal to, enthuse and inspire so many people. 





9 Technology, Tragedy and the Small Hands that turn the wheels of the world
Tolkien’s anti-industrialism as anti-technology and progress?

There are anti-modern and anti-technology themes in Tolkien. Does this make him a reactionary? These themes are bound up with his rejection of industrialisation, urbanisation, militarisation and war. But even the charge of Tolkien being ‘anti-technology’ needs to be sharply qualified. As I argued earlier, technology is used in one form or another by all creatures throughout his tales. The good guys use it as much as the bad guys – they just use different technologies … and use them differently. Tolkien is clearly not against ‘technology’ as such, but the way it is designed and used by different groups with different intents and uses. His target here is the exploitative and abusive relation to people and places, a theme very familiar to anyone who has studied the enclosure of the commons and expropriation of common wealth through capitalist industrialization processes. His target, too, is militarisation. Any mobilisation for war is environmentally destructive. Hence Tolkien focuses on the levelling of the trees, pointing to the common practice of trees being cut down in the preparation for and fighting of wars. A war against people is a war against the environment.

Now let’s look at what Tolkien actually said about the ugliness of industrial society.

‘In Faerie one can indeed conceive of an ogre who possesses a castle hideous as a nightmare (for the evil of the ogre wills it so), but one cannot conceive of a house built with good purpose — an inn, a hostel for travellers, the hall of a virtuous and noble king — that is yet sickeningly ugly. At the present day it would be rash to hope to see one that was not — unless it was built before our time…Many stories out of the past have only become ‘escapist’ in their appeal through surviving from a time when men were as a rule delighted with the work of their hands into our time, when many men feel disgust with man-made things.’

Tolkien. The Monsters and the Critics and Other Essays. George Allen & Unwin 1983: 151

Tolkien’s criticisms are focused against the unnecessary ugliness inflicted upon the landscape by industrial society. His views could be taken to involve a total rejection of industrial society as such, but this is by no means clear (no more than Marx’s rejection of the uses to which technology is put within alienative and exploitative relations entailed the rejection of technology as such.) Tolkien did not reject technology as such, but appreciated different kinds of technology, and the different ways in which technology was used.

Leaving aside the fact that Tolkien was a philologist and a writer, not a politician or propagandist, and was not concerned to express his views on social and political matters in public, Gwydion Williams is surely correct to argue that Tolkien’s basic view — that useful things should not be ugly, and that beautiful things should not be destroyed — is quite compatible with a great range of social and political views. ‘Moorcock himself mentions William Morris, who was one of the pioneers of socialism in Britain, and who is claimed as a forerunner by most of the different varieties of anarchism, socialism and communism that exist today.’ I’ve referred to Jacques Ellul, Lewis Mumford, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx, quite an eclectic bunch. ‘A fondness for Tolkien need not imply a rejection of progress — it may or may not, depending on each individual’s viewpoint. Tolkien fans range all across the political spectrum, with various degrees of interest or indifference to current events.’ (Gwydion M. Williams
https://gwydionwilliams.com/my-science-fiction/defending-tolkien-against-michael-moorcocks-condemnation/ (​https:​/​​/​gwydionwilliams.com​/​my-science-fiction​/​defending-tolkien-against-michael-moorcocks-condemnation​/​​)

It is in that spirit that I have presented Tolkien here. There are no political axes being ground here. 

I think Tolkien’s views on technology bear closer analysis.

Williams argues that whilst a sense of tragedy was always a part of Tolkien’s make-up, importantly, ‘he refused ever to surrender to it.’ I will, in bringing this piece to a conclusion, examine Tolkien’s standpoint in terms of the dialectics of catastrophe and hope, pointing to our ability face great challenges in life, fight seemingly impossible odds and overcome seemingly insurmountable problems. I will return to this theme of active hope and a ‘hope without guarantees’ that we draw upon in ‘fighting the long defeat.’

First, tragedy and technology and hard road of rationalisation.

Tolkien, technology and tragedy
Tolkien expresses a pessimism with respect to industry and technology that possibly clouds the more nuanced views he develops in his work. This pessimism has its origins in his experiences during World War One. This was supposed to be the war to end all wars, but Tolkien lived to see a Second World War, ending with the development and use of the atomic bomb, revealing the human species as exponentially increasing its lethal power in relation to others and to nature through the use of industry and technology. 

‘When Tolkien spoke of tragedy, he knew what he was talking about. Life gave him a very rough ride during his early years. His father died when he was four. When he was eight, his mother was rejected by most of her relative after her conversion to Catholicism. (In those days there was a bitter cold war between Protestants and Catholics. Each side was likely to view the other side as doomed to damnation and hell). Then when he was only twelve, his mother died, leaving him orphaned…





In the end, the issue is not whether Tolkien himself, personally, is for or against industry and technology. That’s far too crude an approach. I hope to have demonstrated a far more nuanced approach at work, which in the end comes down neither for nor against ‘industry’ and ‘technology’ as such, but which sees both as mere abstractions when considered apart from specific social relations, practices and the way these shape the character and use of both. All beings are ‘industrious’; the question is whether art is present as a part of the real world, or separated from it as enemy and used against it antagonistically. The existence or non-existence of industry and technology is not the issue, nor whether these things are used at all – it is how they are used and to what end or purpose they are used that matters. And whether they are used for evil purposes or for great and good works depends upon the context within which industry and technology are set. That’s point I sought to establish by introducing Marx and Weber into the argument, and in making the case for the Orphic as against the Promethean approach.

To repeat a point made above with respect to Treebeard’s comments on Saruman’s plotting to become a Power, technology is neither good nor bad in itself, its character depends on its relation to power and nature and to the ends it serves. ‘He has a mind of metal and wheels’, Treebeard says, ‘and he does not care for growing things, except as far as they serve him for the moment.’ (Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers, II, iv, 76). That’s the criteria for evaluating industry and technology: the question is: does it care for natural growth, or does it serve external ends? Clearly, the evil of Saruman lies in the way he subordinates nature to his own ends and destroys ‘growing things.’ The right way is to respect natural ends and respect the diversity of peoples and lands, or to ends of personal aggrandizement.

The little people overcoming rationalisation






There is only one lord of the Ring, only one who can bend it to his will. And he does not share power!

—Gandalf speaking to Saruman, The Fellowship of The Ring

As a Maia, Saruman could not truly die. Instead, his spirit separated from his body and, as an incorporeal spirit, ought to have returned to the Halls of Mandos. However, implication is that he was barred, leaving his spirit naked, powerless and wandering, never to return from Middle-earth:





As Elrond says at the Council held in Rivendell that decides the fate of the Ring, 

‘Despair, or folly?' said Gandalf. 'It is not despair, for despair is only for those who see the end beyond all doubt. We do not. It is wisdom to recognize necessity, when all other courses have been weighed, though as folly it may appear to those who cling to false hope. Well, let folly be our cloak, a veil before the eyes of the Enemy! For he is very wise, and weighs all things to a nicety in the scales of his malice. But the only measure that he knows is desire, desire for power; and so he judges all hearts. Into his heart the thought will not enter that any will refuse it, that having the Ring we may seek to destroy it. If we seek this, we shall put him out of reckoning.' 
'At least for a while,' said Elrond. 'The road must be trod, but it will be very hard. And neither strength nor wisdom will carry us far upon it. This quest may be attempted by the weak with as much hope as the strong. Yet such is oft the course of deeds that move the wheels of the world: small hands do them because they must, while the eyes of the great are elsewhere.’

Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring, II, ii, 283

In the choice between hope and despair, we have to judge where folly lies – and recognise that real hope is not false hope, and not misplaced hope.

Keeping transcendent hope and vision alive under rationalisation
I have related these criticism through to insights drawn from Karl Marx and Max Weber. Weber is normally considered the bourgeois response to Marx’s radical critique, someone who poured cold critical water on notions of socialist transformation. Indeed, Weber considered socialism to be the culmination of the bureaucratising tendencies of the capital system rather than as a coherent response to them, referring to socialism as ‘housing of the new serfdom.’ Considered in the context of Tolkien’s devout Catholic, deeply conservative, Toryism, this all makes for a complicated situation.

The first point to be clear about is that Marx is surely correct to locate the problems we face not in some ahistorical Reason, or in ‘industry’ or ‘technology’ or any other form of human activity. These are mere abstractions considered apart from social relations. Marx thus directs us to an alienated system of production and the forms in which social labour is provided. The problem, and its solution, lies in these material life-processes. 
The second point is that whilst this systemic and structural analysis gives us a possible way out of our predicament, the idea of an emancipatory politics remains deeply problematic. I agree with Lewis Mumford’s argument that the idea that the Megamachine is all-powerful and unchallengeable is a myth that we have the power to see through and break through. I agree that we can refuse the bribe that the Machine offers. And I agree that we can uproot the alien forms through which our social activity, labour and sovereign power is encased and expressed. In locating the problem not in ‘reason’ as such but in alienated labour, Marx has an answer to Weber. But it is an answer pitched at a much higher level of critical understanding than many socialists have appreciated. A genuinely emancipatory transition and transformation beyond the capitalist Machine involves much more than changing the title deeds on property. The problem is that modern politics and economics is more implicated within a totalising nexus of estrangement than perhaps radical movements have understood, meaning that the road ahead is paved with temptations and compromises that pay so well in the immediate as to be hard to refuse. That has led to a tendency to withdraw from ‘global’ schemes and ‘grand narratives’, but that merely means that the actions undertaken will fall far short of what ‘global’ problems require. Terry Eagleton in After Theory notes that as capitalism has gone big with the globalisation of economic relations, the Left has started to think and act small. That is not an effective response to the scale of the problem and fails to get to grips with the capital system as a totalising social metabolic order of control and domination. The history of radical politics has shown a tendency for organisation and success to lead to an incorporation in which energies opposed to the capital system come to be diverted into its strengthening and reinforcement. 

Pope Francis warns: 
‘We have created new idols. The worship of the ancient golden calf has returned in a new and ruthless guise in the idolatry of money and the dictatorship of an impersonal economy lacking a truly human purpose.’ 

Marx formulates those idols as human powers taking alienated form through the way that capitalist social relations take human subjectivity and sociality and divert them to exploitative ends. Marx’s solution is the practical restitution of that power to its human creators and its reorganisation and exercise as social power. As a broad principled statement, that’s a good start and points us in the right direction. But it’s when we come to the organisation and institutional expression of that power that the tendency to realienation all too easily arises again. And from there, those engaged in the business of practical politics and economics have proved more than willing to strike Faustian bargains with Marx’s alien powers, Weber’s modern devils, Pope Francis’ new idols – it is more rewarding in the short run to bargain and compromise with the Megamachine than to fight it. 

None of this justifies the pessimistic conclusion that social transformation is an institutional impossibility and that we have reached the end of history; it does, however, demand that we cease to use words like ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’ in a lazy way, defined according to political prejudice and wishful thinking, and instead analyse these terms in such a way as to produce institutional and structural clarity. The problem with identifying the problem as ‘capitalism’ is that, unwittingly, radicals come to be drawn into social forms and economic institutions that are integral to the capital system, rather than engaging in the structural transformation of the social metabolic order. (Meszaros 1995: 17 494 606/7 718/20 725 728/9 733/734).

We need to end the sterile debate between capitalism and socialism by clarifying precise institutional and systemic forms and determining the terms on which material life-activity is to be conducted. This cannot be a reversion to the old political clash since, with anthropogenic global warming grace of the industrial heat machine produced by the capital system, the survival of human civilisation, even of the human species, is now in jeopardy. The political terrain needs to change accordingly. I’m not sure that Marx or Weber, even at their most gloomy, ever had even a foreboding that alienative relations appropriating and diverting social labour could possess such destructive potential. I know that Lewis Mumford suffered from regular bouts of pessimism: 

‘it seems to me that, on the basis of rational calculations, derived from what must admittedly be incomplete evidence, if the forces that now dominate us continue on their present path, they must lead to the collapse of the whole historical fabric, not just this or that great nation or empire’. 

‘I think in view of all that has happened in the last half century that it is likely the ship will sink’ he wrote (Mumford-Seidenberg Feb 18 1969 LMC). Despite his personal pessimism, Mumford continued to give grounds for hope in his published work. And his words are pertinent with respect to the arguments I have made above with respect to the long defeat, acting as if catastrophe is inevitable, hope, doom and despair: ‘If human life has no purpose and meaning, then the philosophy that proclaims this fact is even emptier than the situation it describes. If, on the other hand, there is more to man's fate and history than meets the eye, if the process as a whole has significance, then even the humblest life and the most insignificant organic function will participate in that ultimate meaning. (Mumford 1952: 61/62). 

As for Tolkien’s view, I will come to argue this point further in terms of acting out of a ‘hope without guarantees’, ‘fighting the long defeat’, and joining together in common cause, helping each other, making a stand on the things we love, cherish and value. In the process, we get glimpses of the ‘final victory,’ glimpses that strengthen our resolve, solidify our bonds and commitments, and spur us on until we change the odds against our victory into odds in favour.

In fighting this fight, we are up against not just Wraiths but the entire wraithing process that creates an entire nexus of social behaviour that normalises and routinizes evil. That breeds a tyranny and violence of abstraction to such an extent that it is often difficult to distinguish between good and bad, friend and foe. Earlier, I discussed Gil Elliot’s the Twentieth Century Book of the Dead, and the identification of death as ‘the central moral as well as material fact of our time.’ The ultimate measure of the overwhelming force of alienated power is no longer to be found in the total wars of the twentieth century, nor in the pervasive violence that organising and psychologically preparing for these wars has sunk into the institutional fabric, nor even in the nuclear warheads and the threat of nuclear annihilation. I could go on and analyse the economic system which eats up the entire world, encloses and commodifies nature, destabilises communities, bankrupts nations, and determines the lives of each and all with irresistible force. All of these things involve a form of human sacrifice to the modern idols of state control, military power, and economic growth, the totalizing powers which name, frame and ultimately claim the lives of each and all, people, places and even the planet itself. And that, in the most ultimate sense of all, is the true measure of the force of the alienated power that governs us – the fact that our own creative and productive power has taken alien form and now confronts us in the collective force of a climate crisis that threatens to engulf all life on earth. The tens of millions who have died as a result of total war in the past century are as nothing compared to the billions who will lose their lives with the climate induced collapse of civilisation standing on the horizon. Facing that prospect, it may seem anomalous to look backwards to past thinkers to find solutions to problems that confront us now. But I do think Marx posed the right questions. In The German Ideology, Marx asks: 

How is it that personal interests always develop, against the will of individuals, into class interests, into common interests which acquire independent existence in relation to the individual persons, and in their independence assume the form of general interests? How is it that as such they come into contradiction with actual individuals and in this contradiction, by which they are defined as general interests, they can be conceived by consciousness as ideal and even as religious, holy interests? How is it that in this process of private interests acquiring independent existence as class interests the personal behaviour of the individual is bound to undergo substantiation, alienation, and at the same time exists as a power independent of him and without him, created by intercourse, and becomes transformed into social relations, into a series of powers which determine and subordinate the individual, and which, therefore, appear in the imagination as "holy" powers?

Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 1999: 104

Whilst individuals proceed from themselves, as in methodological individualism, their actions are always in relation to others as relations of their material life-processes. Human behaviour is a social behaviour that generates a collective force that is more than the aggregate of incremental individual and particular actions, and, within alienative and exploitative relations, that force takes a social form that assumes an independent existence over against human agents. It has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that climate change is the result of ‘human activity’, but the problem with that general statement is that it doesn’t quite identify the problem, and so is inclined to mislead us in searching for a solution. Because it isn’t strictly accurate to blame ‘human activity’ for anthropogenic global warming and climate change; specifically, it is the actions of particular human beings within certain social relations that is to blame. Moreover, even analysis in such precise terms is insufficient. Because we are dealing with socially structured patterns of behaviour which lock individuals into activities which we know are having damaging environmental consequences. These consequences are ‘perversely wrought’ (Jared Diamond in Collapse) in that individuals act knowing that their actions, collectively, will issue in environmental degradation and destruction. That degradation and destruction is not their intention, but is the inevitable results of actions they have to perform to fulfil the requirements of their social positions. The source of this perversion is an alienated system of production and the turning of our own activities against us. Hence Marx’s concern with the question as to why the forces of our life-processes come to assume an independent common force that is superior to us, dominating us and, ultimately, threaten to destroy us.

Marx’s questions lead us to the capital system, for it is this enclosure, expropriation, mechanisation, quantification, and commodification of the world that is the problem before us. It is the capitalist social metabolic order that generates the forms of estrangement which give the economy its ‘irresistible force’ (Weber), which makes the mechanization and instrumentalisation of the world a seemingly inexorable process, and which gives the Megamachine its appearance of being an unassailable, all-encompassing, homogenising, levelling power. 

And, having reached this pessimism in face of overwhelming force, we remember the victories of the little folk in Tolkien’s tales, we remember the truth and the healthy, natural power of ‘growing things’, and we remember the hollowness of the One Ring and the delusions of its promises of power. And we remember that, in talking of ‘industry’, ‘technology’ and ‘mechanisation’, of ‘power’ in all the forms it may assume, we are really referring to our own forms of subjectivity and sociality, as Marx sought to establish. Weber’s modern devils and Pope Francis’ new idols are really human social powers in various alienated forms, and are therefore capable of being practically reappropriated by associating individuals committed to a cooperative commonwealth. 

But there is more to be said. Left here, there is a danger of substituting alienation for idolatry, inviting alienation from truth in other forms. In The Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx had to correct misrepresentations of his view. ‘Labour is not the source of all wealth,’ he argued. ‘Nature is just as much the source of use-values (and surely these are what make up material wealth!) as labour. Labour is itself only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labour power.’ (Marx CGP 1974: 341-42). All well and good. We need to set human activity in relation to the claims of nature and the other beings and bodies within the more-than-human nature that enfolds, nourishes and sustains us. That, I take, to be a Hobbit like existence, the natural anarchy and pacifism grounded in love of place that I take Tolkien to be affirming. 

But there is still more to be said. I take the Catholic grounds of Tolkien’s environmental vision seriously, as, indeed, did Tolkien himself. Tolkien warns that desire ‘may become possessive, clinging to the things made as “its own.”’ That’s a warning to us not to become so enamoured of our creative labours as to become in thrall to the means and the products of those labours. It is a warning against the ‘men as gods’ thesis, the idea that the world we live in is a self-made world and that history is the tale of human self-creation and final triumph over nature. That is precisely the view that Tolkien is concerned to challenge and uproot. That’s the Promethean view that sees nature as the enemy to be conquered, controlled and put to use for human ends. 

Tolkien thus criticises the situation in which ‘the sub-creator wishes to be the Lord and God of his private creation’, which amounts to rebellion against the laws of the Creator – and ‘especially against mortality.’ In conquering nature without, human beings come to pervert their own nature within, set it to false ends; in becoming as gods, humans become masters of a nowhere land. If we are to have a future at peace with the earth, at peace with others and at peace with ourselves, we need to cure ourselves of the obsession with unveiling the secrets of nature. And that is only possible if we are alive to the insights of philosophers of being, particularly Heidegger, but also Merleau-Ponty, and lose our anguish in face of living into mystery. 

As the modern world approaches its Promethean apotheosis in the form of climate crisis, the promise to finally ‘reveal’ the ‘secrets of nature’ has lost its allure. We have learned the hard way the truth of Wittgenstein’s statement: ‘Even when all the possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched.’ (Quoted in Des MacHale, Wisdom (London, 2002). We ought to have been addressing the key questions of being, meaning and living well together all along, instead of thinking that our knowledge of the external world and our technical know-how in transforming that world and making it satisfy our desires could have resolved those deep, existential questions.

We already know far too much than is good for us when we continue to avoid introspection in pursuit of self-knowledge; we are using the pursuit of knowledge – and control – of the external world as an excuse to evade coming to know ourselves, further estranging ourselves from the world and from our own being. 

In this respect, the choice that was once available between Promethean and Orphic approaches is no longer as generous in its possibilities as it once was. We have come to know too much, to have done too much and to have changed the world too much for that to be the case. With the Promethean approach becoming all-pervasive in the world, establishing forms of instrumental power, alien control and domination in all aspects of human life, the Orphic option is no longer the peacefully contemplative one of reverence and wonder but the disquieting one of horror, fear and lament. This revulsion signifies not a renunciation of Nature, but a recognition of what a disenchanted Promethean ‘humanity’ – that is, an exploitative, extractive, expropriating social system - has done to Nature, taking the art that is present in the ‘real primary world’, as Tolkien calls it, and employing it to external ends beyond natural purview to recreate Nature in monstrous form. I sometimes hear anthropogenic global warming and climate change presented as ‘the revenge of Nature’ upon disrespectful humans. As disrespectful as certain humans have undoubtedly been, this is false, and pathetically so – it betrays the very narcissistic human subjectivism that has brought us to this. Humans need to look at their own handiwork and identify it for what it is rather than shuffle off responsibility for the disturbance, destruction and death to come to Nature. In the end, we are confronted by the revanchism of alienated creativity, an alien nature that unveils the secret source of human misfortune.

Simple solutions and slogans to complex problems can generate support in the short-run, but can take us over the abyss, depriving us of a long-run. The right thing to do is the right thing to do. It's not so much 'complex' as difficult given the options available to us. We need to develop the means and mechanisms of effective action - political, organisational and psychological - and engage in just transitions that will inspire by power of example, draw people in, and take us down the long and winding road. It means following the nous instead of being led by the nose.


Local scale, proximity, the social commons and community resilience
In This Changes Everything, Naomi Klein (2014) examines the way in which the prevailing economic system involves humans in activities and patterns of behaviour that are ecologically damaging and destructive. 
The video trailer for the book concludes with the words: ‘change, or be changed, but make no mistake: This changes everything!’ The only options before us are radical. Either we come together in love and act consciously to change things for the better, or events will act upon us for the worst. That’s the choice before us, to be conscious and active in addressing the consequences of our actions and embracing change voluntarily or be subject to involuntary change of events passively and unconsciously. We have the power and, indeed, the duty to become active and conscious in embracing change as a moral imperative.

All over the world, people are campaigning, organizing and acting to protest and call a halt to planetary harm, engaging ever greater numbers of people in a system-wide transformational response to social and environmental crises we face. This mass activity points to the participation and movement required if we are to turn socially and ecologically unsustainable patterns of behaviour around and set organised life on another trajectory. Klein pays particular attention to the actions and movements of indigenous people:













We are witnessing the emergence of a local-global movement across the planet, a movement of concerned, active and informed eco-citizens who are seeking to align behaviours and actions with the contours of life, breaking with political ideologies and economic practices that depart from planetary realities. 
This new story expresses a cosmo-localism that serves to inspire, motivate and obligate human beings in the task of flourishing together. John D. Liu points to an emerging consciousness along these lines, something that goes beyond the immanence of biological beings to a profound spiritual ecology:

‘By valuing life higher than material things we are coming much closer to the spiritual teachings of all the world’s great religions. This understanding is the next level of evolution for human consciousness. But it is not simply a profound philosophical understanding, it is a practical way forward to rebalance the climate, to create meaningful employment, to fairly distribute affluence and create an abundant and sustainable civilization.’

 — John D. Liu (2014)

Tolkien’s words here point to an intimate knowledge gained from living in close relation to the lie of the land. It points to the need for proximity and appropriate scale. As Wendell Berry argues:

‘No amount of education can overcome the innate limits of human intelligence and responsibility. We are not smart enough or conscious enough or alert enough to work responsibly on a gigantic scale.’ 

— Wendell Berry, quoted in David W. Orr, Ecoliteracy – Education and the Transition to a Postmodern World, (State University of New York Press, 1992, page 29).

The need for collaboration, cooperation, and mutualism on the community scale is expressed by James Hillman when he emphasises that no one movement can restore the Earth, or call back the soul of the world: 

‘Ecology movements, futurism, feminism, urbanism, protest and disarmament, personal individuation, cannot alone save the world from the catastrophe inherent in our very idea of the world. They require a cosmological vision that saves the phenomenon “world” itself, a move in soul that goes beyond measures of expediency to the archetypal source of our world’s continuing peril: the fateful neglect, the repression of the anima mundi.’

Hillman, James. 2007 The Thought of the Heart and the Soul of the World, Putnam, CT: Spring Publications, Inc.

Becca Tarnas refers to those who hold a vision of the future health and harmony of the Earth as ‘imaginal ecologists’, working as ‘Imaginal cells’ in the manner of midwives aiding in the birthing, or re-birthing, of the Earth.





One sees here the emergence of a community of imaginal ecologists bringing about the planetary shift in vision needed to restore the soul of the world.

This view points to the appropriateness of size and scale, the importance of community and local resilience and the love of place, and the need to establish all these things in unison.

‘Evolution will require a more profound shift in how we meet our needs.
We must localize our energy, transportation, and resource consumption while creating a community that provides education and medicine for our future. To find this path we must serve as explorers seeking alternatives. To transition from the conventional paradigms, we need experiments with subsequent successes and failures. The community of people, local ecology, and mission-driven agenda of D Acres weave together to represent my attempt to undertake this challenge.’

Josh Trought , The Community-Scale Permaculture Farm


D Acres of New Hampshire has been challenging and expanding the commonly accepted notion of a farm for two decades now. In The Community-Scale Permaculture Farm, Josh Trought explains how the principles and practices of the D Acres project are grounded in the land, its inhabitants, and the joy inherent in collective empowerment.





I understand Tolkien’s rejection of ‘socialism’ and ‘planning’ in precisely these terms, as an argument in favour of local place, warm, affective ties and bonds and intimate knowledge. The critical point is that large, abstract, centralized systems claiming knowledge and the power to act from the outside through bureaucratic intervention are certain to fail, given the extent to which sustainability is specific to each particular locale or environment. A general approach across the scales cannot but be cumbersome. As Van der Ryn and Cowan argue, sustainability ‘will take endless forms, the very diversity of design possibilities helping to ensure that the whole patchwork quilt of technologies, cultures and values is sustainable. Bringing sustainability home is about growing a culture of sustainability that is suited to the particularities of place.’ (Sim Van der Ryn and Steward Cowan, Ecological Design, Island Press, 1996, page 63). In fine, Tolkien’s Elvic enchantment has the wisdom of emphasising an intimate knowledge that is a precious cultural resource that grows over time in a particular place. It is in this sense that we should make sense of his criticism of ‘socialism’ and ‘planning’, as large-scale centralized forms of intervention, regulation and control. We can make sense of that criticism in terms of ecological design:

‘Ecological design begins with the intimate knowledge of a particular place. Therefore, it is small-scale and direct, responsive to both local conditions and local people. If we are sensitive to the nuances of place, we can inhabit without destroying.’

— Van der Ryn and Cowan, 1996: 57

Inhabiting a place, in the sense of dwelling, is precisely the point, not managing and regulating it, improving it to make it better or meet external goals and objectives. That points to the importance of local scale, community resilience, and proximity in generating intimate knowledge. A culture of sustainable living, rather than ‘development’, is an organic growth over time that unfolds through a communal participatory process. It is an educative process that involves a change in behaviour on the part of all those involved. As David Orr argues, ecological design ‘requires a community of people applied to particular problems in a particular place over a long period of time.’ (David Orr, The Nature of Design, Oxford Uni. Press, 2002, page 9). He proceeds to argue:

‘At a local scale, people’s actions are known and so accountability tends to be high. Production is distributed throughout the community, which means that no one individual’s misfortune disrupts the whole. Employment, food, fuel, and recreation are mostly derived locally, which means that people are buffered somewhat from economic forces beyond their control. Similarly, the decentralisation of control means that the pathologies of large-scale administration are mostly absent. Moreover, being situated in a place for generations provides long memory of the place and hence its ecological possibilities and limits. There is a kind of long-term learning process that grows from intimate experience of a place over time.’

— David W. Orr, 2002: 10

Intimate knowledge, proximity and organic culture are thus premised upon the importance of place. Who we are and where we are are established through our relations to place. As the architect Christopher Day writes: 

‘Places are the outer framework within which we live our lives. The congruent wholeness or conflicting fragmentation of their sensory messages conveys their underlying individuality and works deeply in us.’

Christopher Day, Spirit and Place, Architectural Press, 2002, p 218 

Examining the reciprocal relationship between humans and the places they inhabit Day writes of the genius loci, the spirit of a place, that enables us to discern what is appropriate in any particular place. This is precisely what is meant by an organic culture as something that evolves, changes and grows over time:

‘Wholeness and integrity depend upon the place’s underlying, invisible ecology. Spirit-of-place is influenced by human thought and action: how places are used revered, un-valued or exploited affects them… Listening to a place’s past will tell us where it wants to go in the future: what it needs, what it can’t accept, what would be sustainable and what wouldn’t.’

— Christopher Day, 2002: 164

I particularly enjoy the work of writer and environmentalist Sigurd Olson. His work is for those who like to listen, who like the trees and the animals to talk to them, quietly in nature:

‘No greater challenge faces us than to preserve some places of quiet and beauty for the sanity of mankind.’

For those who like to listen, those who like the trees and animals to talk to them quietly … Sigurd Olson’s Singing Wilderness.

“Awareness is becoming acquainted with the environment, no matter where one happens to be. Man does not suddenly become aware or infused with wonder; it is something we are born with.” (Sigurd F. Olson).

We just need to use what we have. To listen with inward ears and see with inward eyes, to feel and be aware with our entire being.
“If we can change our priorities, achieve balance and understanding in our roles as human beings in a complex world, the coming era can well be that of a richer civilization, not its end.” (Sigurd F. Olson)

Turn down the noise of the built environment and learn the value of listening in nature.

“It was the time of quiet … This was the time for silence, for being in pace with the ancient rhythms of timelessness. The breathing of the lake, the slow growth of living things. Here the cosmos could be felt, and the true meaning of attunement…. That sense of oneness ..”

“In wilderness people can find the silence and the solitude and the noncivilized surroundings that can connect them once again to their evolutionary heritage, and through an experience of the eternal mystery, can give them a sense of the sacredness of all creation.”
- Sigurd F. Olson

The Singing Wilderness – Sigurd Olson documentary excerpt
‘We are missing the big picture.’ Here’s the reconnection.
https://vimeo.com/3708217 (​https:​/​​/​vimeo.com​/​3708217​)

Away from the distractions of civilised life, where you be yourself, where you could be – and this is important – quiet, and listen … and get in touch with true reality, the reality that we have lost touch with, but which remains deep within us. We reconnect with the big picture.

Sigurd’s Olson’s Listening Point

The Listening Point Foundation is dedicated to furthering Sigurd Olson’s legacy of wilderness education by publishing wilderness education materials and sponsoring wilderness educational programs.

“I named this place Listening Point because only when one comes to listen, only when one is aware and still, can things be seen and heard. Everyone has a listening point somewhere. It does not have to be in the north or close to the wilderness, but someplace of quiet where the universe can be contemplated with awe.”
- Sigurd F. Olson
http://listeningpointfoundation.org/ (​http:​/​​/​listeningpointfoundation.org​/​​)

Sigurd Olson’s approach enjoins us to listen to the particularities of place. That applies to culture and nature both, and has clear lessons for ecological design. Christopher Day thus sees place in the present as being formed by the past, arguing that ‘if we dismiss the old and only value the new and exciting, we devalue our present selves. For the past, its traditions and knowledge, heritage and continuum, embodies who we were, so how we’ve come to be as we are. Like wise if we only value the past, dismissing the future, we devalue everything that inspires us to make the world a better place — and more than this we deny life.’ (Day 2002: 162).

Day believes that we have to take both the wisdom of tradition, the intimate local knowledge of a place into account, as well as create visions for the future through a participatory approach to design. He writes:

‘The more participatory are processes of forming, changing and caring for places, the stronger will these be. Above all, and directly resulting from these, they must be places of beauty. Places so made imbue matter with spirit meaning. This alone can justify the environmental costs which all building, even the most eco-friendly, carries. Striving to do things this way moves beyond mere sustainability concerns — they become too integrated to separate out — to sustenance. Actions dedicated to human healing have influence on wider issues — healing our environment as well as ourselves.’

— Christopher Day, 2002: 237

As I pointed out earlier, Tolkien has been accused of expressing a narrow-minded localism. The same criticism is made against all those who argue for local scale and social proximity, for the expression and satisfaction of human needs within the boundaries of the local community. Such communalism and localism can be broadly, as well as narrowly, conceived. The argument here is for appropriateness in size and scale so as to enhance popular participation in the material life-processes of everyday exchange. It’s about bringing this exchange as close to home as possible, reducing abstraction by integrating the need of a particular local culture within the material and energy flows of the surrounding environment, reducing and even eliminating dependence upon distant ecological subsidies.

These points may be presented in terms of a cosmo-localism grounded in a love of place. Sustainable living is all about appropriate scale, social proximity and extensive participatory structures fostering responsible behaviour within sustainable communities networked on a global scale. Christopher Day shows how we can deal with the ambiguities of the local-global relation:

‘For better or worse, globalism is here to stay. Better and worse! Socially it’s broadening; culturally, enriching; but economically, disempowering — with the social (and cultural) consequences of being victim to global capital agendas. Global and local, though polarities, aren’t mutually exclusive. In our global world, the challenge is to be local, be in the place in which you are now. To re-find roots and anchor connections to place.’

— Christopher Day, 2002: 146

With respect to the ‘small hands that turn the wheels of the world’ and the reasoning at work in Tolkien’s idea of intimate knowledge and local scale, this article by Anna Coote at the New Economics Foundation is pertinent.

“The People, the Commons and the Public Realm: How can we take control of the resources we need to survive?”
http://neweconomics.org/2017/08/the-commons/ (​https:​/​​/​l.facebook.com​/​l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fneweconomics.org%2F2017%2F08%2Fthe-commons%2F&h=ATOeeNi-PpnEwwznaAoSKaow8elQNrMI8LLo2csJ3ZT-WofpNJmXmsAzQUSgcNmz5sHDAjPCKtrcrQXfkjC5zRaZEqK9GkYgswpCnhmOUnglCF3gFt0deayzF95ICVrNY56NycU4ppm-" \t "_blank​)

Coote concludes with the idea that: ‘Smaller cities and towns may be the best place to start building locally generated actions to share essential resources.’ This is precisely the argument I am making with respect to local scale, community resilience and ecological participation. This is to bring climate action within our reach, in a way that we can “own” solutions. 

‘There are two mutually reinforcing steps that can be taken. One is to build power among people to own and co-produce a story of the commons that gains real traction and helps to reframe politics for the coming decades. The other is to demonstrate and develop new ways of enabling people to define, claim and control essential resources so that everyone benefits from them. 
We can start by supporting local innovation, and by building on existing examples of shared control. Examples include parent-led childcare co-operatives, Bristol’s municipal energy company, shared land ownership in ‘garden cities’ such as Letchworth, and land owned by local authorities and the Crown Estates. Further examples are detailed in NEF papers on land reform (publication forthcoming) and the social commons.
We can also learn from ideas and initiatives that are closely linked to the commons, such as work around the foundational economy and social wealth funds.’

Not twenty miles from where I live is the village of Ashton Hayes, which involves the entire community in the aim of becoming England's first carbon neutral community. http://www.goingcarbonneutral.co.uk/ (​https:​/​​/​l.facebook.com​/​l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.goingcarbonneutral.co.uk%2F&h=ATMOcm-swQTcnd1eg90Vh5H7TnkfRL1xY9jBun4byqemHTd31Blm_w2vsxbLBoI_jRY6X-f9pf4mwaTKceg7TOKnC_JjC-eQZdFEWJivOFPvjo-Fg19cb3qRkFSXWHAOzSKocGtQRCx7" \t "_blank​)

If writing on Tolkien strikes people as being too conservative at a time when the twin social and environment crises demand radical changes, I can only emphasise that I do argue that we need a new economic system, a real materials/circular economy which uproots the accumulative dynamic driving exponential endless growth at source. And I do think that Tolkien has much to offer, in terms of what he actually writes, and with respect to moral ecology and literary ecology. To those who still object, I simply say it’s about how to create both new modalities and mentalities, how to foster appropriate habits of the heart within new social forms – and there are lessons to be learned in all kinds of places on this.

I do argue for concerted global action within a comprehensive framework. Big problems require big solutions, something that amounts to more than the sum of our lesser actions. That doesn't make me a rabid ‘globalist’ hooked on top-down statist or institutional solutions, as though solutions to our problems are exhausted by top-down actions and interventions abstracted from people and place. I am keenly concerned with the question of how to bring climate actions and solutions down to human dimensions, whilst still being effective and appropriate with respect to the scale of the problems we face. The global action we need is thus rooted in an ecological and moral socialisation, expressed through the provision of the collective means and mechanisms that enable individuals to respond to demands for action as well as through the motivational economy that moves people to respond within the form/s of the common life. In the process, we generate synergy from below as well as deliver it from above. Of course, that’s not a quick engineering or governmental fix – it is a civilisation change. But the result is all the more effective and enduring for that.

In discussing the people, the commons and the public realm, Coote asks how we are able to take control of the resources we need in order to survive. What does it mean in practical and institutional terms to place resources essential for human survival in the control of those who need them? Answering that question opens up issues far beyond a narrowly conceived localism, causing us to address the nature of ‘the commons’ and the popular democratic control of the resources that people rely upon in order to survive and flourish. This is far from a narrow and conservative concern. As Coote argues, the concept of the commons is a useful tool for progressive change-makers, challenging orthodox market economics and implying a new role for the state. ‘Whether we are concerned with land or wealth, or with water, energy, transport, fisheries, parks or libraries, the ‘commons’ enables us to think through a range of important issues, including ownership and control and the links between top-down and bottom-up politics.’ At a time when the old political certainties are disappearing, the ‘commons’ is gaining increasing relevance. ‘It draws on – and deepens – our understanding of universal human needs and the dynamics of wellbeing.’ In pointing to the systemic links between social, environmental and economic resources, the concept of the commons brings the nature, role and distribution of power to the fore. ‘It offers a framework for making decisions about access and distribution. It implies entitlements that are shared by all, and it offers a critique of some forms of private ownership.’ 

Coote considers that the concept of the commons offers a route towards sustainable development, which according to the 1987 Brundtland Report, means ‘meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’ I much prefer to frame this in terms of ‘sustainable living.’ We can achieve long-term sustainability only by defining the ‘commons’ in terms of securing the resources essential to present and future needs for the benefit of all.

Throughout, I have been concerned to emphasise local action, popular participation and practices and forms of organisation that foster a sense of personal and common ownership with respect to problems and solutions. Coote proceeds to identify a quality of the concept of the commons that is pertinent to this very theme. The commons, she argues, ‘makes sense to people outside ‘expert’ circles – it belongs to all whose lives depend on essential resources. People decide for themselves what the conditions are for a decent life.’ This is not anti-elitism, a blanket populist rejection of ‘experts,’ but a concern to establish the limits of rational knowledge and the reach and legitimacy of intimate knowledge. Coote is right to argue that whilst codified knowledge and professional expertise can inform and support the decisions that people take, it cannot determine them. This I take to be the truth behind Tolkien’s rejection of ‘socialism’ and ‘planning’, that is, to be a rejection of abstracted and centralized top-down systems of intervention, manipulation and control. Coote points to the need for a diversity of strategies in accordance with particular needs and environments. ‘What are considered essential resources and how these can be claimed will be established partly by where people live and what they decide they need. Strategies for managing the commons will vary from one kind of resource to another.’ 
The process of ‘commoning’ goes beyond markets and states, but retains a role for them. 

‘Where markets are concerned we can learn from current work developing models for a sharing economy, and from innovations in collaborative consumption, where value is attributed to people’s access and use of things, more than to ownership. Digital platforms can help to support these developments, as they have potential to transform relationships between producers and consumers.
Commoning calls for a new kind of ‘partner’ state, with which people can work to regulate for guaranteed access to essential resources, as well as standards, sustainability and fair distribution. It follows that new, stronger forms of participatory democracy are essential to transforming public institutions and holding them to account.’

This raises questions about duty, obligation and ‘who’s in’ with respect to contribution and involvement. Equal access to the commons needs to regulated, establishing membership and excluding ‘outsiders’ according to specific criteria. Here, Coote argues that two mutually reinforcing steps can be taken. ‘One is to build power among people to own and co-produce a story of the commons that gains real traction and helps to reframe politics for the coming decades. The other is to demonstrate and develop new ways of enabling people to define, claim and control essential resources so that everyone benefits from them.’ 

We make a start by supporting local innovation, and by building on existing examples of shared control. Coote gives a wealth of examples here, such as parent-led childcare co-operatives, Bristol’s municipal energy company, shared land ownership in ‘garden cities’ such as Letchworth, and land owned by local authorities and the Crown Estates. She concludes with the view that ‘smaller cities and towns may be the best place to start building locally generated actions to share essential resources.’ In truth, it’s not about small vs big, but appropriate scale. There is nothing narrow about a localism established on the basis of such appropriateness. On the contrary, it supports a thriving social commons in which all have a part to play and contributions to make.





This reappropriation and restructuring of power means rejecting the free-market narrative of ‘progress’ — the idea that constant economic growth with minimal government involvement is the only reliable way to advance freedom and improve well-being. Parties of government of both left and right persuasions have bought this myth of ‘progress’ and are therefore complicit in an exploitative and extractive political economy that, left unchecked, will kick the biosphere over the cliff and civilised life with it. Bollier is clear that the radical response to Trump’s reactionary politics should go much further than attempts to restore a long lost liberal normalcy and instead pursue a paradigm shift in radical thought, giving us a new vision for the future.

Bollier’s notion of a paradigm shift is integral to the search for a new story. Bollier puts the key existential questions that we now face: ‘Is continued economic growth compatible with efforts to address the urgent dangers of climate change? If not, what does this mean for restructuring capitalism and reorienting our lives? How can we reap the benefits of digital technologies and artificial intelligence without exacerbating unemployment, inequality, and social marginalization? And how shall we deal with the threats posed by global capital and right-wing nationalism to liberal democracy itself?’

In answering these questions, we will generate new modes of thought, action and organisation. Those who yearn for the restoration of liberal normalcy in the aftermath of the Trump administration are still failing to see the depth of the crisis we are involved in. The prevailing structures of government, law, and policy are not up to the job of delivering the answers to the questions we face. The failure to appreciate that point risks a reaction much worse than Trump in the future. Rather than trying to put the broken pieces of the failing old order back together, radicals need to develop ‘a new vision more suited to our times.’ As noted above, there is a wealth of projects already underway in the world which outline the contours of an equitable, eco-friendly, post-growth economy. Bollier laments the tendency for such projects to be treated as thought experiments for someone else to implement. He quotes the artist Jenny Holzer to good effect here: ‘action causes more trouble than thought.’ His point is that what we need now are ‘bold projects that attempt to demonstrate, rather than merely conceptualize, effective solutions.’
Whilst the challenges we face are great, Bollier is adamant that the solutions will not come from Washington. Whilst policy leadership and support at the federal level are required, ‘bureaucracies are risk-averse.’ The mainstream parties are wedded to a failing conventional political sphere and have little to offer. ‘It falls to the rest of us, then, to figure out a way to move forward.’

In emphasising what people have to offer, Bollier emphasises the new social economy and the emerging commons sector. It is on the periphery, far from the guarded sanctums of official power and respectable opinion, that the energy for effective and enduring change will originate. Whilst resources at the local level may be scarce, the potential for innovation is enormous: ‘Here one finds fewer big institutional reputations at stake, a greater openness to risk-taking, and an abundance of grassroots imagination and enthusiasm.’ Bollier thus identifies ‘the seeds of a new social economy are being germinated in neighborhoods and farmers’ fields, in community initiatives and on digital platforms.’

‘A variety of experimental projects, innovative organizations, and social movements are developing new types of local provisioning and self-governance systems. Aspiring to much more than another wave of incremental reform, most of these actors deliberately bypass conventional politics and policy. In piecemeal fashion, they unabashedly seek to develop the DNA for new types of postcapitalist social and economic institutions.’

Bollier calls this bricolage of projects and movements the ‘commons sector.’ It is a world of DIY experimentation and open-source ethics that doesn’t require coercion or profiteering to be kept together, but keeps itself together within through social collaboration, resourceful creativity, and sweat equity, often with the help of digital platforms. Bollier points to the fruits of this way of doing things in cooperatives, locally rooted food systems, alternative currencies, community land trusts, and much else. And he we see that localism, local scale and thinking ‘small’ are anything but narrow, but are rich, varied and expansive:

‘While these insurgent projects are fragmentary and do not constitute a movement in the traditional sense, they tend to share basic values and goals: production for household needs, not market profit; decision-making that is bottom-up, consensual, and decentralized; and stewardship of shared wealth for the long term. They reject the standard ideals of economic development and a return on shareholder investment, emphasizing instead community self-determination and the mutualization of benefits.’

Bollier is thus concerned to value the emerging forms of social economy and their political potential. That requires a new politics, given the extent to which established parties are hooked on the mainstream. He thus points to the climate-justice and transition-towns movements, deep ecological principles and wisdom traditions, and possibilities of a post-fossil-fuel economy, community-driven alternatives, and the work of the social-and-solidarity-economy (SSE) movement to build multi-stakeholder cooperatives for social services. And that points to anything but a narrow-minded localism. 

‘The commons sector goes beyond the orthodox approach to social change and justice, which tends to privilege individual rights and the redistribution of wealth via the tax system and government programs. Instead, the animating ideals of the commons are collective emancipation and the “pre-distribution” of benefits by giving people direct ownership and control over discrete chunks of land, water, infrastructure, housing, public space, and online services.’

Bollier proceeds to emphasise that sense of shared ownership of actions and solutions that comes with the social commons. I don’t doubt that, with these notions of local scale and action, I have come a long way from Tolkien’s own localism. I am not arguing that Tolkien argued for these things. I am arguing that they are quite compatible with his ‘intimate’ vision of local community overcoming the tyranny and violence of centralisation, bureaucratisation and abstraction. The social commons makes possible the local control and participation that fosters responsibility and encourages action.


‘With greater equity stakes and opportunities for self-governance, people are remarkably eager to contribute to their communities, whether local or digital. They welcome an escape from consumerism, exploitative markets, and remote bureaucracies. These sorts of local and regional experiments not only advance effective structural solutions at a time when national politics is dysfunctional; they also provide meaningful ways for ordinary people to become agents of change themselves.’

Commoning thus emerges as an effective strategy facilitating community reempowerment, responsibility and participation, restoring meaning and vitality to the places that have been hollowed out by external forces. Whilst political leadership and policy remains important, Bollier notes that many see conventional politics as ‘a rigged game that won’t yield the transformations needed.’ It is in this sense of structural and system transformations that Bollier makes the case for relocalization.

‘Relocalization strategies can also help reinvigorate democratic self-governance. Just as the rise of public-interest organizations in the 1970s propelled far-reaching changes, today our economic future is taking shape in new organizational forms. Innovative cooperative structures, pool-and-share projects, self-managed digital platforms, and collaborative global networks are changing the topography for pursuing social change.’

Bollier mentions here the platform cooperative, a socially constructive alternative which works with communities, workers, and consumers to share the gains, rather than using networking technologies to extract money from communities for the benefit of investors and speculators. ‘When community commitment and digital platforms come together, they often give rise to “cosmo-local” production, as Michel Bauwens of the P2P Foundation (​https:​/​​/​p2pfoundation.net​/​" \t "_blank​) calls it.’ ‘The rudiments of cosmo-local production are evident at fab labs (short for “fabrication laboratories”) and so-called hackerspaces—participatory communities of socially minded artists, designers, engineers, entrepreneurs, and techies who use computer-assisted tools to produce vanguard industrial designs.’

A series of small changes by small hands may seem insufficient to bring about the broad social transformations required to deal with the problems we face. It would seem clear that changing the micro-dynamics of organizations needs to be supplemented by structural transformation. Bollier, however, is adamant that transforming organizational systems and cultures on a small scale may be one of the most effective ways to bring about macro-change, the small changes summing to give us the great change we need. ‘Just as the microprocessor and the telecommunications network changed the inner dynamics of business, eventually transforming the global economy itself, the rise of self-organized governance and networked collaboration is opening up strategic opportunities on a larger scale.’

Whilst the ambition to abolish the capital system in favour of a new economic system may sound idealistic, naïve even, remarkable practical strides are being made. ‘Besides a range of relocalization strategies, a new sector of commons-based peer production has revolutionized software development, scientific research, academic publishing, education, and other fields by making their outputs legally and technically shareable.’ In developments such as these, we can see the emergence of a new social economy based on a thriving commons sector. Bollier is thus concerned to emphasise the profound political and economic implications of free and open-source software, Creative Commons licenses, citizen science, data commons, open educational resources, and open design and hardware. His view is that these developments point to the emergence of a new participatory sector, and that this sector will continue to grow by means of emulation and federation. However small, local, and unorthodox, however much the participants tend to stand outside of politics and policy, these developments are parts of a pulsating pluriverse of autonomous projects, each working diligently in its own separate sphere. And it is this may well come to fuel a true progressive revival. Designer Thomas Lommée captures the structural logic of postcapitalist movements and the generativity of the Internet in the statement that ‘the next big thing will be a lot of small things.’ 

New modalities and mentalities are emerging in this pluriverse, with swarms of self-selected individuals and projects emerging as serious actors capable of meeting the real needs of people in new ways. These new actors, and the projects they undertake, create, entrench and extend spaces for social deliberation and collaboration, curtailing and even subverting the attempts of markets and centralized bureaucracies to exercise total control and engineer dependencies that diminish creative human agency. In such a way do the ‘small hands’ strike a blow for a new politics scaled to human proportions and dimensions, deflating and disempowering the ‘big’ politics that have removed the world from human control and comprehension.

‘By enabling self-organized groups to bypass large institutions and formal systems of authority, and to set their own terms for establishing social trust and legitimacy, we enter the headwaters of a new kind of politics, one that is more accountable, decentralized, and human-scale. The substantive, local, and practical move to the fore, challenging the highly consolidated power structures and ideological posturing that have turned our national politics into a charade.’

The ‘big’ questions of politics remain, however. The problems we face in a global environment are great and thus demand thought and action of a similar scale. The solutions we advance must be commensurate to the scale of the problem we face. The many small, and often uncoordinated, actions undertaken by the small hands of the world need to sum to something greater and more substantial than their parts, otherwise the problems we face will get worse. Can these countless acts and projects scale up to the task we face? Bollier rejects that question for containing the false premise that some form of centralized management or hierarchical control is needed. He is adamant that ‘the new social economy will not be directed by a political headquarters or a federal program. That kind of control would kill it.’ By offering something for everyone, the participatory local economy will engage a diverse base of pragmatists, and will expand for that very reason. He thus quotes Silke Helfrich: 

‘Conservatives like the tendency of commons to promote responsibility and community; liberals are pleased with the focus on equality and basic social entitlement; libertarians like the emphasis on individual initiative; and leftists like the idea of limiting the scope of the market.’

To be sure, a constructive rapprochement with state power will have to be negotiated at some point, and in the meantime supportive laws and infrastructures would certainly help. But the success of the commons sector will hinge on the independent vitality of its projects, the integrity of its bottom-up participation, and the results it produces.




10 Fighting the long environmental defeat

Here is an essay that has caused something of a storm, raising questions of hope, despair, realism, alarmism. This nine-part, 7,300-word fatalistic essay by David Wallace-Wells opened a heated debate over hope, despair, climate catastrophe, doom, and what the most effective way of motivating action is. In the essay, Wallace-Wells gives us all the reasons why our worst climate fears may soon come to pass. ‘No matter how well-informed you are,’ Wallace-Wells writes, ‘you are surely not alarmed enough.’ Wallace-Wells mixes fantasy and reality to produce a nightmare outcome that is even more terrifying than we could have ever lucidly imagined.

The Uninhabitable Earth: Famine, economic collapse, a sun that cooks us: What climate change could wreak — sooner than you think.
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans.html (​http:​/​​/​nymag.com​/​daily​/​intelligencer​/​2017​/​07​/​climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans.html​)

The Uninhabitable Earth, Annotated Edition: The facts, research, and science behind the climate-change article that explored our planet’s worst-case scenarios.
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans-annotated.html (​http:​/​​/​nymag.com​/​daily​/​intelligencer​/​2017​/​07​/​climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans-annotated.html​)

To Value and to Worship

One of my most favourite books is Earth Rites: Fertility Practices in Pre-Industrial Britain by Janet and Colin Bord. It was published in 1982, and my copy is now somewhat battered and, in truth, falling apart. It has been well-read over the years. The book maps the wealth of ancient relics that dot the land that surrounds us. On family holidays to Anglesey, we would see the burial sites, mounds and standing stones. The effect was magical and inspiring. And I learned that that was precisely the intent. The people who built these sacred monuments also created a soft culture of country customs, and a folklore that touched deep into the human psyche. All of this activity expressed a passionate belief in the existence of powerful energy forces emanating from the living Earth, and that all life, including humans, is intrinsically connected to and enlivened by those forces. With scientific disenchantment rendering the world objectively valueless and inherently worthless, such beliefs are now dismissed as childish superstition. I find the word ‘worth’, as in the inherent worth of Nature and all beings and bodies, significant. The word derives from the old English ‘woerthership’, and correlates with worship. The inherent worth of a person, a place, a thing, therefore, points to a value that we worship. That notion of inherent worth of nature is central to the environmental movement. So what do we worship?

The disenchantment of the world has driven value and worth out. The term employed by Max Weber comes from Friedrich Schiller and what he called die Entgotterung der Nature. This is the de-divinization or, more accurately, the dis-godding of nature (Herman, 1981: 57). It is a disenchantment that denied Nature its inherent value, meaning and goodness, and made it available to humans to employ their technology upon nature, and use and exploit it with complete indifference to its inherent qualities in order to satisfy their desires (Toynbee 1974: 143-5; Passmore 1980: 10). 

The world is objectively valueless, and no one but big children, as Weber calls people like us, believe that there is an inherent meaning or worth in the world. The question as to what we worship is thus answered – our oafish selves and our self-made powers. In modern times, the ancient deities have given way to created gods, 'Logic' and 'Reason', in our more exalted self-image.

I return to an old theme of mine here, and make a point that I shall never tire of repeating – scientific knowledge and technological know-how give people the ability to act; they do not motivate people to want to act.

Scientists, Stop Thinking Explaining Science Will Fix Things: It won’t. Try this instead. By Tim Requarth
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2017/04/explaining_science_won_t_fix_information_illiteracy.html?utm_content=buffer2f767&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer (​http:​/​​/​www.slate.com​/​articles​/​health_and_science​/​science​/​2017​/​04​/​explaining_science_won_t_fix_information_illiteracy.html?utm_content=buffer2f767&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer​)

It’s about visions, values and virtues – as I’ve been saying for aeons. Hence the emphasise I place on the separation of the worlds of fact and value, the exaltation of a dominant form of rationality on the basis of the former, and the diminution of the latter as mere subjective preferences/opinions/value judgments – the disconnection at the heart of the rationalised world is not sustainable. 

We are finding, though, that it is not really Logic and Science and Reason that are the new gods at all – all those wonderful forces that flatter the human self-image - but ‘Capital’ and ‘Money’ and ‘Commodities’ and military might and technological tools and rockets and guns and other such impressively large and loud things. Rather than progressive, it all seems so inherently and hopelessly self-destructive, with absolutely no redeeming qualities. I find the whole clatter and bang of technological civilisation an intolerable strain on the nervous system. It’s all mechanical and miserable, utterly soulless, with no poetry, romance or imagination. A world without fairies, dwarves and dragons. 

And where on earth has Robin gone? 

Throughout late antiquity, the cry went out: ‘Great Pan is dead!’ Plutarch reported it in his ‘On the Failure of the Oracles.’





Having to choose between antiquity and modernity, poised on the brink of eco-catastrophe, it is modern dreams of progress that seem preposterous to me, not the idea of Earth energies. And ancient man and woman’s reverence for and preoccupation with the land – let’s call it a worship based on a belief in inherent worth - is a lesson to one and all at a time when economic imperatives are imposed over and above all things, at the expense of ecological degradation and destruction. And we don’t need strategies or rescue squads or environmental philosopher-kings or planetary engineers to clean the windows of the world to see what we have and get back to worshipping. Janet and Colin Bord’s book Earth Rites detailed how our pre-industrial ancestors worked and worshipped so as to channel the Earth's energies to the good of each and all as well as the entire planet. The book ends with an urgent call for the recovery of harmony between humans and Earth – and a warning. I had the book in 1982. And I noted the date given for the final decision which would make the Earth’s fate – ours, actually – clear.

‘It is becoming increasingly evident to many people that our currently unbalanced materialist attitudes to life are producing a spreading and deep-seated sickness in humanity. The technology which increasingly dominates our lives should in fact be one useful method among many which could be used to solve our problems, and individuals, instead of becoming ever more dependent upon authority as is happening now, should seek to develop their own innate abilities, take charge of their own lives, and find a more balanced and holistic way of life. We do not advocate a return to the past, even if that were possible, but we do suggest that humanity must try to rediscover the life-enhancing values which our ancestors understood and lived by.

There are some small, hopeful indications that this is happening. The movements towards a return to the land and self-sufficiency, organic cultivation of crops, vegetarian and wholefood diets, the practice of handicrafts, and the research being conducted into the production of energy from non-polluting and renewable sources such as sun, wind and water, all indicate a new and positive approach to the material problems of life. Also, the growing interest in eastern philosophies and the development of the new pagan movement indicate the increasing search for a valid and satisfying spiritual life. 





The person who really feels a need to reassess his or her own attitude to life will usually start from a profound distaste for the life attitudes which society presents as being worthy and admirable, and in the search for an alternative will be guided towards some of the 'new' ideas already mentioned.


Humanity is now faced with a choice of two paths. We can continue in our present mode of behaviour towards increasing physical and mental sickness and greater alienation from the planetary ethos and thus eventually destroy ourselves. Or there can be a radical reawakening to the realization that the health and vitality of our planet earth and the life forms upon her surface are intimately connected and that mankind has the innate power to influence his environment not only by physical but also by mental means. If these concepts were to be understood and followed, there would be a revolutionary change in everyone's behaviour. Many of the present concerns and activities of humanity would be seen as pointless, if not decidedly dangerous, and men and women would at last be free to devote their energies to the true purpose of their incarnation in this world.








Facing the Future in the Here and Now

The previous section placed the emphasis of getting in touch with earth energies for a good reason. The problems we face can be attributed to disconnection in one form or another. We have been separated from sources of life and meaning, and the result is threatening to deprive us of a future. The onset of environmental crisis, however, has the misfortune of identifying nature as an external threat, reinforcing the very idea of nature as an enemy that has brought us to the brink of collapse. Too much energy in climate activism is being dissipated in futile and abstract debates over the future, and whether we will have one at all, let alone one worth having. My argument for reconnection begins with reacquainting ourselves with earth energies, energies that give us a climate reality in the here and now. In his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel emphasised that ‘Man is essentially here and now.’ In The Age of Ecology, Joaquim Radkau delivers the lessons given by this insight: 

‘Man's relationship with nature can be made harmonious only if it is in harmony with human nature.





That’s a demand to put an end to calculations over likely future scenarios, debating in the abstract where the balance lies between the realistic and the delusional with respect to hope or despair, and start to live and act in the here and now.

In respect of the contemporary ecological crisis, philosopher Slavoj Zizek writes on our prospects for the future and what grounds we can have to hope:

We have to accept that, at the level of possibilities, our future is doomed, the catastrophe will take place, it is our destiny—and, then, on the background of this acceptance, we should mobilize ourselves to perform the act that will change destiny itself by inserting a new possibility into the past.

Slavoj Zizek, “Nature and Its Discontents,” SubStance 37:3 (2008): 68





Tim Beshara writes of ‘Tolkien’s inspiration for climate advocates.’ He begins his argument with a lament in face of the hard facts we are facing on climate change.

‘Sometimes I wish I didn't know as much about climate change as I do. For my entire professional life, I have been obliged to stay up-to-date with advances in climate science, as well as every intricacy of political manoeuvring in relation to climate policy. I would sleep much better if I had never paid any attention to it.
You see, I don't reckon we are winning. And if you pressed me into looking forward and objectively considering if we are likely to deal with climate change before it is too late I would say, 'Nup, we are stuffed.'

The facts, by any reckoning, do not augur well for the future. And political controversy over misunderstandings that seem all too ideological and inevitable in a world of social division does not help lighten the pervasive sense of doom. I’ve been mired in feckless debate over the Paris climate agreement. I’ve criticised it as falling far short of the 2C threshold, beyond which lies climate catastrophe, I’ve criticised the 2C target as unsafe in any case, condemning millions to pain, misery, death and destruction. I’ve also defended Paris against those climate problems/solutions deniers who work hard to dissemble, deceive, obstruct and undermine any kind of global climate agreement. I’ve praised the Paris accord as an attempt at collaborative global action designed to appeal to all parties of good will to unite and step up efforts to address the problem of climate change. And I have expressed contempt for the U.S. withdrawal, the forces behind it and those who support it. In the process, I’ve been accused of everything from being a fervent globalist imposing top-down solutions in the name of a new world order – by right-wing ideologues and anarchists both - to being an anarchist engaging merely in small-scale reasoning to being a true denier in that I still hold that we can act to stave off runaway climate change rather than admitting it is already too late to being a doomster for pointing out the numbers on the hard climate realities we face. A critic of Paris and a defender of Paris and climate agreement, I’ve been accused of everything from being an apologist of a bad agreement to being a saboteur of the best agreement we have. That’s the problem of politics and perceptions, the world changes according to which way people see it and see you. Politics, you see, complicates realities, so that we end up wasting time – and dissipating energies - debating the shape of the shadows cast on the wall, rather than fixing our eyes firmly on the fire and the fire-makers. How many legs does a dog have if you count a tail as a leg? 

My answers to these conundrums are here:
Peter Critchley, The Climate Commitment, 
https://www.academia.edu/33416412/The_Climate_Commitment_The_Need_for_Common_Agreement_and_Climate_Action_Comments_on_the_U.S._withdrawal_from_the_Paris_Climate_Accord (​https:​/​​/​www.academia.edu​/​33416412​/​The_Climate_Commitment_The_Need_for_Common_Agreement_and_Climate_Action_Comments_on_the_U.S._withdrawal_from_the_Paris_Climate_Accord​)

We know that the pledges made by all the countries who are party to the Paris Agreement are not enough to keep us within the 2C target. The plain facts are that we need a sharp reduction in emissions and quickly if we are to have any chance of meeting that target. That points to a de-growth strategy that is considered an impossible political sell. So we get technological workarounds – negative emissions technology – which are unproven at scale. Add the fact that the world's climate is more sensitive to carbon pollution than we had thought, with positive feedbacks kicking in, melting ice, rising sea levels, floods, droughts, fires, famine … I’ll not go on. We have plenty of research which shows that climate fear and alarm produce paralysis and apathy. I’d recommend the work of Per Espen Stoknes here.
Moral Concern and Earthcare, http://pcritchley2.wixsite.com/beingandplace/single-post/2015/07/12/Moral-Concern-and-Earthcare

Stop scaring people about climate change. It doesn’t work.
http://grist.org/climate-energy/stop-scaring-people-about-climate-change-it-doesnt-work/ (​http:​/​​/​grist.org​/​climate-energy​/​stop-scaring-people-about-climate-change-it-doesnt-work​/​​)

‘Trying to scare people into action usually backfires. Instead, share radical hope that a better world is possible’ - Greenpeace International

We know when we present a problem as so calamitous as to be unsolvable that people prefer to look away. This isn’t a denial of the scientific facts so much as a psychological denial, a defence mechanism protecting against harsh, seemingly unalterable realities. ‘This is why environmental groups are so keen to talk up the successes of renewables and to focus debate on local binary issues like whether the Adani coal mine should go ahead. So we are left with this dichotomy where on one hand the situation is so dire, but on the other hand if we want anything to get any better we can't communicate openly about how dire it really is.’ 

Tim Beshara resolves the issue by turning to hobbits … 
By this, Beshara refers specifically to two themes delineated by JRR Tolkien in The Lord of the Rings.

The first theme is what Tolkien called 'the long defeat'. 

‘This is the idea that so often in the world you find yourself fighting for a cause where there is very little chance of success, but you fight for it anyway because it is the right thing to do and because you can't imagine doing anything else. In The Lord of the Rings this sentiment appears time and time again, whether it is the folly of sending two hobbits alone into enemy territory and thinking it will work out well, or the many occasions the heroes of the story rode out into battle against superior numbers.’

In the periods of calm between the battles, the protagonists would ponder the question as to whether there was any good reason to hope, and whether any such reason or its absence made any difference to their mission. Sometimes they would think that there was no hope, other times they’d think that there was some hope. But mostly they would determine to carry on regardless, because it was the right thing to do, whatever the calculations of the odds for future success or failure. In that sense, debating whether or not there grounds for hope served to galvanise action rather than paralyse it. And that kept the protagonists acting, it kept them keeping on keeping on, until, one day … who knows …

This brings us to the second theme, which Tolkien described as ‘eucatastrophe,’ a sudden and unexpected change of fortune for the better… 

‘To Tolkien, eucatastrophe could only come about if you had faced up to the inevitability of 'the long defeat' and soldiered on regardless.’

Tolkien traced these twin themes of 'the long defeat' and eucatastrophe in folk tales, in history and in Christianity. For Bashara, these themes help us to deal with the crisis in the climate system as an existential crisis.

‘In “the long defeat” climate activists can ground themselves in the enormity of the task we face. When sharing war stories among ourselves we can acknowledge our struggles and it should not dissuade us from keeping on fighting, it should bind us together in the struggle. But when communicating outward we can focus on how our struggles keep alive the chance of success. I don't know what the eucatastrophe for resolving climate change might be; a technological breakthrough perhaps, or maybe even an outbreak of global political will to fix it, but I know without the ongoing slog of day-to-day climate activism we won't be in a position for these miracles to happen.’

There is an excellent quote here from Raymond Williams’ Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism: ‘To be truly radical is to make hope possible, rather than despair convincing.’ 





More words along these lines.




‘Progressive change has never happened without bold ideas championed by bold idealists.
Some thought it was quixotic to try for civil rights and voting rights. Some viewed it as naïve to think we could end the Vietnam War. Some said it was unrealistic to push for the Environmental Protection Act.

But time and again we’ve learned that important public goals can be achieved – if the public is mobilized behind them. And time and again such mobilization has depended on the energies and enthusiasm of young people combined with the determination and tenacity of the rest.

If we don’t aim high we have no chance of hitting the target, and no hope of mobilizing that enthusiasm and determination.’

We don’t know that we will succeed if we try, but we do know that we will fail if we don’t. We can never know for certain that the catastrophe on the horizon is inevitable, so to that extent, then, despair is unwarranted: there is always reason to hope. That has been the lesson running through this piece with respect to ‘fighting the long defeat.’ The facts on global warming and climate charge are not encouraging and promise a bleak future in the absence of substantial, appropriate, effective and precipitous action. Middle-Earth faced its doom in a similar way. 
Standing on the brink of ruination. Pippin asks Gandalf: 

“Tell me,” he said, “is there any hope? For Frodo, I mean; or at least mostly for Frodo.”
Gandalf put his hand on Pippin’s head. “There never was much hope,” he answered. “Just a fool’s hope.”

Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King, V, iv, 88

But, as I have argued – and shown with respect to presenting the full quote here in context – there is more than this going on, ‘there is always hope.’ And in acting on that hope to fight the long defeat we get glimpses of final victory, and those glimpses grow stronger and clearer.

As Zizek expresses the point, ‘against the background of this acceptance’ of our inevitable doom, we have to ‘mobilize ourselves to perform the act which will change destiny itself and thereby insert a new possibility into the past. Paradoxically, the only way to prevent disaster is to accept it as inevitable. For Badiou too, the time of the fidelity to an event is the future antérieur: overtaking oneself vis-à-vis the future, one acts now as if the future one wants to bring about were already here.’ (Zizek 2009: 151). Against the assumption that the catastrophe we fear has already happened, we make the melancholic choice that leads us ‘in and down’ into the dark heart of a doomed world, to act as if it were possible to stave off defeat. We are charged with the responsibility to confront the darkness and face the future head on, however it may turn out.

Tolkien and the Long Defeat
https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/tolkien-and-the-long-defeat (​https:​/​​/​www.thegospelcoalition.org​/​article​/​tolkien-and-the-long-defeat​)

The long defeat is a crucial theme in The Lord of the Rings, introduced in Galadriel’s speech about Celeborn when the Fellowship is passing through Lothlórien:

‘For the Lord of the Galadrim [Celeborn] is accounted the wisest of the Elves of Middle-earth, and a giver of gifts beyond the power of kings. He has dwelt in the West since the days of dawn, and I have dwelt with him years uncounted; for ere the fall of Nargothrond or Gondolin I passed over the mountains, and together through ages of the world we have fought the long defeat.’

The theme is introduced earlier in the book by Elrond: ‘I have seen three ages in the West of the world, and many defeats, and many fruitless victories.’ (“The Council of Elrond”).

The long defeat is one of the final stories from the Middle-earth. The wars and struggles have run their course, and the feats of heroism have brought us to this, the elven queen, Arwen, returning to die alone in the fading heart of the elven country, a place once filled with vitality and effervescence but now a ruin. The elves have come to their end and now leave the world to the rule of man.

‘together through ages of the world we have fought the long defeat.’

These words evoke all kinds of thoughts and images of the human story, certainly as a story of human civilisation as an advance that takes us further and further away from a golden age lost forever. It makes sense, too, in terms of a descent into ecological self-destruction. Removed further and further from our biological matrix, human beings have come to imprison themselves in a world of their own making, subservient to its institutional and systemic imperatives and regularities rather than living in accordance with natural and moral ends. That’s a tale of self-made man coming undone in his self-made social world, suppressing nature as he masters it, his own included. It ends in ruination. (Kingdon 1993). But those in touch with the natural and moral heart of the matter have no option to fight until the end.

To long to plead, yet fear to voice a breath, 
In ruin of all hope to hope all things 




Tolkien didn’t so much create Middle-earth as discover it. The Shire exists deep in the psyche as memory of our true home, a place we love, long to return to, and fight to protect, against its inevitable loss. 

So why fight if defeat is inevitable? Because the struggle is about much more than calculating the odds of success or failure, and about much more than the possession of power. It’s simply the right thing to do. So elven maids fall in love with humans at the cost of their immortality, hobbits spare their tormentors out of a simple sense of mercy, and men march into war as a sacrificial decoy. All who fight do so out of what Tolkien calls ‘hope without guarantees.’

Galadriel and the Long Defeat

The elves, who are immortal unless they are killed in Middle-Earth, have fought and defeated evil for thousands of years, only to see it return time and again. No matter how often it is defeated, no matter how spectacular the victory, in Middle Earth evil will always keep coming back. As one evil falls, another rises to take its place. The forces of good must therefore be vigilant and be prepared to fight against an ever-resurgent evil.





One evil falls and another rises. 

If evil is destined to return, and all our struggles are doomed to defeat, why do we keep on fighting? Why do we press on regardless? The more pointed moral question is how Galadriel is able to refuse Frodo’s offer of the Ring, resisting the temptation of its power and pressing on for goodness sake. This brings us to the heart of the moral predicament with which Tolkien deals concerning the normalisation of evil and finding the resources within to resist it. Why do we carry on? In The Two Towers, Sam answers the question well in his journey with Frodo to Mount Doom, in the midst of their unlikely mission to save Middle-earth. In despair, Frodo says he can no longer carry on:

‘It’s like in the great stories Mr. Frodo. Full of dark and danger they were. And sometimes you didn’t want to know the end, because how could the end be happy? How could the world go back to the way it was when so much bad happened? But in the end, it's only a passing thing, this shadow. Even darkness must pass. A new day will come. And when the sun shines it will shine out the clearer. Those were the stories that stayed with you, and meant something, even if you were too small to understand why. But I think, Mr. Frodo, I do understand. I know now. Folk in those stories had lots of chances of turning back only they didn’t, they kept going, because they were holding on to something... That there’s some good in this world, Mister Frodo. And it’s worth fighting for.’

It’s a hope that comes without guarantees. But it’s hope all the same. And a hope grounded in ‘something’ real and substantial, and which has us pressing on for good. As mortals, humans and Hobbits have a perspective focused on immediate events. Elves, however, experience every joy and sorrow of the earth first-hand. Galadriel’s immortality gives her a long view of history. And she drew hope from the knowledge that, having beaten evil back before, it could be beaten again, and again, and that, one day, wars would cease and a new earth be born. A new earth that redeems all the goodness of the old. 

The little folk who fight the long defeat
Never underestimate the extraordinary capacities of the ‘ordinary folk’, the hobbits, the elven folk, the dwarves, the ‘little people’ of lore and legend! They exist in folk memory for a reason.

Tolkien makes the tritest of observations the profoundest wisdom. This ‘keep on keeping’ on is an active hope that finds a reason for living beyond rational calculation. I write on character and character-construction a lot, as well as on creating capabilities in the manner of Martha Nussbaum. (2011). I argue for the formation of character as being every bit as important as the informing of heads, more important, actually. There’s a need to be cautious here, lest the approach come to sound like being sent to the moral gymnasium to body-build ourselves into the right character. It’s not my intention to be so personally exacting. Tolkien is good at showing that human beings can act courageously, even though they may not have courage. You don’t have to be a hero to act heroically; and acting regardless of prospects for success is a form of heroism. Tolkien doesn’t give us a world of heroes with extraordinary powers delivering the inevitable and obligatory happy endings. He gave us little folk who, with courage and faith, acted despite not knowing the outcomes of their actions, living into the future, people who were able to carry on living into an uncertain future by continually finding hope in seemingly hopeless situations. 

This is most apparent in the poignant thoughts and actions of the elves in The Lord of the Rings. The elves have been fighting what Galadriel calls the ‘Long Defeat’, and they have carried on fighting throughout the last few thousand years knowing they will be defeated in the end, and will carry on until that they are finally defeated. It takes real courage to carry on when there is no hope for a final victory or a happy ending, not even a glimpse or a promise of a possibly favourable outcome, however unlikely. It is in the darkest points in the life that the eye begins to see things clearly. When you touch bottom and prospects look bleak, the wake-up call within is sounded and you reach inside yourself to find something which enables you to face the situation, that something you never even knew you had. There is real courage in coming to make the effort to carry on regardless, fighting on against seemingly impossible odds, not being overwhelmed by the forces confronting you, but fighting on, knowing that one day you will lose.

So why do we do it? Because it is the right thing to do, because it is the only authentic way to be, and because, as beings intimately attached to the things we protect, we can do no other. 

‘There is some good in this world, and it's worth fighting for.’
― J.R.R. Tolkien, The Two Towers

It’s in fighting for that good that we live it. In the end, it is a question of being in an active sense. Tolkien has been described as a pessimistic person. I don’t think that the categories of optimism and pessimism capture his fundamental message well at all. I don’t think they are helpful categories generally. Tolkien offers what he calls a ‘hope without guarantees.’ And it is that ‘without guarantees’ that gives us the key. There are no certainties here to buttress optimism and pessimism, to justify action or inaction out of a knowledge of how the future is going to turn out. No one can know with that level of certainty. Despair is therefore not just a theological sin, but an error, because in an endlessly creative universe, no one can know the future with any certainty (which is a key theme of Stuart Kauffman’s Reinventing the Sacred 2009). It is the easiest thing in the world to despair when we are confronted by overwhelming forces, but false claims to knowledge and certainty induce us to foreclose the ending out of despair. I take Tolkien to be saying that there is always hope, and that the story is brought to a premature end short of its true ending. There’s a depth and an undercurrent to Tolkien’s story that makes it an enduring one. A hope without guarantees is still a hope rather than a despair. No one can foreclose on life out of a certain knowledge of what is to come. Because no one has that knowledge or can have that knowledge. I can’t tell you what’s going to happen, I don’t know what’s going to happen, Galadriel tells Frodo directly. 

Rather than being a simple struggle for the triumph of good against evil, this is a tale of fighting to protect the things we love and value in the world, either to their end or to our own. It’s about loving and valuing persons and places and being ready to fight with all that we have to protect them.

‘War must be, while we defend our lives against a destroyer who would devour all; but I do not love the bright sword for its sharpness, nor the arrow for its swiftness, nor the warrior for his glory. I love only that which they defend.’

― J.R.R. Tolkien, The Two Towers

Fighting the long defeat against the forces of progress
https://blogs.ancientfaith.com/glory2godforallthings/2014/07/15/tolkiens-long-defeat/ (​https:​/​​/​blogs.ancientfaith.com​/​glory2godforallthings​/​2014​/​07​/​15​/​tolkiens-long-defeat​/​​)

The idea of history as a ‘long defeat’ repudiates the narrative of ‘progress’ that is embedded in the story of civilisation. It is a notion that directly challenges the central dynamic of modernity, the constant revolutionising of the conditions of life with a view to making things better. A belief in ‘progress’ and a worship of its instruments as idols – economic growth, technological change, state power, military might – is written into the existential fabric of the modern world. Things are always getting ‘better and better.’ No wonder that there is so much psychological as well as institutional resistance to the idea of a climate crisis capable of inducing eco-catastrophe and civilizational collapse – it contradicts everything we have been taught to believe about modernity. The idea of a long defeat is an anti-modern heresy that reveals the nature and the depth of true religion. The crisis in the climate system is a paradigm crisis in that it contradicts the dominant organising and motivating theme in modern culture, the idea that things will always get better. Younger generations are having to come to terms with the notion that they can expect to be worse off than past generations. And that amounts to a paradigm shift which undermines progressive thought.

But these judgments beg the question: better and worse off in terms of what? That question is easily answered in simple material terms. If we fail to stave off unmitigated climate change, the future for billions is bleak. But the question bears deeper examination. Materialism goes much deeper than this, once we frame it in biological, ecological and anthropological terms. And a moral examination has us focusing on the qualitative aspects of wealth and prosperity more than the quantitative. Placing the emphasis on those aspects would constitute an authentic growth, a growth that restores natural goodness on this good Earth. The ‘long defeat’ could become a new awakening that brings us back to our senses:

As I shall show, Tolkien’s ‘long defeat’, his ‘hope without guarantees’, has a Christian warrant. Here are the answers to the questions I posed in a recent article with respect to the evidence that the human species is irredeemably rapacious, vicious, competitive and greedy, doomed to be fighting ‘constant battles’ until it finally annihilates itself. 
Peter Critchley, The Peace of a Good God: Or, the Hope that transcends Constant Battles 
http://pcritchley2.wixsite.com/beingandplace/single-post/2017/06/13/The-Peace-of-a-Good-God (​http:​/​​/​pcritchley2.wixsite.com​/​beingandplace​/​single-post​/​2017​/​06​/​13​/​The-Peace-of-a-Good-God​)

The questions I put in that essay are serious questions. If life is all merely ‘constant battles’, then why do we bother fighting? Is it mere survival? To what end? Survival for the sake of survival hardly serves to satisfy the cosmic human longing for meaning. So maybe that longing is mere delusion, along with the belief in a good God who has made a good earth. I doubt biologists would be too worried about my questions. There’s no point to the game of life other than staying in the game until, like 99% of all species that have ever existed, the human species too goes extinct. In which case, enjoy life while you have it. It’s a miracle you are alive in the first place. Life is a gift, so treasure it. The problem with those who waste their time with money and power is that they make their pursuit and possession of those things our concern too. These ‘constant battles’ keep stealing our time and our joy, absorbing our energies, bringing our efforts to find meaning to nought. So we are charged with having to find a common solution to the problems caused by the delusions of some. 

We have seen too much and done too much to be able to accept life’s invitation to the dance too easily. ‘How could the world go back to the way it was when so much bad happened?’ 

Progress? In a letter to Henry Osborn Taylor in 1905, Henry Adams wrote:

‘At the present rate of progression since 1600, it will not need another century or half century to tip thought upside down. Law, in that case, would disappear as theory or a priori principle and give place to force. Morality would become police. Explosives would reach cosmic violence. Disintegration would overcome integration.’

Many thought the First World War the absolute depth to which the human species could fall. This would be ‘the war to end war.’ It wasn’t. The Second World War caused even greater death and destruction. The ‘war to end all wars’ turned out to be the parent of all subsequent conflicts, fought with ever more deadly weaponry, physical and mental. A century that ought to have delivered on all the technological promises of progress brought evils that eclipsed all other centuries. The events of the 20th century are amongst the worst in human history in terms of scale and intensity, and have left a deep mark on the modern psyche: ‘the most terrible century in Western history’, said Isaiah Berlin. Rene Dumont (agronomist, ecologist, France): 'I see it only as a century of massacres and wars.' William Golding (Nobel Laureate, writer, Britain): 'I can't help thinking that this has been the most violent century in human history.' Yehudi Menuhin (musician, Britain): 'If I had to sum up the twentieth century, I would say that it raised the greatest hopes ever conceived by humanity, and destroyed all illusions and ideals.'

Marx had a sharp eye on modernity as the best of times/worst of times all along:

‘On the one hand, there have started into life industrial and scientific forces which no epoch of former human history had ever suspected. On the other hand, there exist symptoms of decay, far surpassing the horrors recorded of the latter times of the Roman empire. In our days everything seems pregnant with its contrary. Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving-and overworking it. The new-fangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want. The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character. At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force. This antagonism between modern industry and science on the one hand, modern misery and dissolution on the other hand; this antagonism between the productive powers and the social relations of our epoch is a fact, palpable, overwhelming, and not to be controverted. Some parties may wail over it; others may wish to get rid of modern arts, in order to get rid of modern conflicts. Or they may imagine that so signal a progress in industry wants to be completed by as signal a regress in politics. On our part, we do not mistake the shape of the shrewd spirit that continues to mark all these contradictions. We know that to work well the new-fangled forces of society, they only want to be mastered by new-fangled men - and such are the working men. They are as much the invention of modern time as machinery itself. In the signs that bewilder the middle class, the aristocracy and the poor prophets of regression, we do recognize our brave friend, Robin Goodfellow, the old mole that can work in the earth so fast, that worthy pioneer - the Revolution.’

Marx, Speech at the Anniversary of the People's Paper AB SE 1973

‘Well worked, old mole!’, as Marx wrote in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Robin Goodfellow, also known as Puck, is a nature sprite, demon, or fairy. The Old English ‘puce’ refers to is a kind of half-tamed woodland spirit. The term pixie is in origin a diminutive of puck (compared to Swedish word ‘pyske’ meaning ‘small fairy’. ‘Robin Goodfellow’ or ‘Hobgoblin’, in which ‘Hob’ may substitute for ‘Rob’ or may simply refer to the ‘goblin of the hearth’ or hob. 
‘Those that Hob-goblin call you, and sweet Puck, / You do their work, and they shall have good luck’ said one of William Shakespeare's fairies. Puck replies:

Thou speakest aright;
I am that merry wanderer of the night.
I jest to Oberon, and make him smile.
-- A Midsummer Night's Dream, Act II, scene i

And speaking of hobs and hobgoblins, Tolkien's most famous creations the hobbits must be close relations - the Bagginses, Gamgees, Tooks and Brandybucks, all of them. Judging by the popularity of Tolkien's 20th century novels, and the 21st century films inspired by them, Puck or Robin Goodfellow has a long and exciting future ahead of him. I am most approving! I keep on the good side of the fairy folk.

With respect to war, means of production have been converted into means of destruction, resources that could have been devoted to securing the foundations of sustainable living for all people the world over have been given over to war and preparation for war, sustaining a death-dealing business- and politics-as-usual. A complete waste, and a betrayal.

The wars of the world continue. Always for a good reason, always for a just cause. It’s always the fault of the other side. We could easily have peace, if only the other side would see we are right. We haven’t learned that on this planet there are no others. We have been fighting the long war. May God forgive us, and may we learn to curtail our arrogance and pride (‘boasters, proud’…) by recognising the deeper truth at the heart of the long defeat. Pope Francis is right when he says that we have war because we have not being serious in learning the way of peace; we need to make compassion and nonviolence essential elements in our way of life. He calls for Nonviolence as a style of politics for peace: 

‘To act in this way means to choose solidarity as a way of making history and building friendship in society. Active nonviolence is a way of showing that unity is truly more powerful and more fruitful than conflict. Everything in the world is inter-connected.’





‘I pledge the assistance of the Church in every effort to build peace through active and creative nonviolence. On 1 January 2017, the new Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development will begin its work. It will help the Church to promote in an ever more effective way “the inestimable goods of justice, peace, and the care of creation” and concern for “migrants, those in need, the sick, the excluded and marginalized, the imprisoned and the unemployed, as well as victims of armed conflict, natural disasters, and all forms of slavery and torture”. (Apostolic Letter issued Motu Proprio instituting the Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development, 17 August 2016.) Every such response, however modest, helps to build a world free of violence, the first step towards justice and peace.’

“All of us want peace. Many people build it day by day through small gestures and acts; many of them are suffering, yet patiently persevere in their efforts to be peacemakers”. (Regina Coeli, Bethlehem, 25 May 2014.) In 2017, may we dedicate ourselves prayerfully and actively to banishing violence from our hearts, words and deeds, and to becoming nonviolent people and to building nonviolent communities that care for our common home. “Nothing is impossible if we turn to God in prayer. Everyone can be an artisan of peace”. (Appeal, Assisi, 20 September 2016.)

Words I support. Words I would expect to hear from any Christian – and from the adherent of all religions - when confronted with the assertion that ‘constant battles’ is all that a species designed for aggression, competition and conflict are fit for. I’ll not list the evidence that the human species is nasty and brutish and, if it carries on along these lines, its span on earth will be short, you can see it on the news every day. The norm or the exception? A permanent or remediable feature? War, terror, shooting, knife crime, drug wars, sex crimes, and the ideological and physical violence of racism, sexism, homophobia, hatred of anything and anyone different. The wars abroad are expressions of wars at home, a self-hatred that comes to be projected on others. History is my first degree. I’ve seen it all, seen the nations rise and fall, seen the slaughter-bench that Hegel writes of. There’s no depravity that is beyond human beings. But, like Tolkien, I refuse to surrender to the despair. Because that’s only part of the whole story, and is far from being the best part.

Some thought that the First World War was horror enough to end all war. It wasn’t. With the invention of the atom bomb, Adam’s dire prophecy of cosmic violence was fulfilled, turning all standards upside down. The world now has a $1.7 trillion arms budget. That represents a waste of resources, resources that could be better allocated putting the world on the basis of sustainable living. But it represents more than that, the normalisation of evil. Means of production have been turned into means of destruction, ensuring self-destruction in short time if not checked. Law, in this case, has disappeared as a priori principle and given way to force; morality has become police. Such was Adams’ prediction of the consequences of cosmic violence. ‘Disintegration would overcome integration’, he predicted. The threat of unmitigated climate change and anthropogenic global warming contains a potential to unleash a cosmic violence that would devastate human civilisation – disintegration as a planetary unravelling. That would be the destruction of law and morality, but not their disappearance. That a priori law and morality that Adams warned would give place to force is a warning that applies to time and place only. Cosmic hope lies in the existence of this law and morality as transcendent truths and norms outside of time and place. And that cosmic hope trumps the cosmic violence that certain humans in a particular time and place have inflicted upon the earth.

‘But if I had spoken sooner, it would not have lessened your desire, or made it easier to resist. On the contrary! No, the burned hand teaches best. After that advice about fire goes to the heart.’

The climate crisis we are facing today is an existential crisis. We hear that claim often enough. But what does it mean? Global warming and climate change are the consequence of the industrial heat machine we have built to conquer nature and serve our material interests. This is a fire that goes right to the heart not merely of the social system, but of social relationships and, further, to the human character. The crisis in the climate system is the expression of a crisis in the way we organise our exchange with nature and with each other, indicating that there is something awry in ‘the relationship between human beings and the whole of creation.’ (Pope John Paul II, Peace with God the Creator, Peace with All of Creation). Pope John Paul II calls the contemporary ecological crisis a ‘moral problem’:

‘When man turns his back on the Creator's plan, he provokes a disorder which has inevitable repercussions on the rest of the created order. If man is not at peace with God, then earth itself cannot be at peace: "Therefore the land mourns and all who dwell in it languish, and also the beasts of the field and the birds of the air and even the fish of the sea are taken away" (Hos 4:3).

The profound sense that the earth is "suffering" is also shared by those who do not profess our faith in God. Indeed, the increasing devastation of the world of nature is apparent to all. It results from the behaviour of people who show a callous disregard for the hidden, yet perceivable requirements of the order and harmony which govern nature itself.





Tolkien had seen the degradation of the environment in terms of the harm that industrial expansion and urban sprawl had done to the land, and he very much saw it as a moral crisis at the heart of the world. For him, the root of this crisis lay in the fact that people could no longer distinguish between good and evil but instead acted out of routine. This was the source of the evil in the world, people who no longer sought to understand what was going on, acting in accordance with that understanding. 

So how could people resist the normalisation of evil in an institutional order that proceeds ‘without regard for persons’ and their deliberations and choices? Tolkien’s Hobbit morality affirmed the capacity of individuals caught up in the Machine to affirm the humanity through a focus upon the little things.

The Lord of the Rings is about one war for the fate of the world, and deals with a very simple good vs. evil binary, but these are things we face every day. Some go off to defend their countries in physical wars, but the evils of oppression and injustice are still very much alive as well. And it is that transcendent source of moral behaviour and account that is the subject of this piece.

The long defeat, progress, and hope
The statement that ‘we have fought the long defeat’ can certainly appear fatalistic, more a resigned acceptance that life is a failure of all hopes than a life-affirming principle. There is no doubt that Tolkien, who lost all his close friends in the First World War, possessed a tendency to pessimism. However, ‘the long defeat’ possesses a deeper and more expansive meaning than any mere pessimism with respect to life and its possibilities. Tolkien’s Middle-Earth is a world that is in decline. The down the Middle-Earth timeline we go, the more unhappy the times become. But the point of ‘the long defeat’ is not that our efforts are futile and our hopes are doomed to be dashed, that life is pointless. 
We can, in despair, read events that way. But the important thing to see in this statement is not the defeat, but the fight; that is the life principle that checks tendencies to despair through a transcendent hope and love. Try to remember … without a hurt, the heart is hollow. You know the song. Fighting the long defeat is not about winning victories that protect our hearts from pain and suffering, nor about being resigned to indifference through despair. These are the twin reefs we need to avoid by taking the right path. It is not so much the fact of the final defeat that matters so much as ‘fighting the long defeat.’ That active struggle for the things we value and love is a lifelong preparation for the unapologetic embrace of a law and morality that stands outside of time and place. 

In the very least, the willingness to keep fighting is a tacit affirmation of values and truths that transcend immediate empirical facts. And here we see that the protagonists in the Lord of the Rings put everything on the line and throw their whole heart and soul into the struggle. Everything they hold dear is at stake, the people and places they love, everything they hold true and which know to be right. They long to preserve these things and are prepared to sacrifice themselves for their protection. That’s some love. That’s the love that impels Boromir to courageously fight off hordes of orcs in an attempt to protect two young hobbits captured and carried off by orcs. Without success. Mortally wounded, dying on the border of his homeland, Boromir's last words were ‘Farewell, Aragorn! Go to Minas Tirith and save my people! I have failed.’ And even knowing his efforts to be doomed, he would do the same again. That’s not failure. There is a peculiar flavour to the morality at work here. We see it again in King Theoden’s seemingly hopeless charge at the Battle of the Pelennor Fields. 
“Little hope there is of living out this night.” 
“Perhaps,” said a new, rather gruff voice. “But we shall fight and die as men of Rohan.” 
“They say that it is hopeless.”
“There is always hope.”

There is always hope. The words rang in my head and seemed to give me a vital strength…
There is always hope, I told myself silently. Hope for Rohan; even if we die, even if the fortress is taken. Somehow, there is hope.’

We are beyond rational calculations of the odds for and against success or failure, actions undertaken with a view to the satisfaction of self-interest. Tolkien’s strange morality transcends the utilitarian spirit of the age, and is delivered not through some towering legalistic or moral edifice – the hazard of a natural law presentation – but through actual characters and what they do, whose acts are living testament to inherent goodness. No proof given, and none required. The protagonists commit themselves to seemingly hopeless courses of action for no reason that it is the right thing to do. The hobbits even show mercy to their tormenters, when they surely must have known that such pity and forgiveness of injury would backfire against them. As Tolkien writes in a letter:

‘any prudent person would have told Frodo that Gollum would certainly betray him, and could rob him at the end. To ‘pity’ him, to forbear to kill him, was a piece of folly, or a mystical belief in the ultimate value-in-itself of pity and generosity even if disastrous in the world of time.’

And a piece of folly it was, indeed, in prudent terms, seeing as Gollum did indeed come to rob and injure him. But it’s a folly born of inherent goodness, and which sees that goodness in each and all. To expect that such behaviour could come to be reciprocated could be considered a fool’s hope. But that’s the kind of behaviour I would expect from anyone who lives in accordance with transcendent norms and truths. Such actions are undertaken without guarantees of success. We can hope that ‘constant battles’ will cease, justice will be served and we will come to live in the peaceable kingdom, but there can be no guarantees that such things will come to pass. We can hope for these things, and we can act out of hope that they will be realised. But we act out of hope, and most of all we act knowing that these things are the right things to do, things that are worth fighting for, and things that we will keep fighting for. And if all were motivated to behave in such a way, the world would be a paradise.

The elven queen Arwen dies alone in the forest. She sacrificed her right to an immortal existence to live a life of love with the man in whom she delighted. For this, she lives in face of the long defeat that all humans face: with mortality and the inevitability of death. But Tolkien is getting at a truth deeper even than this, an ultimate truth beyond mortality, a truth that Tolkien expressed as integral to his Christian faith. 

From a letter to Amy Ronald dated December 15, 1956 (recorded as Letter 195 in The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien) Tolkien explained himself thus: 

‘Actually I am a Christian, and indeed a Roman Catholic, so that I do not expect ‘history’ to be anything but a ‘long defeat’— though it contains (and in legend may contain more clearly and movingly) some samples or glimpses of final victory.’ 

This is a profoundly religious truth grounded in the hope and promise of transcendent justice. We cannot expect to extinguish evil from the world given the fallen nature of humanity, and so must be ever vigilant against its return. This is the ideal philosophy for all those seeking to change the world, a long and laborious undertaking in which hopes are frequently frustrated, efforts unrewarded, and actions for the good turn out bad. It’s treacherous terrain. There’s a great scene in the John Cleese film Clockwise in which Cleese, with every effort he makes to get to the conference on time thwarted by rank bad luck, sits at the side of a country road, with his head in his hands, wailing, ‘it’s not the despair, the despair I can cope with! It’s the hope!!’ Hope can be burdensome, and can become a weight. Certainly if we turn it into a goal. I fundamentally agree with John Finnis when he writes: ‘One attends not merely to character types desirable in the abstract or in isolation, but also to the quality of interaction among persons; and one should not seek to realize some patterned 'end-state' imagined in abstraction from the processes of individual initiative and interaction, processes which are integral to human good and which make the future, let alone its evaluation, incalculable.’ (Finnis 1980: 219/20).

We should avoid abstraction, focus on the quality of interaction among persons. That’s how I read Tolkien’s fellowship and environmentalism earlier, in terms of fostering a proximate awareness and closeness. The high expectations we have for the realisation of hopes can turn quickly into deep despair at their frustration. Acting to achieve a high ideal can be worrisome, raising expectations in the short term that are frequently dashed in the long run. Life is a long haul, a marathon and not a sprint. The road we walk is seldom smooth. But here’s to the little folk who walk that road, and walk with others as they go.

‘The road must be trod, but it will be very hard. And neither strength nor wisdom will carry us far upon it. This quest may be attempted by the weak with as much hope as the strong. Yet such is oft the course of deeds that move the wheels of the world: small hands do them because they must, while the eyes of the great are elsewhere.’

Elrond in The Fellowship of the Ring, The Ring Goes South

In fighting the long defeat, we know we are in for the long haul.

‘When anger arises over stupid, destructive policies, and the pollution of our world tempts me to hopelessness, I remember Tulku's smile on the parapet of Khampagar. And when I catch myself looking for a quick fix of inspiration, or assurances of success, or simply a mood of optimism before doing what needs to be done, I think of him and hear words that he never spoke. Don't wait, just do it. A better opportunity may not come along. Place one stone on top of another. Don't waste your spirit trying to compute your short-term chances of success, because you are in it for the long haul. And it will be a long haul, with inevitable risks and hardships. So just keep on, steady and spunky like a Khampa pony crossing the mountains, because in the long run, it's our perseverance that counts.’

Joanna Macy, Pass It On

The way of short victory is not the right way in the end. Those who fight the long defeat can take the blows and setbacks as they come, and can welcome the smallest of victories, precisely because, however much we may hope to succeed, nothing is guaranteed, and we are prepared to fight without expectations of a final triumph. The idea of fighting a long defeat guards us against becoming intoxicated with our victories and becoming in thrall to the powers that have won us those victories. The theme of the long defeat prepares all those who embark upon changing the world for the better not to despair at the inevitable setbacks experienced along the way, not to expect right to prevail just because it is right, not to let any triumphs won turn into a triumphalism, lest we become the very thing we set out to oppose. Real change, a change that endures, takes a lot of effort over a long period of time. And in that long period of fighting the long defeat, we see ‘glimpses of final victory.’ And I would say that it is here that Tolkien reveals what he considers to be the source of courage, effort and inspiration in fighting the long defeat. We can write of ‘the wonder of Middle-Earth’ and the way that Tolkien invokes wonder. ‘There are a lot of mysteries in the tales that the Professor never explained or left intentionally unexplained, and it is these blank spots that make the stories even more believable, not vice versa: our story-teller was not told everything, after all.’ (https://middleearthreflections.com/2017/06/22/the-wonder-of-middle-earth/)

The long joy – the final victory beyond power politics

Tolkien – Inspiring Wonder and Depicting Moral Virtue
https://livestream.com/txlutheran/HettingerLectureWalsh (​https:​/​​/​livestream.com​/​txlutheran​/​HettingerLectureWalsh​)

Behind this mystery is the power that pervades our world, shapes us, inspires us, incites us to act, and keeps us fighting even against seemingly impossible odds, keeps us trying to snatch victory out of the jaws of inevitable defeat. We do so because our salvation lies in the defeat of Christ on the Cross. 

That active struggle for the things we value and love is a lifelong preparation for the unapologetic embrace of a law and morality that stands outside of time and place. In the very least, the willingness to keep fighting is a tacit affirmation of values and truths that transcend immediate empirical facts. Sustaining Tolkien’s hope is the power that pervades our world, forms our character, inspires our enthusiasm and shapes our actions, and keeps us fight in the teeth of our defeat within the world. For our salvation lies in the defeat of Christ on the Cross. Tolkien’s long defeat, then, is profoundly Christian and is integral to his Catholic faith. That ‘final victory’ which we may glimpse as we fight the long defeat is not a work in progress – it is a work in wonder. 





Christ on the cross points to the Christian renunciation of power which underlies Tolkien’s moral ecology as a spiritual ecology. In ‘The End of Magic’, Sarah E. Hinlicky writes of the ambiguities of magic, (re)enchantment and power.
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2002/02/the-end-of-magic (​https:​/​​/​www.firstthings.com​/​article​/​2002​/​02​/​the-end-of-magic​)

She opens her piece with this passage:

“Do you not see now,” Galadriel says to Frodo when he has espied the lady's Ring, hidden from the sight of others, “wherefore your coming is to us as the footstep of Doom? For if you fail, then we are laid bare to the Enemy. Yet if you succeed, then our power is diminished, and Lothlórien will fade, and the tides of Time will sweep it away.”

‘The end of the Ring bodes well for the future of Middle Earth, unquestionably: the power to conduct unchecked devastation of lands and peoples in pursuit of wicked goals will forever be lost. Sauron, the lidless Eye, will be no better off than an angry orc on an empty stomach. There is no chance that he, or any equal to him, will rise again; evil is no longer concentrated in one deadly place in the land of Mordor.’

However, just as evil is no longer concentrated, so good comes to be diffused. 

‘When the final battle has been fought and the Ring dissolves into the fires of Mount Doom, the Elves will pack their remaining treasures and leave in necessary exile from their homes, Lothlórien and Rivendell and all the rest, bastions of the lovely and the right and the kind. With them will go Gandalf, the wizard, whose skills are no longer required as the Fourth Age dawns. So will Bilbo and Frodo, hobbits indelibly marked by the enchantments of the Ring. Their hard-won wisdom belongs to a world governed by magic, but the fulcrum of power in Middle Earth is shifting. It is no longer in the moral certainties and magical assurances of ages past. Now it is in the morally ambiguous governance of men, who shortly will take center stage in the unfolding drama of the planet. The Elves leave for the Grey Havens of their own volition, but the hobbits will be marginalized, the dwarves swallowed up by the earth, and even Tom Bombadil will be seen no more.’

Again, I can relate these words to Stuart Kauffman’s argument in Reinventing the Sacred, which makes the case for human beings coming to recognise God as an invented symbol and thus taking morality into the own hands. 

‘The vision we have discussed rests morality in our own hands, and rests the restraints on the evil we do with we who cause it.’

Kauffman 2008 ch 19

That sounds liberatory enough. Except that it begs the question of what standards exist by which we may critically discern and evaluate good and bad, right and wrong, once morality is in ‘our own hands.’ This sounds like having our God and eating it too. Once it is eaten, it no longer exists. Morality thus becomes an endless reinvention based on no more than convention, custom, fashion … power. Kauffman’s ethics of immanence in the endlessly creative universe thus points to ethical agency being swallowed up by naturalism.

Hinlicky describes The Lord of the Rings as deeply sad, since all the struggles and adventures in this much-loved world build up to its own abolition. For good reason. 

‘Magic is too much to maintain. In a world of magic, this Ring — any Ring —is a possibility; an ever-present possibility, a continuing threat and temptation to all its inhabitants, whether bloodthirsty Nazgûl or retiring, domestic hobbits. The Ring is an addiction, a demon, a torment, a granter of favors, a precious. It will not go away on its own. The world cannot sustain it; the imagination cannot either. And so the magic must come to an end.

At the core of this self-destruction is the problem of power is at the core of that self-destruction. For Hinlicky, the struggles between power and powerlessness that define the book are ones that Christians know well from their own salvation history. ‘Tolkien's work draws on this heritage, namely in the sacrifice of the Ring, but cannot fully address the problem. Rather, he sets the stage for the expected story of Jesus Christ some thousands of years later. Tolkien does this and succeeds because he knows the limits of his own literary witness.’ Those who lack such a direct relationship to Christianity cannot quite resolve the issues in a satisfactory manner but remain beholden to the death of their own magic.

Hinlicky gives the examples of The Chronicles of Prydain (​https:​/​​/​www.amazon.com​/​Chronicles-Prydain-5-Volumes​/​dp​/​1250000939?tag=firstthings20-20" \t "_blank​) by Lloyd Alexander, and The Dark is Rising by Susan Cooper. The latter comes back to this theme of an ideal world that proceeds to its own abolition, with morality being assumed into ‘our own hands’ as Kauffman’s naturalist immanentist ethic would have it. Remember, says Merriman, it is:

‘altogether your world now. You and all the rest. We have delivered you from evil, but the evil that is inside men is at the last a matter for men to control. The responsibility and hope and the promise are in your hands—your hands and the hands of the children of all men on this earth. The future cannot blame the present, just as the present cannot blame the past. The hope is always here, always alive, but only your fierce caring can fan it into a fire to warm the world.’

For Hinlicky, this speech, delivered at the end of Silver on the Tree, ‘rings hollow.’ After hundreds of pages of pell-mell providence, wizards turning up at the last possible moment, and valuable items snatched away from the Dark in deus-ex-machina tropes, there now comes this urgent appeal to free will and moral agency. It is a ‘last-ditch attempt at a corrective’ on the part of the author: 

‘I do not believe any power can possess the mind of a man or woman, Blod—or whatever name you should really be. I believe in God-given free will, you see. I think nothing is forced on us, except by other people like ourselves. I think our choices are our own. And you are not possessed; therefore, you must be allied to the Dark because you have chosen to be.’

That’s an assertion that is available to Tolkien given his Christian underpinnings. It is a theme integral to the Lord of the Rings. But it is ‘patently untrue’ to the plot of Cooper’s story, since ‘the children have been forced to live up to the destinies delivered to them with an outcome practically assured from the start.’ The undoing of the story, forcing the silly ending, is the obsession with power. ‘The Light wins by a superior show of power, and the High Magic can't make its claim on Bran because love is yet more powerful. But there is little if any content to the power, and that, like magic, is unsettling. The only answer is to let both of them dissipate into a pleasant yarn of the past so that the children, and the rest of the human race, can get on with the hard work of getting along.’

Hinlicky comes next to Philip Pullman and his trilogy entitled His Dark Materials. She criticises his conclusion as predictably and absurdly moralistic. Again, it is a conclusion which points to the apparently emancipatory, but ultimately question begging, assertion of morality coming to be taken out of the realm of abstraction and invested back in human hands:

‘Now that the persecuting church has been subdued and hell emptied out, sentient beings are free, and not just free but obliged, to pursue the Republic of Heaven, Pullman's embarrassingly anticlimactic solution to his trilogy's dilemma. On the last page of the last book, Lyra muses to her daemon Pantalaimon that the Kingdom of Heaven is blessedly finished, so now all the people can devote their energies to this life on this earth rather than worrying about the next. And it entails, she realizes in a convenient flash of insight, being “all those difficult things like cheerful and kind and curious and patient, and we've got to study and think and work hard, all of us, in all our different worlds.” This goes well beyond the philosophical fallacy of deriving an “ought” from an “is.” It's deriving an “ought” from an “isn't.”’

The basic problem with all these books and their moralistic and superficially emancipatory conclusions is the same – the identification of power as the ultimate good. Those who win are the ones with the most power, who are thereby able to define their goals as righteous. Hinlicky’s criticism here flags up precisely the issue which troubles me most about Stuart Kauffman’s argument that in coming to understand God as a human invention, a powerful symbol that humans can put to good use, taking morality back into our own hands – the question of who this ‘we’ and ‘our’ actually is. There is no humanity as such in political terms. Humanity as such is a biological entity. There is no political or social ‘we’ in this sense. Specific human beings live within social relations of a particular character, with power unequally distributed and arranged. Within asymmetrical relations of power, the assumption of morality into human hands will mean that some humans will have the power to be more moral and righteous than others, imposing their self-identity and conception as the one and true one. 

Hinlicky’s criticism goes much deeper than this, however, pointing out the flaws of an ideal and egalitarian distribution of power. The problem, in other words, is not the unequal distribution of power, but power, its pursuit and possession, as such:

‘Power is not forsaken but democratically distributed, and the excesses of power in pursuit of that distribution are never seriously addressed. The disturbing questions that remain are quietly covered over in the name of the brotherhood of all mankind. The knife is broken, and then it's back to the age-old conundrum of how we live together. It is deliciously ironic, though, that a series so determined to disprove original sin is forced at the end to demonstrate its unassailable existence with a concluding ethical plea.’

In other words, even if we could achieve a social order based upon egalitarian social relations and an equal and just distribution of power, the problem of power remains. The basic problem of politics and philosophy of how we live well together is an ethical problem that can only be solved in those terms. The resort to power, its possession and use merely reproduces all the old temptations and tendencies to misuse – it’s an evasion.

‘Fantasy's task and trouble alike is power. The word itself derives from the Greek phantazein, to make visible, and so the genre at its best … brings to light the starkly real problems of the human race, its quest for control over itself and others. The difficulty is that, once having exposed (however brilliantly) the dilemma of power, magic can offer no solution. Magical cures to sinful ills reduce themselves to absurdity. Power arrives to solve one moral dilemma, but only succeeds in creating another. The best magic can do is quench itself and, as the flame dies out, exhort its readers to righteous civilization among peoples and nations. For this reason, fantasy can pose no real threat to true faith (as some have suspected)—it will always exhaust itself long before arriving at religion.’

‘The perpetual weakness of the genre is its inability to maintain the paradox of goodness and power. In fantasy literature, one of the two has to be dispensed with, and in the end it is always power, in the form of magic, because no author will sanely forsake goodness. But the goodness quickly turns to moralism, as far too many fantasies prove. For the characters, the end of the story means the inauguration of the new, moral way of governance, sentimentally appealing; for the readers, it is a dreary return to the same old thing. The impulse to sacrifice power is true and right—shown most meaningfully in the decision (in The Lord of the Rings) to destroy the Ring instead of using it against Sauron—but its aftermath leaves even the best storyteller at a loss.’

Those points reveal Tolkien’s achievement – as a storyteller he is not at a loss, he can renounce power for goodness without degenerating into moralism – because his morality is based upon something substantial. It is for this reason that I have been concerned to establish the Christian ethic at the heart of Tolkien’s moral ecology. That is the foundation, the underpinning, the point and the strength.





Tolkien’s long defeat is profoundly Christian and is integral to his Catholic faith. And in our common experiences and struggles, the events we share together as we fight to defend the places and people we love and value, we get those ‘glimpses of final victory.’ It has nothing to do with notions of progress, improving the world and ourselves, making anything and everything better. That ‘final victory’ which we may glimpse as we fight the long defeat is not a work in progress – it is a work in wonder. It a work that expresses reverence, awe and gratitude for life.

And that victory is the New Jerusalem, a new earth, seeing with new eyes – this ‘final victory’ to which Tolkien refers is the hope that did come guaranteed - God's reign on earth. And that is why we fight the long defeat – not out of calculations self-interest, not to advance ‘progress’ in the service of its idols and their imperatives. Our determination to carry on fighting has nought to do with results, for we are not the ultimate power deciding between success and failure, we are not the source of value and goodness, we are finding our way to that source, and the final victory is coming – that’s why we fight the long defeat. Because that’s where our salvation lies.

The long defeat, then, points to a final victory.

A Long Defeat, A Final Victory
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/jacobs/a-long-defeat-a-final-victory/ (​http:​/​​/​www.theamericanconservative.com​/​jacobs​/​a-long-defeat-a-final-victory​/​​)
By Alan Jacobs 

The Politics of Long Joy by Alan Jacobs
http://www.booksandculture.com/articles/webexclusives/2007/january/070112.html (​http:​/​​/​www.booksandculture.com​/​articles​/​webexclusives​/​2007​/​january​/​070112.html​)

Alan Jacobs suggests that what is called ‘political realism’ is a kind of short-sightedness. 

‘The idea that valid political action requires us to choose from among the most prominent current alternatives — in short, to decide whether you’re going to be a Republican or a Democrat and then work to bring your chosen party more closely in line with your convictions — makes sense if your chief goal is to gain a political victory and to gain it now. Or soon.’ 

I know what Jacobs is getting at here. I have voted my entire life, at every level. I am a member of The Green Party and have participated in a few political campaigns now. And I certainly argue for reconstituting the health of public realm not merely as a condition of human flourishing, but as a dimension of it. I think I qualify as a political animal. But I am cautious of the false divisions of the political world. In this respect, I focus not so much on politics, arguing for one side as against others, as upon the social and moral conditions of doing politics. Divorced from that matrix, the ‘debates’ at the abstract political level have all the character of shadow-boxing, phony divisions that serve to separate people from each other, divide them from the commons, facilitating the triumph of those parasitic on the public good. (see my piece Ending the Politics of Illusion 
http://pcritchley2.wixsite.com/beingandplace/single-post/2017/02/02/Ending-the-Politics-of-Illusion (​http:​/​​/​pcritchley2.wixsite.com​/​beingandplace​/​single-post​/​2017​/​02​/​02​/​Ending-the-Politics-of-Illusion​)). 

I will happily affirm the worth and dignity of politics, and argue that politics is integral to the self-actualisation of human beings as social beings. At the same time, I am clear that politics does not set the boundaries of truth and justice. On the contrary, I argue for an ultimate power and objective standard that transcends the laws, institutions and governments of time and place. It is that standard that informs and orients our actions, and allows us to hold our politics to account. So I set politics in a moral frame that transcends the transitory conflicts and rivalries of parties and politicians and ideologies. I have my own political tribe. I don’t say it has the whole truth at all. In fact, I am often at odds with its members. I seem to have more in common with members of other political tribes. I just think, on reflection, it expresses my views better than the other rival tribes. But it doesn’t exhaust all possibilities – and neither do all the parties put together. There is a more expansive view, both of politics and public life, and of a fulfilment outside of politics. It is called beatitude. That’s my view.

Jacobs puts it this way: ‘My political vision, such as it is, has two components: a long defeat (​http:​/​​/​theamericanscene.com​/​2008​/​10​/​13​/​the-long-defeat​) followed by long joy (​http:​/​​/​www.booksandculture.com​/​articles​/​webexclusives​/​2007​/​january​/​070112.html?paging=off​).’ And that long joy is the promise contained in the prospect of a ‘final victory.’ The phrase ‘long joy’ comes from Stanley Fish writing on Milton’s Paradise Lost. The particular scene is relevant to points made above with respect to how quickly expectations of victory in pursuit of our hopes can be dashed, producing despair. Fish is referring to the part in which Adam gets overly excited at the future the archangel Michael reveals to him, only for the darker realities of the situation standing in the way of this vision to leave him ‘of short joy bereft.’ Michael cautions Adam of the need to curtail his political and social idealism and focus instead on the simple but challenging work of obedience to God. 

That’s the point I make above with respect to fighting the long defeat as a psychological preparation for all those setting out to change the world. Rather than pursue victories and results, and risk an easy and early disappointment that too easily becomes mired in despair, it is better to understand that the road ahead is long and difficult and that hopes are likely to be frustrated. The obedience to God here does not imply a political quietism, but sustains the fight, despite obstacles standing in the way of victory, through the knowledge of a final victory. 

Fish explains the ‘politics’ that Michael recommends to Adam thus: 













Of the loyal angels fighting against Satan's forces, Milton says that ‘each on himself relied’ as though ‘only in his arm the moment lay / Of victory.’ In Fish's words, ‘each acts as if the fate of the world is in his hands, while knowing full well it isn't.

We are not the authors of the world and not the authorities of success – these things are not in our control. The long defeat is one we fight knowing, as Jacobs argues, that our salvation lies in Christ’s Defeat on the Cross, a Defeat that contains the promise of final victory. Tolkien’s hope without guarantees is a biblical wisdom:





The main problem with the dominant form of politics of the present age is its zero-sum character, in which the gain of the one side implies a loss to the other, dividing the political commons up into winners and losers. Jacobs puts this in terms of the ‘culture wars’ paradigm that governs so much Christian action and reflection. Either way, ‘it encourages us to think in terms of trophies rather than testimonies. It tempts us to think too much about whether we’re winning or losing, and too little about the only thing we ultimately control, which is the firmness of our own resolve.’

‘It seems to me that the most important political acts I can perform do not involve siding with one of the existing parties, or even necessarily to vote at all, but to try to bear witness through word and action to this double vision of the earthly city: a long defeat followed by a longer joy.’

I fundamentally agree with Jacobs’ point that we are too prone to think that voting is the definitive political act. ‘That would be true only if politics simply belongs to the government.’ In the ancient conception, politics refers to polites, those interested in public affairs. Politics is the sphere of creative human flourishing. This is a much more expansive conception of the political, referring to more than institutions and laws and the spheres of conventional political activity and embracing a culture and a way of life. The idea of a Politeia transcends the formal political institutional realm and sets political activity within the whole social, political, economic and legal structure of the polis. A politeia is a larger and richer sphere of politics, indicating the association of individuals who come together in their acceptance of the moral, spiritual and cultural standards prescribed by the constitution within which they live. This is politics as a shared space constituted by the everyday acts of ordinary individuals, the little folk. That’s the view of politics and public life to which I subscribe, the wider frame which encompasses the more conventional activities of the ins and the outs, the victors and the vanquished, the rulers and their challengers and rivals. It is the moral and social conditions of politics that matters most to me, the quality of personal interaction, social proximity, relationships and solidary structures and the integration of individuals within communities of practice devoted to common ends. It is constituting the political and ethical commons that ultimately determines the quality of political life. The concern with the winning and monopolising and use of governmental power is but a politics narrowly conceived. I return to Weber’s lesson here: in a world that is conceived as objectively valueless, it makes no difference which side we take and which side should triumph: ‘no matter which group may triumph externally now. Where there is nothing, not only the Kaiser but the proletarian has lost his rights.’ (Weber 1970: 128). 

That’s not my view. I believe the world to be better than this, and I believe that we are better than this, and that our words and deeds make a difference.

‘The world is indeed full of peril, and in it there are many dark places. But still there is much that is fair, and though in all lands love is now mingled with grief, it grows perhaps the greater.’ 

Tolkien, The Fellowship of the Ring

I don’t agree with Weber. On this, I’m with Tolkien, and the Greater Love that moves the universe. But I engage Weber at length, because he expresses a hard truth about the modern world that many prefer not to face. The heat generated by political clashes clearly suggests that people do think in terms of right and wrong, good and bad, and that winning these struggles matters a great deal – and that something more than self- or material interest is at stake. People divide on principles. Weber may dismiss them as ‘big children’, but I think that exhibits a faith in the world as objectively valuable and meaningful, containing truth and justice and the transcendent hope and promise that, one day, if we fight long enough and hard enough, these things will prevail. Just a hunch. But I think the ‘little folk’ get it. In a way that the realists with their power politics and strategies don’t. We can read Weber’s ‘realistic’ concern with national strength and the strong state in this light. Frankly, Weber’s realism directed him down some very sterile and, indeed, delusional and self-destructive channels. I agree with MacIntyre that Weber’s ‘realism’ is actually ideological in rationalising bureaucratic institutions, managerial rule and instrumental relationships as inevitable and permanent features of the social order. 

‘Government itself becomes a hierarchy of bureaucratic managers, and the major justification advanced for the intervention of government in society is the contention that government has resources of competence which most citizens do not possess.’

MacIntyre 1981 ch 7

‘in his insistence that the rationality of adjusting means to ends in the most economical and efficient way is the central task of the bureaucrat and that therefore the appropriate mode of justification of his activity by the bureaucrat lies in the appeal to his (or later her) ability to deploy a body of scientific and above all social scientific knowledge, organized in terms of and understood as comprising a set of universal law-like generalizations, Weber provided the key to much of the modern age.'

Weber was a critic of socialism and democracy, seeing both as culminating in bureaucracy. His realist conception of the state as force rendered him blind to bottom-up, participatory conceptions. Insofar as he valued democracy, he did so as a means for selecting strong leaders. To guard against bureaucratisation, he justified a form of charismatic leadership whereby the ‘demagogue imposes his will on the masses.’ We shouldn’t overlook Weber’s role in the creation of the Weimar constitution, Article 41 of which stipulated the direct election of the president by the people. It is well-known that Weber’s influence here was decisive. We don’t know with anything like the same certainty that Weber was similarly committed to Article 48, which gave the president wide-ranging powers to deal with a crisis situation. Many, such as Mommsen, have argued that Weber’s political interventions prepared the ground for Hitler’s ascent to power.

I have no doubt that Weber would have had nought to do with Hitler. But that’s not the point at issue. The point concerns how we conceive the nature of politics. Weber was a man of power politics, a realist who saw politics in terms of conflict and force and division. And he was concerned with the strength of the state and the nation. It’s not my politics. I like Aristotle’s notion of a society of friends. I like Tolkien’s fellowship. I want to make space for the little folk, as ends in themselves, and not as instruments of some political strategy designed to boost the power of the nation state.

In countering this ‘realist’ – and divisive – conception of politics, Gandalf speaks for all the little folk out there, which is all of us at work as citizens in the everyday public life of the community:





That wasn’t Weber’s view. And it wasn’t Hitler’s view. Tolkien writes disparagingly of ‘the inevitable fate that awaits all attempts to defeat evil power by power.’ (31 July 1947, letter 109). Weber should have listened, and joined with the Hobbits!

That is quite a challenging view, for it calls upon us not to fight fire with fire, and refuse to become like the very thing we are challenging. It calls on us to disempower the megamachine, see its seemingly all-encompassing power as a myth and an illusion that is capable of deflation. Travelling the hard road may call for heroic qualities on our part, but the weak and the small may undertake the journey and meet the challenge. And whilst the great are preoccupied with preserving and extending their power, it is the small hands that are at work in finding the good in the world and bringing it to life.

Tolkien plainly has no time for the ‘men as gods’ thesis, the thesis which holds that through scientific advance, technological innovation, industrial expansion and self-legislating reason, human beings can become masters of the world. Gandalf again, giving voice to words which point to the kind of eco-citizenship the world is crying out for:

‘Yet it is not our part to master all the tides of the world, but to do what is in us for the succour of those years wherein we are set, uprooting the evil in the fields that we know, so that those who live after may have clean earth to till. What weather they shall have is not ours to rule.’

Gandalf in The Return of the King, The Last Debate

In these words, Tolkien reveals the moral dimensions of the environmental crisis. It is not only the exploitative and utilitarian relation to Nature, considered as a stock of passive resources, that is to blame, but the pretensions of mastery and rule. It’s an ancient lesson – human beings are not gods.

‘Elves seldom give unguarded advice, for advice is a dangerous gift, even from the wise to the wise, and all courses may run ill.’

Gildor in The Fellowship of the Ring, Three is Company

Tolkien believed that small hands and deeds could succeed in turning the machine world around, ordinary acts of kindness and love bringing about extraordinary consequences, each of which yield glimpses of final victory. And the source of Tolkien’s faith in the little folk? Tolkien said it plainly enough:

‘The birth, death and resurrection of Jesus means that one day, everything sad will come untrue.’

These words express a belief in a transcendent truth that is ever capable of renewing the goodness of the world. Dante is also hugely impressive when it comes to the ever-resurgent transcendent hope that takes us beyond the despair induced by given facts to deeper and truer realities. 





11 A New Earth
The ‘final victory’ contains a promise of a new earth – the New Jerusalem. We act in the implicit hope that a final victory will come someday. The ‘constant battles’ view of the world may indeed one day come to an end, not in one side coming to triumph over all others in a final battle, but through a return to our senses making all things anew. That’s Christ’s promise. That’s revelation, apocalypse as a new beginning, seeing with new eyes – count how many times ‘I saw’ is used in Revelation. This is Tolkien’s ‘recovery’ as a ‘return and renewal of health.’ It is the ‘regaining of a clear view.’ (J.R.R. Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” in The Tolkien Reader (New York, NY: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1966), 77.)

We live in uncertain times. Fighting the long defeat awakens us to the world within and the world without, bringing us to true worth, the things that matter, the things we value, and what it takes to defend them. In days like these, things are in doubt and under threat:





Many people in the world are feeling great fear and anxiety, for the things they love and value are under threat. Many groups of people feel their rights and dignity to be threatened -  black people, Moslems, LGBTIQ people, Latinos, women … that’s a lot of people, and a lot of fear. The attacks on what are denigrated as secularism, relativism and humanism are rationalised in terms of a defence of transcendent standards and truths against ‘the Left’ and ‘cultural marxism.’ They are, in truth, an explicit attempt to roll back the legislative and cultural advance of hitherto oppressed and marginalised groups, an advance that is caricatured as a privileging of those groups, when it is a mere attempt at some kind of parity. 
I, too, affirm transcendent standards and truths. The transcendent justice and hope I defend is a liberation and salvation that applies to all equally. All will be redeemed. I have frequently sought to restore the connection between natural rights and natural law, emphasising that the rights that apply to each and all are grounded in more than political struggles, legislative fiat and convention. In other words, the defence of the rights and the dignity of the marginalised and oppressed, the case for bringing those on the outside into the inside of our public culture is based on a natural law standard that embraces each and all equally. That’s the case for rights, as against their rollback and refusal by reactionary forces who are big on objective truths and morality in the general, and wretched on their concrete manifestation in the particular. I make that case plainly in terms of transcendent standards. The case against what is called ‘cultural marxism’ is not the rights it grants to various groups, for these rights are implicit in the transcendent case (along with duties and responsibilities, it may be added), but the conventional character of their granting, resting on politics, power relations and law alone.

A new beginning on a new earth involves the recovery of some very old truths. We are seeing divisions in society opening up, the loss of a sense of a shared moral code based on the unity of each and all. Once rights become merely conventional, they become a function of mere power struggles. Within asymmetrical social relations, that is a recipe for dissolving the public and moral community into a sphere of universal antagonism, setting people against each other and sending political divisions to extremes. We are seeing a rise in hate crimes across the western world, with extremist movements targeting minorities in an attempt to divert the anger, fear and frustration that people are feeling from their true causes. The world is evincing an incredible feeling of anxiety in the teeth of the dissolution of old certainties. There is disorientation at the evident failure of public life, anger at evident injustices that go without remedy, despair at the present paralysis, fear of the future, a loss of hope. When we say that climate crisis is an existential crisis, we are clearly pointing to a paradigm failure. We live in an age of collapsing assumptions, with a querying of the old modalities and mentalities which no longer deliver on their promises. In ancient times, the climate crisis would have been taken as signs of something ominous in the sky, a warning of the end of days, even.

The Destruction of the Temple and Signs of the End Times, Luke 21: 5-36

5 Some of his disciples were remarking about how the temple was adorned with beautiful stones and with gifts dedicated to God. But Jesus said, 6 “As for what you see here, the time will come when not one stone will be left on another; every one of them will be thrown down.”
7 “Teacher,” they asked, “when will these things happen? And what will be the sign that they are about to take place?”
8 He replied: “Watch out that you are not deceived. For many will come in my name, claiming, ‘I am he,’ and, ‘The time is near.’ Do not follow them. 9 When you hear of wars and uprisings, do not be frightened. These things must happen first, but the end will not come right away.”
10 Then he said to them: “Nation will rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom. 11There will be great earthquakes, famines and pestilences in various places, and fearful events and great signs from heaven.
12“But before all this, they will seize you and persecute you. They will hand you over to synagogues and put you in prison, and you will be brought before kings and governors, and all on account of my name…
19Stand firm, and you will win life.
20“When you see Jerusalem being surrounded by armies, you will know that its desolation is near… 21There will be great distress in the land and wrath against this people. 
25“There will be signs in the sun, moon and stars. On the earth, nations will be in anguish and perplexity at the roaring and tossing of the sea.26People will faint from terror, apprehensive of what is coming on the world, for the heavenly bodies will be shaken. 27At that time they will see the Son of Man coming in a cloud with power and great glory. 28When these things begin to take place, stand up and lift up your heads, because your redemption is drawing near.”
29He told them this parable: “Look at the fig tree and all the trees. 30When they sprout leaves, you can see for yourselves and know that summer is near. 31Even so, when you see these things happening, you know that the kingdom of God is near.
32“Truly I tell you, this generation will certainly not pass away until all these things have happened. 33Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will never pass away.
34“Be careful, or your hearts will be weighed down with carousing, drunkenness and the anxieties of life, and that day will close on you suddenly like a trap. 35For it will come on all those who live on the face of the whole earth. 36Be always on the watch, and pray that you may be able to escape all that is about to happen, and that you may be able to stand before the Son of Man.”
	

As above, so below, problems in the sky indicate problems on the land, the old order of things will pass away, but the truth will never pass away. That truth contains the promise of a new earth beyond the end of times. I think many people will be tempted to look at the current state of politics, collapsing into a narcissism of petty differences, with the shadow of climate change hanging over all, and conclude that we are indeed facing the end of the world. It feels like the end of all manner of things. To seriously address the crisis in the climate system certainly demands the end of politics- and business-as-usual, as a conscious, voluntary choice on our part, or as in involuntary imposition as a result of natural necessity. It isn’t hard to find evidence supporting the ‘end of the world’ reading, every day brings some news item or other that points to some such conclusion.

Era of ‘Biological Annihilation’ Is Underway, Scientists Warn
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/climate/mass-extinction-animal-species.html?mcubz=2 (​https:​/​​/​www.nytimes.com​/​2017​/​07​/​11​/​climate​/​mass-extinction-animal-species.html?mcubz=2​)

Earth's sixth mass extinction event under way, scientists warn
Researchers talk of ‘biological annihilation’ as study reveals billions of populations of animals have been lost in recent decades
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/10/earths-sixth-mass-extinction-event-already-underway-scientists-warn (​https:​/​​/​www.theguardian.com​/​environment​/​2017​/​jul​/​10​/​earths-sixth-mass-extinction-event-already-underway-scientists-warn​)

‘From the common barn swallow to the exotic giraffe, thousands of animal species are in precipitous decline, a sign that an irreversible era of mass extinction is underway, new research finds.’ The study, Biological annihilation via the ongoing sixth mass extinction signalled by vertebrate population losses and declines (by Gerardo Ceballos, Paul R. Ehrlich, and Rodolfo Dirzo), published in the peer-reviewed journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, calls the current decline in animal populations a ‘global epidemic’ and part of the ‘ongoing sixth mass extinction’ caused in large measure by human destruction of animal habitats. ‘It wouldn’t be ethical right now not to speak in this strong language to call attention to the severity of the problem,’ Ceballos said. (http://m.pnas.org/content/early/2017/07/05/1704949114.full.pdf (​http:​/​​/​m.pnas.org​/​content​/​early​/​2017​/​07​/​05​/​1704949114.full.pdf​)) 

‘There is only one overall solution, and that is to reduce the scale of the human enterprise,’ Ehrlich said. ‘Population growth and increasing consumption among the rich is driving it.’ ‘We’re toxifying the entire planet,’ he said. 

The study describes the massive loss of wildlife a ‘biological annihilation’ that represents a ‘frightening assault on the foundations of human civilisation’. The study concludes: ‘The resulting biological annihilation obviously will have serious ecological, economic and social consequences. Humanity will eventually pay a very high price for the decimation of the only assemblage of life that we know of in the universe.’ The scientists hold out the possibility for action to halt the decline, but admit that the prospects do not look good: ‘All signs point to ever more powerful assaults on biodiversity in the next two decades, painting a dismal picture of the future of life, including human life.’ 

“The serious warning in our paper needs to be heeded because civilisation depends utterly on the plants, animals, and microorganisms of Earth that supply it with essential ecosystem services ranging from crop pollination and protection to supplying food from the sea and maintaining a livable climate,” Ehrlich said. Other ecosystem services include clean air and water.

In this context, the call for a new earth and seeing with new eyes amounts to a call to appreciate the old earth, and seeing that earth with new eyes amounts to a call to seeing it in its true light, and organising our social, institutional and psychological relation to it accordingly. That would indeed amount to a ‘recovery’, the ‘regaining’ of a clear view of life on earth and what it is worth. 

Reducing the scale of the human enterprise can only mean system change. When that human enterprise is organised around an accumulative dynamic that endlessly expands the scale of human activity, we cannot constrain or reduce that drive within limits, because that dynamic can recognise no limits. To preserve human civilisation requires that we recalibrate the means and mechanisms by which civilised life is ensured. 

Isaiah 65.   Behold there is a new heaven and a new earth.

New Heavens and a New Earth, Isaiah 65: 17-25
17 “See, I will create
    new heavens and a new earth.
The former things will not be remembered,
    nor will they come to mind.
 18 But be glad and rejoice forever
    in what I will create,
 for I will create Jerusalem to be a delight
    and its people a joy.
19 I will rejoice over Jerusalem
    and take delight in my people;
the sound of weeping and of crying
    will be heard in it no more.
20 “Never again will there be in it
    an infant who lives but a few days,
    or an old man who does not live out his years;
the one who dies at a hundred
    will be thought a mere child;
the one who fails to reach[a (​https:​/​​/​www.biblegateway.com​/​passage​/​?search=Isaiah+65" \l "fen-NIV-18918a" \o "See footnote a​)] a hundred
    will be considered accursed.
 21 They will build houses and dwell in them;
    they will plant vineyards and eat their fruit.
22 No longer will they build houses and others live in them,
    or plant and others eat.
For as the days of a tree,
    so will be the days of my people;
my chosen ones will long enjoy
    the work of their hands.
23 They will not labor in vain,
    nor will they bear children doomed to misfortune;
 for they will be a people blessed by the Lord,
    they and their descendants with them.
24 Before they call I will answer;
    while they are still speaking I will hear.
25 The wolf and the lamb will feed together,
    and the lion will eat straw like the ox,
    and dust will be the serpent’s food.
 They will neither harm nor destroy
    on all my holy mountain,”
says the Lord.	

Israel had been conquered Jerusalem destroyed, and the people sent away. When they returned, Jerusalem was in such a state that the people were reduced to despair once more. How could they restore the old city to its full splendour? Had God become indifferent to the laments and pleas of the people? The prophet Isaiah’s response is that God is not only listening, but is about to create the world anew. The troubles of the people are about to end, a better world is coming – a world of justice that is abundant in fulfilment and joy. Whatever has been done in history will be undone by the creation of ‘new heavens and a new earth.’ (65: 17). The past with all its suffering and anguish will be forgotten in light of this new world in which all things will be made new. Isaiah’s prophecy contains a powerful statement of social and environmental justice, joy and abundance: no longer will those who labour be divorced from the work of their hands; no longer will a ruling elite appropriate the product of social labour, no longer will those who work be poor and enslaved to the rich who do not work. By extension, people will no longer be divided from each other on account of their race, religion, gender, social position, and so on, and no longer will anyone be made anxious and fearful on account of their particular identity, because all are embraced equally by a universal identity based on the equal relation of each to the one and single transcendent source of the new earth. The wealth of the world will be shared equally, justly and abundantly – nature’s plenitude is ample enough for sufficiency of living. Isaiah’s prophecy says that all that is destructive of life and its free enjoyment by each and all will pass away, all those things we see presented as facts of everyday life on the news each day, the death, destruction, distress, abuse, prejudice, injustice, hatred, robbery, murder and war – all this things will be overcome by being faithful to God’s vision of a world made new. 

In fine, fighting the long defeat entails a commitment to love, compassion, justice, peace and reconciliation through a transcendent hope in God and through actively living this hope in place with others. In fighting ‘without guarantees’ of success, we gain glimpses of the new earth, strengthening our determination to carry on and leading us to give something of ourselves by making common cause with the outcasts and the outsiders, the troubled and the downtrodden. If our faith does not impel us to do that, then we have seriously misunderstood its core principle of an unconditional love unrestrained by calculations of self-interest, prospects of success, action plans, ambitions, timetables, goals, objectives. As we face a climate countdown on the planet, many are asking for a ‘strategy’ or a plan for authoritative bodies – and we the foot-soldiers - to put in action. Questions are asked as to what it is that motivates human beings to take action, as if we need to come up with good reasons that appeal to interests and which meet targets and deliver results. I see God as a song and dance man, not a bureaucrat. As St Paul writes to Timothy: ‘God has not given us a spirit of fear, but of power and of love and of a sound mind.’ (2 Timothy 1:7). So when we are faced with debates as to how to report the scientific facts on climate change without being alarmist, with worries that these facts are so overwhelming as to paralyse action through fear, when we get protracted debates concerning strategy, with calculations for success, with complicated theses concerning human motivations and how we may engineer social action and change, then we know that something essential has gone missing.

The ethic is a simple one, without which none of the above would even happen – we must stand with Jesus, make common cause with others and fight for the new earth. And God has given us the gifts we need in this fight – the power to bring about this long-term transformation for the better, the love for people and places that makes us willing to make the effort to effect change, and the sound mind that enables us to examine reality as it is, discern its problems and devise solutions.

He has told you, O man, what is good;
    and what does the Lord require of you
but to do justice, and to love kindness,
    and to walk humbly with your God.
Micah 6:8

Creation Care, then, entails caring about a climate changing as a result of human activity, and involves an active concern for places and people suffering under its impact. That’s who we are and where we are, involving a view of what we’ve been created to do.





For Derrick Jensen, the religious hope expressed above is not merely a delusion but a dangerous one, one that weds us to the very system and practices bringing about the environmental destruction we are seeking to end. Hopes for a ‘new earth’, for a better world to come, divert us from acting in the here and now to preserve what remains of the good earth we have, 

I’m far from ignoring the ‘other-worldly’ devaluation of the material world, and how this is implicated in environmental destruction. The idea that this earth is not our true home makes it all the easier to see nature as a stock of resources to be used and exploited for private gain, with promises of a better future through economic growth and development to seduce the disinherited masses. The earth is without value in itself, a blank sheet, upon which the all-too-human world of money and power can project its own values. 

That is precisely the view I have contested throughout this piece, hence the deep attention I paid to Max Weber and the ‘disenchantment of the world’, the idea that scientific advance has rendered the world objectively valueless. I have shown that that process of rationalisation has proceeded within capitalist relations that have enclosed the global commons and subjected everything as exploitable resources to monetary valuation. And I have shown that that process is the force behind social dislocation and ecological degradation leading to (self) destruction. I have sought to show that the transcendent ethic is essential in subjecting this destructive process to criticism, and that this ethic is a spring for action and fosters the creation of forms of the common life and communities of resistance, practice, and prefiguration.

I take Jensen to be arguing these same or similar points against hope specifically, and the transcendent ethic by implication. 

In Beyond Hope he writes:

‘But no matter what environmentalists do, our best efforts are insufficient. We’re losing badly, on every front. Those in power are hell-bent on destroying the planet, and most people don’t care.
Frankly, I don’t have much hope. But I think that’s a good thing. Hope is what keeps us chained to the system, the conglomerate of people and ideas and ideals that is causing the destruction of the Earth.
To start, there is the false hope that suddenly somehow the system may inexplicably change. Or technology will save us. Or the Great Mother. Or beings from Alpha Centauri. Or Jesus Christ. Or Santa Claus. All of these false hopes lead to inaction, or at least to ineffectiveness. One reason my mother stayed with my abusive father was that there were no battered women’s shelters in the ’50s and ’60s, but another was her false hope that he would change. False hopes bind us to unlivable situations, and blind us to real possibilities.’

‘Hope is, in fact, a curse, a bane. I say this not only because of the lovely Buddhist saying “Hope and fear chase each other’s tails,” not only because hope leads us away from the present, away from who and where we are right now and toward some imaginary future state. I say this because of what hope is.’

I agree with much of what Jensen writes here, except that his critical comments apply more to the false faith in progress, passive optimism, and a transfer of responsibility for acting to external saviours, not to hope as properly understood. Nothing I have ever written about hope involves a belief that ‘somehow the system may inexplicably change’ or that God or technology or The Green Party or Elvis Presley or anything or anyone will save us outside of the efforts that ‘we the people’ make together. The hope I write of answers the ‘why bother?’ question – things are not as they should be, and the forces for the destruction of all that we know to be good, right and true seem always to be in the ascendant. Why bother? Because we know and we feel what the good, right and the true are, and this awareness is transcendent, in that it lies outside of the facts of social dislocation and ecological degradation that confront us. Jensen knows only too well that the hard facts are against us. He carries on because he knows that whilst the world is going the way of ecological and social destruction, it is not the right way in the end. Knowing that right way is to affirm an ideal that transcends the given facts. And to act on that intimate knowledge is to do the right thing, regardless of calculations of ‘success’ or ‘failure.’ And it is to take responsibility for one’s actions, rather than to transfer it to an external source. I have argued precisely this, and have done so in terms of hope. It all depends on understanding hope properly, and refusing its insipid and safe presentation in the contemporary world. 

Hope is indeed utterly false and misplaced if it binds us to the system via any number of the Faustian bargains that the Megamachine offers to us. I have made that point most emphatically in this piece in relation to power and its temptations. With the best of intentions, we think we can avail ourselves of a little power to bring about a desired end, only to find ourselves entangled and compromised. That’s the dangerous dialectic of being in and against the system, the more we succeed in using power, the more ‘in’ the system we become, the less ‘against’, until in the end we do not possess power at all, it possesses us.

For all these reasons, I agree with Jensen. I just disagree with the way he conceives hope. I have argued against everything that Jensen argues against here, and for the same reasons. Only I do it in the name of transcendent hope as an active hope. 

Joanna Macy writes well with respect to the practice of ‘active hope.’ She makes it crystal clear that hope has nothing to do with optimism. And it has nothing to do with a passive waiting upon false promises from people and systems, for economic growth and consumption to deliver happiness, for technology to fix problems and so on – these are hallmarks of despair, not hope, a placing of faith in external powers. 

As Daniel Christian Wahl argues, ‘we become conscious practitioners of the art of living from our love for others, for humanity and for life — and others around us begin to do the same — we encourage each other to live in active hope and to bring forth a better world together.’ (Wahl 2016). That expression ‘active hope’ comes from Joanna Macy and Chris Johnstone:


"Active Hope is not wishful thinking.
Active Hope is not waiting to be rescued
by the Lone Ranger or by some savior.
Active Hope is waking up to the beauty of life
on whose behalf we can act.
We belong to this world.
The web of life is calling us forth at this time.
We've come a long way and are here to play our part.
With Active Hope we realize that there are adventures in store,
strengths to discover, and comrades to link arms with."

Joanna Macy and Chris Johnstone, Active Hope 2012: 36

Hope does not, therefore, imply a passive waiting upon events or a wishful thinking with respect to promises for the future. Such passivity, involving powerlessness, indicates despair, not hope.

‘Active Hope is a practice. Like tai chi or gardening, it is something we do rather than have. It is a process we can apply to any situation, and it involves three key steps. First, we take a clear view of reality; second, we identify what we hope for in terms of the direction we'd like things to move in or the values we'd like to see expressed; and third, we take steps to move ourselves or our situation in that direction.

Since Active Hope doesn't require our optimism, we can apply it even in areas where we feel hopeless. The guiding impetus is intention; we choose what we aim to bring about, act for, or express. Rather than weighing our chances and proceeding only when we feel hopeful, we focus on our intention and let it be our guide.’

Joanna Macy and Chris Johnstone, Active Hope 2012

Hope does not mean quietism and inaction at all, a reliance upon external saviours. That is indeed a false hope, the kind of thing which characterises the passive citizenship of the modern world, in which people withdraw from public life, cease to join together in common cause, and transfer responsibility for realising their dreams or goals or values to ‘progress’ aka ‘economic growth.’ Jensen up the case against hope in precisely these terms: ‘hope is a longing for a future condition over which you have no agency; it means you are essentially powerless.’ I agree 100% with that rejection of a passive longing that denies creative human agency. But that is not the definition of hope at all – hope is not divorced from agency and action at all, it is a protest against the very condition of alienation that disempowers us and renders us decreative and passive.

Jensen writes in “Beyond Hope”: 

“when we stop hoping for external assistance, when we stop hoping that the awful situation we’re in will somehow resolve itself, when we stop hoping the situation will somehow not get worse, then we are finally free — truly free — to honestly start working to resolve it. I would say that when hope dies, action begins.”

I agree very much with that view – but I don’t make hope my target. That view entails a demand that we stop waiting upon events and external saviours and refuse the bribes and false promises of the Megamachine and take responsibility into our own hands. It’s a call for active revolution, as against what Anton Pannekoek called a ‘passive revolution’, a waiting upon political parties and leaders and strategists to engineer social and political change. I’ve spent my entire life arguing for active revolution and against passive revolution.

Peter Critchley, The Proletarian Public 
https://www.academia.edu/1234571/THE_PROLETARIAN_PUBLIC (​https:​/​​/​www.academia.edu​/​1234571​/​THE_PROLETARIAN_PUBLIC​)

Alasdair MacIntyre describes 'hope as a social virtue' (MacIntyre, Marxism and Christianity, 88), and that perfectly articulates the socially engaged and active sense in which I am presenting hope here. Hope involves prophecy not prediction; that is, it presumes the existence of a free moral will and the possibility of its active exercise. There is nothing passive about hope properly understood, no waiting upon events – whether we believe in the promises of progress to be delivered by ‘economic growth’ or any of the other idols, or in the doom certain to come, because human history is not an external force proceeding outside of the will, actions and choices of creative human agents. Hope possesses a moral basis that is anchored in free will and its exercise. 





‘I do not hope coho salmon survive. I will do whatever it takes to make sure the dominant culture doesn’t drive them extinct. If coho want to leave us because they don’t like how they’re being treated — and who could blame them? — I will say goodbye, and I will miss them, but if they do not want to leave, I will not allow civilization to kill them off.
When we realize the degree of agency we actually do have, we no longer have to “hope” at all. We simply do the work. We make sure salmon survive. We make sure prairie dogs survive. We make sure grizzlies survive. We do whatever it takes.’


This argument rests on a false antithesis – hoping and doing go together. What Jensen is describing here is a situation in which hope and action come apart – and he is right to criticise the destructive effects of that separation. Separation is the key figure of the modern world. Modernity is constituted by a series of alienating separations and dualisms – atomising human beings into discrete egoistic individuals and removing them from the means and mechanisms of common action, disempowering them and rendering them passive and dependent upon external processes and anonymous forces for the satisfaction of their needs. In that situation, human beings despair. And it is that despair that renders them passive. It is not hope that induces people to rely upon the false promises of external forces and saviours – it is despair. What Jensen describes here is not hope at all – it is the despair of modern men and women in search of a soul. Once that it understood, I agree very much with what he writes. It is very much the message I have been delivering in this piece.

And that ‘doing whatever it takes’, to hope in the ruination of all hope, to fight the long defeat with a ‘hope without guarantees’ – because it is the right thing to do, because all that we love and value is at stake, is precisely what I have argued throughout. It really is an argument against blind optimism and misplaced faith, against passive revolution, against transferring responsibility to external saviours, against Faustian bargains with money and power, against sacrificing to false idols. It is an arguing for rejecting the way we have been fractured into countless passive egoistic ‘I’s’ enchained to immediate desire and driven by systemic imperatives, coming instead to constitute ourselves as an active, public ‘we’ working together for human and planetary health and well-being.

Sebastien Carew-Reid of Deep Green Resistance writes here: 





That’s exactly what I’ve been arguing. And it involves hope. It is firmly grounded in a transcendent hope affirming a reality greater than the events and institutions of time and place.

‘To be hopeful in bad times is not just foolishly romantic. It is based on the fact that human history is a history not only of cruelty, but also of compassion, sacrifice, courage, kindness.
What we choose to emphasize in this complex history will determine our lives. If we see only the worst, it destroys our capacity to do something. If we remember those times and places—and there are so many—where people have behaved magnificently, this gives us the energy to act, and at least the possibility of sending this spinning top of a world in a different direction.




Turning the divided “I” into the common “We”
I’ve written a lot on social proximity, friendship and fellowship above. I’m finding the turn of events in American politics not merely worrying, but sad. And not just recently. Jonathan Sacks points to the fact that human beings are social beings, requiring a social or public life in order to fulfil themselves.

‘Don't forget that biologically, we're social animals. We've spent most of our evolutionary history in small groups. We need those face-to-face interactions where we learn the choreography of altruism and where we create those spiritual goods like friendship and trust and loyalty and love that redeem our solitude. When we have too much of the "I" and too little of the "we," we can find ourselves vulnerable, fearful and alone. It was no accident that Sherry Turkle of MIT called the book she wrote on the impact of social media "Alone Together.”

So I think the simplest way of safeguarding the future "you" is to strengthen the future "us" in three dimensions: the us of relationship, the us of identity and the us of responsibility.’

In 2001, Robert Putnam published the book Bowling Alone, which showed how changes in work, family structure, age, suburban life, television, computers, women's roles and other factors are coming to separate Americans from each other, dissolving connections and generating an isolation which threatens to undermine public spirit. We have been bowling alone a long while now. The divisions that are opening and widening are unsustainable. We need to recover the common culture and forge solidarity, commonality and connection at the heart of social relationships. The phrase in the American constitution should show the way here: ‘We the people.’ Constituting the bonds of that ‘we’ is the way we recover solidarity and community essential to a healthy public life. ‘We the people’ affirms clearly and openly that all individuals are united as one in sharing a collective responsibility for our common home and future. That’s how things should be, but that’s not how it is in actual political and social life. 

Jonathan Sacks asks us to think about magical thinking. He points out the extent to which ‘magical thinking has taken over our politics.’ ‘So we say, all you've got to do is elect this strong leader and he or she will solve all our problems for us. Believe me, that is magical thinking. And then we get the extremes: the far right, the far left, the extreme religious and the extreme anti-religious, the far right dreaming of a golden age that never was, the far left dreaming of a utopia that never will be and the religious and anti-religious equally convinced that all it takes is God or the absence of God to save us from ourselves. That, too, is magical thinking, because the only people who will save us from ourselves is we the people, all of us together. And when we do that, and when we move from the politics of me to the politics of all of us together, we rediscover those beautiful, counterintuitive truths: that a nation is strong when it cares for the weak, that it becomes rich when it cares for the poor, it becomes invulnerable when it cares about the vulnerable. That is what makes great nations.’

This kind of magical thinking is a technology of power that makes people and places the instruments of its designs. It is not a true magic at all. It is not the invisible magic that works from within via intimate knowledge of reality. It is not in tune with people and place, it seeks to instrumentalise both to its narrow end.

I strongly agree with Jonathan Sacks when he argues that it is ‘we the people,’ all of us joining together in common cause, that will bring salvation. No external magic can do that, no strong leader or technology or strategy or constitution – only us and the bonds we forge together. And doing that requires that we move from the anti-politics of ‘I, me, mine’ alone, to the authentic politics of all of us together as a common ‘we’. 

‘So here is my simple suggestion. It might just change your life, and it might just help to begin to change the world. Do a search and replace operation on the text of your mind, and wherever you encounter the word "self," substitute the word "other." So instead of self-help, other-help; instead of self-esteem, other-esteem. And if you do that, you will begin to feel the power of what for me is one of the most moving sentences in all of religious literature. "Though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for you are with me." We can face any future without fear so long as we know we will not face it alone.’

We face the future, whatever it may hold, without fear, because we face it together; we are not alone. That is the central message I have sought to convey in terms of fighting the long defeat. And I have shown reasons for thinking that long defeat could end in a final victory and give us a long joy 

This little piece of writing concerns the value of friendship and fellowship, and argues that we can indeed face any future without fear, whatever it brings, because we know we are not alone. Let the future come; if we are together, then we make something good of it. And in the communion with something greater than ourselves  - God, Nature, Society – we can turn the world of divided ‘I’s’ into a collective ‘we’ – through fellowship, trust, loyalty and solidarity – a commonwealth of all beings and bodies. 




12 The Prophetic Voice
I have written throughout not only of transcendent truths, values and norms, but of transcendent hope. I have identified the source of hope, a source that we may draw upon in any circumstance. With this hope we are beyond the categories of optimism and pessimism. Hope is not a passive waiting on circumstances, as though future victory is guaranteed. Tolkien’s hope is a ‘hope without guarantees.’ There is no facile optimism here, justifying a political quietism. Hope is an active hope, not only firmly grounded in reality, but accenting a living in place in communion with others. And it is the very antithesis of political ‘realism’ and power structures – it is all about the humility of the little folk, small hands joining together in fellowship, and turning the world around through acts of love and kindness. We act not with a certainty of success. We do not have that knowledge of the future. And we do not need it. We act with faith and courage in living into a future we do not know and cannot know. We do so without calculating the odds for the success or failure of our actions. 

I want to bring this piece to a conclusion on a prophetic note. At the end of The Prophetic Imagination, Walter Brueggemann adds these words in a postscript. These words demonstrate clearly what I mean when affirming a transcendent standard and source that exists outside of time and place, by which to hold politics, laws and institutions to account, evaluate our moral choices, and determine right and wrong, good and bad – thereby taking us out of the noise of incommensurate values and subjective preferences. Brueggemann expresses the hope that his words on the prophetic imagination should come to inspire concrete practice on the part of people. That, precisely, is my hope too with respect to the ecology of the good I have expressed through Tolkien:

‘In the end, of course, “prophetic imagination” is not simply a “good idea.” It is a concrete practice that is undertaken by real believers who share the conviction of grief and hope that escapes the restraints of dominant culture. It is my hope that my exposition of prophetic imagination is intimately connected to concrete practice and that it may, on occasion, evoke, generate, and authorize such concrete practice.’

‘Fighting the long defeat’ with an active ‘hope without guarantees’ is precisely about the concrete practices we undertake in what Brueggemann calls ‘subcommunities of grief and hope that engage in resistance and alternative.’ In resisting the evils that afflict the world and threaten the future, we come to see ‘glimpses’ of a ‘final victory’ in the alternatives our practice, commitment and associative activity engenders.

At the same time, the prophetic voice continues to be heard, warning those who refuse to listen that by their actions, they are bringing disaster upon the world, upon other people, and ultimately upon themselves. Those who are listening are already engaged in the work of reconnection with others, in any number of ways. They are responding to the voice of hope, fighting to protect the world that we are in danger of losing, as well as to the message of grief with respect to the world we have already lost. Tolkien wrote of ‘regaining the clear view’, and that phrase is apt. The task of the prophet here is to help people to come to their senses – to listen to the warnings and take heed, to see reality as it is, and not to panic or fall into despair, but to rediscover hope and join with others on the right road. It’s about ‘keeping the Divine Vision in time of trouble'. 

'At least for a while,' said Elrond. 'The road must be trod, but it will be very hard. And neither strength nor wisdom will carry us far upon it. This quest may be attempted by the weak with as much hope as the strong. Yet such is oft the course of deeds that move the wheels of the world: small hands do them because they must, while the eyes of the great are elsewhere.’

Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring, II, ii, 283

In ‘keeping the Divine Vision in time of trouble,’ we can reclaim the grounds of hope. As Jonathan Sacks writes in The Politics of Hope: 

The prophetic dream is less about the end of history (the messianic age) than about how to move forward, step by step, towards the good society. It is not a cosmic vision; rather, it is a moral one. Isaiah's 'Seek justice, encourage the oppressed, defend the cause of the fatherless, plead the case of the widow', or Micah's 'What does the Lord require of you but to act justly, love mercy and walk humbly with your God?' are not revolutionary programmes. They are reminders that with every act of kindness we undertake, every virtue we develop, every love we translate into life, we help to mend a fractured world and make society a little more just, a little less abrasive and inhumane. Its most striking expression in time is not the Millennium but the Jubilee: 'Consecrate the fiftieth year and proclaim liberty throughout the land to all its inhabitants. It shall be a jubilee for you, a time when everyone shall return to his inheritance and to his family' (Leviticus 25:10). The Jubilee is not the end of history. It is simply a reminder that wherever we are, we can begin again.’

Sacks argues for a prophetic as against an apocalyptic view of society. ‘Things may be bad; the social fabric may be frayed; but precisely because we are moral beings, we have every reason not to despair.’ Prophecy is not prediction, there is chasmic moral gulf between the two – the former affirms our status as moral beings possessing free will and capable of making choices between alternate courses of action; the latter points to ‘objective’ trends and tendencies and says the course of action is fixed and the choices have been made.

‘Foreseeing the future, the prophets did not predict what would happen, but warned of what might happen in the hope that people would change.’ Sacks therefore makes it clear that ‘there is no inevitable future, and hence no tragedy in the classic sense, because the driving force of human history is not a power beyond our control, but our own responsible decisions. Through free will, we overcome the present. Through repentance and forgiveness we overcome the past. That is the moral basis of hope.’

Jonathan Sacks, Politics of Hope 2000: ch 22 Reclaiming the Ground of Hope

And that points to a society based on the unity of each individual and all individuals, a covenant grounded in solidary ties and exchanges, not a contract between self-interested, self-seeking atoms.

The case against hope and for apocalypse is given in this article – it is the view that hope for something better doesn’t drive change. 

Why Hope Is Dangerous When It Comes to Climate Change: Global warming discussions need apocalyptic thinking.
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/07/why_climate_change_discussions_need_apocalyptic_thinking.html

Of course, hope alone – as in passive waiting upon external events and saviours doesn’t drive change. Change in history is always the result of a combination of material interests and moral/metaphysical motivations. It would help immensely if we could stop having phony debates over false dualisms and antitheses and do some integral thinking and acting. As I argue in Political Ecology, ‘Apocalypse is a wake-up call telling us that it is time to get real.’ I shall quote myself from that piece:


‘Apocalypse is as much about the beginning of times as of the end, it concerns the revelation of a deeper, hidden truth. Etymologically, the Greek word apokalyptein is derived from apo-, meaning 'from', and kalyptein, 'to cover or conceal'. As anyone familiar with the Bible knows, ‘Apocalypse’ is an uncovering, a Revelation. Count how many times the words ‘I saw’ are used in the book of Revelations. ‘Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away… I saw the Holy City, the new Jerusalem’. (Rev 21: 1-2). The old reality passes away when we come to see the true reality for the first time. That is precisely what the crisis in the ecological foundations of life demand from us.’ (Peter Critchley, 2013: The Common Ground: Political Ecology, ‘Apocalypse’, pp38-51).

That is precisely what Tolkien’s ‘regaining the clear view’ entails. And it is certainly not antithetical to hope. Apocalypse is the time for the astonishing explosion of new hope, hope that a new world is coming, a new beginning, a hope that inspires us to act to play our part in seeing the world anew, and bringing about a new Earth.

In Optimism and the Apocalypse Sebastien Carew-Reid of Deep Green Resistance writes: 





The prophetic voice speaks in grief, anger and hope. Grief is appropriate given the loss we are suffering, anger is appropriate given that the destruction being wrought is so wanton, callous and so needless. And to survive the travails to come, we need to pull together, make the commitment to each other and stand together in common cause. And to do that requires that we keep hope alive throughout – because it is that hope which points beyond the hardest of given realities to a true reality beyond the facts of time and place. Carew-Reid’s words ‘to never stop fighting for what we love, to never stop fighting for what is right’ are precisely those of the ‘little folk’ celebrated in the pages of Tolkien. They affirm a natural pacifism and anarchy, the magic that works through the intimate knowledge of the world. That’s the ethic I have presented throughout this piece, paying particular attention to the idea that we are fighting the long environmental defeat because it is the right thing to do, because all that we love and value are on the line. In the process, we join together, express anger/protest, grief and hope and create communities of practice, resistance and prefiguration. The new world is coming. And through our communities, we create that new world within the hollow shell of the old world that is dying.

Humanity has seen civilisations rise and fall many times before. The problem this time, as Jared Diamond argues in Collapse, is that the collapse could be global, not merely local, as in the past. The good news from Diamond is that living in a global community means we can learn from and support one another across the planet. The stakes are high. The prophetic challenge is huge this time around. We may lose big. But we may win big. Alex Steffen predicts that Trump’s trashing of the Paris accord will enrage people and inspire a new, and a more radically ambitious climate movement. 
https://medium.com/@AlexSteffen/paris-time-for-passion-not-despair-43afddedf52f (​https:​/​​/​medium.com​/​@AlexSteffen​/​paris-time-for-passion-not-despair-43afddedf52f​)

This could be the moment ‘when climate politics begins to grow and accelerate.’ ‘And when we come, we’re not going to be coming looking for a few gestures — some subsidies, a little cap-and-trade, a few weak regulations. Nope, this movement’s going to demand the building of a carbon-zero nation, starting now.’

Remember, when we face the future, we are not alone, but in fellowship with others. It is good company to be in. 

“I wish it need not have happened in my time,” said Frodo.
“So do I,” said Gandalf, “and so do all who come to see such times. But that is not for them to decide. All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us.”
Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring, I, ii, 60









13 Concluding Thoughts: Ecological Restoration as a Restorying

The case for an Existential Literary Ecology	

The Road goes ever on and on
Down from the door where it began.
Now far ahead the Road has gone,
And I must follow, if I can,
Pursuing it with eager feet,
Until it joins some larger way
Where many paths and errands meet.
And whither then? I cannot say.

Tolkien, The Fellowship of the Ring, Book I, Chapter 1.





We need new fairy stories and folk tales to guide us out of today’s dark woods, writes Andrew Simms. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/01/fairy-stories-folk-tales-climate-change-refugees (​https:​/​​/​www.theguardian.com​/​commentisfree​/​2017​/​nov​/​01​/​fairy-stories-folk-tales-climate-change-refugees​)

It is in that spirit that that this book has been written, understanding that new stories are fundamentally an ancient theme rooted in the nature of human beings. There’s nothing so new as something so old. And wise.

‘Folk tales emerge in times of upheaval, and from societies’ grimmest moments. They enable us to process and assimilate extreme experience, and deal with our fears. They also, typically, communicate powerful and uncompromising moral narratives. It’s not hard to draw a map of current major global problems with reference to them.’

In these perilous times, argues Simms, progressives must create narratives that shine a light on crises such as climate change. 

I agree very much with what Andrew Simms writes in this article. He bemoans the extent to which an emphasis on facts and policies has replaced the art of storytelling. Human beings are story-telling beings; it is in stories that ‘objective’ facts and realities become humanly significant. I would be cautious of affirming mythologies that are ‘impervious to fact and rational argument,’ as Simms put it, but would instead try to bring Logos and Mythos back together. ‘If you want change to happen, you have to change deeply embedded cultural narratives,’ writes Simms. If you want real and enduring change, you need to set facts and realities within a frame of existential meaning. ‘Progressive politics needs better stories as much as it needs facts and policies. Without them it will flail and flounder.’ Communicating environmental concerns has to be about more than informing heads – it has to go deep into the motivational economy of human beings. ‘Most tales, at some level, present a rite of passage through difficulty to maturity, awareness or resolution. Now, more than ever, it feels like we need new tales to lead us through our troubling times,’ Simms concludes. That’s putting it mildly.

In this book, I have referred to ‘Fairy stories and story-telling,’ ‘the power of story,’ ‘the relation of self to setting,’ ‘Mythopoeia,’ ‘the truth of story-telling,’ ‘Keeping transcendent hope and vision alive under rationalisation,’ ‘Local scale, proximity, the social commons and community resilience.’

Tolkien’s words on ‘fighting the long defeat’ are wonderful and endlessly inspiring – he gives us a ‘hope without guarantees.’ And a long defeat that, in acts of love and kindness and solidarity, gives ‘glimpses of final victory.’ There’s a lot of discussion on what it takes to motivate people to act at the moment. Tolkien’s environmental concern came years before environmentalism as a movement, and is really a Christian stewardship. Many would consider him nostalgic, reactionary even, anti-technological – but he saw the impacts of industrialisation and urbanisation and he didn’t like them; he thought that they drew us away from the right way of relating to each other and to the world. Tolkien argued against such ‘socialism’, against the bureaucratic and planning spirit. The problem is that the tyranny of abstraction that Tolkien feared has now brought us to a situation in which global problems require global solutions, and in arguing strongly for concerted and effective action in that respect, I reveal myself to be a socialist. But I shall keep on arguing that large-scale ambitious projects need to be grounded in small-scale reasoning, communities of practice and love of place – a Hobbit like existence in which the ordinary actions of the little people knit communities together and create the warm and affective bonds between us, making us prepared to act to defend the places and persons we love and value. That’s where the motivation to join together and act comes from. And that’s the source of active hope. 

I have developed these themes at length in this Tolkien piece. It’s a personal statement on my part, urban Hobbit as I am, someone who argues for material sufficiency and virtuous action within right relationships, pottering away in my little community, engaging in solidary exchange, creating bonds and links and solidarities between people, being part of an organic culture in its emergence and persistence. 

We need the facts and figures as well as the right policies and policy framework if we are to act effectively in face of any major problem. My deep concern is to avoid opening a democratic deficit in climate action. We need an environmentalism that gives the ‘little folk’ a material and moral stake. If we are Hobbits at heart, and if we create the Hobbit habits of the heart, then we will have the motivation to act and won’t need too much persuasion by way of facts and figures. In this book I have shown how the protagonists in the Lord of the Rings put everything on the line and throw their whole heart and soul into the struggle. Everything they hold dear is at stake, the people and places they love, everything they hold true and know to be right. They long to preserve these things and are prepared to sacrifice themselves for their protection. That’s real love, not some spurious emotionalism, but something rooted in attachments, connections and loyalties to substantial others and places. 

I have emphasised Tolkien's natural anarchy and pacifism. He's been accused of escapism, and he accepted the charge, he is escapist in the truest sense, he said, in the sense of a man escaping prison. Weber's "iron cage" of a rationalized, routinised, bureaucratised world that proceeds "without regard for persons" rings a bell in this respect. We are all in prison in the world of capitalist modernity, confined within a world of anonymous collective force imposed externally to such an extent we lose the personal touch. We need to escape. I return to Tolkien’s expression of his politics: ‘My political opinions lean more and more to Anarchy (philosophically understood, meaning abolition of control not whiskered men with bombs) … the most improper job of any man, even saints (who at any rate were at least unwilling to take it on), is bossing other men. Not one in a million is fit for it, and least of all those who seek the opportunity… The mediævals were only too right in taking nolo episcopari [I do not want to be bishop] as the best reason a man could give to others for making him a bishop.’ (J.R.R. Tolkien, Letter to his son Christopher, Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, ed. Humphrey Carpenter.) Here’s to a world without bosses and without bossing!

I’m quite proud of this little book, and think the case that it makes for literary ecology is clear and cogent. Reading Andrew Simms’ article has confirmed me in that view. Literary ecology starts from the physical world and then takes us off onto a voyage of discovery that looks further than the objective facts to comprehend their existential meaning with respect to human life. Artistic visions, poetic revelation, musical inspiration, and ideas form an imaginal space that expands the physical world into an imaginal landscape that is continually unfolding through the ongoing exploration of the human-Earth interconnection and interaction. The approach I take highlights the important mediating role that the imagination plays in that interface. The natural sciences are important in delivering facts and yielding knowledge about the physical environment, but human life is about the psychic environment too, and that points to living as a quest to satisfy the thirst for meaning, truth, love and justice. An ecology conceived in such a way integrates the scientific study of biology, climatology, ecosystems within an existential and experiential domain constituted by relationship and interconnection, all of it coming together in the one meaning space.

I wrote this piece in just three weeks. Re-reading, it is evident that I go out on a limb. The critique of modern rationalization is emphatic, possibly giving the impression of a cultural pessimism, and maybe of a reactionary and nostalgic yearning for simpler times. I know those times never were, and I believe that whilst the problems we face in the modern world are great, so too are the tools at our disposal for their solution. The old overarching moral framework cannot be reconstituted along the old lines. I have addressed the criticism of Tolkien as a ‘fascist’, as someone who believed in order, virtue and obligation. I believe in order, virtue and obligation too, and far from seeing such things as incompatible with socialism, I see them as the conditions of any viable social order. Of course, it all depends on how these things are constituted. The problem is not a merely moral or intellectual one, it is social – we need to reconstitute for the form and forms of the common life, create new social relations, identities and solidarities, so that the character formation that is key to virtue ethics at the personal level proceeds hand in hand with the social formation that is key to freedom and justice in public life. The solution to our problems lies not in nostalgic revaluation of past social forms and moral modes but in lines of development which are immanent but repressed within modern social forms. 

Developing that argument is work for another day. If my critique of rationalization has been so relentless and repetitive as to give the impression that I think modernity to be an utterly hopeless terrain with no redeeming features, then I apologise. I had a particular theme for this piece, and stuck to it throughout – the one rule as the tyranny of abstraction through the modern process of rationalization. I think it has emptied the world of meaning, value and purpose and turned human relations into instrumental and calculating affairs centred on self-interest. It is against those I have affirmed a politics of proximity and fellowship based on solidary ties and affective bonds. And based upon reconnection with the sources of life and meaning. And I affirm, against disenchanted man and his disinheriting, disconnecting mind that the world is objectively valuable. 

I will stand very much with what I have written on hope. I know it's right. I don’t need to debate it with people who load the terms and definitions, and misidentify the very thing to be criticised. Much of what those who reject ‘hope’ are criticising is not hope at all, but despair. Passively waiting upon false promises made by any number of modern idols and external saviours is not hope at all, it is the very definition of despair. I know what hope is. It isn’t naïve and deluded at all. It requires guts, faith and courage. And it demands dedicated action, often against objective facts that tell us we are beaten. Reason and realism frequently tell us to give in; hope tells us to carry on. I've seen hope work in situations that seemed objectively hopeless. I’ve been a part of campaigns for justice that had the entire establishment against a small group of people – and seen those campaigns win. I’ll stand on hope. And justice. And the ‘little people’, the ‘ordinary’ people who, with the root of the matter in them, will reach within themselves and find the extraordinary capacities that take hopeless causes and turn them into final victories. 

I'll stand, too, on the demand to make objective reality and the facts about it meaningful in a subjective or personal sense by developing an existential focus via art, aesthetics and ethics. Let’s call it an imaginal moral ecology. My concern is to give the material facts of the environmental crisis an existential focus within a humanly meaningful frame of reference and action. So I affirm the power of literary ecology, too, in fostering the ecological vision and imagination. I'll certainly stand on the power of words, too, as in Bachelard’s confession to be a dreamer of written words. I'll make that confession too. Bachelard loved writing, and loved seeing how his words would live and create worlds of their own, enriching the world we live in. I come from a family of builders. I build with words. And I am happy to stand on Heidegger's linking of thinking and building in dwelling. I loved the time I spent in the Black Forest, and can see why so many fairy-stories originated from there. I came home with a few tales of my own, all very real, and no less mythical and legendary for that. I can picture Heidegger in his days in the Black Forest, I can see him engaging in a little Elvic enchantment. I’ll stand by Heidegger's 'dwelling in the fourfold,' and by the call for a new spirituality. Only a god can still save us, he said towards the end of his life …. Only we can save ourselves by resisting the dis-godding of the world and coming finally to answer the question as to where value lies. Man may be the measurer of all things, but he is not the measure of all things.


And I'll stand on the prophetic voice, too - there's a reason I repeat myself endlessly in a time when people are deaf not only to fact but also to value. Climate denial comes in many forms ... I'm prepared to strike out alone if need be. How real do people want it? 

I'm a curious mix of ingredients. I like what Becca Segall Tarnas writes on the trickster, as well her work in general, and I have quoted her extensively throughout. I added a photograph of me in The Dragon Snug at Cae Mabon, Snowdonia for a reason. There's a point to it. God/Nature runs throughout. I argue against the dis-godding of the world. It's there in the Earth Rites passage I quote. But I shall make it even more clear. ‘Fairy tales do not tell the children the dragons exist. Children already know that dragons exist. Fairy tales tell children the dragons can be killed.’ (G.K. Chesterton). Well, I have soft spot for dragons and, with Montaigne, will continue to light a candle for both St Michael and his dragon. The point is that tales are true in the deepest psychic and moral sense, telling us not merely that the demons that plague us exist, but that we have the resources within us to beat them. There are no dragons in nature, those external monsters are merely our inner demons. I believe in inherent goodness, and keep the inner Puff alive, so that the world is always ancient, ever young, ever renewing itself.

As to what this ‘god’ is that can still save us … The key questions are these: is the world objectively valueless? What are the forces of disenchantment that say it is? Where does value lie? Is there such a thing as inherent worth? What is worth, with respect to 'woethership'? What gods or idols do we worship? To empty the world of value, meaning, purpose and goodness and then think that there are technical and engineering workarounds that allow us evade these questions is the plainest delusion. That expresses the disenchanted mindset that has brought us to this, in the name of ‘human progress.’ 

Are we co-creators at work in a ceaselessly creative universe? That’s Stuart Kauffman’s appealing view in Reinventing the Sacred. If so, what is to check the co-creators asserting an autonomy over against the universe they are supposed to be partnering with? Kauffman argues for human beings taking morality into their own hands. I say humanity has already done this, and a lot more appropriating besides. Humans are tyrannised by their own creations, and stand in need of a standard of justice that lies outside of them and their power relations. Against co-creation, Tolkien’s notion of humans as engaging in sub-creative activity under the divine imagination strikes me as more balanced. It contains a principle of limitation. And it places us within the Greater Love.

As the title of Keith Breen's excellent book puts it, we live "under Weber's shadow." So I engage with Weber tirelessly. He warned of humans being confined within the "iron cage" of a rationalised modernity until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. He warned of a capitalist economy that determines our lives with "irresistible force." He warned of a world which proceeds "without regard for persons." And he warned: "Not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness." An objectively valueless world, with a human world built in its meaningless image, systemic and institutional imperatives overriding the moral law within, planetary boundaries without, a world without soul, without romance, without imagination, ‘without regard for persons.’ This captures the pathos of means and ends that characterises the modern world, with the enlargement of means to become ends in themselves serving to bring about the diminution of meaning. The 'disenchantment of the world' indeed, and I have sought to expand the meaning-space throughout, as a condition of ever coming to respond to what the facts of our climate crisis are trying to tell us (clue, the science needs some psychic and moral help.) 

The term Weber employed came from Friedrich Schiller and what he called "die Entgotterung der Nature" - the de-divinization or dis-godding of nature. I don't care for it. It is a disenchantment that denied Nature its inherent value, meaning and goodness, and made it available to humans to employ their technology to selfish ends with complete indifference to the natural environment and the beings and bodies that populate it. I'm for re-enchantment and re-godding. I have no faith in 'men as gods.' This divinizing is thoroughly dehumanizing. From Dante to Blake to Nietzsche to Mumford to Heidegger to Ellul to Roszak, there is a long line of sensitive souls who openly condemned the mechanizing process as utterly infernal. 

In the 2016 Blake Society lecture on William Blake, Iain McGilchrist compares Blake to Nietzsche: 'both were rightly of the view that machines were and are infernal. Blake was appalled by the treatment of man as a machine.' 'A machine is not a man, or a work of art', Blake wrote, 'it is destructive of humanity and art.' As Erich Fromm writes in The Sane Society:

‘Furthermore, ethics, whether it is that of monotheistic religion or that of secular humanism, is based on the principle that no institution and no thing is higher than any human individual; that the aim of life is to unfold man's love and reason and that every other human activity has to be subordinated to this aim. How then can ethics be a significant part of a life in which the individual becomes an automaton, in which he serves the big It? Furthermore, how can conscience develop when the principle of life is conformity?’

Fromm, The Sane Society 1990 ch 5

Men as gods mechanising the human spirit and unleashing hell on earth stands in the way of the truly human society. As I have made clear, Tolkien loathed this mechanisation of life too:

"Yet it is not our part to master all the tides of the world, but to do what is in us for the succour of those years wherein we are set, uprooting the evil in the fields that we know, so that those who live after may have clean earth to till. What weather they shall have is not ours to rule." 

Gandalf in The Return of the King, The Last Debate

We may live under the shadow of an alien rationalization – but there is a Greater Love that enfolds, nourishes and carries us. And it is that Love that can still save us, if we can start to see from behind the physical eyes and engage in the work of re-connection, re-enchantment and ‘recovery’ – and thereby come to regain the ‘clear view.’





'If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, Infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks of his cavern.'

William Blake,The Marriage of Heaven and Hell

As for the road that goes ever on and on, our eager feet may grow weary in pursuit, but we carry on. That’s the journey from the first to the second version in The Lord of the Rings. (Book I, Chapter 1, Book 1, Chapter 3). The third and final version of the song appears in The Return of the King, Book VI, Chapter 6, murmured by Bilbo, who is now a sleepy old hobbit. 

The Road goes ever on and on
Out from the door where it began.
Now far ahead the Road has gone, 
Let others follow it who can!

Let them a journey new begin,
But I at last with weary feet
Will turn towards the lighted inn,
My evening-rest and sleep to meet. 

Earlier, when leaving the Shire, Frodo tells the other hobbits Bilbo's thoughts on 'The Road': "He used often to say there was only one Road; that it was like a great river: its springs were at every doorstep, and every path was its tributary. 'It's a dangerous business, Frodo, going out of your door,' he used to say. 'You step onto the Road, and if you don't keep your feet, there is no knowing where you might be swept off to.'".

What makes a good story is a purpose and a point, an end. The peerless poet-philosopher Dante Alighieri knew more than anyone the power of story to instruct, inspire, motivate, and direct people. He understood human beings to be story-telling animals impelled by their highest desire to the good. In his Comedy, Dante expressed his unwavering belief in ultimate good. Dante compares the soul on its way back to God to a traveller:

“who takes a road along which he has never gone before and thinks that every house he sees in the distance is an inn and, finding he is mistaken, fixes his eyes trustfully on another and so on from house to house until he arrives at the inn he is seeking.”

We travel through life in pursuit of the higher or greater desire, but may be led astray because 'the path is lost in error like the roads on earth' (questo cammino siperdeper errore come le strade della terra):

“[I]n human life there are diverse paths, one of which above all is the right road, and another the wrong, and certain other paths which are more or less wrong or right.”

Il Convivio, Section IV, Chapter 12.

The image of the right path that we lose, but may yet return to, goes back to the Bible, of course, and is employed to great effect by Boethius. Dante uses the image most memorably in the first canto of Inferno:
 
Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita mi ritrovai in una selva oscura che la diritta via era smarrita.

In the middle of our path in life
I woke to find myself in a dark wood
for the way which leads us straight was lost to sight?
 
In Il Convivio, Dante describes the soul as entering upon new, untrodden terrain in life’s journey (nel nuovo e mat nonfatto cammino di questa vita). He speaks, too, of the young man 'who enters into the wrong forest of this life and cannot keep to the right path unless it is pointed out to him by his elders.’ (Il Convivio, Section IV, Chapter 24.) There is, then, a right path, and the power and efficacy of story-telling lies in its moral and instructive purpose, educating desire and guiding it to its true end. In separating the Mythos and the Logos, discarding the former in thinking the latter alone is sufficient, we have lost the psychic and emotional apparatus by which we could comprehend and regulate the life forces that shape humanity within. We have lost the capacity to inspire and motivate at the level of the psyche, informing heads whilst starving the heart. We have lost our way.
 
"Because the right way was lost." That those words are not merely expressions of Dante’s personal crisis but apply to all of us is made clear by Dante’s use of the collective plural.
 
Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vital
Mi ritrovai per una selva oscuraj
Che la diritta via era smarrita
 
Midway along the journey of our life
I found myself within a gloomy wood
For the right pathway had been lost to view.

Note well the shift in pronouns, the combination of the plural possessive – our life – and the first person singular – I found myself. Dante’s predicament is ours too. We are in life’s journey together. We share a common story with Dante, and Dante is sharing his experience with us. Not Dante alone, but all of us suffer as a result of departing from the right road:
 
se'l mondo presente disvia in voi e la cagione;
 
"If the present world goes off the road — in you (you all) is the cause" (Purg. xvi, 82-83).
 
As I say above, the demons to be beaten arise from within ourselves, and our failure to order love and direct desire to the proper object. The world is good. We need to enjoy it, not consume it out of desire for fame, fortune and mere transitory pleasures.
 
As Rousseau cautioned in his Social Contract:
 
“The general will is always right, but the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened. It has to be to made to see objects as they are, sometimes as they ought to appear to it, to show it the good road it is looking for and to protect it from the seduction of particular wills.”

Rousseau understood well the complications of this question, producing the seemingly paradoxical formulation of ‘the general will’ as a resolution. The pedants of philosophy will point out that will is particular, and ask how it could be general? Rousseau was as analytical and logical as any great philosopher. He was a great philosopher himself, one of the greatest in fact. Kant called him ‘the Newton of the moral world’ for very good reason. Rousseau understood that the true and the good cannot just be given, they have to be willed if they are to be acted upon and realized, which is surely the point of story-telling as moral, educative, directive … That’s what stories are about in Dante and Tolkien, the apprehension of moral and psychic truth, and the affirmation that such things are truly real, and not merely ‘made-up.’
 
Rousseau intended this as an invitation to an education in civic virtue and fraternal love among citizens. So, too, did Dante for that matter.
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 If we shadows have offended,
 Think but this, and all is mended—
 That you have but slumbered here
 While these visions did appear.
 And this weak and idle theme,
 No more yielding but a dream,
 Gentles, do not reprehend.
 If you pardon, we will mend.
 And, as I am an honest Puck,
 If we have unearnèd luck
 Now to ’scape the serpent’s tongue,
 We will make amends ere long.
 Else the Puck a liar call.
 So good night unto you all.
 Give me your hands if we be friends,
 And Robin shall restore amends.
-	Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, scene i
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